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gent views of ethics in fact and science

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

VOL. I.

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THE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

ILLUSTRATED WITH
ESSAYS AND NOTES.


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SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND COMPLETED.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.



THE AUTHOR of this work is conscious that in many places it requires re-writing. He would have wished to re-cast especially many parts of the 'Essays,' and to introduce into them the results of fresh reading and thought. But official duties in India have precluded him from attempting such a task, and have obliged him to be content with a bare completion of his commentary, by the addition of notes (such as they are) upon the last four books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

For a revision of the work in general, but more especially of the Notes, the Author is indebted to the accomplished scholarship and kind care of John Purves Esq., B. A., of Balliol College, Oxford. Several minor alterations have been introduced by Mr. Purves, with the Author's entire concurrence, into the translations and notes.

The same causes which have prevented the re-writing of the 'Essays,' have also prevented the fulfilment of certain promises formerly made to the public ;

as, for instance, of a translation of the entire *Ethics* of Aristotle. Indexes, however, to the matter contained in the Essays and Notes have been added by Mr. Purves. And the Verbal Index to the Nicomachean text, which appeared in Dr. Cardwell's edition, has been here reprinted, with the permission of the Delegates of the Oxford University Press. An essay on the 'Ancient Stoics,' which was contributed by the Author to the volume of 'Oxford Essays' for 1858, has now been introduced among essays which endeavour to treat not only of the Aristotelian moral system, but also of its surroundings.

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ESSAY I.

On the Genuineness of the Nicomachean Ethics, and on the Mode of their Composition.

IN studying the philosophy of Aristotle, we encounter at the outset a very difficult question with regard to the genuineness, the form, and the literary character of the works in which that philosophy is contained. The question, in its full scope and real earnestness, is one of recent origin, though sceptical theories concerning the text of Aristotle have been at various times mooted, as, for instance, by Strabo and by Patricius. We stand now in a very different position with regard to Aristotle from that occupied by the middle ages, or even by the scholars of the Renaissance. Once the whole body of what are called the writings of Aristotle were received with equal reverence, though not by any means equally studied. A sort of dogmatic completeness, and almost a verbal nicety of finish was thought to pervade the whole; and we accordingly find Thomas Aquinas¹ discussing why it was that Aristotle makes an apology in his *Ethics* for attacking the theories of Plato, while in the *Metaphysics* he attacks them without any such apology. Aquinas decides the reason to have been that in a treatise on morals due attention to good manners was particularly necessary. Such criticism appears ludicrous to our times. Our

¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentarii in Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, upon l. vi., 'Ideo autem potius hic hoc dicit quam in aliis libris, in quibus opinionem Platonis improbat, quia impro-

bare opinionem amici non est contra veritatem, quæ quæritur principaliter in aliis speculativis. Est autem contra bonos mores; de quibus principaliter agitur in hoc libro.'

eyes have become more and more opened to the incomplete and fragmentary character of Aristotle's remains. In what are called his works we know that we have a considerable nucleus of the actual writing of Aristotle himself. Also we have a concretion of Peripatetic philosophy, some of it nearly contemporary with Aristotle, other parts far later. Also, even in books that are most essentially genuine, we can recognise the hand of the editor; we can trace what is most probably posthumous recension, joinings added of parts before dis-united, references introduced, completion as far as possible, or the semblance of completion, given to what was really in itself left incomplete.

Almost all we know of the life of Aristotle is contained in a quotation made by Diogenes Laertius (v. i. 9) from the chronology (*Χρονικὰ*) of Apollodorus. This Apollodorus is praised by Niebuhr as a trustworthy writer; he appears to have lived about 140 B.C. He gives the following dates of the leading events in the life of Aristotle: 'That he was born, Olymp. 99. 1 (B.C. 383). That he met Plato and spent 20 years in his company, 17 years of them continuously. That he came to Mytilene Ol. 108. 4 (B.C. 344). That in the first year after the death of Plato, he went to Hermeas and abode with him 3 years. That he came to Philip, Ol. 109. 2 (B.C. 342), when Alexander was 15 years old. That he came to Athens, Ol. 111. 2 (B.C. 334). That he held his school (*σχολάσαι*) in the Lyceum 13 years, and then went to Chalcis, Ol. 114. 3 (B.C. 321), where he died of a disease, about 63 years old.' The different parts of this sketch have been filled up in most cases with little certainty. With regard to Aristotle's career as an author, no information has reached us, but the general opinion has been that his works were composed during his second stay at Athens,—that is, while he was holding his school in the Lyceum, during the last 13 years of his life.

Internal evidence, on which we have chiefly to rely, is on the whole in favour of this supposition, as the works that have come to us belong to *one* period of the philosopher's mind; his system and terminology, peculiar as it is, appears throughout fully formed. It is only in minute points that a development of ideas can be traced. Another argument for the same hypothesis is, the unfinished character of almost everything that bears the name of Aristotle. All is characterized by vastness of conception, but also by a falling short in the attainment of what had been designed. Connected with this torso-like appearance of the philosophy as a whole, there is so great an absence of art in many portions of the works of Aristotle, as to have given rise to the opinion that we possess not his own writings, but only the notes of his disciples. This theory was first promulgated by Julius Scaliger about *some* of the works of Aristotle, but subsequently has been more or less vaguely entertained about his works in general, and especially about the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

'The waters' are said to be 'from the exhaustless spring of Aristotle, but the pitchers' to have been 'supplied by others.'² The truth or falsehood of this theory seems to be a question of degree. There is no denying that the notes or *compendia* of Peripatetic disciples, more or less dressed up, do go to form part of the bulk of the Aristotelian works; for instance, we shall see that the *Eudemian Ethics* were a composition of this character. Also, we no doubt owe the redaction of many of Aristotle's writings to the care of his disciples. But beyond this, the theory must not be extended. The unfinished style

² Julius Scaliger, in Arist. *de Plantis*, i. p. 11, 'Cujusmodi commentationes a discipulis exceptas ejus nomine circumferri videtis. Etenim qui Commentarii contra Zenonem et

Xenophanem tanquam ab illo conscripti leguntur, illius quidem inexhausti fontis perennes aquas sapiunt, alveos tamen aliorum esse manifestum est.'

of the writing, the looseness or inaccuracy of quotations, the apparent familiarity of the allusions, and the occasional mention of 'hearers,' must not lead us to conclude in a sweeping manner that we have only notes from lectures. The scientific depth and subtlety of the discussions in many parts, and their tentative rather than conclusive attitude, is incompatible with this assumption. Above all, we cannot blind our eyes to the intense individuality which seems to mark the style of Aristotle, which is no mere reproduction, but the words and the sentences of the very man himself. Even his obscurity is characteristic, and differs from the obscurity of a disciple misunderstanding and garbling the philosophy of his master. Nor must too much stress be laid on the word ἀκροᾶσθαι. Partly, from a sort of ancient tradition, it corresponded to our conception of reading; partly (as in the name φυσικαὶ ἀκροῦσεις) it was used to denote more intimate and systematic study of a subject, as opposed to popular knowledge. Partly, Aristotle in making use of it, had in view his own oral instructions in the gardens round the temple of the Lycean Apollo. But it must not be supposed that it would be an entire account of his works to say that they are notes *for* lectures any more than notes *from* lectures. Aristotle was designing to complete the whole sphere of knowledge; he was absorbed in his zeal for the accumulation of scientific results and the perfection of scientific form, about artistic form and literary structure he was indifferent, and death arrested his manifold beginnings. His philosophy, which was to cover the world, was springing and growing up all at once, and nothing perfect. Let us now picture to ourselves a set of philosophical treatises—all elaborately conceived, but all more or less incomplete, to have been, subsequently to the death of their author, we cannot tell how soon or how simultaneously—brought forth, perhaps out of disjointed and

separately existing memoranda, and put together for publication, and we have perhaps the most adequate notion that can be formed of the genuine parts of the so-called works of Aristotle. This conception perfectly agrees with the testimony of Cicero,³ who speaks, on the one hand, of certain exoteric dialogues composed by Aristotle; on the other hand, of the 'Commentaries' which he 'left behind him.' The exoteric dialogues appear to have been a few works in a popular vein of thought, finished in point of style, and exhibiting what Cicero praised as a 'golden stream' of diction. These may in all probability have been earlier compositions, suggested by the example of Plato. The 'Commentaries' have alone descended to us: harsh and incomplete in style, unequal in thought, sometimes obscure from brevity, at other times prolix and self-repeating, devoid of all artistic treatment, setting at nought the restrictions of grammar—these yet, in their rude and prematurely arrested form, outside which we can often discern the patchwork of other hands, contain the philosophy and the very words of Aristotle, and have more influenced the thought of the world than any other uninspired works.

We have now taken the first step towards a proper point of view with regard to the literary history of the works of Aristotle. The next step will be to convince ourselves of the uncertain character of all ancient testimony on the subject, so as to feel that internal evidence and criticism of the works themselves can be our only sure guide. Let us advert then to the celebrated story of the Fate of the Writings of Aristotle, given first by Strabo,⁴ and afterward repeated by Plutarch. Strabo relates (*à propos* of his account of Scepsis, a town in

³ *De Finibus*, v. 5. *Academ. Prior.*
II. xxxviii. 119. See *infra*, Appendix B.

⁴ *Strabo*, xiii. I, 418.

the Troas) that the library and MSS. of Aristotle, being in the possession of Theophrastus, were by him bequeathed to one Neleus of Scepsis, whose heirs, to elude the book-collecting zeal of the Kings of Pergamus, concealed these treasures in a vault. There they remained for ages, till finally, corrupted with damp and worms, they were sold for a considerable sum to one Apellicon of Teos. By him they were brought to Athens, where he caused copies of them to be taken, himself filling up on conjecture the gaps in the text, not however happily, for he was more of a book-collector than a philosopher. Soon after the death of Apellicon, Athens was taken by Sulla, and this library was seized and brought by him to Rome. There Tyrannio, the grammarian, obtained permission to arrange the MSS. At the same time the booksellers had numerous copies made by very careless transcribers. Hence it came about (says Strabo) that the earlier Peripatetics, being deprived of all the really philosophic works of Aristotle, were reduced to mere rhetorical commonplaces in their philosophizing; and the later ones, when the books came again to light, were generally compelled to resort to a conjectural interpretation of them, owing to their corrupt condition.

The same story is repeated by Plutarch,⁵ who probably took it from Strabo, and who adds to it the further statements, that Tyrannio put almost the entire MSS. into shape; that Andronicus of Rhodes, getting numerous transcripts made, gave publicity to a generally-received text of Aristotle; finally, that it was for no want of personal zeal or ability, but from the loss of the original writings, that the Peripatetic school had previously declined.

This curious history, if literally true, would represent to

⁵ Plutarch, *Vit. Sullæ*, c. 26.

us the text of Aristotle as absolutely corrupt, frequent gaps having been caused by physical circumstances, and these so unskilfully filled up as to destroy the sense. It would represent to us that we possessed the works of Aristotle as a whole, but that they were defective in the parts. Internal evidence does not bear out this account. An examination of the works as we possess them does not show them to be in the condition which Strabo would imply. The *Characters* of Theophrastus indeed, and parts of the *Eudemian Ethics*, exhibit this kind of corruption, but not the works of Aristotle in general. The touches of an editorial hand often appear, but not as supplying lacunæ. There is no trace of the conjectures of Apellicon. When we turn to external evidence, we find that there must have been some ground for the narrative of Strabo. Strabo was the scholar of Tyrannio and the friend of Andronicus (whose share, however, in the business he does not mention); he therefore had the history of Sulla's MSS. on the best authority. The adventures recorded may have happened to the autographs, or some of them, of Aristotle and Theophrastus. But restrictedly to these. Strabo deserts history for imagination when he says that Aristotle's philosophical writings were lost to the earlier Peripatetics. Investigations tend to prove, as far as anything can be proved about so dark a period, that all the important works of Aristotle were known to the world during the 230 years which elapsed between the death of Aristotle and the capture of Athens by Sulla. Many of these works were made the basis of fresh treatises and commentaries by his immediate followers, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Phantias, &c. It seems certain that a mass of writings under his name, some genuine, others spurious, were purchased by Ptolemy Philadelphus for the Alexandrian library. His logical works must have been known to the Stoics, who made a development of his principles. The

allusions to him in Cicero⁶ show an amusing mixture of knowledge and ignorance. They show that Cicero himself had no scientific acquaintance with Aristotle's philosophy—indeed that he possessed the most superficial and external knowledge of the subject. But he speaks as if claiming to know the philosophical books, and as if there was a general acquaintance with them existing among the Greek rhetoricians and educated Romans of the day. His way of speaking is quite incompatible with Strabo's account of the recovery of these books. Nor do the earlier Greek commentators mention it. Boethius alone speaks of Andronicus as 'exactum diligentemque Aristotelis librorum et judicem et repertorem.'

On the whole then this famous story contributes hardly anything to our knowledge of the Aristotelian text, except perhaps the following two points. (1) It tells us of a recension by Tyrannio and Andronicus. This accordingly stands over against the Alexandrian copies, though to which of these two families our present edition of the text belongs, it seems impossible to pronounce. (2) It shows us how entire was the ignorance of Strabo as to the literature of philosophy. He speaks without knowledge and without criticism of the isolated fact that had come beneath his notice. We see with

⁶ As for instance in the *Topics*, I. 1-3. Trebatius had seen the *Topics* of Aristotle in Cicero's library at the Tusculan Villa, and had asked him what the book contained. Cicero, not to avoid trouble (as he says), but thinking it more for the interest of Trebatius, advises him to read the work himself, or else consult a certain learned rhetorician. Trebatius, however, was repelled by the obscurity of the writing, and the rhetorician, when consulted, said 'he knew nothing about Aristotle.' Cicero thinks this

not to be wondered at, since even the philosophers hardly knew anything about him, though they 'ought to have been attracted by the incredible flow and sweetness of the diction.' Cicero now proceeds to give Trebatius an account of the *Topics* of Aristotle, but he evidently is only acquainted with the first few pages of them. In *De Fin.* v. 5, where he quotes the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he shows that he has never read them, for he praises them as making happiness independent of good fortune.

how great caution we have to receive each separate testimony coming to us from periods so uncritical.

Another instance of the negligence of antiquity is to be found in the catalogue of the works of Aristotle, given by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of the Philosophers* (v. i. 22). This catalogue exhibits at first sight an immense discrepancy from the edition of Aristotle to which we are accustomed. We miss the names of the great works, such as the *Physical Lectures*, the *Ethics*, the *Metaphysics*. Instead of these, we find a mass of apparently small and separate treatises enumerated, often apparently popular works in the form of dialogues, and even where more scientific works are specified, there seems often to be rather a coincidence of subject than an identity of the books with those which we possess. By a rough computation, it appears probable that the list of Diogenes would correspond to a mass of writings about four times the size of what remains at present, for Diogenes specifies the sum total as amounting to 445,270 lines, which at the rate of 10,000 lines to an alphabet or ream, would give forty-four reams, whereas ten reams is the utmost extent of the present aggregate. Granting, however, that the exoteric writings and much beside are lost, the question is, How can we reconcile what we have remaining with the titles given by Diogenes? Take, for instance, the names of ethical works scattered about in this list. *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης δ'. περὶ ἡδονῆς α'. περὶ τἀγαθοῦ γ'. περὶ φιλίας α'. ἡθικῶν ε'. περὶ ἡδονῆς α'* (repeated). *Περὶ ἐκουσίου α'. θέσεις φιλικαὶ β'. περὶ δικαίων β'.* Can we find anything in what we call Aristotle corresponding to these names?

If the list in question were to be relied upon, it would follow that Aristotle wrote nothing but comparatively isolated treatises, which have been amalgamated by other hands. More than one writer has accepted this hypothesis, and has

attempted to find in the works as we possess them many of the treatises named by Diogenes. For instance, on this principle the *Nicomachean Ethics* may be resolved into 'four books of Ethics,' *plus* 'One book on the Voluntary' (introduced into *Eth. Nic.* III.), *plus* two treatises on Pleasure, *plus* 'One Book on the Good' (corresponding to *Eth. Nic.* x.), *plus* 'One Book on Friendship,' and 'Two Books of Theses on Friendship' (forming *Eth. Nic.* VIII. IX.); though it would still be difficult to fit in the 'Four Books on Justice,' and the 'Two Books on the Just,' and also to find anything answering in the list to Book VI. of the *Nic. Ethics*. But even were all difficulties of detail surmounted, a broader view of the question shows us that the above-mentioned hypothesis has only the most superficial plausibility, it will not stand the test of either internal or external evidence. Certainly the authority of Diogenes is not such as by itself to weigh against probabilities. His work is a mere thoughtless compilation, written at a time when literature was in the dregs, about the end of the second century. His *débris* of anecdotes and quotations about the old philosophers is of inestimable value from the lack of other information. But every statement must be weighed by itself.

External authority at once contradicts the catalogue of Diogenes. For authors earlier than he make mention of entire works, of which he takes no notice. Not only does Cicero specify the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*De Fin.* v. 5), but also Atticus, a Platonic philosopher of the reign of Marcus Aurelius, cited by Eusebius (*Præparatio Evangelica*, xv. 4), speaks of the ethical works under their present titles, as follows: αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι Εὐδήμειοί τε καὶ Νικομάχαιοι καὶ Μεγαλῶν Ἠθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμεναι κ.τ.λ. Internal evidence is also equally decisive against our considering the works of Aristotle to be an amalgamation of

smaller treatises complete in themselves. Here and there, it is true, we find subjects worked out in a separate manner, the different parts seem often to have too little relation to the whole. That various portions of the *Ethics*, for instance, were composed piecemeal and at different times, there seems to be every reason for believing. But at the same time there is another element in Aristotle which the list of Diogenes would ignore—namely, the idea of vast completeness and organic unity which presents itself constantly as an idea, though by no means realized throughout his works. However apparent may be the separateness of different parts of his system, it is much more apparent that every science is opened with a comprehensive plan, and proposing to itself an extended scope which is never carried out. Whatever therefore may have been the origin of this catalogue, it stands completely beside our present Aristotle. The most probable conjecture is that it was copied from the backs of the rolls in some library, without reference to the contents of the rolls themselves. The fragmentary condition of Aristotle's works, and his separate mode of writing, no doubt sometimes favoured this mode of labelling, and transcribers may for shortness sake have separated that which the author intended to be inseparable. Another ancient catalogue which exists agrees in general with the present arrangement of the books. It is Arabian, but is merely a translation of the catalogue given by a certain Ptolemæus, a Peripatetic philosopher of unknown date, who wrote on the life and works of Aristotle.

More and more we are led to rely on internal evidence alone in deciding any question concerning the works of Aristotle. Let us then apply these principles in discussing the genuineness and criticizing the composition of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The latter point depends on analysis of the work itself, the former implies some consideration of the

fact that among the reputed works of Aristotle there appear also two other ethical treatises (not to mention the small and evidently spurious fragment *De Virtutibus et Vitiis*), namely, the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*. We have seen before, that as early as the second century these three ethical treatises were ranked, under their present names, among the works ascribed to Aristotle. And the first point that would naturally strike the reader would be to ask an explanation of these names. Antiquity is ready, as usual, with an answer of the most hasty and uncritical description, for we find Porphyry,⁷ in his *Prolegomena* to the *Categories*, gravely stating, that ‘Aristotle’s ethical works consisted of a treatise addressed to Eudemus his disciple; another, the Great Nicomacheans, to Nicomachus his father; and a third, the Little Nicomacheans, to Nicomachus his son.’ Strange to say, this guess or tradition, from whatever source derived, has been echoed pretty constantly since; and in almost all commentaries on the ‘Little Nicomacheans,’ it is taken for granted that they are inscribed by Aristotle to his son Nicomachus. Samuel Petit was perhaps the first to see an improbability in the story. His objection was based upon the fact that Nicomachus must have been a young child at the time of the composition of the book. Petit remedies the difficulty by finding out in the list of Archons one named Nicomachus, and some other great man of the name of Eudemus, to whom Aristotle’s books might be worthily dedicated; an explanation quite in accordance with the ideas of the seventeenth century.

If, unfettered by tradition, we look the question in the

⁷ Porphyry. *Proleg.* p. 9. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἠθικὸν γεγραμμένα αὐτῷ εἰσι τὰ ἠθικά πρὸς Εὐδήμον μαθητὴν, καὶ ἄλλα πρὸς Νικόμαχον τὸν πατέρα τὰ μεγάλα Νικομάχεια, καὶ πρὸς Νικόμαχον τὸν υἱόν, τὰ μικρὰ Νικομάχεια.

face, we see at once that the account given by Porphyry is absurd; that in the first place, it is in the highest degree improbable that Aristotle should have inscribed his books to his disciple and to his son; and in the second place, if he had done so, that the names Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια and Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια would not have implied this, still less could Ἠθικὰ Μεγάλα have meant *Ethics* addressed to his father. (1) We do not find any work of Aristotle's composed with this sort of personal reference, for the Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον has been proved to be spurious. Far less in the *Ethics* themselves is there any trace of a purpose of this kind. The stern impersonality⁸ of Aristotle and the purely scientific character of his enquiries, are quite opposed to the idea of a book composed for, or inscribed to his son. Such an idea would imply a false view of the whole tendency of the treatise, which is not to be regarded as a practical compendium, but rather as a scientific treatise on moral subjects. It is indeed the first treatise on *Morals*, written in uncertainty as to how far they could be separated from *Politics*. It is characterized by the freshness of a novel enquiry, and contains nothing hortatory. Its unfinished appearance also renders it doubtful whether it ever appeared in its present form during the life of Aristotle. This idea of inscribing a book of *Morals* to a son is essentially of later date and is suitable to Cicero. But it is especially remarkable that Cicero knew nothing of this story—of the *Nicomacheans* being addressed to Nicomachus. He knew them by their name as *Ethics of Nicomachus* and doubted whether they were by the father or the son (*De Fin.* v. v.). (2) Indeed it is only natural that Ἠθικὰ

⁸ Perhaps the most remarkable places in which this impersonality relaxes itself are, *Eth. Nic.* i. 6, 1., where his friendship for the Plato-

nists is alluded to; and *Sophist. Elench.* 33, where he speaks of his being the first to have laid the foundation of logic.

Νικομάχεια should mean Ethics of, or by, Nicomachus, and *Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια* Ethics by Eudemus. Other works by Eudemus are quoted with a similar title; cf. Alexander Aphrod. on the *Topics*, p. 70. ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἐπιγραφομένων Εὐδημείων Ἀναλυτικῶν (ἐπιγράφεται δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ Εὐδήμου ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν). Those who wish against all probability to translate *Νικομάχεια*, as if it were πρὸς Νικόμαχον, appeal to the parallel word *Θεοδέκτεια*, mentioned in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, III. ix. 9. Αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηριθμῶνται. They assume that this means ‘the Rhetoric inscribed to Theodectes.’ But in fact, the contents of this book and the meaning of its name are equally unknown. In all probability, it was merely a summary by Theodectes, embodying some of the doctrines of Aristotle.

The name *Μεγάλα Ἠθικὰ* is an apparent anomaly, for in point of bulk, this work is the least of the three treatises. Spengel thinks that the name may have been given in reference to the intended completeness of its scope. Perhaps, however, the most probable account may be, that the name is due to a merely external accident, to the humour of a copyist or librarian. The work may have been labelled ‘Great Ethics,’ to distinguish it from some adjacent Ethics in the library, just as we find the *Hippias μείζων* and *ἐλάττων* of Plato distinguished by these epithets from each other.

It would seem at the first glance in the highest degree improbable, that Aristotle, engaged as he was in pushing out philosophical analysis, enquiry, and speculation in all directions, and who, from the immensity of his undertakings, was forced to leave the greater part of his works uncompleted, should have been at the labour of composing three treatises on the same subject, with the same scope and the same

results. And this is the character of the three treatises in question. There is therefore strong *a priori* probability against their being all the work of Aristotle. When we ask further what can be learnt from the titles they bear, we find that the name Μεγάλα Ἠθικὰ tells us nothing, being itself an anomaly that requires explanation; and that the other two titles would imply, that there have come down to us two expositions of the ethical system of Aristotle, the one drawn up by Nicomachus, the other by Eudemus. These two expositions might stand on the same footing with each other, or, again, might have a widely different character. The relation between Aristotle and his expositor or editor might in such cases vary almost indefinitely. It is possible on the one hand that the editorship consisted in a mere mechanical transcription. On the other hand it is possible that we have a mere nucleus or a mere collection of episodical fragments properly belonging to Aristotle himself, while form, method, and the conception of the whole are due severally to Nicomachus or Eudemus—or thirdly, the thoughts alone may be Aristotelian, and these may have been recast by the expositor and not left wholly uncoloured by his own modes of thinking.

Various are the shades of these hypotheses, which might hold good according as internal evidence should enable us to decide. Fortunately, the first point to be established is one on which general consent and internal probability entirely coincide—namely, that the Nicomachean treatise is to be preferred above the Eudemian, as well as above the *Magna Moralia*. Neither by the Greek scholiasts, nor by Thomas Aquinas, nor by the succeeding host of Latin commentators have the two latter treatises been deemed worthy of illustration, while the *Nicomachean Ethics* have been incessantly commented on. This tacit distinction between the three

works was the only one drawn till the days of Schleiermacher, who mooted the question of their relation to each other. He at once pronounced they could not all belong to Aristotle, and seeing clearly the irregularities in the *Nicomacheans*, he was led to conclude that the *Magna Moralia* was the original work and the source of the other two. This conclusion, however, has been set aside by the deeper criticism of Spengel,⁹ whose theory is now universally received in Germany, and may be looked upon almost as a matter of certainty. Spengel considers that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* we have on the whole the work of Aristotle himself; in the *Eudemians* a work by Eudemus of Rhodes, based on the former; in the *Magna Moralia* a *résumé* of both these preceding works, compiled by some later Peripatetic.

Any one who compares the opening sentences of the three treatises will be struck at once with a difference of manner. The *Nicomachean* commencement—Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ—is quite in the style of Aristotle. It reminds us of the beginning of the *Post. Analytics*—Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως—or of the *Metaphysics*—Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. It is a universal proposition forming the first step in an elaborate argument. This argument bases the whole of *Ethics* upon the Aristotelian conception of τέλος, on the practical chief good, or happiness, demonstrated to be the final cause of life. The question then follows—What science is to treat of this all-important conception? The answer is ‘Politics,’ which answer belongs to a Platonic point of view, and shows that *Ethics* had not yet been separated

⁹ Ueber die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen ethischen Schriften, (in den *Abhandl. der Philos. philol. Klasse der K. Bay. Akad.* 1841).

from Politics. Considerations of the method of this science follow. All is systematic, and evinces a deep and comprehensive, but at the same time a tentative, view of the subject.

The *Eudemian Ethics* commence quite differently. 'Ο μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητῶν, διελὼν οὐχ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ποιήσας

κάλλιστον τὸ δίκαιότατον, λῦστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
πάντων δ' ἥδιστον, οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

'Ημεῖς δ' αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον ἀπάντων οὔσα ἥδιστόν ἐστιν. In this opening we can trace several characteristic peculiarities: (1) There is an apparent attempt at style, the book is begun with an attractive quotation, which is alien from Aristotle's manner. (2) We recognise the quotation as having occurred in *Eth. Nic.* I. viii. 14. There, however, it is only mentioned in passing as one of the λεγόμενα with which Aristotle compares his definition of the chief good. Here it is amplified, and quoted with more circumstance. This is characteristic of the *Eudemian Ethics*, which often play a useful part in furnishing learned references and more explicit quotations for the *Nicomacheans*. For instance, they give in amplified form the saying of Anaxagoras on Happiness, and of Heraclitus on Anger; and a corrected statement of the doctrine of Socrates on Courage.¹⁰ (3) We miss the

¹⁰ *Eth. Eud.* I. iv., 'Αναξαγόρας μὲν δ' Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, 'οὐθεὶς' εἶπεν, 'ὦν σὺ νομίζεις, ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἂν τις σοι φανείη.' τοῦτον δ' ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προση-

γορίας. αὐτὸς δ' ἴσως ᾤετο τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τινας θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὥς ἄνθρωπον εἶπεν μακάριον εἶναι. On Heraclitus: *Eth. Eud.* II. vii., ἔοικε δὲ καὶ 'Ηράκλειτος λέγειν εἰς τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλέψας ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἡ κώλυσις αὐτοῦ· 'χαλεπὸν γάρ' φησι· θυμῷ

tentative attitude, and gradually developed argument. In the place of them we find a disposition to set forth results. Above all we miss what is most philosophical in Aristotle's system, the conception of the End, the identification of this with the chief good; the definition of Politics and of their method.

The *Magna Moralia* open with grammatical distinctness, but with some confusedness of thought. Ἐπειδὴ προαιρούμεθα λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἠθικῶν, πρῶτον ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον τίνος ἐστὶ μέρος τὸ ἦθος. Ὡς μὲν οὖν συντόμως εἰπεῖν, δοκεῖ οὐκ ἄλλης ἢ τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι μέρος. Ἔστι γὰρ οὐθὲν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατὸν πράξαι ἄνευ τοῦ ποιοῦν τινα εἶναι, λέγω δ' οἶον σπουδαῖον. Surely Aristotle would never have used this argument, that 'the character is part of Politics, because one cannot act in political matters without exhibiting some moral character.' Aristotle's connexion of Ethics with Politics was for greater and deeper reasons; partly it was due to the history of Grecian moral science, which commenced with questions about the nature of justice, the law, the state, &c.; partly it was from a grand conception of the state as a living whole, including the individual as a subordinate part. The writer of the *Magna Moralia* understands nothing of this. He evidently writes at a later period, when practical Ethics have attained an independent footing, and he tries to go back and reproduce Aristotle's point of view. He speaks afterwards as if standing as the representative of the Peripatetic¹¹

μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖται.' On Socrates: *Eth. Eud.* π. i., δευτέρα [ἀνδρεία καθ' ὁμοιότητα] ἡ στρατιωτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ, ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη, τὰ δεινὰ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. See note upon *Eth. Nic.* iii. viii. 6.

¹¹ In one passage, i. v., which is at

first sight startling, he seems to quote *Eth. Nic.* ii. 2. 6. ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἐνδεῖα καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν. Δεῖ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυροῖς χρῆσθαι. Spengel, however, acutely remarks that the true reading must be not ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν, but ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων,

philosophy. Thus, after mentioning the former systems of Ethics, those of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, he adds, οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφήψαντο καὶ οὕτως, ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη μετὰ ταῦτα σκέψασθαι τί δεῖ αὐτοὺς λέγειν (I. i. 4). So too I. xxxv. 26, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ὥς ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν. These expressions, however, are a mere echo of Aristotle's way of speaking. Spengel observes that the use of ὑπέρ in ὑπὲρ ἠθικῶν (I. c.) is not in accordance with the practice of Aristotle, who employs περὶ in similar cases. It is found however in Theophrastus. We presently meet with the words πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρησε Πυθαγόρας. Aristotle always says οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι.

Passing on from these first sentences, the more we examine the treatises in question, the more we are confirmed in accepting Spengel's hypothesis with regard to them. Let us then consider the hypothesis as provisionally established, and proceed to take such a general survey of the nature and contents of the two subsequent and collateral Aristotelian treatises, as may serve to show their relationship to Aristotle's own ethical system. Let us commence with a brief notice of Eudemus and the *Eudemian Ethics*.

Eudemus of Rhodes was a leading scholar of Aristotle. We have no particulars of his life. Aulus Gellius gives a silly story of Aristotle deciding in favour of Theophrastus over Eudemus as his successor, by saying, that he 'preferred Lesbian wine to Rhodian.' Simplicius¹² has preserved a more

confirming this conjecture by the words of Stobæus, who, with regard to the Peripatetic Ethics, says, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐνδειξιν τοῦτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μαρτυροῖς χρῶνται. This writer is therefore only borrowing, not quoting, from Aristotle.

¹² Simplic. ad *Aristot. Phys.* fol. 216, a, 7. This passage is referred to by Stahr in his article on Eudemus, in Smith's *Dictionary of Biography*, and may be found in Brandis's *Scholia* upon Aristotle, p. 404, b. 9. See upon it Stahr, *Aristotelia*, II. p. 100, 189.

important notice, namely, a passage of the work of Andronicus Rhodius on Aristotle and his writings, which contains a fragment of a letter of Eudemus to Theophrastus, asking for an accurate copy of a MS. of the fifth book of Aristotle's *Physics*. This testifies to the editorial labours of Eudemus. Asclepius¹³ records that Aristotle committed his MS. of the *Metaphysics* to Eudemus, who was dissatisfied with the form of the work, by which its publication was delayed; that on the death of Aristotle some parts of the MS. were missing, and that these had to be completed from the other writings of Aristotle by his survivors. We know that Eudemus¹⁴ and Theophrastus, and others of the Peripatetics, set themselves to compose treatises on subjects already treated of by Aristotle. In this they were probably actuated by a desire of systematizing and making known his philosophy. They no doubt endeavoured to complete what was obscure, and to supply links in the arguments, derived from their recollections of the oral teaching of the philosopher himself. They thus furnished a sort of paraphrase¹⁵ or commentary. Of the writings of Eudemus, the following¹⁶ are mentioned by ancient Greek authorities: a *History of Geometry*, a *History*

¹³ Asclepius, *Proem.* in Aristot. *Metaphys.* (Brandis, *Schol.* in Arist. p. 519, b. 39) γράψας τὴν παρούσαν πραγματείαν ἔπεμψεν αὐτὴν Εὐδήμῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ αὐτοῦ τῷ Ῥοδίῳ· εἶτα ἐκείνος ἐνόμισε μὴ εἶναι καλὸν ὥς ἔτυχεν ἐκδοθῆναι εἰς πολλοὺς τηλικαύτην πραγματείαν. ἐν τῷ οὖν μέσῳ χρόνῳ ἐτελεύτησε, καὶ διεφθάρησαν τινὰ τοῦ βιβλίου· μὴ τολμῶντες δὲ προσθεῖναι οἴκοθεν οἱ μεταγενέστεροι διὰ τὸ πολὺ πᾶν λείπεσθαι τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐννοίας, μετῆγαγον ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ πραγματειῶν τὰ λείποντα, ἀρμόσαντες ὡς ἦν δυνατόν.

¹⁴ Cf. Ammonius on the *Categories* (Brandis, *Schol.* in Aristot. p. 28 note). οἱ γὰρ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ Εὐδήμος καὶ Φανίας καὶ Θεόφραστος κατὰ ζῆλον τοῦ διδασκάλου γεγραφήκασιν κατηγορίας καὶ περὶ ἐρμηνείας καὶ ἀναλυτικὴν.

¹⁵ Simplicius on the *Physics*, fol. 279 a. καὶ ὁ γε Εὐδήμος παραφράζων σχεδὸν καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους, τίθησι, κ.τ.λ. Brandis, *Schol.* p. 431 a.

¹⁶ The authorities for these works are given by Fritzsche in his edition of *Eth. Eud.* (Ratisbon, 1851). *Prol.* p. xv.

of *Astrology, Analytics, Categories, De Interpretatione, De Dictione, Physics*, and lastly *Ethics*. These *Ethics* are quoted by Aspasius in a Scholium on *Eth. Nic.* VIII. p. 141, λέγει δὲ καὶ Εὐδημος καὶ Θεόφραστος ὅτι καὶ αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλῳαὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς γίνονται, ἥ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν. The reference is to *Eth. Eudem.* VII. x. 9.

The *Eudemian Ethics* have suffered more from time than the *Nicomacheans*. The text is notoriously corrupt. Parts of the work are evidently lost, as for instance the eighth book refers to a previous mention of *καλοκαγαθία*, which is not now to be found. And there are also numerous unfulfilled promises. As they stand, these *Ethics* consist of eight¹⁷ books, of which the last is incomplete. Their contents may be said roughly to be a reproduction in other words of the contents of the *Nicomachean* treatise.

Books I. and II. correspond with *Eth. Nic.* I.—III. v.

Book III. corresponds with *Eth. Nic.* III. vi.—xii., IV.

Books IV. V. VI. are word for word identical with *Eth. Nic.* v. vi. VII.

Book VII. contains in a compressed form *Eth. Nic.* VIII. and IX.

Book VIII. is a mere fragment, of which the beginning is wanting, and it is not probable that the author meant to end his whole work where this present portion ends. It contains entirely new matter, namely, certain ἀπορίαι as to the possibility of misusing virtue, and as to the nature of good fortune, and a discussion upon *καλοκαγαθία*.

The most remarkable point about the contents of the *Eudemian Ethics* is the absolute identity of three books

¹⁷ Printed as seven books in Bekker's edition. But in some MSS. the last three chapters are placed

separate, and they certainly stand by themselves.

with three in the *Nicomacheans*. Hence arises the difficult question of the authorship of these books. To which of the treatises do they originally belong? This question may be reserved for discussion in connexion with the composition of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. We have spoken of the one treatise being in general a reproduction of the other, let us now advert to such differences and peculiarities as are discernible in the exposition of *Eudemus*.

First, as regards style. The phraseology and the turn of the sentences are, for the most part, a close approximation to the writing of Aristotle. An abundance of quotations, and a predominance of logical formulæ may however be observed. But the greatest divergence from Aristotle occurs at that point where style ceases to be an affair of particular words, where method and general modes of thought exert an influence. *Eudemus* re-arranges and restates the ethical theory, and here we at once perceive a difference; for while the parts are more summarily and dogmatically stated, about the whole there seems a sort of confusion, so that it is almost impossible to hold in one's head the thread of one of the *Eudemian* books. Also there are places where *Eudemus* is no longer reproducing Aristotle. He sometimes enters upon questions and ἀπορίαι of his own, as, for instance, with regard to the voluntary (*Eth. Eud.* II. 7), whether it consists in knowledge or desire.

In these places he is more indistinct, more involved, and unsatisfactory than even the obscure parts of Aristotle himself. The obscurity, too, seems of a kind which is due rather to weakness than to depth of thought, it seems to arise from an inability to maintain steadily a philosophic point of view. An instance of this latter failing occurs in the question, 'Whether does virtue make the end right, or the means?' (*Eth. Eud.* II. xi.), on which we shall have more to say here-

after; and in the expression, αἱ διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ μετὰ λόγον (II. i. 19), which is surely not a right mode of speaking: the moral virtues are μετὰ λόγου, the intellectual excellences are λόγοι. Already we are touching upon differences not so much of style as of philosophy. The point of view of Eudemus appears different from that of Aristotle; there are several novelties and fresh questions introduced, and there is a later and more developed psychology. The difference of point of view consists in the abandonment of what might be called the scientific context of Ethics,—the connection of the individual with the state, of happiness with the chief good, of human life with its final cause, being no longer preserved. This peculiarity has the effect of making the *Eudemian Ethics* correspond to the modern conception of a ‘practical’ treatise; if by practical is understood moralizing without philosophy. Another fundamental difference consists in this, that whereas Aristotle had represented contemplation as the highest human good, Eudemus seems to have set aside this idea, and to have substituted for it that of καλοκαγαθία, the aggregate and perfection of moral virtues. The aim and standard of this perfect quality he makes the service and contemplation of God, so that the passions are to be subdued, and all external goods only chosen in so far as they may be subservient to that end, VIII. iii. 15. Ὅστις οὖν αἵρεσις καὶ κτήσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μάλιστα θεωρίαν, ἢ σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος. Εἴ τις δ’ ἢ δι’ ἐνδειαν ἢ δι’ ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. Ἐχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ ὅρος ἄριστος, τὰ ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τοιοῦτον. Τίς μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκαγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον. This elevated passage enters upon a subject which we do not find discussed by Aristotle, namely, the con-

nection between religion and life. As far as we can judge of Aristotle's opinions on this question, the above passage gives a different view from his. The words *θεραπεύειν τὸν θεὸν* imply a different conception of the Deity from what we are accustomed to find in Aristotle, and the connection here made between moral virtue and theological contemplation is opposed to the broad distinction made by Aristotle between speculation and practical life, and is more like Platonism. Also we may notice something peculiar in the formulæ here used, *ὅρος τῆς καλοκαγαθίας*, and *σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν*.

We have already specified in passing the chief novelties introduced into the *Ethics* of Eudemus. They are (1) his questions about the voluntary, which confusedly as they are treated, show a growth in psychology and in ethical science, for the want of a sufficiently profound theory of the individual will had been one of the chief defects in Aristotle's system; (2) his enquiry as to the relation of virtue to purpose in the moral syllogism. This is a later development than is contained in the first books, at all events, of the *Nicomachean* treatise; (3) his discussion of the influence of fortune on happiness, which we find treated in a religious spirit, though obscurely; (4) his theory of *καλοκαγαθία*. These differences grafted on to the system of Aristotle are not such as to entitle the *Eudemian Ethics* to any great praise as an independent system, but they are interesting as showing the relation of the Peripatetic school to Aristotle.

The so-called *Magna Moralia* consist of two books. The conclusion of the second appears wanting. The whole presents uniformly the appearance of a *résumé* of foregone conclusions, but the writer seems to have had before him not only the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*, but also some other source, perhaps the writings or the traditions of Theophrastus. To this latter authority we might attribute the

slight novelties that occur, as for instance, the sketch of the history of morals (I. i. 4-8); an expanded statement of the import of the word *τάγαθόν* (I. i. 10, ii. 11), which in its arid logical clearness forms a sort of Scholium upon Aristotle; some *ἀπορίαι* on justice (II. iii.); and certain other minor improvements and additions. At the beginning of Book I. the writer seems to follow Aristotle, afterwards he adheres rather more closely to Eudemus. In one case, however, where Eudemus had corrected Aristotle, namely, with regard to the doctrine of Socrates on courage, the author of the *Magna Moralia* repeats the original less correct statement. The point of view coincides almost entirely with that of Eudemus: but the writer indicates some sort of advance in stating still more dogmatically than Eudemus the freedom of the will, and with regard to the intellectual *ἀρεταί* he denies the name of *ἀρεταί* to these at all, though he discusses the intellectual qualities, substituting however *ὑπόληψις* for *τέχνη*, and throughout his writing confusing the words *ἐπιστήμη* and *τέχνη*. On the whole, the *Magna Moralia* must be regarded as a dry compendium, executed with less clearness, and exhibiting the decline of the Peripatetic school, for the only originality here is one that exhausts itself in paraphrase and elucidation.

After these preliminary enquiries, we may now proceed to examine the treatise that bears the name of Nicomachus, which is our immediate concern. Of Nicomachus himself scarcely anything is known. Eusebius (*Præp. Evang.* xv. 2) quotes the following notice from Aristocles the Peripatetic: Μετὰ δὲ τὴν Πυθιάδος τῆς Ἑρμείου τελευτὴν Ἀριστοτέλης ἔγγραψεν Ἑρπυλλίδα Σταγειρίτιν, ἐξ ἧς υἱὸς αὐτῷ Νικόμαχος ἐγένετο. Τοῦτον δὲ φασιν ὀρφανὸν τραφέντα παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ καὶ δὴ μεираκίσκον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ. The fact of his being educated by Theophrastus may have placed him in some

connection with the MSS. of his father. But the tradition that he died while yet a youth in war, is not consistent with the notice of him by Suidas (sub voce), which speaks of him as a philosopher, the scholar of Theophrastus, and the author of six books of Ethics, and of a commentary on his father's physical philosophy. These 'six books of ethics' mentioned by Suidas may in all probability be a confused allusion to the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. In Diogenes Laertius also, the title seems to have caused a confusion with regard to the authorship. Φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν Νικόμαχος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν (VIII. viii. 2). This refers to the mention of Eudoxus, *Eth. Nic.* x. ii. 1. Taking then, on the whole, this as the result of the testimony of antiquity, that though nothing certain is known of Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, tradition agrees in coupling his name with the chief of the ethical treatises among the Aristotelian works; not (as we have already proved) as being the person to whom they are addressed, but as being in some sort redactor, editor, or expositor of the ethical system: we may proceed at once with certain confidence to pronounce that Nicomachus was not the author of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in the same way that Eudemus was of the *Eudemians*. None among all the works of Aristotle is more definitely marked with the signs of genuineness than the greater part of this treatise. We have here all the qualities of an original work, the merits and the faults of a fresh enquiry; style, manner, the philosophy, the relation to Plato, all bespeak for this book the actual composition of Aristotle himself, except in certain disputed portions. And yet anything like a careful examination brings out equally clear traces of the hand of an editor.

If we take the first book and in connexion with it the tenth book from the sixth chapter onwards, we cannot but feel that here is a systematic ground-work for a science con-

ceived as a whole. In the first book the question is stated, what is the chief good or end for man? Partly from a Platonic way of viewing the subject, partly from Greek notions in general, Aristotle identifies the end for the state and the individual, and calls his science of the chief good for man, 'a kind of Politics.' This point of view is taken up again at the close of Book X., which in fact is a transition to Politics proper. But not only do the beginning and the end of the *Ethics* coincide. Beside this, we see other evidences of system equally strong in the preconceived idea of the method of what is to follow, betraying itself in the first two books. An instance of this may be noticed in the deferring of any discussion upon the Contemplative life. Had the first book been in any sense an isolated treatise, the discussion could not have been deferred. Again, Aristotle having given his definition of Happiness, and having compared it with the theories of others, the last chapter of the book opens a methodical analysis of the different parts of that definition. This analysis is based upon a distinction between moral and intellectual excellence. The second book takes up the discussion,—defers the consideration of the λόγος or moral standard, and gives that table of the virtues which is afterwards followed in books third and fourth. On the whole, speaking roughly, there appears at first sight perfect logical sequence from the beginning of the first book to the end of the sixth, and between the first six books and the close of Book X. Suppose we grant also that continence, pleasure, and friendship, are subjects essential to Ethics, we might then say that the whole ten books possess a systematic unity,—though in truth the existence of two separate treatises on pleasure suggests a difficulty, which some persons evade by denying that the treatise in Book VII. properly belongs to this work of Aristotle.

Further consideration must oblige us very considerably to modify these views. In the first place it soon becomes apparent, that whatever general idea of system they may contain, the *Nicomachean Ethics* cannot be regarded as a finished work of art. In the best of Plato's dialogues there is an organic unity, a sort of omnipresence of the writer's mind throughout the various parts of his work; there are subtle anticipations and subtle references backward; nothing seems redundant and nothing omitted. It would be in vain to look for anything of this kind in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. Repetitions, unfulfilled promises, wandering from the point of view, unskilful joining of parts apparently written separate,—these things induce the conviction, that if there is an element of order and of unity in this book, there is also another element of irregularity, confusion, and patchwork. Not to leave these charges unsubstantiated, it may be as well to give some instances of each, and it will afterwards remain to state what seems the most probable hypothesis as to the composition of the work.

1. Under the head of 'repetitions' may be comprehended all those parts of the book which seem unnaturally to ignore each other. The most striking instance of this is the co-existence of the two treatises on Pleasure, which the most strenuous partisan for the unity of the *Ethics* would never be able to justify. These treatises are absolutely independent of each other, and the latter partly repeats and partly contradicts the former. But even setting this aside, even on the supposition that only one of the two belongs to this work, how are we to justify on principles of art the arguments on the connexion between pleasure and morals, which occur in the third chapter of Book II.? Would it not have been possible to find a more philosophical arrangement for this very deep and important question, the relation of pleasure to morals?

Are not the arguments in Book II. shallow as regards the view of pleasure, and is not the treatise in Book X. too isolated as regards morals? Another instance of repetition occurs in Book V., where the voluntariness of an action is discussed in terms rendered unnecessary by what had preceded in Book III. It is true that there is a reference backward, v. viii. 3, *Λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, κ.τ.λ.* but this would be so natural an interpolation either of the editor or of some later hand, that no stress can be laid on it. The question is one not of external references, but of internal method and unity. So too *εὐβουλία* is treated of in Book VI., without any recollection of the account of *βούλευσις* in Book III.; and *πολιτική* is defined and subdivided in the 8th chapter of Book VI. in a way that quite ignores the mention of *Πολιτική* as a science at the opening of the *Ethics*. Lastly, it must strike the reader as at all events strange, that the account of *Σοφία* in Book VI. should contain no allusion to the discussion of contemplation, as connected with happiness, which is reserved for Book X., and that in the latter discussion, there is no reference backward to all that had before been said upon *Σοφία*. The question raised at the end of Book VI. as to whether *Σοφία* produces happiness, is quite incompatible with any recollection of the mention of the contemplative life in Book I. or any prescience of the concluding argument in Book X.

2. Unfulfilled promises and fallacious references, forward as well as backward, may be genuine, or they may be interpolated. Where they are genuine, they testify to an *idea* of method, and of an extended scope. But they equally show that the idea has not been realized, that the last hand of the writer is wanting. Where they have the appearance of interpolations, they point to the composite character of the book, and to the meddling of the editor or the scribe. The first instance of

the kind seems natural and genuine. I. vii. 7.: *Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαὐθις ἐπισκεπτέον.* This question, as to where the circle is drawn round a man within which his *αὐτάρκεια* radiates, is never reconsidered.

The next instance to be noticed occurs II. vii. 16: *Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἐκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.* The first part of this programme corresponds well enough to Books III. IV. V. But it cannot be said that the last part corresponds to Book VI. For is it there discussed, how the intellectual excellences are mean states? On the whole, however, these last few words have so extremely suspicious an appearance, that we may almost confidently pronounce them not to have been written by Aristotle. The very phrase *λογικαὶ ἀρεταί* belongs to a later style than that of Aristotle. Whether Nicomachus is responsible for the sentence, is a different question. Another unfulfilled promise occurs, IX. ix. 8: *Οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον.* Now 'in what follows' there is no question about the nature of pain, except so far as its nature is implied in its being the contrary of pleasure. Certainly there is no explanation of the 'indefinite' character of pain, though in X. iii. 1, it is argued, that pleasure is not indefinite. We cannot say then whether a vague recollection of this latter point induced the editor or the copyist to introduce the reference, or whether we have here an unfulfilled promise made by Aristotle himself. A reference of another kind, suggesting some difficulty, occurs in VIII. i. 7: *Οἱ μὲν*

γὰρ ἐν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἱκανῶ πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ· δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. Εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν. The Scholiast on the passage observes, that something now lost appears to be referred to, *ἔοικε δὲ εἰρησθαι ἐν τοῖς ἐκπεπτωκόσι τῶν Νικομαχείων*. This is evidently a mere conjecture. Considering how separate the last words in the sentence stand, that they contain an un-Aristotelian formula (*ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν*), and that they interrupt the grammar of the context, perhaps it is best to consider them not Aristotle's, but added on. Some commentators imagine that the reference is to the eighth chapter of Book II., where the mean is shown to differ in degree and also in kind from the extremes. This may have suggested itself to the mind of a person interpolating the reference. But it is too vague and indistinct a resemblance to have been really alluded to by Aristotle. What the form of the reference would lead one to expect is, an abstract logical discussion on the question, whether things differing in kind can be compared with each in point of degree.

3. Much of the *Ethics* seems written, as if the author had first divided his subject into separate parts, and then had worked out the analysis of those parts without taking thought of their mutual relation. Thus zeal for the particular enquiries seems to overpower any consideration for the general harmonious impression. This is perhaps the extreme of the analytic tendency. The web of human life is divided into its component threads, and each thread is followed out in separation from the rest. Happiness, pleasure, virtue, wisdom, temperance, and friendship, each have their turn. At one time Aristotle seems to speak entirely of moral virtue, at another time entirely of happiness. Virtue is said to be necessary for happiness; but in the discussion of virtue, no

allusion to happiness is made. For virtue, or the mean, you must have a standard in the practical reason; but when the practical reason is defined, all mention of the mean is omitted. This characteristic gives a disjointed appearance to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Partly, it is attributable to an idiosyncrasy in the mind of Aristotle. Partly, no doubt, this idiosyncrasy has been aggravated by the really unfinished state of the present work. Not only in point of method do the different parts hang ill together, but there is also an inconsistency discernible in the manner of the writing. In tone and colour the first book and the tenth seem to harmonize. These seem to have been written together. On a level with these, both in moral elevation and in philosophical interest, we may place Books VIII. and IX. In these four books, the prominence of the metaphysical conception *ἐνέργεια* is a token of their philosophical point of view. Books II. III. IV. seem hardly above the popular level of thought. Books V. VI. VII. are characterized by a confusion and indistinctness from which other parts of the work seem free. Books VI. and VII. are also marked by a prevalence of logical phraseology.

4. We now come to certain marks of joining and patch-work, which are so inartificial, that they need only be set down in order to be immediately recognised. VII. x. 5.-xi. 1: 'The nature of continence and incontinence, and the relation of these states to one another, has now been declared. But pleasure and pain are subjects for the consideration of the political philosopher,' &c.

VII. xiv. 9: 'About continence and incontinence, and pleasure and pain, we have now spoken, and the nature of each, and how some of them are goods and some evils. Next we shall speak also about friendship.' VIII. i. 1: 'But after this it would follow to discuss friendship,' &c.

IX. xii. 4: 'Thus far then let the discussion of friendship go; it will follow to investigate pleasure.'

X. i. 1: 'But after this, perhaps the next point is to investigate pleasure.'

No one could imagine that such links as these would be employed to connect the parts of a work really written from end to end. The very collision between the beginnings and ends of books, the repetition in the first line of a fresh book of the same words which concluded the book before, is very awkward, and we do not find it elsewhere in Aristotle, though it is true that it appears in the *Eudemian Ethics*. But even passing this over, there is obviously something wrong about the arrangement of a work which first says, 'Having discussed pleasure we may now discuss friendship;' and some pages later, 'We have now discussed friendship, and it follows to discuss pleasure.' And the second treatise on Pleasure proceeds accordingly in the most *naïve* manner to bring forward arguments why pleasure should be discussed, on account of the importance of the subject, and its connection with morals, just as though it had never been mentioned before.

The above then are some of the most salient indications of disorder and incompleteness in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. No hypothesis can entirely explain them away. You cannot, by dropping out so many chapters here and so many words there, make the work smooth and entire. The only course is to endeavour to form as fair an opinion as possible on the probable method in which Aristotle composed the work, and the condition in which he left it. And Nicomachus, or the copyist, may be answerable for the rest.

The most important question on this part of the subject is as to the authorship of Books V. VI. VII. We have already seen that these books occur word for word in the

Eudemian Ethics. The question is, to which of the two works do they originally and properly belong? There have been various hypotheses on the subject. The first and most moderate is that started among the moderns by Casaubon, that the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. is not by Aristotle but by Eudemus. This supposition, if we could accept it, would no doubt remove great awkwardness from the appearance of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But from grounds of *a priori* probability we may safely conclude that this supposition cannot be the true one. For though it is possible to conceive that the whole of these three books may have been introduced into the one treatise from the other, and may have brought along with them a superfluous discussion on Pleasure to a work already treating of the subject; it is not possible to believe that a treatise on Pleasure should be separated from its context in the *Ethics* of Eudemus, and unnecessarily transplanted into the *Ethics* of Aristotle. Moreover, if the last four chapters of Book VII. were written by Eudemus and introduced here, how came it about that the remainder of Book VII., and the whole of Books VI. and V., written by Aristotle, were afterwards transferred to the work of Eudemus? Those who wish to operate for the benefit of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, must use the knife deeply or not at all. They must separate three entire books, or else leave the excrescence untouched.

The second hypothesis is that adopted by a recent editor of the *Eudemian Ethics* (Fritzsche), who maintains that Book V. belongs to the work of Aristotle, Books VI. and VII. to that of Eudemus. For the same reasons as before, we may say that it is almost impossible to believe in this double transference. We can imagine that one treatise may have been left imperfect, or may have been mutilated, and that its deficiencies were supplied from the other. But it is hard

to believe, without any external evidence, in the imperfection or mutilation of both works, and in a system of mutual accommodation arising out of the wants of each.

The only suppositions then which remain open to us are, either that the three books in question are by Aristotle, or that they are by Eudemus. If we can on other grounds allow them to be the work of Aristotle, there is no insuperable obstacle in the double treatise on Pleasure. We must at once conclude that *that* in Book VII. is an earlier essay, on which Aristotle afterwards improved. We might say, the treatise in Book VII. is dialectical, merely opposing the Platonists. That in Book X. is scientific, giving a more complete analysis of the subject. Instances occur in the *Metaphysics* of short discussions, which appear repeated in a more or less changed form. Of course a repetition of this kind is due to the editors of Aristotle. They were naturally reluctant to lose or omit any part of his writings. And hence it may have come about, that a treatise on Pleasure superseded and discarded by its author was afterwards revived and awkwardly grafted upon one of his works. It is not on the ground of these few last chapters that the genuineness of the whole three books is brought to an issue.

The chief arguments in favour of attributing these books to Aristotle are—(1) The fact that they are found in his treatise, and have been constantly received as part of it, and, in fact, are required to complete it. (2) That they appear to be quoted by Aristotle himself in the *Metaphysics* and *Politics*. (3) That they are said to be completely Aristotelian in style. Against these arguments might be pleaded—(1) That they are found in the work of Eudemus. And if we attribute them to Eudemus, we shall be only applying to these books the hypothesis which some would apply to the whole treatise, or even to all the works of Aristotle—namely,

that they consist of the notes of his scholars. Moreover, the very name, *Ethics by Nicomachus*, might suggest the probability that something might be found in a work so called, not coming purely and entirely from Aristotle, while the fact that these books are required to complete the system does not prove their genuineness, so much as account for their having been borrowed; especially if it turns out that they do not exactly fit, and give a seeming rather than a real completeness to the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

(2) An examination of the places where these books are said to be quoted a little weakens the argument drawn from those quotations.

In *Metaphys.* I. i. 17, Book VI. appears to be referred to. Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα νῦν ποιοῦμεθα τὸν λόγον, τοῦτ' ἐστίν. κ.τ.λ.

In *Politics* III. ix. 3, Book V. seems quoted, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς.

So too in *Politics* III. xii. 1, δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μέχρι γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν· τί γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναί φασιν.

We see about the last of these passages that it is no quotation at all, but merely an assertion that, with regard to justice, people in general agree to a certain extent with the philosophic theory of ethics, &c. In the second passage, there are all the marks of an interpolated reference. In the first passage the reference is general, being to doctrine not to words. We possess no doubt the ethical doctrine of Aristotle, as far as he had completed it, but do we possess it altogether in his own words?

(3) As to the style, we must bear in mind the very close

resemblance of the style of the *Eudemian Ethics* to that of Aristotle. Perhaps nothing in the present books might have struck us as remarkable, but for the fact that they already stand as part of the *Eudemian Ethics*. And this leads us to institute a closer scrutiny. And out of this scrutiny there becomes apparent something confused, and what we might call Eudemian, about the writing, and something about the philosophy, on the one hand later and more mature, on the other hand slurred and indistinct. Many will, no doubt, feel the argument from style to be subtle and evanescent, and, declining to be convinced by it, they will deny the possibility of distinguishing with certainty between the hand of the Master and the imitative work of the School. To such persons we submit that at all events it is impossible to sum up and convey in a few lines the import of an evidence which is in its nature essentially cumulative. It is not on the form of this or that particular sentence by itself that the question turns, and by quoting isolated Eudemianisms (or what we consider such), we should only weaken the argument to be drawn from them. We can only refer to the disputed books themselves, and if, after going through the peculiarities in detail which will be pointed out in the notes, any one still denies that there is any difference in the writing between the Nicomachean and the Nicomacho-Eudemian books, there is nothing more to be said on the subject.

As to the philosophy of these books, it is to be noticed that they prominently contain the doctrine of the practical syllogism, which on the other hand is not applied in Book III. to the explanation of the will. There is also something very mature in the formula given in Book VI. for the definition of virtue. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου (xiii. 5). Again in the use of the terms ὄρος and σκοπός, we observe something

which has no parallel in other books of Aristotle, and which is apparently an innovation introduced into the system by Eudemus. Compare *Eth. Nic.* vi. i. 1, ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐστὶ τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίσιν— and vi. i. 3, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον (δεῖ εἶναι) τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος—with *Eth. Eud.* II. v. 8, τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. As we have seen, Eudemus makes the great ὅρος to consist in the contemplation and service of God. *Eth. Eud.* VIII. iii. 16, τίς μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκαγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον. Surely this new formula is a confusion of Aristotle's ethical philosophy, for whereas before ὀρθὸς λόγος was made the standard of virtue, here a standard of that standard is introduced,—καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος. Again, does not the mention of σκοπὸς in this formal way (not merely in a metaphorical sense, as in *Eth. Nic.* i. ii. 2) clash, as it were, with Aristotle's doctrine of τέλος?

Another piece of Eudemian philosophy shows itself in the theory that virtue gives us the end, and wisdom the means (or as they are here called, τὸν σκοπὸν and τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον), see *Eth. Nic.* vi. xii. 6, vi. xii. 10, VII. viii. 4. Whatever be the value of this doctrine in itself, it does not harmonize with the theory of moral faculties given in *Eth. Nic.* Book III.; but it coincides perfectly with the *Eudemian Ethics*, where this very question is the subject of a chapter (*Eth. Eud.* II. xi.). Πότερον ἢ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν; With regard to the treatise on Pleasure in *Eth. Nic.* Book VII., we may notice that it opens with a reference back which is rather more applicable to the Eudemians than to the Nicomacheans. Τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν (xi. 2). This might indeed

allude to *Eth. Nic.* II. iii. 10, ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ.

But the identification of virtue and vice with pleasure and pain is more definitely expressed in *Eth. Eud.* II. i. 24, II. ii.

1, II. v. 8. And it is more after Aristotle's manner to begin

a treatise *without* such a reference, as we find him doing

Eth. Nic. x. i. 1. The distinctive characteristic of the treatise

in Book VII., as compared with the latter, seems to be

that it is less of a scientific account, and exhibits a more

practical tendency. On the one hand, the formula for expressing

pleasure is less exact, and the relation of pleasure to the

chief good is less clearly enunciated. On the other hand,

there seems to be some reference to the theory of incontinence.

While it is acknowledged that all pleasure is not

bodily pleasure, bodily pleasure is in reality almost exclusively

discussed; and it is pointed out, how by necessities of nature

and temperament men are led to run into bodily pleasures.

Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται (xiv. 6).

Not only is this practical and moral feeling characteristic of

Eudemus, but also the materialistic tendency shown in these

chapters, and indeed throughout Book VII., was a tendency

into which the Peripatetic scholars seem to have fallen, and

which runs out into extremity in many of the 'Problems'

falsely attributed to Aristotle.

When we ask fairly, Do these three books complete the

system of Aristotle's *Ethics*, on the supposition that they are

genuinely his? the answer must be, that they cannot be said

to do so. What we most essentially want after the conclusion

of Book IV. is a theory of the Λόγος or moral standard.

But can Book VI. be said to supply this? In the first place,

we have already noticed the awkwardness of the phrase made

use of by Eudemus, αἱ διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ μετὰ λόγου. This

same confusion of phrase is carried all through Book VI. of

Eth. Nic. Φρόνησις equally with ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη is described as a *ἕξις μετὰ λόγου*. We might perhaps have imagined that this λόγος was some deeper law of the consciousness, lying behind φρόνησις and regulating it. But the reverse statement occurs at the end of Book VI., where φρόνησις is made to regulate the λόγος (πάντες ὅταν ὀρίζονται τὴν ἀρετὴν προστιθέασι τὴν ἕξιν,—τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. xiii. 4). Thus there is a carelessness of formula, which impairs the value of this part of the theory. Suppose we accept φρόνησις as Aristotle's term for the moral standard, we must in the first place miss any explanation of its connection with the mean; secondly, we do not find it harmonized with βούλησις, βούλευσις, and προαίρεσις, as they are described in Book III. Again we find it variously and incongruously set forth; 1st, as prudence, though its relation to happiness is not drawn out (vi. v. 2); 2nd, as including all human interests in its scope (vi. vii. 6); 3rd, as universal (vi. vii. 7); 4th, as particular (*ib.*); 5th, as intuitive (vi. viii. 9); 6th, as acquired by experience (vi. viii. 5); 7th, as a faculty of ends (vi. ix. 7); 8th, as a faculty of means (vi. xii. 9); 9th, as depending on the moral character (vi. xii. 10); 10th, as a sort of universal wisdom and perfected condition, both of the reason and the will, so that he who possessed it could do no wrong (vi. xiii. 6, vii. ii. 5). These contradictions and incongruities, when put together, allow us perhaps to form a general conception in which they may be all reconciled; but scattered about as they are in the sixth book of *Eth. Nic.* they present a very unphilosophical and unsatisfactory appearance, and make us doubt whether Aristotle himself can have been the author of this very imperfect *statement*. That he was the author in some sense of the *theory* we cannot doubt, and we know from *Metaphysics*, I. i. 17, that the psychology of the intel-

lect,—the difference of *ἐπιστήμη* from *σοφία*, &c., formed part of Aristotle's ethical system, though we must also remark that *σοφία* is differently represented in the *Metaphysics* from what it is in *Eth. Nic.* Book VI., and we may well suspect that the theory of *φρόνησις* also is to some extent coloured by the views of Eudemus.

The same criticism applied to Book V. discloses also its imperfections, when considered as a supplement to the lucid account of the virtues in Books II.–IV. It gives a very indistinct answer to the question, 'In what sense are the two kinds of justice mean states?' which was proposed for discussion, *Eth. Nic.* II. vii. 16. In Book V. Aristotle's theory of justice looms upon us vaguely through a cloud. We know that he differed from Plato in his conception of justice, that he attributed to it a more special character, but how indistinct are the arguments (v. ii. 1–6) by which this special character is established! In Chapter 4th, *διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον* is spoken of as applicable both to voluntary and involuntary transactions, but of the former kind there is no explanation given. What is the relation of that justice in exchange, of which the principles are stated in Chapter 5th, to this 'corrective justice'? Granted that the two divisions of justice, viewed politically, into distributive and corrective, are of considerable importance (they were apparently known to Plato before Aristotle), yet these should not in a moral treatise absorb the whole account of the matter. The moral view of justice as an individual virtue or duty is here greatly deficient. Partly we must conclude that the theory of Aristotle was immature, partly that it is ill-stated by Eudemus. In the last chapter of the book we find an irregularity which proves the influence of unskilful editorship. There is a repetition of a question already answered. In all probability the book was meant to end at the conclusion of Chapter 10.

Those who start with the supposition that the *Nicomachean Ethics* are a finished treatise from which they have only to reject glaring irregularities, are in the habit of saying that Book V. is by Aristotle except the last chapter, which is by Eudemus. For this hypothesis there is not the slightest evidence, either internal or external.

Arguments might be multiplied to show that in all probability Books V. VI. VII. are the work of Eudemus, just in the same sense as the *Eudemian Ethics* are his work, namely, they are his exposition of the theory of Aristotle slightly modified by his own views. Whether, as in the case of the *Metaphysics* (above mentioned p. 20), parts of Aristotle's own ethical writing which corresponded to these books have been lost, and the lacuna supplied from the exposition of Eudemus, or whether never anything but an oral theory of this part of the system existed, it seems impossible to say. Aristotle's reference to the theory (*Metaphys.* I. i. 17), makes it more probable that something was written, but we must not hence conclude that the *Ethics* was ever a finished work, or published in the lifetime of Aristotle. His quotations in the *Metaphysics* and *Politics* do not by any means prove this. Aristotle was probably carrying on his various works together, and thus might naturally refer from one which was in conception later, to one which was in conception more complete, though not yet given to the world.

It would be easy then to form a hypothesis to account for the present condition of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. A comparison of their beginning and end might seem to show that the work is constructed on a scientific frame. We might say that without doubt these first and last books were written by Aristotle himself. That he probably drew out at the same time the entire plan for the intermediate books. That the separate parts of his subject, divided according to this plan,

he must have worked out according to his custom at different times. That these parts therefore have different degrees of connection with the whole, different degrees of completeness in themselves. Thus the treatises on the Voluntary, on Pleasure, and on Friendship, have all an introduction, showing that they are meant to form part of an ethical system. But the treatise on Friendship in three places uses the phrase *καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται* (VIII. ix. 1, VIII. xiii. 1, IX. iii. 1), to denote its own earlier chapters, as if being an independent work. It also uses the same phrase (IX. ix. 5) to denote the beginning of the entire *Ethics*. We might say then that Books VIII. and IX. have a double nature; on the one hand they are a separate treatise, on the other hand part of a larger work. We might conceive these ‘disjecta membra’ of Aristotle’s *Ethics* lying among his papers at his death, and imagine that some time may have elapsed before Nicomachus, or whoever was the first editor, took in hand their amalgamation; that in the meanwhile Eudemus may have been writing his system; that part of the original system of Aristotle being now lost or for some cause or other wanting, Nicomachus took three of the Eudemian books as being the nearest approach to the doctrine and to the very words of Aristotle, and grafted them on with the view of presenting a completed treatise to the world. After all, however, any hypothesis of the kind could only be a mere shot in the dark. To those cautious minds who would immediately rebuke such guess-work, we would submit that, at all events, the *Nicomachean Ethics* are put together out of two separate, and, to some extent, heterogeneous parts.

ESSAY II.

On the History of Moral Philosophy in Greece previous to Aristotle.

IN the *Ethics* of Aristotle there are but few direct allusions to moral theories of other philosophers. Plato's theory of the idea of good, viewed in its relation to *Ethics* (I. vi.); Socrates' definition of courage (III. viii. 6); of virtue (VI. xiii. 3); his opinion of incontinence (VII. ii. 1); Eudoxus' theory of pleasure (X. ii. 1); the Pythagorean definition of justice (V. v. 1); and Solon's paradox (I. x.), are perhaps the only ones which are by name commented on. There are constant impersonal allusions to various opinions (the λεγόμενα on the subject in hand); some of these Aristotle attributes to 'the few,' that is, the philosophers; others he speaks of as stamped with the consent of 'the many and of ancient times.' (I. viii. 7.) But there is no connected history of ethical opinions or ethical systems to be found in this work of Aristotle. His *Metaphysics*, his *Physical Lectures*, and his *De Animâ*, each commence with a historical introduction, so that the various problems to be answered in these several sciences are made to develope themselves out of the attempts and the failures of previous enquiries. But we miss here any such opening, and the reason is that *Ethics* were only first beginning to have an existence as a separate science,—with Aristotle. Before the fifth century, philosophy had been entirely physical or metaphysical; with the Sophists and Socrates thought was directed to the *rationale* of human life, to discussions of virtue and justice and the

duties of a citizen. But before Plato there were no scientific treatises on moral subjects, and even in Plato there was no separation between Morals and Politics. Aristotle beginning his treatise in a tentative way, and partly following the lead of Plato, speaks of his science as 'a sort of Politics' (I. iii. 1); at the same time he gives it a treatment which effectually separates it from Politics. By reason then of this tentative attitude and this silence of Aristotle, we are left to discuss for ourselves the beginnings of moral philosophy in Greece; which it is indeed necessary to do, since a system of any kind can only be properly understood by knowing its antecedents.

The author of the *Magna Moralia* prefixes to his book the following brief sketch of the previous progress of the science. 'The first to attempt this subject was Pythagoras. His method was faulty, for he made virtue a number, justice a cube, &c. To him succeeded Socrates, who effected a great advance, but who erred in calling virtue a science, and in thus ignoring the distinction between the moral nature (*πάθος καὶ ἦθος*) and the intellect. Afterwards came Plato, who made the right psychological distinctions, but who mixed up and confused ethical discussions with ontological enquiries as to the nature of the chief good.' In a shadowy way this passage represents the truth; for it is true that in the pre-Socratic philosophy, of which the Pythagorean system may stand as a type, ethical ideas had no distinctness, they were confused with physical or mathematical notions. Also the faults in the Ethics of Socrates and Plato are here rightly stated. But it is a confusion to speak of Pythagoras as a moral philosopher, in the same sense that Socrates and Plato were so, or to speak of Socrates succeeding Pythagoras in the same way that Plato succeeded Socrates. Even were the account more accurate, that it is too barren to be in itself very useful, every one will acknowledge.

Renouncing any attempt to trace a succession of systems (which indeed did not exist), until we come to the limited period of development between Socrates and Aristotle, let us take a broader view of the subject, and divide morality into three eras, first, the era of popular or unconscious morals; second, the transitional, sceptical, or sophistic era; thirdly, the philosophic or conscious era. These different stages appear to succeed each other in the national and equally in the individual mind. The simplicity and trust of childhood, the unsettled and undirected force of youth, and the wisdom of matured life. First, we believe because others do so; then, in order to obtain personal convictions, we pass through a stage of doubt; then we believe the more deeply and in a somewhat different way from what we did at the outset. On these three distinct periods or aspects of thought about moral subjects, much might be said. The first thing to remark is, that they are not only successive to each other if you regard the mind of the most cultivated and advanced thinkers of successive epochs, but also they are contemporaneous and in juxtaposition to each other, if you regard the different degrees of cultivation and advancement among persons of the same epoch. In Plato's *Republic* we find the three points of view represented by different persons in the dialogue. The question, What is justice? being started, an answer to it is first given from the point of view of popular morality in the persons of Cephalus and of his son Polemarchus, who define it to be, in the words of Simonides, 'paying to every one what you owe them.' To this definition captious difficulties are started,—difficulties which the popular morality, owing to its unphilosophical tenure of all conceptions, is quite unable to meet. Then comes an answer from the Sophistical point of view, in the person of Thrasymachus, that 'justice is the advantage of the stronger.' This having been over-

thrown, partly by an able sophistical skirmish, partly by the assertion of a deeper moral conviction,—the field is left open for a philosophical answer to the question. And this accordingly occupies the remainder of Plato's *Republic*, the different sides of the answer being represented by different personages; Glaucon and Adeimantus personifying the practical understanding which is only gradually brought into harmony with philosophy, Socrates the higher reason and the most purely philosophical conception. Almost all the dialogues of Plato, which touch on moral questions, may be said to illustrate the collision between the above-mentioned different periods or points of view, though none so fully as the *Republic*. Some dialogues, which are merely tentative, as the *Euthyphro*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, &c., content themselves with showing the unsatisfactoriness of the popular conceptions; common definitions are overthrown; the difficulty of the subject is exposed; a deeper method is suggested; but the question is left at last without an answer. In others, as in the *Hippias Major*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Euthydemus*, various aspects of the Sophistical point of view are exposed; (on which we shall find much material for discussion hereafter); in all the dialogues a glimpse, at all events, of true philosophy is suggested; in a few only, as in the *Philebus*, is there anything like a proportion of constructive to the destructive dialectic.

Plato's wonderful dramatic pictures hold up a mirror to the different phases of error and truth in the human mind, so that we turn to his dialogues as to real life. But all reasonings on morality must exhibit the distinction existing between the popular, the sophistic, and the philosophical points of view. This distinction will be found marked in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, only Aristotle is less hostile than Plato to the popular conceptions, and rather considers them as the

exponents of a true instinct with which his own theories must be brought into harmony. Also, being more concerned with the attainment and enunciation of truth than with recording its *genesis*, he does not dwell on the relation of the sophistical spirit to morality. He touches on certain sceptical and arbitrary opinions concerning morals which may be considered as the remnants of sophistry. But we must not reckon among these philosophical opinions with which he disagrees, since philosophy may be mistaken and yet be philosophy, if its spirit be pure.

Without laying too much stress on our three divisions, we may at all events regard them as convenient chronological heads. And let us now proceed to make some remarks on the characteristics of the first period of Grecian Ethics.

I. It has been said that ‘before Socrates there was no morality in Greece, but only propriety of conduct.’¹ This sentence conveys the same meaning as the argument in Plato’s *Phædo* (p. 68 D), that ‘without philosophy there is no morality, for the popular courage is a sort of fear, and the popular temperance a sort of intemperance.’ It rightly asserts that the highest kind of goodness is inseparable from wisdom, from a distinct consciousness of the meaning of acts—from a sense of the absoluteness of right in itself. ‘Morality’ according to this view only exists when the individual can say, ‘I am a law to myself, the edicts of the state and of society are valid to me because they are *my* edicts—because they are pronounced by the voice of reason and of right that is in me.’ It however puts perhaps too great a restriction upon the term ‘morality,’ as if nothing but the highest moral goodness were ‘morality’ at all. It seems absurd to charac-

¹ Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, | waren sittliche, nicht moralische Men-
 ii. 43: ‘Die Athener vor Socrates | schen.’

terize as mere 'propriety of conduct' the acts of generosity, patriotism, endurance, and devotion, which were done, and the blameless lives that were led, long before there was any philosophy of right and wrong. Indeed there is something that seems *more* attractive about instinctive acts of nobleness, than about a reasoned goodness. To some the innocent obedience of the child appears more lovely than the virtue of the man. Still instinct is inferior to reason, the child is less than the man; and if God makes us what we are in childhood, we must re-make ourselves in maturer age; and it is the law of our nature that what was at first only potential in us, and only dimly felt as an instinct, should become realized by us and present to our consciousness. The very word 'conscience,' on which right so much depends, is only another term to express 'consciousness,' and a man differs from a machine in this, that the one has a law in itself,—is moved, as Aristotle would say, *κατὰ λόγον*; the other is moved *μετὰ λόγον*, has the law both in and for himself.

Without entering into speculations on the origin of society, we may safely assert that, as far as historical evidence goes, the broad distinctions between crime and virtue seem always to have been marked. National temperament, organization, climate, and a certain latent national idea that has to be gradually developed—these go some way to mould the general human instincts of right and wrong, and these produce whatever is special in the national life and customs and code of laws (for occasion calls forth legislation, and so a code of laws grows up); and thus men live and do well or ill, and obtain praise or blame, are punished and rewarded. But as yet there is no *rationale* of all this. It is an age of action rather than of reflection—of poetry rather than analysis. To this succeeds a time when the first generalizations about life,

in the shape of proverbs and maxims, begin to spring up. These are wise, but they do not constitute philosophy. They seldom rise above the level of prudential considerations, or empirical remarks on life, but they serve the requirements of those for whom they are made. Later, however, poetry and proverbs cease to satisfy the minds of thinkers; the thoroughly-awakened intellect now calls in question the old saws and maxims, the authority of the poets, and even the validity of the institutions of society itself. After this has come to pass, the age of unconscious morality, for cultivated men at least, has ceased for ever. In the quickly ripening mind of Greece, the different stages of the progress we have described succeed each other in distinct and rapid succession. In Christendom, from a variety of causes, it was impossible that the phenomenon should be re-enacted with the same simplicity.

The popular morality which is represented in the dialogues of Plato may serve to embody the results which were arrived at in Greece without scepticism and without philosophy. The following are its chief characteristics: (1) It is based upon texts and maxims, and these maxims are for the most part merely prudential. (2) It is apt to connect itself with a superstitious and unworthy idea of religion, such as was set forth in the mysteries, and which constituted the trade of juggling hierophants. With regard to the former point, nothing is more marked than the unbounded reverence of the Greeks for the old national literature. Homer, Hesiod, and the Gnostic poets, constituted the educational course. Add to these the saws of the Seven Wise Men and a set of aphorisms of the same calibre, which sprung up in the sixth century, and we have before us the main sources of Greek views of life. It was perhaps in the age of the Pisistratidæ that the formation and promulgation of this system of texts

took place most actively. In the little dialogue called *Hipparchus*, attributed to Plato, but of uncertain authorship, we find an episode (from which the dialogue is named) recounting a fact, if not literally, at all events symbolically true. It relates that Hipparchus, the wisest of the sons of Pisis-tratus, wishing to educate the citizens, introduced the poems of Homer, and made Rhapsodes recite them at the Panathenæa. Also, that he kept Simonides near him, and sent to fetch Anacreon of Teos. Also, that he set up obelisks along the streets and the roads, carved with sentences of wisdom, selected from various sources, or invented by himself, some of which even rivalled the 'Know thyself,' and other famous inscriptions at Delphi.

It is obvious how much the various influences here specified worked on the Athenian mind. The mouths of the people were full of these maxims, and when Socrates asked for the definition of any moral term, he was answered by a quotation from Simonides, Hesiod, or Homer. The same tendency was not confined to Athens, but was doubtless, with modifications, prevalent throughout Greece. With regard to the worth of the authorities above specified, a few words may be said, taking each separately. The morality in Homer is what you would expect. It is concrete, not abstract; it expresses the conception of a heroic life rather than a philosophical theory. It is mixed up with a religion which really consists in a celebration of the beauty of the world, and in a deification of the strong, bright, and brilliant qualities of human nature. It is a morality uninfluenced by a regard to a future life. It clings with intense enjoyment and love to the present world, and the state after death looms in the distance as a cold and repugnant shadow. And yet it would often hold death preferable to disgrace. The distinction between a noble and an ignoble nature is strongly marked in Homer, and yet the

sense of right and wrong about particular actions seems very fluctuating. A sensuous conception of happiness and the chief good is often apparent, and there is great indistinctness about all psychological terms and conceptions. Life and mind, breath and soul, thought and sensation, seem blended or confused together. Plato's opinion of Homer was a reaction against the popular enthusiasm, and we must take Plato's expressions not as an absolute verdict, but as relative to the unthinking reverence of his countrymen. He speaks as if irritated at the wide influence exercised by a book in which there was so little philosophy.

If we consider Homer in his true light, as the product and exponent, rather than as the producer of the national modes of thought, Plato's criticisms will then appear merely as directed against the earliest and most instinctive conceptions of morality, as a protest against perpetuating these and treating them as if they were adequate for a more advanced age. Socrates says (*Repub.* p. 606 E), 'You will find the praisers of Homer maintaining that this poet has educated all Greece, and that with a view to the direction and cultivation of human nature he is worthy to be taken up and learnt by heart; that in short one should frame one's whole life according to this poet. To these gentlemen,' continues Socrates, 'you should pay all respect, and concede to them that Homer was a great poet and first of the tragic writers (*ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν*); but you should hold to the conviction that poetry is only to be admitted into a state in the shape of hymns to the Gods and encomia on the good.' The point of view from which this is said is evidently that, in comparison with the vast importance of a philosophic morality, everything else is to be considered of little value and to be set aside. The faults that Plato finds with Homer in detail are, that he recommends justice

by the inducements of temporal rewards (*Repub.* pp. 363 A, 612 B), thus turning morality into prudence; that he makes God the source of evil as well as of good (*Repub.* p. 379 C); that he makes God changeable (p. 381 D); that he represents the gods as capable of being bribed with offerings (p. 364 D); that he gives a gloomy picture of the soul after death, describing the future world in a way which is calculated to depress the mind and fill it with unmanly forebodings (p. 387); that he represents his heroes as yielding to excessive and ungoverned emotion, and that even his gods give way to immoderate laughter (pp. 388-9); and that instances of intemperance, both in language, and in the indulgence of the appetites, often form a part of his narrative (p. 390). In the *Ethics* of Aristotle the poems of Homer are frequently referred to for the sake of illustration as being a perfectly well known literature. Thus the warning of Calypso—or, as it should have been, Circe (*Eth.* II. ix. 3); the dangerous charms of Helen (II. ix. 6); and the procedure of the Homeric Kings (III. iii. 18); are used as figures to illustrate moral or psychological truths. Again, instances of any particular phenomenon are hence cited; as for example, Diomedes and Hector are cited as an instance of political courage (III. viii. 2), and Glaucus and Diomedes of an unequal bargain where no wrong is done (v. ix. 7). In other places Aristotle appeals to the words of Homer, in the same way that he does to the popular language, namely, as containing a latent philosophy in itself, and as bearing witness to the conclusions of philosophy. Thus Homer's use of the word *σοφὸς* (VI. vii. 2); his calling Agamemnon 'shepherd of the people' (VIII. xi. 1); his mention of the superhuman qualities of Hector (VII. i. 1); his description of the girdle of Venus (VII. vi. 3); and his physical descriptions of courage (III. viii. 10), are all appealed to as containing, or testifying to, a philosophical truth.

Turning from Homer to Hesiod, we discover at once a certain change or difference in spirit, and in the views that are taken of human life. In the *Works and Days* those that fought at Troy are represented as 'a race of demi-gods and beatified heroes,' dwelling in the 'happy isles' free from care or sorrow; whereas with Homer, these personages are merely illustrious mortals, subject to the same passions and sufferings as their descendants, and condemned at their death to the same dismal after life of Hades, so gloomily depicted in the *Odyssey*.² Not only does this difference point to a development in the Grecian mythology, indicating the matured growth of the popular hero-worship; it also shows a feeling which characterizes other parts of Hesiod, a sense that a bright period is lost, and 'that there had passed away a glory from the earth.'

The poet is no longer carried out of himself in thinking of the deeds of Achilles and Hector. He laments that he has fallen on evil days, that he lives in the last and worst of the Five Ages of the World.³ He finds 'all things full of labour.' He is conscious of a Fall of Man, and accounts for this by two inconsistent episodes, the one⁴ representing mankind, through the fatal gift of Pandora, blighted at the very outset; the other⁵ describing a gradual decadence from the primeval Golden Age. Once the gods dwelt upon earth, but now even Honour that does no wrong, and Retribution that suffers no wrong (*Αἰδώς καὶ Νέμεσις*), the last of the Im-

² Mure's *Literature of Greece*, Vol. II. p. 402.

³ V. 172 sqq.
μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' ὤφειλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι
μετεῖναι
ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρόσθε θανεῖν, ἢ
ἔπειτα γενέσθαι

νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστί σιδήρεον· οὐδέ
ποτ' ἦμαρ
παύσονται καμάτων καὶ διζύος, οὐδέ τι
νύκτωρ
φθειρόμενοι· χαλεπὰς δὲ θεοὶ δώσουσι
μερίμνας.

⁴ Vv. 48-105.

⁵ Vv. 108-171.

mortals, have gone and left us.⁶ Mixed up with this sad and gloomy view of the state of the world, we find indications of a religious belief which is in some respects more elevated than the theology of Homer. Hesiod represents the messengers of Zeus, thirty thousand dæmons, as always pervading the earth, and watching on deeds of justice and injustice.⁷ A belief in the moral government of God is here indicated, though it is expressed in a polytheistic manner, and there is a want of confidence and trust in the divine benevolence. The gods are only just, and not benign. Hesiod's book of the *Works and Days* is apparently a cento, containing the elements of at least two separate poems, the one an address to the poet's brother Perses, with an appeal against his injustice; the other perhaps by a different hand, containing maxims of agriculture, and an account of the operations at different seasons. Into this part different sententious rules of conduct are interwoven, which may be rather national and Bœotian than belonging to any one particular author. The morality of Hesiod, whatever its origin, contains a fine practical view of life. It enjoins justice, energy, and above all, temperance and simplicity of living. Nothing can be finer than the saying⁸ quoted by Plato (cf. *Repub.* p. 466 C; *Laws*, p. 690 E), 'How much is the half greater than the whole! how great a blessing is there in mallows and asphodelus!' Plato finds fault with Hesiod that his is a merely prudential Ethics, or eudæmonism, that he recommends justice by the promise

⁶ Vv. 195-199.

⁷ V. 250 sq.

τρίς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυ-
βοτείρῃ
ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων·
ὅς ῥα φυλάσσουσιν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια
ἔργα

ἡέρα ἑσσάμενοι, πάντα φοιτῶντες ἐπ'
αἶαν.

⁸ V. 40 sq.

νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἤμισυ
παντός,
οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ
μεγ' ὄνειρα.

of temporal advantage (*Repub.* p. 363 A). Many of his maxims are indeed not above the level of a yeoman's morality, consisting in advice about the treatment of neighbours, servants, &c. One of these Aristotle alludes to (*Eth.* ix. i. 6). It is the recommendation that, even between friends, wages should be stipulated and the bargain kept. Of a different stamp, however, is that passage of Hesiod, which has been so repeatedly quoted.⁹ It contains the same figure to represent virtue and vice, which was afterwards consecrated in the mouth of Christ: 'The road to vice may easily be travelled by crowds, for it is smooth, and she dwells close at hand. But the path of virtue is steep and difficult, and the gods have ordained that only by toil can she be reached.' And this truth is rendered still deeper by the addition, that 'He is best who acts on his own convictions, while he is second-best who acts in obedience to the counsel of others.' Aristotle cites this latter saying (*Eth.* i. iv. 7), which contains more than, in all probability, its author was conscious of. He also quotes from Hesiod another most acute remark,¹⁰ which is to the effect that society is constructed upon a basis of competition,—that a principle of strife which makes 'potter foe to potter' (*Eth.* viii. i. 6), produces all honourable enterprises. It may truly be said that if Hesiod was no moral philosopher, he was a very great moralist.

Passing on now to the 'Seven Wise Men,' the heroes of the sixth century B.C., who are separated from Hesiod by we cannot tell how wide a chronological interval, we do not find

⁹ Xen. *Memorab.* ii. i. 20. Plato, *Repub.* p. 364 C. *Laws*, p. 718 E. *Protagoras*, p. 340 D, &c.

¹⁰ V. 11 sqq.

οὐκ ἄρα μούνον ἔην ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν

εἰσι δῶα. τὴν μὲν κεν ἐπαινῆσαι νοήσας,

ἣ δ' ἐπιμωμητή, κ.τ.λ.

. . . ἀγαθὴ δ' ἔρις ἦδε βρο-

τοῖσι

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει, καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων.

any great advance made beyond him in their moral point of view, but rather a following out of the same direction. We find still a prudential Ethics dealing in a disjointed, but often a forcible and pregnant manner, with the various parts of life. Of the 'Seven,' it was well said by Dicæarchus (ap. Diog. Laert. i. 40) that 'they were neither speculators nor philosophers (*οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε φιλοσόφους*, N.B. *σοφοὺς* is here used in a restricted and Aristotelian sense), but men of insight, with a turn for legislation (*συνετοὺς δέ τινας καὶ νομοθετικούς*).' They belonged to an era of political change, which was calculated to teach experience and to call forth worldly wisdom, the era of the overthrow of hereditary monarchs in Greece. All the sages were either tyrants, or legislators, or the advisers of those in power. The number seven is of later date, and probably a mere attempt at completeness. There is no agreement as to the list, but the names most generally specified are Thales, Solon, Periander, Cleobulus, Chilon, Bias, Pittacus. Of these Thales ought to be exempted from the criticism of Dicæarchus, for though many adages are attributed to him, he was no mere politician, but a deep thinker, and the first speculative philosopher of Greece. All that was most distinctive in Thales does not belong to the level of thought which we are now considering. Of the rest it was said by Anaximenes (ap. Diog. Laert. *l. c.*), that they 'all tried their hand at poetry.' This is characteristic of a period antecedent to the formation of anything like a prose style. Of the poems of Solon, considerable passages are preserved to us; they consist of elegies, in which the political circumstances of Solon's lifetime are recorded, and into which sufficient general reflections on human nature are interwoven to entitle him to be called a Gnostic poet. Solon's views of life, as far as they appear in his poetry, are characterized by a manliness which contrasts them with the

soft Lydian effeminacy of Mimnermus, to one of whose sentiments Solon made answer. Mimnermus having expressed a wish for a painless life and a death at the age of sixty, Solon answers: 'Bear me no ill will for having thought on this subject better than you—alter the words and sing, May the fate of death reach me in my *eightieth* year.' In one passage of his works Solon divides human life into periods of seven years, and assigns to each its proper physical and mental occupations (*Frag.* 14); in another the multifarious pursuits of men are described, and their inability to command success, because fate brings good and ill to mortals, and man cannot escape from the destiny allotted to him by the gods (*Fr.* 5). Let us now compare these two last sentiments with that saying which is always connected with the name of Solon, and which was thought worthy of a careful examination by Aristotle (*Eth.* I. x.-xi.), the saying, that 'One must look to the end,' or that 'No one can be called happy while he lives.' The story of Solon's conversation with Croesus, as given by Herodotus, is in all probability totally without historical foundation. It has the aspect of a rhetorical *ἐπιδείξις* dressed up by some Sophist to illustrate the *gnome* of Solon. However, the beauty of the story as related by Herodotus, no one can deny. The *gnome* itself in its present form has this merit, that it is perhaps the first attempt to regard life as a whole. It denies the name of happiness to the pleasure or prosperity of a moment. But its fault is, as Aristotle points out, that it makes happiness purely to consist in external fortune, it implies too little faith in, and too little regard for, the internal consciousness, which after all is far the most essential element of happiness. Moreover, there is a sort of superstition manifested in this view, and in the above-quoted verses of Solon. It represents the Deity as 'envious' of human happiness. This view is

elsewhere reprobated by Aristotle (*Metaphys.* i. ii. 13); it was a view, perhaps, natural in a period of political change and personal vicissitude, previous to the development of any philosophy which could read the permanent behind the changeable.

The remainder of the 'Seven' hardly need a mention in detail. The sayings attributed to them are too little connected to merit a criticism from a scientific point of view. 'The uncertainty of human things, the brevity of life, the unhappiness of the poor, the blessing of friendship, the sanctity of an oath, the force of necessity, the power of time, such are the most ordinary subjects of their gnomes, when they do not reduce themselves to the simple rules of prudence.'¹¹ However, some of the utterances of this era of proverbial philosophy stand conspicuous among the rest, containing a depth of meaning of which their authors could have been only half conscious. This meaning was drawn out and developed by later philosophers. The *Μηδὲν ἄγαν* of Solon, and the *Μέτρον ἄριστον* of Cleobulus passed almost into something new in the *μετρίότης* of Plato, and the *Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν* (of uncertain authorship), which was inscribed on the front of the temple at Delphi, became in the hands of Socrates in a measure the foundation of philosophy. In the *Ethics* of Aristotle, proverbs of this epoch are occasionally quoted, though not always connected with the name of any individual sage. Thus the saying, that 'Office shows the man' (*Eth.* v. i. 16), is attributed to Bias; but the adage *πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσε* (viii. v. 1), and other proverbial verses, such as *ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ.* (ii. vi. 14), and *κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον κ.τ.λ.* (i. viii. 14), which belong to the gnostic period, are cited without a name.

¹¹ Renouvier, *Manuel de Phil. Anc.* i. p. 127.

Two more poets may be mentioned who will serve to complete our specimens of the sixth century thought on moral subjects. These are Theognis and Simonides. They both were great authorities, as is evinced by their being so frequently cited in the writings of the ancients. They both have this in common that their verse betrays a constant reflectiveness on human life. But the tone is to some extent different. Theognis draws a darker picture than Simonides. Theognis exhibits traces of a harassed and unfortunate life, and the pressure of circumstances. Simonides, who lived through the Persian wars, writes in a more manly strain, as if inspired by the times and the glorious deeds of his countrymen, which he celebrated in his poetry. Theognis appears to have lived during the latter half of the sixth century. His writings are chiefly autobiographical, and consist of reflections caused by the political events of his life and of his native city Megara. He seems to have belonged to the aristocratic party and to have suffered exile, losing all his property and barely escaping with his life. His feelings of indignation are constantly expressed in his poems—in which perhaps the greatest peculiarity is, that in them the terms *ἀγαθοί* and *ἑσθλοί* are used to designate his own party, the nobles, while the commons are called *κακοί* and *δειλοί*. It must not be supposed that these terms had hitherto no ethical meaning, though of course scientific ethical definitions had as yet never been attempted. But the words *ἑσθλός* and *κακός* occur in Hesiod in quite as distinctive a sense, as the terms ‘good man,’ and ‘bad man,’ are used in general now. It is the extreme of political partizanship expressing itself in a naïve and unconscious manner which causes Theognis to identify goodness with the aristocratic classes, and badness with the commonalty of his city. We can find a strange intermixture and confusion in his writings of political and ethical thoughts.

In the celebrated passage which dwells on the influence of associates, he begins by saying 'You should eat and drink with those who have great power' (*i. e.* the nobles), 'for from the good you will learn what is good, but by mixing with the bad you will lose what reason you have.' Here an undeniable moral axiom is made to assume a political aspect, which indeed impairs its force. Plato, in the *Meno*,¹² quotes this passage and shows that it is contradicted by another passage of Theognis, which declares education to be of no effect. Theognis appears to have felt at different times with equal force the two points of view about education. At one time education appears to be everything, at another time, nothing.

All the expressions of Theognis, as indeed of the other Gnostic poets, seem characterized by perfect naturalness, if such a word might be used. They contain no attempt to reduce life to a theory; they flow from the heart of the individual according as he feels joy or sorrow. They exhibit no striving to be above circumstances,—rather the full, unrestrained wail of one who bitterly feels the might of circumstances. They do not seek to be logical; on the contrary,

¹² Οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδασκόν, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεόγνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἶσθ' ὅτι ταῦτ' αὐτὰ λέγει; M. 'Ἐν ποίοις ἔπαισιν; Σ. 'Ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις, οὐ λέγει καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πίνει καὶ ἔσθιει καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν

ἴζε καὶ ἀνδανε τοῖς ὄνι μεγάλη δύναμις.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάσκει, ἣν δὲ κακοῖσιν

συμμίσηται, ἀπολείπει καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὥς διδασκτοῦ ὁσσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει; M. Φαίνεται γὰρ. Σ. 'Ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ γὰρ ὀλίγον μετα-

βάς, εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητὴν, φησί, καὶ ἐνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα λέγει πως ὅτι

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον

οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ

οὐ ποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἐγεντο κακός,

πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαφροσιν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκων

οὐ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰναντία λέγει; 95 C sqq.

Both of these passages of Theognis are alluded to by Aristotle in the *Ethics* (ix. ix. 7, x. ix. 3).

they are full of inconsistencies. In one place Theognis says (173-182), 'if one is poor it is better to die than live; one should cast oneself from some high cliff into the sea.' In another place (315-318), 'Many of the bad are rich, and the good poor, yet one would not exchange one's virtue for riches.' In the views of Theognis, as we saw before in those of Solon, there may be traced a superstitious feeling of the resistless power, and at the same time the arbitrary will of the gods. As to the standard of duty in his poems, such a conception must needs be held to have been very wavering in him who could write (363 sq.), 'Flatter your enemy, and when you have got him into your power, wreak your vengeance, and do not spare him.' It is obvious that the elegiac form adopted by Theognis gave an air of universality to maxims which were only suitable to his own troubled times, and his own angry spirit. To accept the cynicism and the complaints of Byron as if of universal applicability, would be almost a parallel to what actually took place in Greece, when the verses of Theognis were quoted as an authority in morals. That this could ever have been the case, shows how great was the want of a more fixed standard, and almost justifies the sweeping attacks made by Plato upon the poets.

In the verses of Simonides of Ceos there is, as we have said, a more healthy spirit. His life (B.C. 556-467) was prosperous, and was spent at different courts, especially those of Hipparchus at Athens, of the Aleuads and Scopads in Thessaly, of Hiero at Syracuse. If Theognis be compared to Byron among the moderns, Simonides may, in some respects, be compared to Goethe, though Goethe exhibits no parallel to his spirited and even impassioned songs on the heroic incidents of the war. But the courtly demeanour of Simonides, to which he seems to have somewhat sacrificed his independence, his worldly wisdom, his moderation of views, his

realistic tendencies with regard to life, and his efforts for a calm and unruffled enjoyment, remind one a little of the great German. Beyond heroism in war, Simonides does not appear to have held any exalted notions of the possibilities of virtue. There is a very interesting discussion in the *Protagoras* of Plato (pp. 339–346), on the meaning of some strophes in one of the Epinician odes of Simonides. This discussion has the effect of exhibiting the critical ability of Socrates as superior to that of Protagoras. The import of the passage criticized appears to be, that, ‘while absolute perfection (τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου γενέσθαι) is well-nigh impossible, yet Simonides will not accept the saying of Pittacus, ‘it is hard to be good,’—for misfortune makes a man bad and prosperity good; good is mixed with evil, and Simonides will be satisfied if a man be not utterly evil and useless;—he will give up vain and impracticable hopes, and praise and love all who do not voluntarily commit base actions.’ These expressions are very characteristic of Simonides. We may remark in them (1) the criticism upon Pittacus, which shows the advance of reflective morality; (2) the point of view taken, namely, a sort of worldly moderation. Simonides complains that Pittacus has set up too high an ideal of virtue, and then proclaimed the difficulty of attaining it. Simonides proposes to substitute a more practical standard.

In thus discussing one of the gnomes of the Seven Sages, Simonides approaches in some degree to the mode of thought of the Sophists, but in later times he was taken as the representative of the old school, in contradistinction to ‘young Athens,’ with its sophistical ideas. Thus in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (1355–1362), Strepsiades calls for one of the *Scolia* of Simonides, while his son treats them with contempt. A sort of sententious wisdom appears to have been aimed at by this courtly poet; a specimen of it is given in

the *Republic* of Plato (p. 331 E), where justice is defined according to Simonides, to consist in 'paying one's debts.' It is easy to show this definition inadequate, and yet it was a beginning. The quickly developing mind of Greece could not long remain in that stage to which Simonides had attained; it was imperatively necessary that it should break away, and by force of questioning, obtain a more scientific view. We might say of the aphoristic morality of the poets and sages what Aristotle says of the early philosophers, namely, that 'without being skilled boxers, they sometimes give a good blow' (*Metaphysics*, I. iv. 4).

There was another element specified by Plato in his picture of the popular morality of Greece, which we have hitherto left unnoticed, namely, the tendency to accept unworthy conceptions of religion, such as would essentially interfere with the purity and absoluteness of any ideas of right and wrong. Not only was there prevalent a belief in the enviousness and *Nemesis* of the Deity, such as forms the constant theme of the reflections of Herodotus; not only was there a superstitious hankering after signs and oracles, which tended to disturb the manly calmness of the mind; not only was there a mean and anthropomorphic conception of God, which reduced religion to hero-worship, and really stood quite beside, and distinct from, all morality; but also there was a direct tampering with morality itself on the part of certain religious hierophants. These were the professors of mysteries, respecting whom Adeimantus is made to say in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 364 B sq.), 'The most astonishing theories of all are those which you shall hear about the gods and about virtue—that the gods themselves have actually allotted to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, and to the bad a directly opposite lot. On the other hand, seers and jugglers come to the doors of the rich, and persuade them that they

have a power given them by the gods of expiating by offerings and charms all offences, whether committed by a man's self or his ancestors, and this quite pleasantly—merely by holding a feast; and if any one wants to be revenged on an enemy, they will, for a trifling cost, do the fellow a harm (they say) whether he be a good man or a bad man—by forcing the gods with their incantations and spells to serve them. They cite the poets as authorities for their assertions, to prove that the path of vice is easy, and that of virtue rugged and difficult. They prove from Homer that the gods are not inexorable, but may be turned by the prayers and offerings of men. And they adduce a whole swarm of the books of Musæus and Orpheus, the kinsmen (as they say) of Selene and of the Muses, according to which they perform their rites, and persuade not only individuals, but whole states, that actually by means of feastings and pleasure, expiations and releases may be provided both for the living and also for the dead, which will free men from all the penalties of the future life; but that for any one not using their rites a most horrible fate remains.'

Of the Orphic mysteries here alluded to, and of the other mysteries in general, it will not be necessary for our present purpose to say much. They appear to have originally possessed an oriental character, and to have been in themselves not without a deep meaning. They were a protest against Grecian anthropomorphism. They seem to have contained the assertion of two deep ideas, the immortality of the soul, and the impurity of sin, which required expiation. That they had become debased before becoming popular, we learn from this account of Plato. A perverted religion that offered 'masses for the soul,' and a preference to the rich over the poor,—joined with the traditional, unreflecting, and prudential morality that was rife in Greece—produced a state of feeling

that made Plato say in the person of Adeimantus—‘The only hope is, either if a person have a sort of inspiration of natural goodness, or obtain a scientific apprehension of the absolute difference between right and wrong.’ (πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ. *Repub.* p. 366 C.)

The relation of the *Ethics* of Aristotle to the popular morality was, as we have said, rather different from that of Plato. Aristotle considers the opinion of the many worth consideration, as well as that of the philosophers. He constantly appeals to common language in support of his theories, and common tenets he thinks worthy of either refutation or establishment. There are certain points of view with regard to morals, which are not exactly philosophical in Plato’s sense of the word, but which have a sort of philosophical character, while, at the same time, they were common property; and these are made use of by Aristotle. Such are especially the lists and divisions of good, which seem to have been much discussed in Greece; as, for instance, the threefold division into goods of the mind, the body, and external (*Eth.* I. viii. 2); again, the division into the admirable (τίμια) and the praiseworthy (*Eth.* I. xii. 1). One list of goods, not mentioned by Aristotle, pretended to give them in their order of excellence, thus,—wisdom, health, beauty, wealth. The conception of a chief good seems to have been vaguely present before people’s minds, and this no doubt determined primarily the form of the question of Aristotle’s *Ethics*. This was the natural question for a Greek system of Ethics; both Plato and Aristotle tell us how wavering and inconsistent were the answers that common minds were able to give to it, when in an utterly unsystematic way it was presented to them (*Repub.* p. 505 B; *Ethics*, I. iv. 2).

Before taking leave of this period of unphilosophic morals,

we must ask—How fared the philosophers in it? The author of the *Magna Moralia*, as we have seen, attributed to Pythagoras certain mathematical formulæ for expressing ethical conceptions. That the Pythagoreans adopted these we know from other sources, but at how late a date it seems difficult to say,¹³—perhaps not before the time of Philolaus. Of the other philosophers it may be said generally that ethical subjects did not form part of their philosophy, they made no attempt to systematize the phenomena of human society and human action. And yet they had deep thoughts on life and stood apart from other men. This standing apart was indeed their characteristic attitude. Philosophic isolation was the chief result of their reflections upon the world. The same thing, as M. Renouvier says, expresses itself in the symbolic tears of Heraclitus and the symbolic laughter of Democritus,—a doctrine of despair and of contempt. A deep feeling pervades the utterances of Heraclitus, but it is a feeling of the insignificance of man. ‘The wisest man,’ he says, ‘is to Zeus, as an ape is to man.’ In the ceaseless eddy of the creation and destruction of worlds, which he pictured to himself, individual life must have seemed as the motes in the sunbeam. He was called ὀχλολόιδωρος, from his philo-

¹³ A quantity of spurious Pythagorean fragments have come down to us. Patricius, in his *Discussiones Peripateticæ* (Vol. II. Book VII.), quotes these to prove that Aristotle plagiarized from the Pythagoreans. If the fragments were genuine, they would indeed prove wholesale plagiarism. But they are plainly mere translations of Aristotle into Doric Greek. The following is attributed to Archytas. οὐδὲν ἑτερόν ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ’ ἡ χράσις ἀρετᾶς ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ. Able as the

work of Patricius is, it labours under the disadvantages of its era, criticism having as yet hardly an existence. As a specimen of his judgment—he calls it ‘a lie’ on the part of Aristotle to attribute the authorship of the Ideas to Plato, since this doctrine had been known before Plato, to the Pythagoreans, Orpheus, the Chaldeans, and the Egyptians! His authorities are such works as *Iamblichus*, *Pselus*, &c.

sophic exclusiveness. Democritus, though a pre-Socratic philosopher, yet lived into and was influenced by the thought of the Sophistic era. He seems to have considered the human will as something apart in the world, and thus while subjecting the atoms to the power of necessity, he is reported to have said, 'Man is only a half-slave of necessity.' The chief good he considered to be *Ἀταραξία* or an unruffled serenity of mind. In a similar spirit Anaxagoras affirmed that 'he considered happiness something different from what most men supposed, and that they would be astonished to hear his conception of it' (cf. *Eth.* x. viii. 11), meaning that it consisted not in material advantages, but in wisdom and philosophy. The moral doctrines of these early philosophers come before us in general in the form of aphorisms, they seem to belong rather to the personal character of the men than to the result of their systems.

II. We pass now from the period of unconscious morality in Greece, and enter upon the era of the Sophists. A difficult subject for discussion now presents itself. The question, What was the character and position of the Sophists? is one with regard to which it is hard to obtain the exact truth, and lately it has been made matter of controversy whether we are to trust the testimony of antiquity at all with regard to the Sophists, whether we have not been all along entertaining an illusion; whether Plato's portraits of them are not mere caricatures prompted by a spirit of antagonism, whether Aristotle's allusions to them are not a mere reproduction of the calumnies in Plato, whether, in short, the existence of what we have been accustomed to call 'Sophistry,' or the 'Sophistical spirit,' is not altogether a chimera as far as regards those personages to whom the name *σοφισταί* was first distinctively applied. To answer those doubts it will be necessary to employ as much as possible an inductive method,

and to bring together the exact words of ancient authorities upon the subject.

In the term 'Sophist,' we have to deal with a word of indefinite, progressive, and variable signification. The original vagueness of its meaning in the early writers, is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, i. 12, who says the term used to be applied to the poets. (Οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ἐκαλοῦντο. Καὶ οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ σοφισταί. Καθὰ καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν Ἀρχιλόχῳ τοὺς περὶ Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡσίοδον ἐπαινῶν οὕτως καλεῖ.) It is plainly distinguished from *σοφὸς* in that it implies 'one who *by profession* practises or exhibits some kind of wisdom or cleverness.' Æschylus (born 525 B.C.) makes Hermes apply the term obviously with sarcasm to Prometheus. Cf. *P. V.* 944 sqq.:—

σὲ τὸν σοφιστὴν, τὸν πικρῶς ὑπέρπικρον,
τὸν ἐξαμαρτόντ' ἐς θεούς, ἐφημέροισ
πορόντα τιμάς, τὸν πυρὸς κλέπτην λέγω.

but the sneer consists in addressing Prometheus as 'you the craftsman,' 'the planner,' 'the deviser,' when in so helpless a situation. In the same play, v. 62, it occurs without any such irony—

ἵνα
μάθῃ σοφιστῆς ὦν Διὸς νωθέστερος.

'duller in his art than Zeus.' In one of the fragments of Æschylus *σοφιστής* is applied to Orpheus, denoting 'musician,' or 'master.'

Herodotus (born 484 B.C.) uses the word without any good or bad intent to denote a man distinguished for wisdom or philosophy; cf. i. 29, ἀπικνέονται ἐς Σάρδεις ἀκμαζούσας πλούτῳ ἄλλοι τε οἱ πάντες ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σοφισταί, οἱ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτύγχανον ἔόντες, ὥς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἀπικνέοιτο, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σόλων ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος. In this passage we see that there is not the slightest allusion to the so-called 'Sophists' of the

time of Socrates; οἱ πάντες ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σοφισταί implies those who professed or were noted for any kind of intellectual ability. The term would include *litterati* and statesmen, just as much as philosophers. In II. 49, Herodotus speaks of οἱ ἐπιγενόμενοι τούτῳ (Melampus), σοφισταί, meaning something analogous to 'the Theosophists who came after him.' In IV. 95 he applies the term to Pythagoras, Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ, where it simply means 'philosopher.'

Aristophanes, though born probably about 449 B.C., began his career as a writer so extremely early, that his play of the *Clouds* was brought out in 423. In this play we have a most important caricature of the Sophistic spirit as an innovating and corrupting element in the education of youth. It will be worth while to advert to this picture hereafter. At present, as we are dealing only with the name 'Sophist,' it is enough to remark that this name is *never* in the *Clouds* applied to the teachers of the thinking school (φροντιστήριον), which is made the subject of ridicule. The word occurs three or four times in the play. It appears in what might be called its fifth century signification. It no longer has its old indeterminate meaning of 'artist' or 'philosopher,' free from all reproach implied; nor, again, has it reached the limited Platonic sense of 'paid instructor in rhetoric and philosophy.' While it is still used to denote the 'professors' of various arts and sciences, an association of subtlety and over-refinement, in fact what we now understand by 'sophistry,' attaches to it, cf. V. 331, where it is said that the clouds are the maintainers of many such idle and dreamy professors;¹⁴ in V. 361, Socrates and Prodicus are spoken of as the chief amongst the

¹⁴ οὐ γὰρ μὰ Δὲ οἷσθ' ὅτι πλείστους
αὐταὶ βόσκουσι σοφιστάς,

θουριομάντεις, ἰατροτέχνας, σφραγιδονυχ-
αργοκομήτας.

crew of subtle speculators;¹⁵ in v. 1111 sq. we see expressed the popular opinion of the Sophist, *i.e.*, a pale and attenuated student;¹⁶ and in v. 1306 sq., the term is applied to Strepsiades in allusion to his cheating of his creditors.¹⁷

Thucydides (born 471 B.C.) who wrote at the end of the fifth century, though not much later in point of years than Herodotus, is immensely advanced beyond him in point of style and thought, and seems to belong in fact to a different era. He uses the word *σοφισταί* in a sense nearer to that of Plato, than Aristophanes had done, to denote those professional orators who made displays of rhetoric (*ἐπιδείξεις*) before a set audience.¹⁸

Xenophon (born about 444 B.C.), though a disciple and friend of Socrates, stood quite aloof from the transcendental philosophy of Plato. We cannot therefore attribute his opinion of the Sophists to a mere copying of Plato's descriptions, even if chronological considerations would allow this. Xenophon's point of view was totally distinct from Plato's. He rather represents the opinions of an educated Athenian of the day. The *locus classicus* in his writings with regard to the Sophists occurs at the end (as far as it remains) of the treatise on Hunting (*Cynegeticus*, c. XIII.). After descanting on the advantages of hunting as a moral training for youth, he is led to speak of the spurious teaching of 'the so-called Sophists' of his time. He says, 'They pretend to teach

¹⁵ σὺ τε, λεπτοτάτων λήρων ἱερεῦ,
φράζε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὃ τι χρήσεις.
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἕλλω γ' ὑπακούσaiμεν τῶν
νῦν μετεωροσοφιστῶν
πλὴν ἢ Προδίκῳ, τῷ μὲν σοφίας καὶ
γνώμης οὐνέκα, κ.τ.λ.

¹⁶ ΑΔ. ἀμέλει, κομιεῖ τοῦτον σοφί-
στην δεξιόν.
ΦΕΙΔ. ὥχρον μὲν οὐκ οἶμαι γε καὶ κα-
κοδαίμονα.

¹⁷ κοῦκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐ τήμερον λήψε-
ται τι
πρᾶγμ' ὃ τοῦτον ποιήσει τὸν σοφιστὴν
ἀνθ' ὧν πανουργεῖν ἤρξατ' ἐξαίφνης
κακὸν λαβεῖν τι.

¹⁸ Cf. III. 38. ἀπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ
ἡσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικό-
τες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως
βουλευομένοις.

virtue, but their teaching is a mere pretence.’¹⁹ He has never seen any one made a good man by the teaching of a Sophist. He says, ‘Many beside me find fault with the Sophists, and not with the philosophers, because the former are subtle in words and not in thoughts.’²⁰ ‘They seek only reputation and gain, and do not like the philosophers teach with a disinterested spirit.’²¹ We see that in this passage the word ‘Sophist’ is used in that sense which it bears uniformly in Plato and Aristotle, namely, to denote a professional teacher, and we may also judge of the character of the instructions given by a Sophist, namely, that they mainly consisted in so-called ethical teaching (φασὶ μὲν ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ἀγχειν) and in rhetoric (ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται). Xenophon testifies to their rapacious spirit, and to the general disrepute in which the profession and the name of Sophist was held (ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί—ὃ ἐστὶν ὄνειδος παρὰ γε τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι). The charge that they ‘hunted after rich young men,’ may have emanated from Socrates. It is repeated in the half humorous definition of their character, given in Plato’s *Sophist*.

In one passage of the *Memorabilia* Xenophon uses the word σοφιστής apparently in a less determinate sense to denote ‘philosopher’ (cf. *Mem.* iv. ii. 1, γράμματα πολλὰ

¹⁹ Θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν καλουμένων ὅτι φασὶ μὲν ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ἀγχειν οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς νέους, ἄγουσιν δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον· οὔτε γὰρ ἄνδρα που ἐωράκαμεν ὄντιν’ οἱ νῦν σοφισταὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν, οὔτε γράμματα παρέχονται ἐξ ὧν χρὴ ἀγαθοὺς γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ματαίων πολλὰ αὐτοῖς γέγραπται ἀφ’ ὧν τοῖς νέοις αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ κεναὶ, ἀρετὴ δ’ οὐκ ἔστι.

²⁰ Ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται καὶ οὐκ

ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν.

²¹ Οἱ σοφισταὶ δ’ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐξαπατᾷ λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτῶν κέρδει καὶ οὐδὲνα οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδ’ ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἐκάστῳ σοφιστὴν κληθῆναι, ὃ ἐστὶν ὄνειδος παρὰ γε τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν σοφιστῶν παραγγέλματα παραινῶ φυλάττεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐνθυμήματα μὴ ἀτιμάζειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοφισταὶ πλουσίους καὶ νέους θηρῶνται, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι πᾶσι κοινοὶ καὶ φίλοι.

συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων).

In *Mem.* I. i. 11 (ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος), there seems to be an allusion to the technical nomenclature introduced or employed by the Sophists properly so called, *i. e.* the professional teachers.²² In *Mem.* I. vi. 1, Xenophon speaks of Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστήν. It is uncertain whether Antiphon of Rhamnus, the master of Thucydides, is here meant. Whoever is the person alluded to, he is described as making it a reproach to Socrates that he asked no pay for his teachings, to which Socrates replies that the sale of wisdom is a kind of prostitution, and that those who practise it are stigmatized with the name of Sophists.²³ We find then in Xenophon that a definite sense (on the whole) is now attached to the name Sophist, *i. e.* a professional teacher demanding pay for his instructions.

The next testimony we have to cite is that of Isocrates, who was born 436 B.C., and was thus seven years older than Plato. He seems to have been to some extent the pupil of Socrates, but he maintained himself afterwards by keeping a school of rhetoric, which was attended by the most distinguished pupils. His direction was entirely practical, as is evinced by frequent passages of his works, in which he expresses contempt or dislike of the speculative spirit. On the one hand he uses the term 'Sophist' in its received meaning of professional teacher, and on the other hand he is in the habit of employing it loosely and vaguely to apply to *litterati* or philosophers in general. Isocrates was totally incapable of appreciating the philosophic spirit, and from his point of

²² Cf. Plato's *Meno*, p. 85 B. καλοῦσι δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί. Cf. *Protag.* p. 315 C, ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἅττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἰππίαν.

²³ Τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνοὺς ἀποκαλοῦσιν, κ.τ.λ. § 13.

view, which regarded practical success as alone worth having, he ignored altogether any distinction between the philosopher and the Sophist. His aversion to speculation vents itself in a confused and indiscriminate carping at the literary profession and the philosophers. His oration *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν*, which is fragmentary, contains an attack on ‘those who undertake to teach.’ He ridicules the magnitude of their promises,—their imposture in offering to impart to youths virtue and the art of attaining happiness; and the absurdity of their demanding in return for these inestimable advantages, the paltry sum of three or four minæ. This class of teachers he calls the disputants (*οἱ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατρίβοντες*); from them he passes on to censure those that offer to impart political discourses, being all the while themselves incompetent, and speaking as if such discourses had no relation to particular occasions, but could, like the art of writing, be acquired once for all. The reproaches he makes use of are some of them identical with those to be found in the dialogues of Plato, as, for instance, that the Sophists cannot trust those very pupils to whom they are undertaking to teach justice. He laughs at their affecting to despise wealth, and says that their mean condition, and adherence to mere verbal distinctions, has made many prefer to remain unscientific, as despising such a kind of exercise.

What Isocrates upholds, however, in contrast to this is not a deeper philosophy, but a more polished rhetoric, and he names mental qualifications for it, which are precisely such as Plato thought most undesirable. *Ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι*. In another passage (*Philippus*, § 12), Isocrates uses the term Sophist with what seems to be an undeniable allusion to Plato’s *Republic* and *Laws*. Speaking of the futility of abstract political speculations, he says, *ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι*

τῶν λόγων ἄκυροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις. In his oration, *De Permutatione* (§ 235), he says that Solon, through his attention to rhetoric, 'came to be called one of the Seven Sophists, and took the appellation now dishonoured and censured by you,' and in § 313, he affirms that Solon was the first of the Athenians to be called a Sophist.²⁴ This last statement is at variance with that of Plato, who makes Protagoras to have been the first who accepted the appellation 'Sophist.' The discrepancy depends on the ambiguity and change of meaning in the term. Solon may have been the first Athenian who was called Sophist, in the old sense of the word, *i. e.* philosopher. Protagoras was the first who adopted the name in its later sense, *i. e.* professional teacher of philosophy.

Hitherto we have dealt with what might be called the external side of the character of the Sophists. We have seen the impression they produced upon cultivated men, who were not troubled to estimate very deeply their tendencies, viewed as a direction or 'moment' in philosophy. In Aristophanes we have seen them broadly caricatured, and Socrates mixed up with them as their representative. By Thucydides they are alluded to as rhetoricians, exhibiting their displays of art before an audience. Xenophon, as a gentleman and a soldier, expresses contempt for a set of men, whom he regards as impostors in teaching, while, on the other hand, he respects the philosopher who is free from all mercenary motives. Isocrates speaks of them partly with the bitterness of a rival teacher, and one who has experienced

²⁴ Οὐκ οὖν ἐπὶ γε τῶν προγόνων οὕτως εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς καλουμένους Σοφιστὰς ἐθαύμαζον καὶ τοὺς συνόντας αὐτοῖς ἐζήλουν. Σόλωνα μὲν γὰρ, τὸν πρῶτον

τῶν πολιτῶν λαβόντα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταύτην προστάτην ἡξίωσαν τῆς πόλεως εἶναι.

hostility²⁵ from some of them, and partly he despises the useless and unpractical character of their teaching, its empty pretence, and idle verbal subtleties. Passing on now to Plato, we shall first be able to gain much additional information from him as to this same external side of the Grecian Sophists; afterwards we shall learn from him to appreciate the inner essence of that spirit which he calls ἡ σοφιστική, and which may undoubtedly be looked upon as an actual phase of human thought, by no means confined to the age of Socrates.

It has been a common mistake to understand, under the name of 'the Sophist,' certain particular individuals, Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Polus, Thrasy-machus, and one or two others, who figure in the dialogues of Plato. Enough has been said to show that in earlier writers the name is never used to indicate a sect in philosophy, and it is equally true that in Plato it is the name of a profession, not of a sect; nor is it ever restricted by him to the above-mentioned individuals, who are merely eminent members of what was indeed a very wide-spread profession. In the *Meno*, p. 91 E, Socrates is made to speak as if Protagoras was not by any means even the first of the Sophists, καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγυνοῦτες ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. And by a still more remarkable mode of speaking, in the *Ethics* of Aristotle ix. i. 5-7, Protagoras appears to be in a sort of way contrasted with the Sophists.²⁶ It is true that Plato represents Protagoras to

²⁵ Cf. *De Permutatione*, § 2. Ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰδὼς ἐνίοις τῶν σοφιστῶν βλασφημοῦντας περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς καὶ λέγοντας ὥς ἐστι περὶ δικογραφίαν.

²⁶ Ὁ γὰρ προῖέμενος ἔακ' ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. "Ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτέ, τι μῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ

ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον.—Οἱ δὲ προλαβόντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μὴν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν, διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. Τοῦτο δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μὴθῆνα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται.

have been the first to assume openly the name of Sophist (cf. *Protag.* p. 317), but he also gives a humorous picture in the same dialogue, p. 314 D, of the crowds of Sophists flocking to the house of Callias, so that the porter mistaking Socrates and Hippocrates for members of the profession, would scarcely open the door to them.²⁷ Within the house they find a conclave of persons, ‘most of them foreigners whom Protagoras, like another Orpheus, had drawn after him from their own cities’—amongst others, ‘Antimærus the Mendæan, the most famous of the pupils of Protagoras, who was learning with professional objects, meaning to be a Sophist’ (ἐπὶ τέχνη μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος). Protagoras takes great merit to himself for openly declaring his art, for he confesses ‘that a certain amount of envy attaches to it; that, going about drawing away youths from their kindred and connexions under the promise of making them better if they associated with him—he was likely to be assailed with hostility; old as he is, however, no harm has ever come to him on account of his candour.’ (pp. 316–317.)

It is interesting to trace in Plato the indications of general opinion about the Sophists. In spite of their great success he represents them to have been held in dislike and suspicion by persons of honour, who at the same time made no pretensions to philosophy. This feeling is instinctively expressed by the young Hippocrates (*Protag.* p. 312 A), who being asked whether he is going to Protagoras in order himself to become a Sophist, confesses that he should consider this a great disgrace.²⁸ By Callicles, in the *Gorgias* (p. 519 E), a sweeping contempt is

²⁷ Ἐα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες οὐ σχολή αὐτῷ.—Ἀλλ’ ὦ γαθέ, ἔφη, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἤκομεν οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν, ἀλλὰ θάρρει.

²⁸ Σὺ δέ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ

ἂν αἰσχύναιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἂ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν.

expressed for ‘those who profess to teach virtue;’ Socrates asks, ‘Is it not absurd in them to find fault with the conduct of those whom they have undertaken to make virtuous?’ Callicles replies, ‘Of course it is; but why should you speak about a set of men who are absolutely worthless?’ Socrates answers, ‘Because I find the procedure of the Sophist and the Rhetorician identically the same.’ In the *Meno* the question being, Is virtue teachable? Socrates argues that if it be so, there must be teachers of it, and inquires of Anytus, ‘To whom shall we send Meno to learn virtue from? Whether to the Sophists?’ Anytus repudiates the idea, since ‘these corrupt all who come near them.’²⁹ Socrates, in reply to this, urges, ‘How is it possible this should be true of the Sophists;—a cobbler who professed to mend shoes but made them worse, would be found out in less than thirty days, how then could Protagoras have remained undetected and maintained so great a reputation and made so great a fortune, deceiving the whole of Greece for more than forty years? At all events, must we not concede that if they do harm to others, they do so unconsciously, and are like men insane?’ To this Anytus answers, ‘That *they* are insane who give money to the Sophists, and still more so the states who allow them to practise their art.’ Socrates says, ‘Some one of the Sophists must have wronged you, Anytus, or you would not be so bitter.’ Anytus says, ‘No, I never had anything to do with

²⁹ P. 91 B. σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς πέμποιμεν. ἡ δὴλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφάναντας αὐτοὺς κοινούς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθάνειν, μισθὸν τοῦτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους; AN. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ.

Οἶσθα δὴκου καὶ σὺ ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἷους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς. AN. Ἡράκλεις, ἐδφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες. μηδένα τῶν συγγενῶν, μήτε οἰκείων μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λῶβη τε καὶ διαφθορά τῶν συγγινομένων.

them.' Socrates asks, 'How then can you know what they are like?' Anytus says, 'Oh, I know well enough what they are like without having had anything to do with them.' Socrates implies that Anytus is speaking not from knowledge but prejudice. He dismisses the subject by adding, 'after all, there is perhaps something in what you say' (*καὶ ἴσως τι λέγεις*, *Meno*, p. 92 D).

In this discussion it is observable that the abuse of the Sophists is put into the mouth of Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, who may be looked at as the representative of conservative feeling in Athens. Full justice is done in the dialogue (*Meno*, p. 90 A) to the eminence of his position, his wealth, and political influence. But afterwards, dramatically, his arbitrary, narrow, and unfair turn of mind comes out. Evidently we cannot say that in the *Meno* Plato calumniates the Sophists, or vilifies them as opponents and rivals of Socrates. Rather he makes it appear that there is something hasty and inconsidered in the popular feeling against them (which is a true, but blundering instinct), and that the philosopher must consider their claims, their tendencies, and the phenomena of their success from a deeper point of view.

To a similar purport Socrates is made to speak in the *Republic* (p. 492 A), where he says to Adeimantus, 'Perhaps you think with the multitude that youths are corrupted by Sophists, and do not perceive that Society is itself the greatest Sophist, educating and moulding young and old. What Sophist or private instructor could withstand the powerful voice of the world? Don't you see that the so-called Sophists do nothing else but follow public opinion? They teach nothing else but the popular dogmas. They are like keepers of a wild beast, who, when they have studied his moods and learned to understand his noises, call this a system and a philosophy.' The common accusation had been that the Sophists unsettled

young men's opinions, and turned them away from the established beliefs. Socrates implies, 'I am willing to exonerate them from this. Rather I have to complain that the Sophists are too unsophisticated, that they are too much merely echoes of the popular voice; that they have "*plus que personne, l'esprit que tout le monde a.*"'

Viewed externally the Sophists presented the appearance of a set of teachers, such as first appeared in Greece towards the middle of the fifth century B.C. (Protagoras was born about B.C. 480, and began to practise his art in his thirtieth year, but there were others before him). They were for the most part itinerant teachers, going from city to city. They would make displays of their rhetoric (*ἐπιδείξεις*), and then invite the youths of their audience to come and receive instruction with a view to becoming able men in the state (*δεινοί, habiles hommes, &c.*). Their instructions were various, rhetoric and dialectic, ethics, music, and physical science. Some, such as Hippias, professed a pantological knowledge; others, as Gorgias, confined themselves to rhetoric. Their profits no doubt varied with their success; some must have been ill-paid and wretched, as represented by Aristophanes and Isocrates. The leading members of the profession seem to have made large sums of money. On this point, however, Isocrates is at direct issue with Plato. Socrates says in the *Meno*, p. 91 D, that 'he knew of Protagoras gaining greater wealth by his profession than Phidias and ten other sculptors put together.' And in the *Hippias Major* (p. 282-283) Prodicus is said to have made immense sums;³⁰ Hippias is made to boast that 'when quite a young man he made in Sicily, in a short space of time, more than 150 minæ (450*l.*), and that in one little village, Inycus, he

³⁰ Τοῖς νεοῖς συνὼν χρήματα ἔλαβε θαυμαστὰ ὄσα. Cf. Xen. *Symp.* 1. 5, IV. 62.

made more than 20 minæ' (60*l.*). He adds, however, 'that he supposes he has made more than any two Sophists put together.' In contradiction to this picture, Isocrates gives a much more limited account of the pecuniary success of the Sophists. He says (*De Permutatione*, 155-156), 'Not one of the so-called Sophists will be found to have amassed much money. Some of them lived in small, others in very moderate circumstances. Gorgias of Leontium made the most on record. He lived in Thessaly, where people were very rich, attained a great age, was long given up to his business, had no settled habitation in any state, paid no taxes nor contribution, had no wife nor children, and so was free from this the most continual tax of all — and with these advantages beyond others for acquiring a fortune, he only left behind him at the last 1000 staters' (125*l.*?). This oration was written in the eighty-second year of Isocrates' life, and probably much later than the above-mentioned dialogues of Plato; the fame of the achievements of the Sophists was therefore less fresh. Isocrates, being himself a paid teacher, was complaining of the difficulty of making enough, he was therefore not likely to take a sanguine view of success in this department; also, it is credible that the Sophists did, as is usually the case with persons whose gains are irregular, not save much or leave much behind them. Hence we need not find a great difficulty in the discrepancy of the two statements. Plato represents popular rumours and external surprise at the success of a new profession; Isocrates, taking the other side, goes into details and shows that in the long run there was nothing so very wonderful effected, after all.

With regard to the reproach against the Sophists, that their teaching for money at all was something discreditable — an argument has been raised, that this is really no reproach, as the practice of so many respectable men among the

moderns may serve to testify. But we should endeavour to put ourselves into the position of the ancients, and the following considerations may help us to do so. (1) The practice of the Sophists was an innovation, and jarred on men's feelings. There was something that to the natural prejudices of the mind seemed more beautiful in the old simple times, when wisdom, if imparted, was given as a gift. As soon as the Sophists began their career, the fine and free spirit of the old philosophers seemed gone. When Hippias boasts of his gains, Socrates ironically replies, 'Dear me, how much wiser men of the present day are than those of old time. You seem to be just the reverse of Anaxagoras. For he is said to have had a fortune left him and to have lost it all, such a poor Sophist was he (*οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφίζεσθαι*), and other such stories are told of the ancients.' (*Hipp. Major*, p. 283 A.) (2) With the Sophists systematic education began for the first time. Undoubtedly this was a necessity. But it is equally true that about the administration of systematic education there is something that appears at first sight slavish and mechanical. The Greeks had not yet learned those principles according to which a sense of duty will dignify the meanest tasks. They tested things too exclusively in reference to the standard of the fine and the noble (*καλόν*). (3) But it was not simply the office of the paid schoolmaster that was disliked in the Sophist. We do not find that the teachers of gymnastics or of harp-playing were held in disrepute. Those who kept schools for boys were looked down upon, it is true,³¹ but were not identified with the Sophists. The latter taught not boys, but youths; again, they taught not the necessary rudiments, but something more pretentious—wisdom, philosophy, political skill, virtue, and

³¹ Cf. Demosthenes *de Coronâ*, p. 313.

the conduct of life. To make a market of the highest subjects and of divine philosophy seemed to men like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, little less than a sort of simony. There was a charlatanism in the offer to teach these things to all comers, which was from different causes equally offensive to ordinary men and to the philosophers. Men like Anytus and Aristophanes complained that the Sophists corrupted youth by teaching them subtleties and unsettling their opinions. In this complaint there was a part of the truth. The philosophers added the other side, by complaining that the Sophists were shallow and rhetorical, that they flattered popular prejudices instead of displacing them. The Sophists were vilipended by the philosophers not merely as paid teachers, but as paid charlatans.³²

The most characteristic and prominent creation of the Sophistic era was, in one word, rhetoric. But as rhetoricians, the Sophists were themselves the creatures of their times. Circumstances were ripe in the Greek states for the development of this new direction of the human mind, and it came. Cicero (*Brutus*, c. 12) quoting from Aristotle's lost work, the *Συναγωγή τεχνῶν*, tells us that Rhetoric took its rise in Sicily, 'when after the expulsion of the tyrants (*i.e.* Thrasybulus, B.C. 467), many lawsuits arose with regard to the claims of citizens now returning from banishment and who had been dispossessed of their property. The incessant litigation which this led to, caused Corax and Tisias to draw up systems of the art of speaking; (for before this time there had been careful speaking and even written speeches, but no fixed method or *rationale*). Hence also Protagoras came to write his commonplaces of oratory and Gorgias his *encomia*.' Every-

³² Καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔσης. Aristotle, *Soph. Elench.* ii. 6.

where in Greece circumstances were analogous to those in Sicily. Personal freedom gave rise to the contests of the law courts. Nothing was more necessary than that a citizen should be able to defend his own cause. The demand for instruction in rhetoric, and for the development of all its arts, means, and appliances, was met everywhere by the Sophists.

Hence the impression they produced on the national speech and thought was almost unspeakably great. To trace the technical changes and advances in the various systems from Corax to Isocrates belongs to the history of rhetoric. It will suffice for the present purpose to make a few remarks on the Sophistical rhetoric in its relation to life and modes of thought. Two separate tendencies seem to have manifested themselves from the very outset among the masters of composition. On the one hand, the Sicilian school, represented by Gorgias of Leontium, Polus of Agrigentum, and their follower, Alcidas of Elæa, in Asia Minor, aimed at *εὐτέλεια*, 'fine speaking.' On the other hand, the Greek school, led by Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, devoted themselves more especially to *ὀρθόεπεια*, 'correct speaking.' From these opposite but concurrent tendencies arose that which may be called 'style' in Greece, and which did not exist before the middle of the fifth century.

The achievements of Protagoras and the 'Greek' rhetoricians seem to have amounted to no less than the foundation of grammar, etymology, philology, the distinction of terms, prosody, and literary criticism. In judging of the so-called verbal quibbles of the Sophists, we have to transport ourselves to a time anterior to the commonest abstractions of grammar and logic. Protagoras was the first to introduce that thinking upon words which was one manifestation of the subjective tendencies of the day. His work, entitled

Ὁρθοέπεια (which is mentioned by Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 267 C), most probably contained a variety of speculations, as well philological as grammatical. And even his Ἀλήθεια appears from Plato's *Cratylus* (p. 391 C) to have touched upon etymological questions. From Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, III. v., we learn that Protagoras was the first to classify the genders of nouns, calling them ἄρρενα, θήλεα, and σκεύη. From *Soph. Elench.* xiv. § 1, we learn that he considered the terminations -is and -ης ought to be appropriated to the masculine gender, so that to say μῆνιν οὐλομένην would be a solecism. In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (v. 668-692), Socrates is ludicrously introduced as following out these ideas, and wishing to alter the termination of κάρδοπος and ἀλεκτρούων to suit the feminine gender. Another of the grammatical performances of Protagoras was the classification of the λόγος or 'form of speech,' into question, answer, command, and prayer (Diogenes Laert. ix. 53), a classification which seems to have had some affinity with that of the moods of verbs. The allusions in the *Clouds* to the art of metres, versification, and rhythms, seem to imply the practice of similar studies in the school of Protagoras. Lastly, his speculations in etymology and language seem to have been made in support of his philosophical doctrine of 'knowing and being,'—πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος (cf. Plato's *Cratylus*, l.c.).

Prodicus, who is said to have been the master of Socrates (cf. *Protagoras*, p. 341 A, *Hippias Major*, p. 282 C), was famous for his distinctions between words of cognate signification and apparently synonymous. He is reported to have said 'that a right use of words is the beginning of knowledge' (πρῶτον γὰρ, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ, *Euthydem.* p. 277 E). In Plato's *Protagoras*, p. 337, a speech is put into his mouth, which exhibits an amusing caricature of his style. Every sentence contains a verbal refinement,

and is thrown back on itself, in order to furnish out some antithetical distinction in language. ‘We must be impartial, but not indifferent listeners (*κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι, ἴσους δὲ μὴ*). The speakers should dispute, not wrangle (*ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μὴ*). So they will gain our esteem, rather than our applause (*εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε*), and we shall feel rather joy than pleasure (*εὐφραينوίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα*).’

In themselves, many of the distinctions drawn by Prodicus were probably of little value—many were overstrained, and even false; cf. *Charmides*, p. 163, where a distinction is given which is said to be after the manner of Prodicus. It is between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις*—*πρᾶξις* is defined to be *ποίησις τῶν ἀγαθῶν*, but we must acknowledge the merit of this first attempt at separating the different shades of language, and fixing a nomenclature. The powerful influence of this example (not always a healthy one) may be traced in the style of Thucydides. And its full development was attained in the accurate terminology of Aristotle.

The short speech assigned to Hippias in the *Protagoras* of Plato (p. 337), and that in *Hipp. Maj.* p. 282, being obvious caricatures, give us still a conception of his manner. He appears to have united some of the splendour of the Sicilian school to the self-conscious and introverted writing of the Greek rhetoricians. This combination gives the sentences attributed to him a shadowy resemblance to the style of Thucydides, as, for instance, the following:—*ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχροὺν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήνασθαι* (337 D). Of course here the pomp of the words covers vapidness of thought, but one can see the outward husk and hollow shell of style.

The influence of Gorgias upon the writers of Greece probably exceeded that of any other Sophist. After his first essays in speculation, he appears to have renounced philosophy, and to have proclaimed himself a teacher of rhetoric. He was chosen by his countrymen, the Leontines, to come as ambassador to Athens in the year 427 B.C., asking aid against Syracuse. Thucydides (III. 86), with his usual reserve on all matters the least extraneous, makes no mention of his name. Diodorus (XII. 53) has the following remarks on this event: — ‘At the head of the envoys was Gorgias the rhetorician, a man who far surpassed all his contemporaries in oratorical skill; he also was the first inventor of the art of rhetoric. He amazed the Athenians, quick-witted and fond of oratory as they were (ὄντας εὐφυεῖς καὶ φιλολόγους), by the strangeness (τῷ ξενίζοντι) of his language, by his extraordinary ἀντίθετα, and ἰσοκῶλα, and πᾶρισα, and ὁμοιοτέλευτα, and other figures of the same kind, which at that time from the novelty of their style were deemed worthy of adoption, but are now looked upon as affected and ridiculous when used in such nauseous superabundance.’ The speeches of Gorgias were thus most elaborately constructed, and in addition to their almost metrical character, bordered upon poetry also in their use of metaphors and of compound words. Aristotle comments upon the fault of writing prose as if it were poetry, and he severely says that this was done by the first prose writers because they observed how great was the success of poets in covering by their diction the emptiness of their thoughts.³³ Aristotle in another place quotes from Gorgias and from Alcidas, his follower, several instances of what

³³ *Rhet.* III. i. 9. Ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἰδούκουν πορίσασθαι τήνδε τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο

ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου.

he calls 'frigidity' (*ψυχρότης*, *Rhet.* III. iii. 1), produced by pompous or poetical words and compounds. He also mentions two of the rhetorical tricks of Gorgias. One was that Gorgias boasted he could never be at a loss in speaking, 'for if he is speaking of Achilles, he praises Peleus,' *i.e.* he will go off from his subject into something collateral (*Rhet.* III. xvii. 2). The other device was one full of shrewdness: he said, 'You should silence your adversary's earnestness with jest, and his jest with earnest.'³⁴ Among the imitators of Gorgias were Agathon and Isocrates. The speech of Agathon in the *Symposium* of Plato is an example of the extreme of the flowery style. Socrates remarks at its conclusion, that he has been almost petrified by the speaking Gorgias (*i.e.* Gorgon's) head which Agathon has presented to him. The influence of Gorgias may also be extensively detected in the antitheses (often forced), the balance of sentences, and the occasionally poetical diction of Thucydides.

Rhetoric, viewed historically, considered as a thinking about words and the possibilities of language, was by no means, as we have seen, coeval with the origin of states and of human thought. It was a somewhat late product of civilization. But it was a path which there was an inherent necessity for opening and exploring. From this point of view, thanks are due to the more eminent Sophists for their contributions towards the formation of Grecian prose style, for developing the idea of the *period*, and bringing under the domain of art that which before was left uncultivated. If in their own writing ornament was overdone, they may be considered in this, as in other things, to occupy a transition place, and to have served as pioneers to others.

³⁴ *Rhet.* III. xviii. 7. Καὶ δεῖν ἔφη | τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι, τὸν δὲ γέλωτα
Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν | σπουδῇ.

But there is yet another aspect in which rhetoric must be regarded, and that is, not merely as an affair of words and sentences, but as a direction and phase of thought itself. It consists in attention to form, producing neglect of matter—in striving for the brilliant and the plausible, instead of for the true—in decking out stale thoughts with a fresh outer garment of words—in enforcing a conclusion without having tested the premises. This takes up the arts of the lawyer into the philosopher's or the teacher's chair; it covers its ignorance with a cloak of verbosity; it will never confess there is anything it does not know. This most truly keeps the key of knowledge, and will neither enter in itself nor let other men come in. It speaks things which it does not feel; its utterances come from the fancy, and not from the heart; its pictures are not taken from nature; its metaphors are unnecessary; its pathos is hollow. If language be looked on as not separate from thought, but identical with it, then is rhetoric false thought, as opposed to true. There are, no doubt, various degrees and stages of rhetorical falsehood. The lightest kind is that which consists in some slight exaggeration in a word or an expression. This often takes place in cases where a speaker or writer fully and sincerely believes the general import of what he is asserting; but in setting forth the separate parts he allows himself to quit the stern simplicity of what he actually feels. Again, when a foregone conclusion has lost its freshness, rhetoric is called in in the hope of enlivening it. The most flagrant rhetorical falsity would, of course, consist in the advocacy of propositions which the speaker not only did not believe (in the sense of not feeling or realizing them), but absolutely disbelieved. As men are not fiends, this is extremely rare. Rhetoric usually juggles the mind of the speaker as well as of his audience. It takes off the attention of both from examining

the truth. It is, for the most part, well-meaning, and is much rather a defender than an impugner of the common orthodox opinions. Hence it was that Plato defined rhetoric to be a trick of flattering the populace. Hence, also, he said that the Sophists studied the humours of society, as one might study the temper of a wild beast. In the practice of the Sophists, Plato saw rhetoric and Sophistry³⁵ identical. Sophistry consisted in substituting rhetoric for philosophy, words for thoughts (*ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασι*, Xen. *Cyneget.* l. c.). With Plato, philosophy was a higher kind of poetry, in which reason and imagination both found their scope. With the Sophists, it was a harangue (*ἐπίδειξις*) upon any given subject, with figures and periods to catch applause. Aristotle, indeed, was enabled afterwards to look at rhetoric in a mere abstract way, as the art of composition, and so to separate the rhetorician from the Sophist, since it was not necessary that rhetoric should be used in a Sophistical spirit. But Plato always regards rhetoric as a false impulse in human thought; he always considers it in the concrete, and never as a mere instrument to be used and abused. And that the rhetorical spirit is a reality, attaching itself above all to the highest subjects, to philosophy and religion, and, like 'the bloom of decay,' luxuriantly overgrowing them,—this the experience of all ages and of every thinking man can testify.

If Aristotle does not identify rhetoric with Sophistry, he yet very distinctly acknowledges the existence of the latter as a phase of thought. He does not, however, any more than Plato, speak of definite doctrines belonging to the Sophists, as if they were a school of philosophers with their own metaphysical or ethical creed. When he says 'Some persons

³⁵ Cf. *Gorgias*, p. 520 A. *τὰντων, ὃ μακάρι', ἐστὶ σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ.*

think justice to be a mere conventional distinction' (*Eth.* v. vii. 2), or 'Hence they call justice our neighbour's good' (*Eth.* v. vi. 6), we are accustomed to assert that 'Aristotle is here alluding to the Sophists,' but he himself never speaks in this way of the *doctrines* of the Sophists. He speaks repeatedly of their *practice*, of their method, of certain tricks in argument commonly used by them; he says that in their teaching they put Rhetoric on a level with Politics. Again, he treats of the position of Protagoras as a definite philosophical dogma, but as peculiar to Protagoras, not as common to the Sophists. Lastly he speaks of 'Sophistic' as a particular tendency or method in thought, which he compares with dialectic and with philosophy. Aristotle in all that he says about the Sophistical spirit no doubt accepts, analyses, and reduces to method much that is to be found in the Platonic dialogues. But it would be a most unwarrantable scepticism to consider Aristotle's statements a mere blind repetition of certain calumnies or hostile caricatures. Such an opinion would not only go against all historical evidence, but it would ignore most ungratefully one of the deepest utterances and most significant lessons of ancient philosophy. Truly, if Sophistry be a chimera, we had better close at once the volume of Plato.

Sophistry, as represented in the persons of the two most eminent Sophists, sprang almost simultaneously from the north and the south. Also it may be said to have derived its origin more or less immediately from two directly opposite schools of previous thinkers. Protagoras of Abdera starts from the principle of Heraclitus that all is becoming; Gorgias of Leontium took up the Eleatic principle of absolute unity. Both Protagoras and Gorgias may be considered to have held their character as philosophers in some measure distinct from their professional character as rhetoricians and

teachers, and yet the results of their philosophizing coloured their teaching. The philosophy of the two can never be said to have amalgamated, and yet it exhibits a common element. An accurate statement of the doctrine of Protagoras appears in the *Theætetus* of Plato, which is intended to refute it, but which at the same time treats its author with all respect. We see at once that it was a profound doctrine, and of the greatest importance as a 'moment' in philosophy. Heraclitus had said that all is motion, or becoming, — Protagoras analyses this becoming into its two sides, the active and the passive, in other words the objective and subjective. Nothing exists absolutely, things attain an existence by coming in contact with and acting on an organ of sensation, that is, a subject. Thus all existence is merely relative, and depends in each case on a relation to the individual percipient; and therefore 'man is the measure of all things, of the existent that they exist, and of things non-existent that they do not exist.' This proposition on the one hand contains the germ of all philosophy, on the other hand it renders philosophy impossible by reducing all knowledge and existence to mere sensation. It contains the germ of all philosophy by asserting that all knowledge, and therefore all existence, as far as we can conceive it, consists in the relation between an object and a subject, that every object implies a subject and every subject an object. This cannot be gainsaid, and it is in short one of the main purposes of philosophy to lift men out of their common unreflecting belief in the *absolute* existence of external objects, into so much idealism as this. But the principle of Protagoras falls short in its misconception and too great limiting of the subjective side of existence. Objects exist only in relation to a subject, but not necessarily in relation to individual perceptions. If individual perception is the measure of all things, the same object will be capable

of contradicting qualities at the same moment according as it *appears* different to different individuals; a thing can then be and not be at the same time; the distinction between true and false will be done away; even denial (*ἀντιλέγειν*) must cease. Protagoras acknowledged these results; he said, 'What appears true to a person is true to him. I cannot call it false, I can only endeavour to make his perceptions, not truer but better, *i.e.*, such as are more expedient for him to entertain.'

Man is indeed the measure of all things, not the individual man with his changeable and erring perceptions, but the universal reason of man, manifesting itself more or less distinctly in the deepest intuitions of those who are pure and wise, and who attain most nearly to the truth. The principle of Protagoras, by calling attention to the subjective side of knowledge, led the way to what has been called 'critical' philosophy, to a critic of cognition itself; and this was a great advance upon former systems, which regarded knowledge and existence too much as if absolutely objective. But Protagoras himself rested in sensationalism, and becoming from his own system sceptical about truth altogether, he seems to have returned, (as above-mentioned), to mere principles of expediency. His sensational theory and his scepticism about knowledge are not to be regarded as Sophistical, in the Platonic sense of the word. But with this sceptical foundation to all theories, to commence teaching virtue; to have thus reduced virtue to a matter of expediency for daily life—to have combined such acute penetration with so little moral or scientific earnestness—after exploding philosophy to have fallen back upon popular and prudential Ethics—this indeed was to exhibit many of the essential features of that Sophistry against which Plato directed all his strength. We see traces of the same spirit—of acute and

active intellect combined with a certain trifling and unreality upon the gravest subjects—in the well-known sentence of Protagoras on the gods: ‘Respecting the gods, I neither know whether they exist or do not exist; for there is much that hinders this knowledge; namely, the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life.’³⁶ This scepticism, as far as we can conjecture its tendency, does not consist in denying the Grecian Polytheism in order to substitute in its place some deeper conception. It cannot, therefore, be considered parallel to the philosophical contempt of Xenophanes and others for the fables of Paganism. Protagoras despairs of a theology, and proclaims his despair, and falls back upon practical success.

The celebrated thesis of Gorgias, which formed the subject on his book ‘On Nature, or the Non-existent,’ and of which a sketch is preserved in the treatise, called Aristotle’s, *De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiâ*, and also in Sextus Empiricus (*ad Math.* vii. 65), is one of the most startling utterances of antiquity. It consists of three propositions. (1) Nothing exists. (2) If it does exist, it cannot be known. (3) If it can be known, it cannot be communicated.³⁷ The extravagant character of this position was denounced by Isocrates in the opening of his *Helen*. He is speaking of the inveterate habit of defending paradoxes which had so long prevailed, and he asks, ‘Who is so behindhand (*ὀψιμαθής*) as not to know that Protagoras and the Sophists of that time left us compositions of the kind I have named, and even more vexatious? for how could any one surpass the audacity of Gorgias, who dared to

³⁶ Diog. Laert. ix. 51, Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* ix. 56.

³⁷ *Οὐκ εἶναι φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ δ' ἔστιν,*

ἄγνωστον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνωστόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις. Arist. *De Xenophane*, &c. c. v.

say that nothing of existing things exists?' Isocrates adds to the name of Gorgias, those of Zeno and Melissus; he had before specified as ridiculous paradoxes the theses that 'it is impossible to speak falsehood'—that 'it is impossible to deny'—that 'all virtue is one'—that 'virtue is a science.' Elsewhere (*De Permutat.* § 268), he mentions as the 'theories of the old Sophists,' that 'the number of existences was according to Empedocles, four; according to Ion, three; according to Alcmaeon, two; according to Parmenides and Melissus, one; according to Gorgias, absolutely none.' We see then that the point of view which Isocrates takes is that of so-called common sense, and practical life—that he declines to enter upon philosophical questions at all. He regards the absolute Nihilism of Gorgias as belonging to the same sphere of thought, only a more flagrant development of it, as the doctrine, 'all virtue is a science.' It is always easy to set aside philosophical views as repugnant to common sense, as mere subtleties and useless paradoxes. But if we enter on philosophy at all, we must accept the dialectic of the reason. The difficulties into which it may lead us must not be rejected as subtleties, but acknowledged, and if possible reconciled with the views of common sense.

Philosophy, before Gorgias, had been occupied with an abstract conception of Being, whether as One or Many. The dialectic of the Eleatics had been directed to establish, against all testimony of the senses, that the only existence possible is one immutable Being. On the other hand, the Ionics maintained the plurality of existences; and Heraclitus especially held the exact contrary to the Eleatic view, that there was no permanence or unity, but all was plurality and becoming. The dialectic of Gorgias coming in here explodes all philosophy by a demonstration that 'nothing exists.' This part of his position he appears to have maintained by bringing

Eleatic arguments against the Ionic hypothesis, and Ionic arguments against the Eleatic hypothesis.³⁸ 'If there is existence (εἰ δ' ἔστι), it must be either Not-being or Being. It cannot be Not-being, else Being will be identical with Not-being. It cannot be Being, for then it must be either One or Many, either created or uncreate. It cannot be One, for One implies divisibility, *i.e.*, plurality. It cannot be Many, for the Many is based upon the unit of which it is only the repetition, and is so essentially One. Again, it cannot be created, for it must either be created out of the existent or the non-existent. It cannot be the former, else it would have existed already. It cannot be the latter, for nothing can come from the non-existent. Nor can it be Uncreate, for that implies its being Infinite, and the Infinite can have no existence in space.' These arguments are not to be looked at as a mere wanton sporting with words. Rather they contain a very penetrating insight into some of the difficulties which beset the most abstract view of existence. The same difficulties have been felt by other philosophers; thus, in the *Parmenides* of Plato, great obstacles have been set forth to considering existence either as One or as Many. And Kant represents it as one of the antinomies of the reason, that the world can neither be conceived of as without a beginning, nor as having had a beginning. No blame can possibly attach to Gorgias for these speculations, nor for the conclusions to which they led. Plato himself, in the *Parmenides* (p. 135 D), urges and exhorts the young philosopher to follow out this sort of dialectic. 'You should exercise yourself while yet young,' says Parmenides to Socrates, 'in

³⁸ Καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, συνθεῖς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα, ὅσα περὶ τῶν ὄντων λέγοντες, τὰναντία, ὡς δοκοῦσιν, ἀποφαίνονται αὐτῶς· αἱ μὲν, ὅτι ἐν καὶ οὐ

πολλὰ· οἱ δὲ αὖ, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ οὐχ ἓν· καὶ οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἀγέννητα οἱ δὲ ὡς γενόμενα ἐπιδεικνύντες, ταῦτα συλλογίζεται κατ' ἀμφοτέρων, Arist. *De Xen.* &c. l. l.

that which the world calls waste of time (*τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας*), else truth will escape you.' What, then, is this method? It consists in the following out of contrary hypotheses, the one and the many, the like and the unlike, motion, rest, creation, destruction; not only supposing the existence of each of these separate ideas, but afterwards also their non-existence; follow out the consequences in each case, and see what comes of the antinomy. All praise, then, is due to Gorgias, from Plato's point of view, for his stringent dialectic. To the popular mind, such reasonings appear absurd or repugnant. But the philosopher is only stimulated by them to seek for a higher ground of vision, whence these seeming contradictions and difficulties may be seen to be reconciled. We can only regret that we do not possess the entire work of Gorgias, in order to know more accurately its exact purpose; whether his arguments were meant to have a universal validity, or whether they were only relative to the Ionic and Eleatic philosophies. The latter would seem to be actually the case, whatever was meant by the author himself; for the destructive arguments of Gorgias, while they are of force against previous philosophy, do not touch the universe of Plato, in which there was a synthesis of the one and the many, of being and not-being.

The two remaining theses of Gorgias, that being if existent could not be known, and if known could not be communicated, — contain the strongest form of that subjective idealism afterwards repeated by Kant. They place an impassable gulf between things in themselves and the human mind. We can never know things in themselves, all we know is our thought, and the thought is not the thing. Still less could we communicate them to others, for by what organs could we communicate things in themselves? How by speech could we convey even the visible? In this part of the dialectic of

Gorgias we trace an affinity to the doctrines of Protagoras. They each exhibit a tendency to a disbelief in the possibility of attaining truth. The scepticism, however, does not constitute Sophistry. It was not peculiar to the Sophists, but is a characteristic universally of the close of the Pre-Socratic era of philosophy. Aristotle speaks against it very strongly, but he does not call it Sophistry, he attributes it to several great names (*Metaphys.* III. c. iv.-v.). After arguing against the saying of Protagoras, he mentions that Democritus said ‘there is no truth, or it is beyond our finding’ (Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἥτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ’ ἄδηλον); that Empedocles said ‘thought changes according as men change;’ that Parmenides said in the same way, ‘thought depends on our physical state;’ that Anaxagoras said ‘things are according as men conceive them.’ Aristotle remarks, ‘It is surely an evil case, if those who have attained truth most, as loving it best, and seeking it most ardently, hold these opinions. It is enough to make one despair of attempting philosophy. It makes the search after truth a mere wild-goose chase. The cause of these opinions is that men, while speculating on existence, have considered the sensible world to be the only real existence. And this latter is full of what is uncertain and merely conditional’ (*Metaphys.* III. v. 15, 16). Sophistry then is not constituted by any theories of cognition or existence. It consists in a certain spirit, in a particular purpose with which philosophy, or the pretence of philosophy, is followed. ‘Sophistry and dialectic,’ says Aristotle, ‘are conversant with the same matter as philosophy, but it differs from them both; from the one in the manner of its procedure, the other in the purpose which guides its life. Dialectic is tentative about those subjects on which philosophy is conclusive, and Sophistry is a pretence, and not a reality.’³⁹

³⁹ Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ

None of the remaining great Sophists, besides Protagoras and Gorgias, appear to have entered upon metaphysical questions. Sophistry far rather consists in the absence of fixed opinions, than in any tenets whether good or bad. As before said, we shall find that Aristotle always speaks of it as a spirit, a tendency, a trick, and not as a set of doctrines. In one place he speaks of Sophistry as consisting in rhetoric applied with certain aims (*Rhetoric*, i. i. 14). Elsewhere he says it is the near neighbour of dialectic (*Soph. El.* xxxiii. 11). It consists in using wrangling unfair arguments, with a view of astounding the listener,⁴⁰ in order that out of this triumph, reputation, and out of reputation, gain, may accrue.⁴¹

The false arguments used for this purpose seem to have become a sort of professional prerogative; so that the Sophistical art, as dramatically represented by Plato, and as analysed and reduced to system by Aristotle, may claim the distinction of having exhausted all the resources of fallacy—of having boldly entered on and utterly explored the possibilities of error in human reasoning. Aristotle says that ‘Plato gave no bad definition of Sophistry in making it to be concerned with the non-existent. For the arguments of almost all the Sophists may be said to be concerned with the accidental (*i.e.* that which has no absolute existence); as, for instance, their question whether Coriscus, the musician, is the same as plain Coriscus; whether, by becoming musical, one absolutely comes into being,’ &c. (*Metaphys.* v. ii. 4). Plato had said (*Sophist*, p. 254 A), that ‘while the philosopher is ever devoted to the idea of the absolutely existent, and thus lives in a

προαιρέσει. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστικὴ, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινόμενα, οὕσα δ' οὐ. *Metaphys.* iii. ii. 20.

⁴⁰ Διὰ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινὸν ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν,

Eth. vii. ii. 3.

⁴¹ Οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμὸν σοφιστικοί. *Soph. El.* xi. 5.

region which is dark from excess of light; the Sophist, on the other hand, takes refuge in the murky region of the non-existent.' This 'non-existent' was, as Aristotle explained it, the sphere of the accidental, the conditional, the relative, as contrasted with absolute being. Elsewhere we find that it was a trick of the Sophists to avail themselves of a traditional piece of dialectic 'older than Protagoras,' and to argue that to speak falsely was impossible, for that would be no less than uttering the non-existent, whereas the non-existent has no existence in any sense whatever, and therefore to conceive or utter it is impossible (*Euthydem.* p. 284-286). Plato maintains against this argument, and against the doctrines of the Eleatics, that in some sense 'not-being' has an existence. We see then that to set the relative meaning of a word against its absolute signification, to play off the accidental against the essential, formed a main part of the 'Eristic' art. We might have conceived that Plato's representation of the fallacies employed by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus was mere sport of the fancy, and beyond even an exaggeration of the reality, but Aristotle gravely tells us as a matter of fact, that these tricks were habitually employed by the Sophists.⁴² How far this sort of petty success was universally aimed at by them it is hard to say. Even the more eminent among them, Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus, can hardly be exonerated. In spite of the appearance of well-meaning, and a certain dignity of conduct which they exhibit in the dialogues of Plato, yet when we read of the 'boast of Protagoras' (τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα), that 'he would make the worse cause the better,' which Aristotle says men were justly indignant at, and when we read of the devices of

⁴² *Sophist. Elench.* i. 8. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν
ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον λόγων γένος, καὶ ὅτι

τοιαύτης ἐφίενται δυνάμειος οὗς καλοῦμεν
σοφιστάς, δῆλον.

Gorgias (mentioned above, page 88), and also when we consider the rhetorical turn of these men, their activity of intellect, and their boldness in dealing with grave subjects, combined with their want of philosophical earnestness, we can scarcely doubt that they were liable to resort to paralogisms.

Looking at the Sophists in general, we are certainly justified in considering Eristic, and fallacy growing out of it, to have been one of their characteristics. The birth and prevalence of fallacy no doubt gave rise to a sounder logic, which was necessary as a counteraction to the Sophists. Thus, historically, their vicious practice was advantageous, but this cannot be reckoned to them as a merit.

We now come to that which is by far the most important question with regard to the Sophists, namely, what was their influence upon ethical thought? Their influence was very great. We have seen that before the fifth century moral philosophy did not exist in Greece. Socrates is commonly spoken of as the first moral philosopher. He is said to have 'brought down philosophy from heaven.' But as in nature, so in the progress of the human mind, nothing is done 'per saltum.' The thought of Socrates was necessitated by that of the Sophists. Without them as his precursors, as well as his antagonists, his life would lose half its meaning. Socrates did not so much see philosophy wandering in heaven, and bring it down to earth and human interests, but rather he found himself surrounded with a cloud of Sophistry which was covering the whole earth, and he called up a human philosophy to dispel it. From one point of view Aristophanes uttered a sort of truth when he virtually represented Socrates as the chief of the Sophists. Unspeakably greater, and deeper, and holier, as Socrates is than Gorgias or Protagoras, he has yet something in common with them, he is the leading

figure in a new era of conscious morality which they had inaugurated.

The very first characteristic that is predicated of the Sophists by Xenophon, Isocrates, and Plato is, that they 'undertook to teach virtue.' To this rule, however, Gorgias was an exception. Meno, in Plato's dialogue, praises him 'because he was never heard to make any pretence of the kind, but used to ridicule those who made it,—he himself thought that men ought to be made clever in speaking.' Socrates on this asks Meno, 'What, don't you then really think that the Sophists can teach virtue?' to which Meno replies, 'I know not what to say, Socrates, for I feel like most men on this question. Sometimes I think that they can teach it, and sometimes that they cannot.' (*Meno*, p. 95 C.) A nearer definition of what this 'teaching virtue' meant is put into the mouth of Protagoras, who boasts (*Plato, Protag.* p. 318 E) that 'he will not mock those who come to him by teaching them mere specialities against their will, as the other Sophists do, such as dialectic, astronomy, geometry, and music. They shall learn from him nothing except what they came to be taught. His teaching will be, good counsel, both about a man's own affairs, how best to govern his own family, and also about the affairs of the state, how most ably to administer and to speak about state matters.' Socrates says, 'You appear to me to mean the art of Politics, and to undertake to make men good citizens.' 'This is just what I undertake,' says Protagoras. To attempt to discover in this proposal anything insidious or subversive of morality would be quite absurd. Protagoras is represented by Plato throughout the dialogue as exhibiting an elevated standard of moral feelings. Thus he repudiates with contempt the doctrine that injustice can ever be good sense (p. 333 C), and from grounds of cautious morality he declines to admit that the

pleasant is identical with the good (p. 351 D). There is little reason to doubt that Protagoras may have conveyed to those who sought his instructions much prudent advice, and many shrewd maxims on the conduct of life and on the art of dealing with men in public and private relations. Of the hortatory morality of the Sophist, we have further means of forming a judgment from the celebrated composition (Σύγγραμμα) of Prodicus, commonly called ‘The Choice of Hercules.’ It is preserved for us by Xenophon (*Memorab.* II. i. 21-34), who represents it as being quoted by Socrates with a view of enforcing the advantages of temperance and virtue. It was the most popular of the declamations of Prodicus (ὅπερ δὲ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται), and has since constantly found a place in books of elegant extracts and moral lessons. It would be easy to criticise and find fault with this fable. It does not adequately represent the real trial and difficulty of life. If, at the period of transition from boyhood to youth (ἐπεὶ ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἡβην ὠρμάτο) one might go forth to a place of retirement (ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι), and there see presented Vice and Virtue, the one meretricious in dress and form, the other beautiful, and dignified, and noble; and if, when Vice had opened her alluring offers, Virtue immediately exposed their hollowness, substituting her own far higher and greater promises of good; and if, there and then, one might choose *once for all* between the two, who is there that would hesitate a moment to accept the guidance of Virtue? It may be said almost universally that all youths aspire after what is good. If it depended on a choice made once for all at the opening of life, all men would be virtuous. But man’s moral life consists in a struggle in detail; and this the figure of Prodicus fails to represent. But the same criticism might be applied to other allegories. We all feel that if Christian life were literally the same as

the *Pilgrim's Progress*, many more would follow it. Several parts of the exhortation which Prodicus puts into the mouth of Virtue are full of merit; a noble perseverance and manliness of character are inculcated; and in the denunciation of vice the following fine sentence occurs: 'You never hear that which is the sweetest sound of all, self-approbation; and that which is the fairest of all sights you never see, a good deed done by yourself!' There is something rather rhetorical in the complexion of this discourse, even as it is given by the Socrates of Xenophon, and he concludes it by saying, 'Prodicus dressed up his thoughts in far more splendid language than I have used at present.' But against the moral orthodoxy of the piece not a word can be said, and we may safely assert, that had all the discourses of the Sophists been of this character, they would not have fallen into such general bad repute as teachers.

Plato never represents the Sophists as teaching lax morality to their disciples. He does not make sophistry to consist in the holding wicked opinions; on the contrary, he represents it as only too orthodox in general, but capable occasionally of giving utterance to immoral paradoxes for the sake of vanity. Sophistry rather tampers and trifles with the moral convictions than directly attacks them. It is easy to see how this came about. Greece was now full of men professing to 'teach virtue.' They were ingenious, accomplished, rivals to each other, above all things desirous of attracting attention. Their talk was on a trite subject, on which it was necessary to say something new. The procedure of the Sophists was twofold, either it was rhetorical or dialectical. They either (1) tricked out the praises of justice and virtue with citations from the old poets, with ornaments of language, and with allegories and personifications. Of this latter kind of discourse we have a specimen in the 'Choice of Hercules,' and again

we have the sketch or skeleton of a moral declamation which Hippias, in Plato's dialogue (*Hipp. Major*, p. 286), says he has delivered with great success, and is about to deliver again. The framework is simple enough. Neoptolemus, after the fall of Troy, is supposed to have asked Nestor's advice for his future conduct. Nestor replies by suggesting many noble maxims. 'Tis a fine piece,' says Hippias complacently, 'well arranged, especially in the matter of the language.' Such like compositions of the Sophists form a sort of parallel to the moral or religious novel of the present day. Or else (2) they gave an idea of their own power and subtlety, by skirmishes of language, by opening up new points of view with regard to common every-day duties, and making the old notions appear strangely inverted. All the while that they thus argued, no doubt they professed to be maintaining a mere logomachy. But to an intellectual people like the Greeks there would be something irresistibly fascinating in this new mental exercitation. Aristophanes represents the conservative abhorrence which this new spirit awakened. He depicts in a caricature a new kind of education in which everything is sophisticated, that is, tampered with by the intellect. A sort of casuistry must have been fostered throughout Greece by various concurrent causes; by the drama, which represented, as for instance in the *Antigone*, a conflict of opposing duties; by the law-courts, in which it was constantly endeavoured to 'make the worse side seem the better;' and lastly, as we have seen, by the Sophists, who, in discoursing on the duties of the citizen, did not refrain from showing that there was a point of view from which 'the law' appeared a mere convention, while 'natural right' might be distinguished from it.

To be able to view a conception from opposite points of sight; to see the unsatisfactoriness of common notions; to

feel the difficulties which attach to all grave questions—these are the first stages preparatory to obtaining a wise, settled, and philosophical conviction. Thus far the dialectic of the Sophists and that of Socrates coincide. But the Sophists went no further than these first steps; the positive side of their teaching consisted in returning to the common views for the sake of expediency. That there is danger incurred by the dialectical process, in its first negative and destructive stages, no one has felt more strongly than Plato. He wishes, in his *Republic*, that dialectic, as a part of education, may be deferred till after thirty, because ‘so much mischief attaches to it,’ because ‘it is infected with lawlessness.’ ‘As a supposititious child having grown up to youth, reverencing those whom he thought to be his parents, when he finds out he is no child of theirs, ceases his respect for them and gives himself up to his riotous companions; so is it with the young mind under the influence of dialectic. There are certain dogmas relating to what is just and right, in which we have been brought up from childhood—obeying and reverencing them. Other opinions recommending pleasure and license we resist, out of respect for the old hereditary maxims. Well, then, a question comes before a man; he is asked, what is the right? He gives some such answer as he has been taught, but is straightway refuted. He tries again and is again refuted. And when this has happened pretty often, he is reduced to the opinion, that nothing is more right than wrong; and in the same way it happens about the just and the good and all that he before held in reverence. On this, naturally enough, he abandons his allegiance to the old principles and takes up with those that he before resisted, and so from a good citizen he becomes lawless’ (*Repub.* pp. 537–538). It is obvious that the process of dialectic here described consists in nothing more than starting the diffi-

culties, in other words, stating the question of morals. Plato does not here attribute antinomian conclusions to the teachers of dialectic; he speaks of the disciple himself drawing these, from a sort of impatience, having become dissatisfied with his old moral ideas, and not waiting to substitute deeper ones.

Throughout his dialogue Plato does not attribute lax or paradoxical sentiments to the greater Sophists; he puts these in the mouths of their pupils, such as Callicles, the pupil of Gorgias, or of the inferior and less dignified Sophists, as Thrasymachus. Sophistry consists for the most part in outward conformity, with a scepticism at the core; hence it tends to break out and result occasionally in paradoxical morality, which it is far from holding consistently as a system. We shall have quite failed to appreciate the true nature of Sophistry, if we miss perceiving that the most sophistical thing about it is its chameleon-like character. One of the most celebrated 'points of view' of the Sophists was the opposition between nature and convention. Aristotle speaks of this opposition in a way which represents it to have been in use among them merely as a mode of arguing, not as a definite opinion about morals. He says (*Sophist. Elench.* xii. 6), 'The topic most in vogue for reducing your adversary to admit paradoxes is that which Callicles is described in the *Gorgias* as making use of, and which was a universal mode of arguing with the ancients,—namely, the opposition of "nature" and "convention"; for these are maintained to be contraries, and thus justice is right according to convention, but not according to nature. Hence they say, when a man is speaking with reference to nature, you should meet him with conventional considerations; when he means "conventionally," you should twist round the point of view to "naturally." In both ways you make him utter paradoxes.

Now by “naturally” they meant the true, by “conventionally” what seems true to the many.’ Who was the first author of this opposition is uncertain. Turning from the Sophists to the philosophers, we find the saying attributed to Archelaus (Diog. Laert. II. 16), ‘That the just and the base exist not by nature, but by convention.’⁴³ This Archelaus was the last of the Ionic philosophers, said to be the disciple of Anaxagoras and the master of Socrates. ‘He was called the Physical Philosopher,’ says Diogenes, ‘because Physics ended with him, Socrates having introduced Ethics. But he, too, seems to have handled Ethics. For he philosophized on laws, and on the right and the just; and Socrates succeeding him, because he carried out these investigations, got the credit of having started them.’ About the same period Democritus is recorded to have held that ‘the institutions of society are human creations, while the void and the atoms exist by nature.’⁴⁴ He also said, that the perceptions of sweet and bitter, warm and cold, were νόμῳ, that is, what we should call ‘subjective.’ These reflections indicate the first dawn of Ethics. They show that philosophy has now come to recognize a new sphere; beyond and distinct from the eternal laws of being, there is the phenomepon of human society, with its ideas and institutions. The first glance at these sees in them only the variable as contrasted with the permanent, mere convention as opposed to nature. Ethics at its outset by no means commences with questions about the individual. It separates ‘society’ from ‘nature,’ as its first distinction. This was because in Greece the man was so much merged into the citizen; even Aristotle says, the state is prior to the individual; the individual has no mean-

⁴³ Καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.

⁴⁴ Ποιητὰ δὲ νόμιμα εἶναι. Φύσει δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν. Diog. Laert. ix. 45.

ing except as a member of the state. It is a subsequent step to separate the individual from society: first sophistically, for the sake of introducing an arbitrary theory of morals; at last, philosophically, to show that right is only valid when acknowledged by the individual consciousness, but at the same time that the broad distinctions of right and wrong are more objective and permanent than anything else, more absolutely to be believed in than even the logic of the intellect.

Looking at the Sophists rather as the promulgators than as the inventors of this opposition between φύσις and νόμος, we see they applied it (as in the person of Callicles, their pupil, in the *Gorgias*, pp. 483-484) to support crude, paradoxical, and anti-social doctrines; to maintain that nature's right is might, while society's right (which is unnatural, and forced upon us for the benefit of the weak) is justice and obedience to the laws. It is a carrying out of exactly the same point of view, to say, as Thrasymachus is made to do in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 338 C), that justice is 'the advantage of the stronger.' This position is there treated as a mere piece of 'Eristic.' It is met by arguments that are themselves partly captious and sophistical. The real difficulty which lies at the root of the question is immediately restated in the second Book of the *Republic*, and the answer to it forms the subject of the entire work. Another ethical topic with which the Sophists would be sure to deal was the question, What is the chief good? We have before observed that this was a leading idea in the early stages of Grecian morals. In the discourses of the Sophists various accounts would be given of the matter. Sometimes, as in the fable of Prodicus, happiness, or the chief good, would be represented as inseparable from virtue; at other times a rash and unscrupulous Sophist, like Polus, in the *Gorgias* of Plato (p. 471), would

be found to assert that the most enviable lot consists in arbitrary power, like that of a tyrant, to follow all one's passions and inclinations. This assertion of arbitrary freedom for the individual, though, of course, not consistently maintained by the Sophists, was yet one of the characteristics of their era.

Let us now briefly sum up the conclusions to which we have been led regarding this celebrated set of men; the influence they produced upon thought; and their relation to moral science. We have seen how the word 'Sophist' had at first a merely general import, signifying artist, or philosopher. We have seen how it came to be applied in a restricted sense to the members of a particular profession, the itinerant 'teachers of virtue,' in Greece, and how, from the bad repute into which these teachers fell, the word was now applied with a certain amount of reproach. Especially this was the case with the adjective formed from this word; and lastly, the characteristics of the Sophists and their procedure were summed up in one word 'Sophistic,' which was denounced both by Plato and by Aristotle, as being a spirit utterly antagonistic to philosophy and sound thinking. In asking further in what did this 'Sophistic' consist, we found that it by no means implied directly immoral tenets, or an intention to corrupt the world. It consisted (1) in the making a craft or profession of philosophy; (2) hence truth was not its aim, but reputation or emolument; (3) hence it was rhetorical, covering with words the poverty of its thoughts; (4) or else Eristical, using the artifices of dialectic to raise difficulties, or to maintain paradoxes. In the relation of the Sophists to society in general, the question has been raised, Did they impair the morality of Greece? The answer must be a mixed one. Owing to the influence of the Sophists, and also to other causes, thought was less simple in Greece at the end of the fifth century than

it had been at the beginning. Between the age of Pisistratus and that of Alcibiades, the fruit of the tree of knowledge had been tasted. Man had passed from an unconscious into a conscious era. All that double-sidedness with regard to questions, which is found throughout the pages of Thucydides, and which could not possibly have been written a hundred years before, is a specimen of the results of the Sophistical era. The age had now become probably both better and worse. It was capable of greater good and of greater evil. A character like that of Socrates is far nobler than any that a simple stage of society is capable of producing. The political decline of the Grecian states alone prevented the full development of what must be regarded as a higher civilization. The era of the Sophists then must be looked upon as a transition period in thought—as a necessary, though in itself unhappy, step in the progress of the human mind. The subjective side of knowledge and thought was now opened. Philosophy fell into abeyance for awhile, under the scepticism of Protagoras and Gorgias, but only to found a new method in Socrates and Plato. Ethics had never yet existed as a science. Popular moralizing and obedience to their laws, was all the Greeks had attained to. But now discussions on virtue, on the laws, on justice, on happiness, were heard in every corner; at times rhetorical declamation; and at times subtle difficulties or paradoxical theories. If physical philosophy begins in wonder, Ethics may be said to have begun in scepticism. The dialectical overthrow of popular moral notions, begun by the Sophists and characteristic of their times, merged into the deeper philosophy and constructive method of Socrates.

III. The personality of Socrates (to whom we now turn) has perhaps made a stronger impression upon the world than that of any other of the ancients, and yet, as soon as we wish to inquire accurately about him, we find something that is

indeterminate and difficult to appreciate about his doctrines. Socrates, having contributed the greatest impulse that has ever been known to philosophy, was himself immediately absorbed in the spreading circles of the schools which he had caused. Cynic, Cyrenaic, and Platonic doctrines stand out each more definitely in themselves than the philosophy of Socrates. The causes of this are obvious, for the fact that he wrote no philosophical treatises gave rise to a twofold set of results. (1) On the one hand, his philosophy, being in the form of conversations with all comers, restricted itself for the most part to a method—to a way of dealing with questions—to an insight into the difficulties of a subject—to a conception of what was attainable, and what ought to be sought for in knowledge. It was therefore free from dogmatism, but also wanting in systematic result. Taking even the conversations of Socrates as they are given by Xenophon, we can find in them certain inconsistencies of view. (2) From the absence of any actual works of Socrates, we are left to the accounts of others. And here we are met with the well-known discrepancy between the pictures drawn of him by his different followers, a discrepancy which can never be reconciled nor exactly estimated. We can never know exactly how far Xenophon has told us too little, and Plato too much.

However, by a cautious and inductive mode of examination we may succeed in establishing a few points at all events about Socrates, and in discerning where the doubt lies about others. There seems to be no reason whatever against receiving in their integrity the graphic personal traits which Plato has recorded of his master. The description of him, which is put into the mouth of Alcibiades at the end of the *Symposium*, seems to have in view the exhibition, in the concrete, of those highest philosophic qualities which had before been exhibited in the abstract. Plato does not shrink

from portraying the living irony which there was in the appearance of Socrates, his strange and grotesque exterior covering, like the images of Silenus, a figure of pure gold within. Other peculiarities of the man have a still deeper significance, being more essentially connected with his mental qualities. Not only did he excite attention by a robustness and versatility of constitution which could bear all extremes, but also by another still more strange idiosyncrasy; he seems to have been liable to fall into fits of abstraction, almost amounting to trances. During the siege of Potidæa, while on service in the Athenian camp, he is recorded to have stood fixed in one attitude a whole night through, and when the sun rose to have roused himself and saluted it, and so returned to his tent. It has been observed that the peculiar nervous constitution which could give rise to this tendency, and which seems to have an affinity to the clairvoyance of Swedenborg and others among the moderns, was probably connected with that which Socrates felt to be unusual in himself, that which he called τὸ δαιμόνιον, 'the supernatural,' an instinctive power of presentiment which warned and deterred him from certain actions, apparently both by considerations of personal well-being, and the probable issue of things, and also by moral intuitions as to right and wrong. This 'supernatural' element in Socrates (which he seems to have believed to have been shared, in exceedingly rare instances, by others) cannot be resolved into the voice of conscience, nor reason, nor into the association of a strong religious feeling with moral and rational intuitions, nor again into anything merely physical and mesmeric, but it was probably a combination, in greater or less degrees, of all. There are other parts of the personal character of Socrates which are also parts of his philosophical method; for his was no mere abstract system, that could be conveyed in a book, but a living play of sense

and reason; the philosopher could not be separated from the man. Of this Xenophon gives us no idea. But in Plato's representation of the irony of Socrates we have surely not only a dramatic and imaginative creation, but rather a marvellous reproduction (perhaps artistically enhanced) of the actual truth. To this Aristotle bears witness, in stating as a simple fact that 'Irony often consists in disclaiming qualities that are held in esteem, and this sort of thing Socrates used to do' (*Eth.* iv. vii. 14). The irony of Socrates, like any other living characteristic of a man, presents many aspects from which it may be viewed. It has (1) a relative significance, being used to encounter, and tacitly to rebuke, rash speaking, and every kind of presumption. It was thus relative to a Sophistical and Rhetorical period, but has also a universal adaptability under similar circumstances. (2) It indicates a certain moral attitude as being suitable to philosophy, showing that in weakness there is strength. (3) It is a part of good-breeding, which by deference holds its own. (4) It is a point of style, a means of avoiding dogmatism. (5) It is an artifice of controversy, inducing an adversary to expose his weakness, maintaining a negative and critical position. (6) It is full of humour; and this humour consists in an intellectual way of dealing with things, in a contrast between the conscious strength of the wise man and the humility of his pretensions, in a teacher coming to be taught, and the learner *naïvely* undertaking to teach. Such are some of the most striking features in the mien and bearing of Socrates, not only one of the wisest, but also one of the strangest beings that the world has ever seen; who moved about among men that knew him not. One man alone, Plato, knew him and has handed down to us the idea of his life. When now we come to his doctrines, Plato, as is acknowledged, ceases to be a trustworthy guide. The sublime

developments of philosophy made by the disciple are with a sort of pious reverence put into the mouth of the master. We are driven then to criticism, in order to assign to Socrates, as far as possible in their naked form, his own attainments.

The statements of Aristotle would seem to furnish a basis for an estimate of the Socratic doctrine; but even these cannot be received without a scrutiny, for Aristotle was so imbued with the writings of Plato, that he seems at times to regard the conversations depicted in them as something that actually had taken place. He speaks of the Platonic Socrates as of an actual person. A remarkable instance of this occurs in his *Politics* (II. vi. 6), where, having criticized the *Republic* of Plato, he proceeds to criticize the *Laws* also, and says, 'Now, all the discourses of Socrates exhibit genius, grace, originality, and depth of research; but to be always right is, perhaps, more than can be expected.'⁴⁵ 'The discourses of Socrates' here stand for the dialogues of Plato, which is the more peculiar in the present case, since in the *Laws* of Plato, the dialogue under discussion, Socrates does not appear at all as an interlocutor. In other places, however, we may judge from Aristotle's manner of speaking that he refers to the real Socrates, and not to the Socrates of literature. The most important passages of this kind are where he draws a distinction between Socrates and Plato, and states their relation to each other; cf. *Metaphys.* I. vi. 2, XII. iv. 3-5. The second of these passages contains a repetition and an expansion of the former; it may, therefore, be quoted alone. Aristotle is relating the history of the doctrine of Ideas. He tells us how it sprung from a belief in the Heraclitean principle of the flux of sensible things, and the necessity of some

⁴⁵ Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες | τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν, καλῶς
ἰστοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ | δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπόν.

other and permanent existences, if thought and knowledge were to be considered possible. He proceeds, that Socrates now entered on the discussion of the ethical virtues, and was the first to attempt a universal definition of them—definition, except in the immature essays of Democritus and the Pythagoreans, having had no existence previously. ‘Socrates was quite right in seeking a definite, determinate conception of these virtues (εὐλόγως ἐξήτει τὸ τί ἐστίν), for his object was to obtain a demonstrative reasoning (συλλογίζεσθαι), and such reasonings must commence with a determinate conception. The force of dialectic did not yet exist, by means of which even without a determinate conception (χωρὶς τοῦ τί ἐστίν), it is possible to consider contraries, and to enquire whether or not there be the same science of things contrary to one another. There are two things that we may fairly attribute to Socrates, his inductive discourses (τούς τ’ ἐπακτικούς λόγους) and his universal definitions. These universals, however, Socrates did not make transcendental and self-existent (χωριστά), no more did he his definitions. But the Platonists made them transcendental, and then called such existences Ideas.’

This interesting passage assigns to Socrates, first, his subjects of enquiry, namely, the ethical virtues; second, his philosophical method, which was to fix a determinate conception or universal definition of these, by means of inductive discourses, by an appeal to experience and analogy. His definition was an immense advance on anything which had gone before, and yet it fell far short of the Platonic point of view. The reasoning of Socrates was demonstrative or syllogistic, and therefore one-sided. His conceptions were definitely fixed so as to exclude one another. He knew nothing of that higher dialectic, which, setting aside the first limited and fixed conception of a thing, from which the con-

trary of that thing is wholly excluded, asks, Is there not the same science of things contrary to each other? Is not a thing inseparable from, and in a way identical with, its contrary? Is not the one also many, and the many, one? In another point also the conceptions formed by Socrates differed from the Ideas of Plato—that they had no absolute existence, they had no world of their own apart from the world of time and space. We see, then, the gulf which is set by this account of Aristotle's between the historic Socrates and the Socrates of Plato. The historic Socrates was quite excluded from that sphere of contemplation on which the Platonic philosopher enters (*Repub.* p. 510), where all hypotheses and all sensible objects are left out of sight, and the mind deals with pure Ideas alone. According to Aristotle, Socrates had not attained to the higher dialectic which Plato attributes to him. No doubt, however, Plato discerned in the method which Socrates employed in his conversations,—in his enquiring spirit, in his effort to connect a variety of phenomena with some general law, in his habit of testing this law by appeals to fresh experience and phenomena,—hints and indications of a philosophy which could rise above mere empirical generalizations. The method was not so much to be changed as carried further, it need only pass on in the same direction out of subordinate into higher genera.

Aristotle always says about Socrates that he confined himself to ethical enquiries.⁴⁶ This entirely coincides with the saying of Xenophon, that 'he never ceased discussing human affairs, asking, What is piety? what is impiety? what is the noble? what the base? what is the just? what the unjust? what is temperance? what is madness? what is a state?

⁴⁶ Περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικά πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν. *Met.* I. vi. 2.

what constitutes the character of a citizen? what is rule over man? what makes one able to rule?' (*Memor.* I. i. 16.) In all this we see the foundation of moral philosophy as a science, and hence Socrates is always called the first moral philosopher. But we have already remarked (see above, p. 108) that the way was prepared for Socrates by Archelaus, by the Sophists, and by the entire tendencies of the age. There is another saying about Socrates which is a still greater departure from the exact historical truth, namely, that he divided science into Ethics, Physics, and Logic. It is quite a chronological error to attribute to him this distinct view of the divisions of science. He never separated his method of reasoning from his matter, nor could he ever have made the method of reasoning into a separate science. In Plato even, Logic has no separate existence; there is only a dialectic which is really metaphysics. And we may go further, and say that in Aristotle Logic has no one name, and does not form a division of philosophy. Again, Socrates probably never used the word Ethics to designate his favourite study. If he had used any distinctive term, he would have said Politics. With regard to Ethics also, we may affirm that in Plato they are not as yet a separate science, and in Aristotle only becoming so. As to Physics, Socrates appears rather to have denied their possibility, than to have established their existence as a branch of philosophy. The above-mentioned division is probably not older than the Stoics.

Pursuing our negative and eliminatory process with regard to the position of Socrates in the history of thought, we may next ask what was his hold upon that tenet which in Plato's dialogues appears not only closely connected with his moral and philosophical views in general, but also is made to assume the most striking historical significance in connection with his submission to the sentence of death—his belief in the

immortality of the soul. But on this point also we can only say that a different kind of impression is left on our minds by the records of the last conversations of Socrates, as severally furnished by Plato and by Xenophon. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Apologia Socratis* (the genuineness of which has been doubted, but it bears strong internal marks of being genuine), Socrates is asked whether he has prepared his defence. He answers that 'His whole life has been a preparation, for he has never acted unjustly.' It is possible that this answer might have had a double meaning: on the one hand a literal meaning—that his conduct was the best answer to his accusers; on the other hand a religious meaning—that his life had been a *præparatio mortis*; but Xenophon appears only to have understood the saying in the former and literal sense. When reminded that the judges have often condemned those that were really innocent, Socrates replies that he has twice been stopped by the supernatural sign when thinking of composing a defence—that God seems to intimate to him that it was best for him to die—that if he is condemned he will meet with an easy mode of death—at a time when his faculties are still entire—whereas, if he were to live longer, only old age and infirmities and loss of his powers would await him—that he knows good men and bad are differently estimated by posterity after their deaths—and that he leaves his own cause in the hands of posterity, being confident they will give a right verdict between him and his judges. The only sentence recorded by Xenophon (besides the one above-mentioned) that admits the possibility of being referred to a future life, is where Socrates is mentioned to have said in reference to Anytus, 'What a worthless fellow is this, who seems not to know that whichever of us has done best and most profitably for all time (*εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον*), he is the winner.' In this saying, Plato might have discovered a

reference to immortality, but Xenophon takes it to mean merely 'the long run,' applying it to the bad way in which the son of Anytus afterwards turned out. If we separate from the speeches recorded by Xenophon the allusion which Socrates makes to his 'supernatural sign,' which shows a sort of belief in a religious sanction to the course he was taking;—the rest resolves itself into a very enlightened calculation and balance of gain against loss in submitting to die. The *Phædo* of Plato has elevated this feeling into something holy; it puts out of sight those parts of the calculation which consisted in a desire to escape from the pains of age by a painless death, and in a regard to the opinion of posterity; and it makes prominent and all-absorbing the desire for that condition on which the soul is to enter after death. Were it not for Plato, we should have had an entirely different impression of the death of Socrates, an entirely different kind of sublimity would have been attached to it. Instead of the almost Christian enthusiasm and faith which we are accustomed to associate with it, we should only have known of a Stoical resignation and firmness,—an act indeed which contains in itself historically the germ of Stoicism. The narrative of Xenophon no doubt misses something which Plato could appreciate, but it at all events enables us to understand how both the Cynic and Cyrenaic morality sprang from the teaching and life of Socrates.

One more point is worth notice in the *Apology* of Socrates, as it is given by Xenophon. It is the way he answers the charge of corrupting youth. Having protested against the notion of his teaching vice to any, when Melitus further urges, 'Why, I have known those whom you have persuaded not to obey their parents;' Socrates replies, 'Yes, about education, for this is a subject they know that I have studied. About health people obey the doctor and not their parents;

in state affairs and war you choose as your leaders those that are skilled in these matters; is it not absurd, then, if there is free trade in other things, that in the most important interest of all, education, I should not be allowed to have the credit of being better skilled than other men?' The fallacy of this reasoning is obvious, for had Socrates claimed to be chosen 'Minister of Education' by the same persons who voted for the Archons and the Generals, or had he succeeded in persuading the fathers that he was the best possible teacher for their sons, nothing could have been said against it. But the complaint against him was that he constituted youths, who were unfit to judge, the judges of their own education, and thus inverted all the natural ideas of family life. One can well understand the invidiousness which would be encountered by one undertaking such a position and defending it in the words recorded by Xenophon. Viewing this attitude of Socrates merely from the outside, one can justify, in a manner, the caricature of it drawn by Aristophanes. We see from this point of view how Socrates was a Sophist, and must have exhibited a merely Sophistical appearance to many of his contemporaries. But from another point of view, looking at the internal character and motives of the man, his purity and nobility of mind, his love of truth, his enthusiasm (*Schwärmerei*, as the Germans would call it), his obedience to some mysterious and irresistible impulse, and his genius akin to madness,—we must call him the born antagonist and utter antipodes of all Sophistry. There is an opposition and a contradiction of terms in all great teachers. While they are the best men of their times, they seem to many wicked, and the corrupters of youth. The flexibility and ardour of youth make the young the most ready disciples of a new and elevated doctrine. But this goes against the principle that the children should honour the parents. Hence a great teacher sets the

‘children against the fathers’; and the higher morality which he expounds, being freer and more independent of positive laws; being more based on what is right in itself, and on the individual consciousness and apprehension of that right,—tends also in weaker natures to assume the form of license. This is one application of the truth, that new wine cannot safely be put into old bottles.

The positive results that are known to us of the ethical philosophy of Socrates are of course but few. Aristotle’s allusions restrict themselves virtually to one point—namely, the theory that ‘Virtue is a science.’ This doctrine is mentioned in its most general form *Eth.* VI. xiii. 3. Its application to courage is mentioned, *Eth.* III. viii. 6—that Socrates said courage was a science. And the corollary of the doctrine, that incontinence is impossible, for it is impossible to know what is best and not do it—is stated, *Eth.* VII. ii. 1. These allusions agree equally with the representations of Plato and of Xenophon, we may therefore treat them as historical. It remains to ask what was the occasion, the meaning, and the importance of this saying that ‘Virtue is a science.’ The thought of Socrates was so far from being an abstract theory, it was so intimately connected with life and reality, that we are enabled to conceive how this proposition grew up in his mind, as a result of his age and circumstances. (1) It was connected with a sense of the importance of education. This feeling was no doubt caused in part by the procedure of the Sophists, which had turned the attention of all to general cultivation, and especially to ethical instruction. The question began now to be mooted, whether virtue—*e.g.*, courage, could be taught? (cf. *Xen. Memor.* III. ix. 1.) Socrates appears on this question to have taken entirely the side of the advocates of education. The difficulties which are shown to attach to the subject in the *Meno* of Plato we may con-

sider to be a later development of thought, subsequent even in the mind of Plato to the *Protagoras*, *Laches*, &c. We may specify three different stages of opinion as to the question, Can virtue be taught? The Sophists said ‘Yes,’ from an over confidence of pretensions, and from not realizing the question with sufficient depth. Socrates said ‘Yes,’ giving a new meaning to the assertion; wishing to make action into a kind of art, to make self-knowledge and wisdom predominate over every part of life. Plato said ‘No,’ from a feeling of the deep and spiritual character of the moral impulses. He said, ‘Virtue seems almost to be an inspiration from heaven sent to those who are destined to receive it.’⁴⁷ Aristotle, taking again the human side, would say ‘Yes,’ implying, however, that the formation of habits was an essential part of teaching, and allowing also for some differences in the natural disposition of men. (2) This doctrine was connected with the inductive and generalizing spirit of Socrates, it was an attempt to bring the various virtues, which Gorgias used to enumerate separately (cf. Plato, *Meno*, p. 71, Aristot. *Politics*, I. xiii. 10), under one universal law. Thus the four cardinal virtues, justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom, he reduced all to wisdom. (3) The doctrine had two sides. It on the one hand contained implicitly the theory of ‘habits,’ but was at the same time a sort of empiricism. ‘Courage consists in being accustomed to danger.’ (This is the expression of the doctrine given, Xen. *Memorab.* III. ix. 2, and Aristot. *Eth.* III. viii. 6.) On the other hand, it implied rather self-knowledge, and a consciousness of a law; which is quite above all mere acquaintance with particulars. This is drawn out in the *Laches*, where courage is shown to consist in the knowledge of good and evil; and in the *Republic* it is described as that

⁴⁷ Θεία μοίρα παραγιννομένη ἀνευ νοῦ, ὡς ἀν παραγίγνηται. *Meno*. p. 99 E.

highest kind of presence of mind, which maintains a hold of right principles even amidst danger. (4) We have said that Socrates wished to make action into a kind of art. It seems to have been a favourite analogy with him to remark that the various craftsmen studied systematically their own crafts; but that Politics, (which would include the direction of individual life), was not so learned. Out of this analogy, no doubt, sprang the further conclusion that human life must have its own proper function (*ἔργον*, cf. *Repub.* p. 353). Virtue, then, according to the point of view of Socrates, became the science of living. So expressed, the doctrine easily takes a utilitarian and somewhat selfish turn; as, indeed, it does in the *Protagoras*, where virtue is made the science of the good, but 'the good' is identified with pleasure. Under this aspect the doctrine presents an affinity to Benthamism, and also to the practical views of Goethe, and at the same time enables us to understand how it was possible for the Cyrenaic philosophy to spring out of the school of Socrates. (5) It lays the foundation for conscious morality, by placing the grounds of right and wrong in the individual reason. It forms the contradiction to the Sophistical saying, 'justice is a convention' (*νόμος*), by asserting that 'justice is a science,' that is, something not depending on society and external authority, but existing in and for the mind of the individual. Aristotle said that nothing could be better than this—if only Socrates, instead of identifying virtue with the rational consciousness, had said it must coincide with the rational consciousness; in other words, had he not ignored all distinction between the reason and the will.

This defect in the definition of Socrates exhibits one of the characteristics of early Ethics, namely, that they contain extremely little psychology. At first men are content with the rudest and most elementary mental distinctions; after-

wards greater refinements are introduced. Plato's threefold division of the mind into Desire, Anger, and Reason, was the first scientific attempt of the kind. But even in Plato, the distinction between the moral and the intellectual sides of our nature was hardly established. Partly we shall see that this was a merit, and consciously admitted in order to elevate action into philosophy; partly, it was a defect proceeding from the want of a more definite psychology. Socrates identified the Will with the Reason. We can understand this better, if we remember that the practical question of his day always was, not, What is Right? but, What is Good? Socrates argued that every one would act in accordance with their answer to this question; that they could not help doing what they conceived to be good. Hence incontinence was impossible. The argument, however, is a fallacy because it leaves out of sight the ambiguity of the word good. Good is either means or end. All men wish for the good as an end; that is, good as a whole, as a universal. All wish for happiness and a good life. But good as a means does not always recommend itself. The necessary particular steps appear irksome or repulsive. Hence, as it is said, *Eth.* VII. iii. 5, a distinction must be drawn with regard to this phrase ‘knowing the good.’ In one sense a man may know it, in another not. Undoubtedly, if a perfectly clear intellectual conviction of the goodness of the end, and of the necessity of the means, is present to a man, he cannot act otherwise than right.

There was another paradox connected with the primary doctrine of Socrates. It was that injustice, if voluntary, is better than if involuntary. This startling proposition appears to gainsay all the instincts of the understanding, and its contradictory is assumed in the *Ethics* (VI. v. 7). But it is stated by Socrates, and supported by arguments (Xen.

Memorab. iv. ii. 20), and it is again maintained dialectically, though confessed to be a paradox, in Plato's dialogue called the *Hippias Minor*. The key to the paradox is to be found in this, that the proposition asserts, that *if it were possible* to act with injustice voluntarily, this would be better than if the same act were done involuntarily. But by hypothesis it is impossible for a man really to do wrong knowingly. It would be a contradiction in terms, since wrong is nothing else than ignorance. Therefore the wise man can only do what is seemingly wrong. His acts are justified to himself and are really right. The effect of this proposition is to enforce the principle that wisdom and knowledge are the first things, and action the second. The same is expressed in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 382 B), where it is asserted that the purest and most unmixed lie is not where the mind knows what is true and the tongue says what is false, but where the mind thinks what is false. *Mutatis mutandis*, we might compare these tendencies in the Socratic teaching to the elevation of Faith over Works in theological controversy.

The dialectical difficulties of morality characteristic of the Sophistical era appear from Xenophon's account to have frequently occupied the attention of Socrates. Thus Aristippus is recorded to have assailed him with the question whether he knew anything good. Whatever he might specify, it would have been easy to show that this was, from some points of view, an evil. Socrates, being aware of the difficulty, evaded the question by declining to answer it directly. He said, 'Do you ask if I know anything good for a fever? or for the ophthalmia? or for hunger? For if you ask me if I know any good, that is good for nothing, I neither know it, nor wish to know it' (*Xen. Memorab.* iii. viii. 3). This answer implies the relative character of the term good. The puzzle of Aristippus was meant to consist in playing off the relative

against the absolute import of 'good.' Other subtleties Socrates is mentioned to have urged himself, as for instance in the conversation with Euthydemus (*Memorab.* iv. 2), whose intellectual pride he wished to humble, he shows that all the acts (such as deceiving, lying, &c.) which are first specified as acts of injustice, can in particular cases appear to be just. In fact, the unsatisfactoriness of the common conceptions of justice is suggested here just as it is in the *Republic* of Plato. It is probable that the historic Socrates would really have advanced in the argument on justice as far as the conclusion of the first book of the *Republic*. For the development of the later theory he perhaps furnished hints and indications which Plato understood and seized, and buried in his mind. Thence by degrees they grew up into something far different from what Socrates had consciously attained to. The dialectic of Socrates had an element in common with that of the Sophists, namely, it disturbed the popular conceptions on moral subjects. It had this different from them, and which constituted its claim to be not merely a destructive, but also a constructive method—it always implied (1) that there was a higher and truer conception to be discovered by thought and research; (2) it seized upon some permanent and universal ideas amidst the mass of what was fluctuating and relative; (3) it left the impression that the most really moral view must after all be the true one.

The many-sided life of Socrates gave an impulse, as is well known, to a variety of schools of philosophy. It is usual to divide these into the imperfect and the perfect Socraticists; the Megarians, who represented only the dialectic element in Socrates, and the Cynics and Cyrenaics, who represented each a different phase of his ethical tradition, being considered as the imperfect Socraticists; and Plato being esteemed the full representative and natural development of all sides of his

master's thought. Plato is so near to Aristotle, and is such a world in himself, that we may well leave his ethical system in its relation to Aristotle for separate consideration. An account of the Megarian school belongs rather to the history of Metaphysics. The Cynics and Cyrenaics then alone remain to be treated of in the present part of our sketch of the pre-Aristotelian morals.

The Cynical and Cyrenaic philosophies were each, as has been remarked, rather a mode of life than an abstract theory or system. But as every system may be regarded as the development into actuality of some hitherto latent possibility of the intellect, so these modes of life may be regarded each as the natural development of a peculiar direction of the feelings. Nor do they fail to reproduce themselves. That attitude of mind which was exhibited first by Antisthenes and Diogenes has since been over and over again exhibited, with superficial differences, and in various modifications by different individuals. And many a man has essentially in the bias of his mind been a follower of Aristippus. Each of these schools was an exaggeration of a peculiar aspect of the life of Socrates. If we abstract all the Platonic picture of the urbanity, the happy humour, and at the same time the sublime thought of Socrates, and think only of the barefooted old man, indefatigably disputing in the open streets, and setting himself against society, we recognize in him the first of the Cynics. Again if we think of him to whom all circumstances seemed indifferent, who spoke of virtue as the science of the conduct of life, and seemed at times to identify pleasure with the good, we can understand how Aristippus, the follower of Socrates, was also founder of the Cyrenaic sect. Several points these two opposite schools seem to have had in common. (1) They started from a common principle, namely, the assertion of the individual consciousness and will, as being above all outward

convention and custom, free and self-responsible. (2) They agreed in disregarding all the sciences, which was a mistaken carrying out of the intentions of Socrates. (3) They stood equally aloof from society, from the cares and duties of a citizen. (4) They seem both to have upheld the ideal of a wise man, as being the exponent of universal reason, and the only standard of right and wrong. This ideal was no doubt a shadow of the personality of Socrates. We find a sort of adaptation of it by Aristotle in his *Ethics* (II. vi. 15), where he makes the *φρόνιμος* to be the criterion of all virtue. The same conception was afterwards taken up and carried out to exaggeration by the Roman Stoics.

Cynicism implies sneering and snarling at the ways and institutions of society; it implies discerning the unreality of the shows of the world and angrily despising them; it implies a sort of embittered wisdom, as if the follies of mankind were an insult to itself.

We may ask, How far did the procedure of the early Cynics justify this implication? On the whole, very much. The anecdotes of Antisthenes and Diogenes generally describe them as being true 'Cynics,' in the modern sense of the word. Their whole life was a protest against society: they lived in the open air; they slept in the porticos of temples; they begged; Diogenes was sold as a slave. They despised the feelings of patriotism: war and its glory they held in repugnance; 'Thus freed,' says M. Renouvier, 'from all the bonds of ancient society, isolated, and masters of themselves, they lived immovable, and almost divinized in their own pride.' Their hard and ascetic life set them above all wants. 'I would rather be mad,' said Antisthenes, 'than enjoy pleasure.' They broke through the distinction of ranks by associating with slaves. And yet under this self-abasement was greater pride than that against which they protested. Socrates is

reported to have said, 'I see the pride of Antisthenes through the holes in his mantle.' And when Diogenes exclaimed, while soiling with his feet the carpet of Plato, 'Thus I tread on Plato's pride,' 'Yes,' said Plato, 'with greater pride of your own.' The Cynics aimed at a sort of impeccability; they were equally to be above error and above the force of circumstances. To the infirmities of age, and even to death itself, they thought themselves superior; following the example of Socrates, they resorted to a voluntary death when they felt weakness coming on, and such an act they regarded as the last supreme effort of virtue. As their political theory, they appear to have maintained a doctrine of communism. This seems to have been extended even to a community of wives,—a point of interest, as throwing light upon the origin of Plato's ideal *Republic*. Such notions may really have been to some extent entertained by Socrates himself. At all events we find them in one branch of his school. A life like that of the ancient Cynics presents to us a mournful picture, for we cannot but deplore the waste of so much force of will, and that individuals should be so self-tormenting. The Cynic lives by antagonism; unless seen and noticed to be eccentric, what he does has no meaning. He can never hope to found an extended school, though he may be joined in his protest by a few disappointed spirits. In the Cynical philosophy there was little that was positive, there was no actual contribution to Ethical science. But the whole Cynical tone which proclaimed the value of action and the importance of the individual Will was an indication of the practical and moral direction which thought had now taken, and prepared the way for the partial discussion of the problems of the Will in Aristotle, and for their more full consideration among the Stoics. Crates, the disciple of Diogenes, was the master of Zeno.

Personally, the Cyrenaics were not nearly so interesting as the Cynics. Their position was not to protest against the world, but rather to sit loose upon the world. Aristippus, who passed part of his time at the court of Dionysius, and who lived throughout a gay, serene, and refined life, avowed openly that he resided in a foreign land to avoid the irksomeness of mixing in the politics of his native city Cyrene. But the Cyrenaic philosophy was much more of a system than the Cynic. Like the *Ethics* of Aristotle, this system started with the question, What is happiness? only it gave a different answer. Aristotle probably alludes to the philosophy of Aristippus amongst others, in saying (*Eth.* i. viii. 6), ‘Some think happiness to consist in pleasure.’ But it has been observed that he chooses not Aristippus, but Eudoxus, as the representative of the doctrine formally announced, that ‘pleasure is the Chief Good’ (*Eth.* i. xii. 5, x. ii. 1). This points to the fact that Aristippus did not himself entirely systematize his thoughts. He imparted them to his daughter Arete, by whom they were handed down to her son, the younger Aristippus (hence called *μητροδιδάκτος*), and in his hands the doctrines appear first to have been reduced to scientific form. If then we briefly specify the leading characteristics of the Cyrenaic system, as it is recorded by Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, &c., it must be remembered that this is the after growth of the system. But though we cannot tell to what perfection Aristippus himself had brought his doctrines, there are many traces of their influence in the *Ethics* of Aristotle.

Cyrenaic morals began with the principle, taken from Socrates, that happiness must be man’s aim. Next they start a question, which is never exactly started in Aristotle, and which remains an unexplained point in his system, namely, ‘What is the relation of the parts to the whole, of each suc-

cessive moment to our entire life?' The Cyrenaics answered decisively, 'We have only to do with the present. Pleasure is *μονόχρονος*,⁴⁸ *μερική*, an isolated moment, of this alone we have consciousness. Happiness is the sum of a number of these moments. We must exclude desire and hope and fear, which partake of the nature of pain, and confine ourselves to the pleasure of the present moment.'

In this theory it must be confessed that there is considerable affinity to Aristotle's doctrine of the *τέλος*; and some have thought that Aristotle alludes to Aristippus (*Eth.* x. vi. 3-8), where he argues that amusement cannot be considered a *τέλος* (cf. *Politics*, viii. v. 13). In short, the *τέλος* of Aristotle is only distinguished from the *μονόχρονος ἡδονή* of Aristippus by the moral earnestness which characterizes it. The Cyrenaics further asking, What is pleasure? answered by making three states of the soul possible; one, a violent motion, or tempest, which is pain; another, a dead calm, which is the painless, or unconscious state; the third, a gentle, equable motion, which is pleasure. Pleasure was no negative state, but a motion. This doctrine seems to be alluded to in the *Philebus* of Plato (p. 53 C),⁴⁹ where Socrates, in arguing against the claims of pleasure to be the chief good, returns thanks to a certain refined set of gentlemen for supplying him with an argument, namely, their own definition of pleasure, that it is not a permanent state (*οὐσία*), but a state of progress (*γένεσις*). It is generally thought that the Cyrenaic school are here meant. In the *Ethics* of Aristotle (vii. xii. 3), there appears to be another allusion to this

⁴⁸ Here we trace something similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, that 'Pleasure is like a monad, or a point, complete in itself, perfect without relation to time' (*Eth.* x. iv. 4).

⁴⁹ Ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὥς αἰεὶ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες αὐτῶτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μνησθῆναι ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

same definition, in a way which, without some explanation, it is excessively hard to understand. Aristotle (or Eudemus), in discussing pleasure, says, Some argue that pleasure cannot be a good, because it is a state of becoming (*γένεσις*). He afterwards denies that pleasure is a *γένεσις*, except in certain cases. And then he proceeds to explain how it was that pleasure came to be called a *γένεσις*. He says⁵⁰ ‘it was from a confusion between the terms *γένεσις* and *ἐνέργεια*,—it was thought to be a *γένεσις*, because essentially a good, to express which the term *ἐνέργεια* would have been appropriate.’ At first sight it appears a strange contradiction to say pleasure is thought not to be a good, because it is a *γένεσις*; it is thought to be a *γένεσις*, because it is a good. The explanation is, that the two clauses do not refer to the same set of opinions. The former part refers to the Platonists, who argued, as in the *Philebus*, against pleasure, because it was not a permanent state; the latter part refers to the definition of the Cyrenaics, that pleasure is a state of motion, or, as it is here called, a *γένεσις*. It is obvious that the Cyrenaic definition of pleasure, as far as we are aware of it, will not bear a comparison, as a scientific account, with the theory of Aristotle. Aristippus appears to have made the senses the only criterion of pleasure, and pleasure, again, the measure of actions. All actions, in themselves indifferent, were good or bad according to their results, as tending or not tending to pleasure. The Cyrenaics, however, adapting themselves to circumstances, allowed that their wise man would always maintain an outward decorum in obedience to established law and custom.

The selfishness of this system at once condemns it in our eyes. For even acts of generosity and affection, according

⁵⁰ *Eth.* vii. xii. 3. Δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις | ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἰοῦνται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' | τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ | ἕτερον.

to such a system, though admitted by it to be excellent, are excellent only on this account, because, by a reflex power, they occasion pleasure to the doer. What in other systems is only concomitant to good acts is here made the primary motive, by which all morality is debased. The maintainers of such a philosophy are, perhaps, half-conscious to themselves that it never can be generally applicable, that they are maintaining a paradox. Looked into closely, this is seen to be a philosophy of despair. Those who cannot put themselves into harmony with the world, who cannot find a sphere for any noble efforts, nor peace in any round of duties, who have no ties and no objects, may easily, like Horace, 'slip back into the doctrines of Aristippus.' The profound joylessness which there is at the core of the Cyrenaic system showed itself openly in the doctrines of Hegesias, the principal successor of Aristippus. Hegesias, regarding happiness as impossible, reduced the highest good for man to a sort of apathy; thus, at the extremest point, coinciding again with the Cynics. It is instructive to see the various points of view that it is possible to take with regard to life. In the Cyrenaic system we find a bold logical following out of a particular view. In this respect the system is remarkable, for it is the first of its kind. The Sophists had trifled with such views, and not followed them out. In the prominence given to the subject of pleasure, in the Ethical systems both of Plato and Aristotle, we may trace the effects of the Cyrenaic impulse.

ESSAY III.

On the Relation of Aristotle's Ethics to Plato and the Platonists.

WE have already traced in outline the characteristics of moral philosophy in Greece down to the death of Socrates, and have made brief mention of two of the schools of 'one-sided Socraticists,' as they have been called, the Cynics and Cyrenaics. It remains to resume the thread of the progress of ethical thought in Plato, compared with whom all previous philosophers sink into insignificance. In him all antecedent and contemporary Greek speculation is summed up and takes its start afresh. Especially in relation to any part of the system of Aristotle, a knowledge of Plato is of overpowering importance. To explain the relation of any one of Aristotle's treatises to Plato is almost a sufficient account of all that it contains. If one were asked what books will throw most light upon the *Ethics* of Aristotle, the answer must be undoubtedly, 'the dialogues of Plato.'

Plato as successor to Socrates exhibits a gradual development of philosophy. To trace this progress with any certainty is perhaps impossible, but perhaps the following account may be a sufficient approximation to the truth for our present purpose. At first we have purely Socratic dialogues, as the *Charmides* and *Laches*, the *Euthyphro* and the *Lysis*, &c. These exhibit only a negative dialectic. They show the insufficiency of popular views and the difficulties of the question; they suggest the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge; but leave the problems without a dogmatic

settlement. With these we may rank the *Hippias Minor*, which contains in a wavering form the Socratic paradox, that to do injustice voluntarily would be better than doing it involuntarily. To this group of dialogues there now succeeds another, which is still negative and destructive. Such are those in which Socrates is brought into collision with the Sophists, *e.g.* the *Hippias Major*, the *Euthydemus*, the *Protagoras*, and *Gorgias*; these are the most wonderful imaginative and dramatic creations, they contain a picture of all that is most living in the method of Socrates, and they show that the Sophistic point of view is quite as antagonistic to philosophy as the merely popular point of view. After this group there comes a transition period in the *Meno*, where Plato, seeing the limitations to the system of Socrates, and the weaknesses inherent in it, takes the first step to break away into a deeper and broader sphere of thought. This first step consists in seeing the difficulty about virtue and knowledge being taught. How can knowledge be acquired? In the *Meno* the answer is, that knowledge is ‘remembered,’ not imparted from without. This leads the way to the doctrine of Ideas, but as yet they are not matured. Another group of dialogues represents the growth of Plato’s mind under the influence, it is said, of the Megarian school of thought. In this the ideas come forth, but as yet sparingly, and in a dry, logical, and abstract manner, *e.g.* in the *Parmenides*, the *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, &c. The last element that has to be added before the Platonism of Plato is complete is a Pythagorean influence, a tendency to delight in numbers as a symbol of the absolute, and to entertain the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. This period of Plato’s mind we see illustrated in the *Phædrus*, the *Republic*, and the *Timæus*. In the *Republic* we have the full perfection of Plato’s philosophy; in it all the different elements are balanced against

one another—negative and constructive dialectic; the manner and method of the historic Socrates, and again of a transcendental Platonic philosopher; the refutation of popular and of Sophistic views; Megarian and Pythagorean influences; a deep morality, and a metaphysic that almost denies the existence of the material world; and above all, and springing out of all these elements, we have here the doctrine of Ideas in its most deeply speculative, and at the same time its most imaginative, vivid, and many-sided aspect.

As Socrates discoursed on nothing but moral subjects, so we find that the dialogues of Plato, with very few exceptions, start each with the discussion of some moral question. But the morality of Plato culminates in the *Republic*. Let us then briefly examine some of the distinctive features of this moral system, viewed as an advance upon Socrates. We have already seen (p. 127) that in all probability the Socrates of real life would not have progressed farther in the argument of the *Republic* than the conclusion of Book I., except, indeed, that he might have gone on to define justice as ‘a science.’ The constructive portion of the dialogue, beginning with the foundation of a state, is probably all a development made by Plato on the beginning of his master. Here then is the first characteristic of the Ethics of Plato, namely, the principle, that ethical conceptions cannot be isolated and considered separately. All things stand in relation to one another. You must take the mind as a whole, or rather society as a whole, before you can judge of any of its parts. Now here we have not only a great advance upon the method of Socrates, who, as Aristotle said (see above, p. 116), always sought a definite conception of each moral term by itself; but also we notice a reaction against what may be called the individualizing principle in the doctrine of Socrates. This individualizing principle, which expressed itself in the saying ‘virtue is

knowledge' (see above, p. 124), and which pervaded the whole independent life and thought of Socrates, was full of merit as a protest against that blind obedience which saw no other ground for morality than the dictates of the law. But it was liable to abuse, and it ran out into an obvious extreme in both the Cynic and the Cyrenaic schools. It contained in itself the germ of the dissolution of society. The whole system of the *Republic* of Plato contains the strongest possible reaction against this principle. Not only does it avoid to contemplate the individual asserting himself against society, but it, so to speak, absolutely annihilates the individual. Lest there should be any trace at all of *imperium in imperio*, even family life is swept away. An individual is debarred from what seem the first rights of individuality—the holding of his own property; the possession of his own wife; and the direction of his own faculties of mind and body. How far this unsparing system of communism was meant for a practical reality, it is hard to say; we may at all events affirm that Plato meant to imply that the state must be an organized whole, like one mind and body, with parts harmoniously adjusted and readily working together, and all under the direction of a supremely wise philosophical consciousness—else there is no scope for virtues in the state, and it is only by conceiving of them in the state that we can learn to conceive of them in the individual.

Besides this appearance of a widely constructive system, including in its view all human relations and institutions—which Plato substituted for the isolated moral enquiries of Socrates, he also made another advance beyond his master by the metaphysical and the religious aspect which he gave to his Ethico-political doctrine. The knowledge of the Idea of good he makes essential as a guiding principle for the legislator, and the belief in a future life, and in a state of rewards

and punishments, he considers a necessary complement to the theory of justice. One other development due to Plato makes moral science for the first time appear something like what we in modern times have been accustomed to conceive it, and that is, Plato made morals in some slight degree psychological. His account of the cardinal virtues is based on a psychological division of human nature into Desire, Anger, and Intellect. These principal traits of what morality had become in his hands may now best be estimated by comparing and contrasting with them the *Ethics* of Aristotle. The *Ethics* of Aristotle were composed between fourteen and twenty-seven years after the death of Plato. If Plato could have come to life again and seen them, he would have been surprised in the first place at a complete terminology and set of formulæ in which for the most part they are expressed, which had been created or developed since his own day; he would have been astonished at the growth of philosophy. In the second place he would have found a different point of view from his own upon many leading questions, and he might have complained here and there of a somewhat captious antagonism. But he must have recognized, perhaps with pride, indications in almost every page of the work of the lasting influence produced by his twenty years' intercourse, and by his literary productions, on his most distinguished pupil, now become the greatest thinker of the world.

In order to see at one glance how great was the debt of Aristotle to Plato, let us place together and briefly indicate those parts of the moral system of Aristotle which were inherited from his master. These were, (1) His conception of the science as a whole, that Politics was the science of human happiness. (2) His conception of the practical chief good, that it is *τέλειον* and *αὐτάρκες*, and incapable of improvement or addition. (3) That man has an *ἔργον*, or proper function;

that man's ἀρετή perfects this, and that his well-being is inseparable from it. (4) The psychology of Plato, as a basis for moral distinctions. (5) The practical conclusion of Ethics, that philosophy is the highest good and the greatest happiness, being an approach to the nature of the Divine Being. (6) The doctrine of Μεσότης, which is only a modification of Plato's Μετρίότης. (7) The doctrine of φρόνησις, which is an adaptation, with alterations, of a Socratico-Platonic view. (8) The theory of pleasure, its various kinds, and the transcendency of mental pleasures. (9) The theory of friendship, which seems based on the questions started and not answered in the *Lysis* of Plato. (10) Many a conception, of which mere scattered hints are to be found in Plato, appears here worked out definitely. To this we may add, that the very metaphors in the *Ethics* of Aristotle seem, for the most part, taken from Plato. So great an influence had the one philosopher produced upon the mind and writings of the other, in spite of their wide dissimilarities of nature and tendency. On each of the above heads a few remarks may be made.

(1) Not only is the general point of view—that the individual is inseparable from the state—taken from the *Republic* of Plato, but also the special description of Politics as the science of human happiness appears unmistakably borrowed from the *Euthydemus*. It is interesting to compare the conception of Politics, and its relation to the sciences, which is expressed in *Eth.* I. ii. 5-6, with the following description (*Euthydem.* p. 291 B):—ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοπούμενοι αὐτήν, εἰ αὕτη εἴη ἢ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπεργαζομένη—ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἢ αὕτη εἶναι.—ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ ἢ τε στρατηγικῇ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι παραδιδόναι ἄρχειν τῶν ἔργων, ὧν αὐταὶ δημιουργοὶ εἰσιν, ὥς μόνῃ ἐπισταμένῃ χρῆσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἐδύκει ἡμῖν αὕτη εἶναι, ἣν ἐζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ

ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου λαμβεῖον μόνη ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνῶσα καὶ πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν. While, however, accepting this conception of Politics, Aristotle does so in a wavering way—he says that his science will be ‘a sort of Politics’ (πολιτική τις, *Eth.* i. ii. 9); and elsewhere he speaks as if it were rather a stretch to call the science of moral subjects Politics.¹ He treats Ethics in such a way as virtually to separate them from Politics; and in his *Politics*, properly so called, he makes various general references, as we have seen (p. 36), to ‘Ethics,’ as if to a separate science.

(2) In *Eth.* i. vii. 3–6, Aristotle, in laying down his own conception of the chief good, which is to be the ἀρχή for Ethics, says that it must be τέλειον and αὐταρκες. These same qualities are attributed to the chief good in the *Philebus* (p. 20 C), a dialogue to which Aristotle seems often to refer, and from which the present doctrine is probably taken. The words are as follows:—τὴν τὰγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλειον ἢ μὴ τέλειον εἶναι; πάντων δὴ που τελεώτατον, ὃ Σώκρατες. τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τὰγαθόν; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; κ.τ.λ. It is to be observed, however, that Aristotle analyzes the term τέλειον, and gives it a more philosophical import than Plato had done. Plato probably meant nothing more than ‘the perfect.’ Aristotle analyzes this into ‘that which is never a means,’ ‘that which is in and for itself desirable.’ He accepts also from the *Philebus* another doctrine, which is the corollary of the former, namely, that the chief good is incapable of addition. He directly refers to the *Philebus*, *Eth.* x. ii. 3, saying, ‘Plato used just such an argument as this to prove that pleasure is not the chief good—for that pleasure, with thought added to it, is better than pleasure separately; whereas, if the

¹ *Rhet.* i. ii. 7. Τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πραγματείας ἦν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν.

compound of the two is better, pleasure cannot be the chief good; for that which is the absolute chief good cannot be made more desirable by any addition to it. And it is obvious that nothing else can be the chief good, which is made better by the addition of any other absolute good.' The reference is to *Philebus*, pp. 20-22. Aristotle implies the same thing, *Eth.* I. vii. 8, by saying that, 'When we call happiness the most desirable of all things, we can only do so on the proviso that we do not rank it with other goods, and place it in the same scale of comparison with them' (μὴ συναριθμουμένην, see *infra*, note on this passage); 'else we should come to the absurdity of considering it capable of improvement by the addition of other goods to it, which, if we consider it as the ideal good for man, is impossible.'

(3) The whole argument by which, from the analogy of the different trades, of the different animals, and of the separate parts of the body, the existence of an ἔργον or proper function for man is proved (*Eth.* I. vii. 11), comes almost verbatim from the *Republic* (p. 352-3); as also does the account of the connexion between the ἀρετή of anything with its proper function, which is given, *Eth.* II. vi. 2. The object selected as an illustration is in each case the same—namely, the eye.²

(4) The psychology of Aristotle's *Ethics* is based on that of Plato, but it is also a development of it, and contains one essential difference, in the greater prominence, namely, that is given to the will. This, is true, is virtual rather than expressed, but it lies at the root of the separation of 'practical virtues' from philosophy, and from 'excellencies of the reason.' Plato divides the mind into the following elements: —τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, and τὸ θυμοειδές (*Repub.* p. 440). Aristotle gives a more physical account of the internal

² Cf. *Repub.* p. 353 B. Ἐὰν ποτε ὕματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργά-

σαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν; κ.τ.λ.

principle (see below, Essay V.), and divides the mind into that which possesses reason and that which partakes of reason.³ This answers at first sight to the division of Plato, since the λόγου μετέχον includes both θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία. But Aristotle pushes the analysis farther, dividing the reason into practical and speculative (which is a great discrepancy from Plato), and not attributing the same character to θυμὸς as it has in the *Republic*, where it is made to stand for something like the instinct of honour, or the spirited and manly will, which, as Plato says, is generally on the side of the reason in any mental conflict. In Aristotle's discussions upon βούλησις, βούλευσις, &c., we see an attempt to found a psychology of the will, thus supplying what was a deficiency in Plato, but the theory does not appear to be by any means complete.

(5) The burden of all the Platonic dialogues is the same, the excellence of philosophy, and its extreme felicity. Most completely does Aristotle reproduce this feeling when (*Eth.* x. vii.) having, as it were, satisfied the claims of common life by his analysis of the 'practical virtues,' he indulges in his own description of that which is the highest happiness, when he says, 'Philosophy seems to afford wonderful pleasures both in purity and duration' (*Eth.* x. vii. 3), and 'We need not listen to the saying, "Men should think humanly," rather as far as possible one should aspire after what is immortal, and do all things so as to live according to what is highest in oneself' (*Eth.* x. vii. 8). We are reminded generally of the enthusiastic descriptions of philosophy in the *Republic*, the *Phædo*, and the *Symposium* of Plato. One particular passage of the last-named dialogue seems probably to have suggested to Aristotle the saying (*Eth.* x. viii. 13), that 'The philosopher

³ Λόγον ἔχον and λόγου μετέχον. *Eth.* i. xiii.

will surely be most under the protection of heaven (*θεοφιλέστατος*), because honouring and cherishing that which is highest and most akin to God—namely, the reason.’

(6) The principle of *Μεσότης*, so prominent in Aristotle’s theory of moral virtue, is a modification of Plato’s principle of *Μετρίότης* or *Συμμετρία*. As, however, the history of the doctrine of *Μεσότης* will form part of the subject of the following essay, no more need at present be said upon it.

(7) Aristotle’s doctrine of *φρόνησις*, as far as we can understand it in the Eudemian exposition, which alone remains to us (see above, p. 40), seems to be partly an adoption and partly a correction of a Socratico-Platonic doctrine of similar import. This doctrine, beginning with the form that ‘Virtue is knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), or thought (*φρόνησις*),’ and being afterwards developed by Plato into the form that ‘Virtue is, or implies, philosophy,’ is accepted, with two corrections, by Aristotle. He denies the identification of ‘thought’ with virtue, saying instead—virtue must ‘be accompanied by’ thought; and he distinguishes and divides thought or wisdom (*φρόνησις*) from philosophy (*σοφία*). The former of these corrections was directed more against Socrates than against Plato; the latter, we shall see, is an important correction of the system of Plato, one that is connected with differences as to the whole view of Ethics. Plato speaks quite decisively of the necessity of *φρόνησις* to make moral action of any worth. In a celebrated passage of the *Theætetus* (p. 176 A), he says, ‘We should strive to fly from the evil of the world; the flight consists in as far as possible being made like to God; and this “being made like” consists in becoming just and holy with thought accompanying’ (*ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι*). In the *Phædo* (p. 69 B), he descants upon the worthlessness of moral acts if performed without *φρόνησις*: he says, ‘Such virtue is a mere shadow and in

reality a slavish quality, with nothing sound or true about it.⁴ But a little further on (p. 79 D) he defines *φρόνησις* to be the contemplation of the absolute.⁵ We see then that Plato requires that every act should be accompanied by an absolute consciousness—and this absolute consciousness he does not separate from that which takes place in speculation and philosophy. Aristotle says a moral consciousness must accompany every act, a sort of wisdom which is the centre to all the moral virtues (*Eth.* vi. xiii. 6), but this kind of consciousness is quite distinct from the philosophic reason, it deals with the contingent and not with the absolute.

(8) Of the two treatises on Pleasure contained in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, we may assume (see above, p. 39), that the one which appears in Book VII. is the work of Eudemus. It has then a totally different kind of interest from that in Book X. It illustrates, not so much Aristotle's relation to Plato, as rather the growth of the Peripatetic school. It is in its main outline borrowed from the treatise in Book X., but it also contains some peculiarities belonging to the views of Eudemus, of which the chief are a practical, and at the same time a materialistic tendency. It is antagonistic to the views of 'some' who argued that no pleasure could be a good, because it is a state of becoming (*γένεσις*). This argument is refuted by Aristotle himself in Book X. Eudemus adds other arguments for the same position, not mentioned in Book X., which he criticizes and overthrows. None of

⁴ Χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχουσα.

⁵ "Ὅταν δὲ γέ αὐτῇ (ἡ ψυχῇ) καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκείσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθα-

ρόν τε καὶ αἰὲ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὲς οὖσα αὐτοῦ αἰὲ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ—καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται.

these, however, are to be found in the *Philebus*, or any dialogue of Plato. They are, in all probability, to be attributed to the Platonic school. There is a direct mention, in connexion with one of the arguments, of the name of Speusippus (*Eth.* vii. xiii. 1). Turning now to Book X., we find the question as to the nature of pleasure opened by the statement of two extreme views on the subject; one, that of the Cynics—that pleasure was ‘entirely evil’ (*κομιδῇ φαῦλον*)—the other, that of Eudoxus, that pleasure was the chief good. The first view Aristotle sets aside as having rather a moral and practical than a speculative character; and as being, though well-intentioned, at all events an over-statement of the truth. He specifies four arguments of Eudoxus to prove that pleasure is the chief good. (a) All creatures seek it. (b) It is contrary to pain. (c) It is sought for its own sake. (d) Added to any good, it makes that good better. He then mentions the objections (*ἐνστάσεις*) made to each of these four, and shows that none of the objections is valid, except that brought against the last of the arguments. He shows from Plato (see above, p. 141), that the fact that pleasure can be added to other goods *disproves*, instead of proving, its claim to be considered the chief good. Aristotle now mentions other general arguments that have been brought against pleasure—namely, that it is not a quality: that it is indefinite (*ἀόριστον*); that it is a motion, a becoming, or a replenishment (*κίνησις, γένεσις, ἀναπλήρωσις*); again, that there are many disgraceful pleasures. He answers all these objections, and having accepted the Platonic position that pleasure is, at all events, not the chief good, he proceeds to give his own theory of its nature, considering it to be, except in certain cases, a good, and analyzing its character more accurately than had hitherto been done. In all this we cannot trace anything like a direct antagonism to the *Philebus*

or to any other part of Plato's works. Far rather, as we shall have an opportunity of seeing more distinctly in the next Essay, Aristotle, while perfectly coinciding with and accepting Plato's general theory of pleasure, the division of its different kinds, the distinction between bodily pleasures which are preceded by desire and a sense of pain, and the mental pleasures which are free from this; while accepting, that is, the whole theory in its moral and practical bearing, refines and improves upon it as a speculative question, substituting a more accurate and appropriate definition of pleasure than is to be found in Plato.

(9) We cannot doubt that Aristotle's attention was turned to the consideration of the subject of friendship by the importance that Plato attributed to it, and the interesting part which he makes it play in his system. Both the *Lysis* and the *Phædrus* are devoted to the discussion of friendship. In the former dialogue little more is done than starting the difficulties, some of which are taken up and re-stated in the beginning of Aristotle's treatise (*Eth.* VIII. i. 6); 'Whether does friendship arise from similarity, or from dissimilarity? Does it consist in sympathy, or in the harmony of opposites?' In the *Phædrus* a passionate and enthusiastic picture of friendship is given, which renders it not distinguishable from love; its connexion with the highest kind of imagination, and with the philosophic spirit, is dwelt upon at length. In Aristotle nothing of this kind is to be discovered. The picture is colder, but at the same time more natural and human. In the ninth chapter of Book IX. a fine philosophic account of the true value of friendship is to be found, on which more will be said in the succeeding Essay. The whole of this subject is treated with depth and also with moral earnestness, which renders it one of the most attractive parts of Aristotle's *Ethics*. We see throughout that on every

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point of the question the analysis has been pushed farther than Plato carried it.

(10) It remains now to mention, what any one will be conscious of who reads the Platonic dialogues in order to illustrate Aristotle — that scattered through the pages of Plato will be found hints and suggestions afterwards worked out by his successor, and floating conceptions that in Plato have no determinate meaning, but which in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, as well as in his other works, have become, or are becoming, fixed and definite terms. Of course the more broad and general conceptions, such as τέλος, δύναμις, τὸ ὀρισμένον, τί ἐστι; and ποῖον τί; , and a host of other metaphysical and logical formulæ, are developments of what is to be found in Plato. But also more special conceptions appear, in germ at least, to have been borrowed. Take, for instance, ὀρθὸς λόγος (*Eth.* II. ii. 2); this term, which appears used first in a tentative sort of way in the Aristotelian philosophy, and afterwards more definitely (*Eth.* VI. i. 1) to express the moral standard, occurs here and there in the Platonic pages coupled with ἐπιστήμη and other such terms, in an approximation to Aristotle's meaning, but by no means reaching it (see *infra*, note on *Eth.* II. ii. 2). So also the conception of παιδεία to express a general connoisseurship of science, and especially some acquaintance with the logic of science, as it is used *Eth.* I. iii. 4 (on which see the notes *ad locum*), is to be found in the *Timæus*, p. 53 C, and in the so-called *Erastæ* of Plato, p. 135.

We have said that the very metaphors in Aristotle seem often to have been inherited. That of the 'bowmen' (*Eth.* I. ii. 2) occurs in *Republic*, p. 519 C. That of the 'Aristeia for pleasure' (*Eth.* I. xii. 5) comes from the *Philebus*, p. 22 E. The analogy between the political philosopher and an oculist (*Eth.* I. xiii. 7) is from the *Charmides*, p. 155 B. The com-

parison of mental extremes to excesses in gymnastic training (*Eth.* II. ii. 6) occurs in the *Erastæ*, p. 134. The metaphor of 'straightening bent wood' (*Eth.* II. ix. 5) is from the *Protagoras*, p. 325 D. The comparison of those who have made their own fortune to poets and mothers, who love their offspring (*Eth.* IV. i. 20, IX. vii. 7), is from the *Republic*, p. 330 C. This list of examples might doubtless be increased.

We have traced hitherto the close connexion of the *Ethics* of Aristotle in almost all its parts with the system of Plato. We have now to show that this connexion was not only one of succession, inheritance, and development, but also was one of antagonism. Already we have seen that even Aristotle's following of Plato was often tinged with discrepancy. We have now to notice those parts of his *Ethics* which are directly characterized and even prompted by a spirit of difference and of polemic.

The greatest difference between Plato and Aristotle is that expressed in the sixth Chapter of Book I.—Aristotle's dissent from the theory of the Idea of good. Elsewhere, Aristotle criticizes the Ideas altogether; here, in conformity with his present purpose, he confines himself to the Idea of good. To exactly comprehend and explain Plato's Ideas has always been a problem. Aristotle tells us they rose from a union between the universal definitions of Socrates and the Heraclitean doctrine of the fleeting character of all objects of sense. To put this a little more clearly, the position is as follows: we desire some permanent and certain knowledge. Let us take some object and try to know it, *e. g.* 'this man.' Looking closely into it we find at once that, in 'this man,' we are in possession of a conception made up of two elements, a universal and a particular. 'Man' is universal, 'this' is particular. Now 'this' may be infinitely various.

It is purely relative, entirely changeable. It baffles all attempts at knowledge. The more we analyze 'this,' the more it escapes us, and comes to actually nothing. What constitutes 'this' man? Particular time and place, particular qualities, such as form, colour, size, and the like. But time and place, form, colour, and size are all in themselves universals. 'This' man is determined by 'this' time, place, form, &c. But, again, what is 'this time'? The particular element in 'this time' is equally unknowable and unexpressible with the particular element in 'this man.' Hence Heraclitus said, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Let us now take the other side, and look at the universal element, 'man.' This is something permanent and stable; this constitutes a unity in the midst of plurality; this the mind can rest in contemplating. We give to this universal element the name of form or idea (εἶδος, ἰδέα), a name borrowed probably from Democritus, who spoke of the 'forms' of things being emanations from things themselves, and constituting our knowledge of the things. And now another step has to be taken; we must throw out all distinction between knowledge and existence. Since things exist for us solely through our knowledge of them, and we cannot conceive them existing at all, except as either for our minds or for some other minds, we must give up entirely that dualism which would suppose two terms standing opposite each other, namely, the object and the mind, and we must speak now of one term alone. Nothing exists except what we know. Knowledge and existence are identical, since, as Protagoras said (only in an altered sense), the mind is 'the measure of all things; of existing things that they exist, of non-existent things that they do not exist.' Taking as established the identity of knowledge and existence, we may use one term to express this identity, namely, 'truth' (ἀλήθεια), which

equally implies reality of existence in things, and the right apprehension of them in the mind.

What is it that possesses truth, or reality? Not particulars, which, as we saw before, are (in so far as they are particulars) unknowable, but the universal, the idea. The universal element, or idea, may hence be said to be the only real existence, while the particulars have only a sort of illusory, or mock existence; when we look closely into them we find they are mere shadows of reality. Hence Plato, following out this train of thought, said, by a forcible metaphor, that common persons who fancy the particulars to be real existences are like men in a dimly-lighted cave, taking the shadows on the wall to be realities. By an equally strong metaphor, which Aristotle speaks of as mere poetry (*Metaphys.* I. ix. 12), Plato called the Ideas archetypes (*παράδειγματα*) of sensible things. In this metaphor several points are expressed. (1) That knowledge is rather prior to experience than derived from it. Experience is the occasion, and not the cause of knowledge. This Plato expressed by saying that all our knowledge is 'reminiscence.' Things in the world are constantly reminding us of, and calling up, the reminiscence of the Ideas which we saw in their pure state, before we were born. (2) That the forms of the mind are permanent, while the material universe is fleeting. The mind is always prior to, and greater than, the world. This points, as Plato argued in the *Phædo*, to the immortality of the soul. (3) The Eleatics had denied the existence of motion, plurality, change; in short, the whole sensible creation. Plato does not go so far as this; though infinitely less real than the Ideas, he allows that it has some share of reality. Metaphorically, he says, 'it partakes of the Ideas.' The Ideas are archetypes of things; in other words, in the midst of the unknowable, the fleeting, the chaotic, the moveable—there is law, unity, form, order, symmetry,

the permanent, and the absolute, existing not materially, but as ideas, dimly seen by the mind, because it is not pure enough; seen more distinctly, according to the purity and elevation of the mind, and always more or less suggested.

We are now brought to that part of Plato's doctrine where he spoke of the 'Idea of good.' Of this he says (*Repub.* p. 509 B), that 'As the sun affords to all visible objects not only the power of being seen, but also growth, increase, and nourishment; so is there afforded to all objects of knowledge by the good not only the being known, but also their very being and existence. The good is not existence, but is above and beyond existence (ἐντὶ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας) in dignity and power.' In the *Philebus* (p. 65 A), it is said that 'the good cannot be comprehended in one idea alone, but it may be taken in three manifestations; beauty, symmetry, and truth.' We see what a metaphysical world we have now to deal with. It is not the material world immediately, but the world of pure cognitions (τὰ γνωσκόμενα), that depend on the good for their existence. Every cognition must have the Idea of good present in it. We cannot conceive anything existing except as being good. Evil, in the shape of disease, crime, pain, &c., Plato, from this point of view, would call the non-existent; it is the negation of existence, the want of existence in some way or other; it is the chaotic, the formless, that which has no universality or absoluteness, that which the mind cannot deal with. The Idea of good in the world of thought Plato compared to the sun in the material world; following out this metaphor, evil would be as the shadows which are the mere negation of light, and yet they are necessary to relieve the light, for were all light, nothing would be visible; and so too evil, as the negation of good, may be said to be necessary to its existence. 'Good,' says Plato, 'is the cause of existence and knowledge.' This opens a sublime

conception, on the one hand, of a world in which all things are very good; on the other hand, of a philosophy whose method of the deepest knowledge consists in no mere abstract investigations, nor any mere accumulation of experience, but in apprehending with enthusiasm and joy the all-pervading idea of Good, as it manifests itself under the three forms of beauty, symmetry, and truth. The Idea of good Plato would by no means confine to metaphysics, as if it had no application to the other sciences. On the contrary, his great object was to raise Morals and Politics above all mere empiricism into philosophy properly so called. Hence he says that 'States will never prosper till philosophers are kings'; again, he says, 'The guardian of the state must know with certainty that which all vaguely seek and aspire after — namely, what is the good' (*Repub.* p. 505-6). The Idea of good then, according to Plato, is to be a principle influencing human action, and necessarily forming a part of any system of Politics or Morals worthy of being called so.

With this position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the theory in the following words (*Eth.* I. iv. 3), 'Some have thought that besides all these manifold goods upon earth, there is some other absolute good, which is the cause to all these of their being good'; he proceeds to criticize the tenability of such a conception, and concludes his argument by saying, 'But we may dismiss the Idea at present, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, or transcendental (*χωριστόν*) and absolute, it obviously can neither be realized nor possessed by man, whereas something of this latter kind is what we are inquiring after' (*Eth.* I. vi. 13). He follows up those remarks by saying that 'Perhaps some may think the knowledge of the idea may be useful as a pattern (*παράδειγμα*) by which to judge of relative good.' Against this he argues that 'There is no trace of the arts making any

use of such a conception; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general, all pursue their vocations without respect to the absolute good, nor is it easy to see how they could be advantaged by apprehending it.'

This criticism is a direct denial of Plato's point of view. Plato, who had expressed himself utterly dissatisfied with the empirical and prudential morality of his countrymen, and who wished to raise morality and Politics (which with him was but morality on an extended scale) into something wise, philosophical, and absolute—made certain requisitions for this. He demanded that a full philosophic consciousness should govern everything. He required that a knowledge of the good-in-itself should be present to the mind. He acknowledges, it is true, that the philosopher, after dealing with sublime speculations, may seem dazzled and confused when he is suddenly confronted with the petty details of life, the quibbles of law-courts, &c. But on the other hand he seems to have considered, not only that philosophy was indispensable to morality, but also that the mind, by contemplating the Idea of good, would become conformed to it. This Idea, then, was not merely an object for the abstract reason; it was an object for the imagination also, and an attraction for the highest kind of desires. It was not only an idea, but also an ideal. Aristotle, in a clearer and more analytic way, regards the Idea as something out of all relation to action (*οὐ πρακτόν*), as a metaphysical conception simply, if, indeed, it could be entertained at all. He then entirely separates it from Ethics. He considers that the guiding principle (*ἀρχή*) for Ethics must be not this absolute transcendental good, but a practical good, which he envisaged as happiness, or the end for man. These two views must stand for ever apart, and on each side there seems to be some degree of merit and some degree of fault. Fine as is Plato's conception of science, it

must be confessed that there is some degree of vagueness about it. We need not put ourselves in the position of Plato's contemporaries, those of whom the story is related that 'They went to him expecting to hear about the chief good for man, but they were disappointed, for he put them off with a quantity of remarks about numbers and things they could not understand.' But even taking Plato as 'a philosopher for philosophers,' there seems to be something not quite explained in his system. Infinitely rich as he was in invention and suggestion, we might almost say that he required an Aristotle as his successor to give definiteness to his conceptions. When then we turn to Aristotle, we find the power that is gained by a division of the sciences. We find no longer an effort to attain to that highest point of union for all knowledge and all existence, which is far above the ordinary ken, and which can hardly be viewed otherwise than by occasional glimpses—but rather an effort after clearness and completeness, after the arrangement of all experience under appropriate and separate leading conceptions. It is easy to see what an immense field is at once laid open. Rapid indeed and wonderful were the achievements of a mind like that of Aristotle. But when all is done, one feels also that something has also been lost by this separate treatment of different subjects. One desires again to see Ethics not dissevered from Theology and Metaphysics.

As yet we have only spoken of Aristotle's treatment of the Idea of good in its relation to ethical science; we must now advert to his general treatment of it as a theory. In the first place, we remark that Aristotle gives a very limited and restricted representation of the theory before criticizing it. He does not enter upon, or even mention, that most striking characteristic of the Idea of good, which Plato assigns to it, namely, that it is the cause of existence to all objects of cog-

nition, and also the cause of our knowing them. Aristotle merely speaks of it as 'The cause to all other goods of their being good.' He also calls it 'the Universal' (τὸ καθόλου), and enquires in what sense its existence is asserted (πῶς λέγεται). He leaves out then all discussion of that higher and at the same time more difficult part of the theory which makes the good the central cause of all 'knowing and being'; he makes the question a drily logical one, as to the nature of universals. What is the meaning of this word good? Is all good one? Is there one absolute conception of good under which you can reduce all separate goods? Is there the same law of good (τὸν τάγαθοῦ λόγον, *Eth.* I. vi. 11) in all goods properly so called? Else how is the universal name to be accounted for? These are the questions which Aristotle seems to propose to himself. We see how totally different from Plato's is his point of view at starting.

After an expression of respect and good feeling towards the Platonic school, he proceeds directly to bring a series of arguments against the tenability of their doctrine,—and these arguments are briefly as follows:—(1) The Platonists themselves allowed that where there is an essential succession (τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον) between any two conceptions, these could not be brought under a common idea. But this succession occurs in different kinds of good. Good in relation, *e.g.* the useful, is essentially later than good in substance, and therefore cannot fall under the same idea. (2) If all good were one, it ought to be predicated under only one category, whereas it can be predicated under all. (3) If it were one, it would be treated of by only one science. (4) The Idea is only a repetition of phenomena, for with these it is really identical. (5) Even the most essential and undoubted goods seem incapable of being reduced to one idea. Every one has felt the unsatisfactoriness of these arguments;

they seem captious, verbal, unreal, and not to touch the point at issue. Let us examine them separately. Argument (1) seems to beg the question. It refers to the Platonic doctrine of the ideal numbers (referred to *Metaphys.* XII. vi. 7), which they held to stand in absolute and immutable succession to each other, and to be incapable of being brought themselves under one common Idea. To this Aristotle compares the relation between relative and absolute goods; he says the one stands in immutable succession to the other, therefore there can be no common idea of them. A Platonist might reply, that this is a mere assumption; that in the case of the ideal numbers, Unity and Duality, for instance, stand in such essential contradistinction to each other, that they are Ideas themselves, and therefore there cannot be Ideas of them. But with regard to the goods, all that is relative in them is merely the particular, the non-existent, which the philosophical reason cannot deal with. It is absurd to make the relativity of the relative good an immutable and permanent quality, which is for ever to distinguish it from the good in itself. (2) The second argument is a mere repetition of the first. Aristotle takes certain categories, namely, substance, quality, quantity, relation, time and place, &c. (*καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα*), and shows that there are different modes of the good under these different categories. Now, these categories might all be reduced to substance and relation, and then the argument is, 'You have good in substance, and good in different relations; can these be considered the same?' (3) The argument of the sciences is a carrying out of the same objection. Aristotle argues that the sciences point to a still greater subdivision of good. For good, in relation to time, for instance,—that is, opportunity, may be treated of by strategies, or by medicine; and so on with good under the other categories; the sciences still more minutely subdivide it.

Plato might well complain of this subdivision of the sciences being brought as an argument against him, when he had so anxiously urged (*Repub.* p. 534 E) that in dialectic all sciences united, and dialectic was the science of the idea of good. Even Aristotle had made a union of the practical sciences in Politics (*Eth.* i. ii. 6), and had he contented himself with maintaining here that the *πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν*, the subject of Politics and its subordinate sciences, must always be distinct from the *νοητὸν ἀγαθόν*, the subject of metaphysics, we must have allowed that such a point of view was fair and admissible. But his present mode of statement makes the argument, both relatively to Plato and also in itself, worthless. When we look back on the whole of these three arguments, it seems almost inconceivable that Aristotle should have believed them to be valid. We can only say with regret, that on some points this great mind seems to have descended to a sort of smallness. We must also consider that to be able with perfect fairness to represent an antagonist's system was not commonly the merit of antiquity. Certainly it was not always the merit of Aristotle. His accounts of other philosophers, as, for instance, in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, frequently contain something garbled. Again, the direction of his mind was totally different from Plato's; his leaning was predominantly towards experience, and though by no means a mere empiricist or a mere nominalist, yet he was excessively unequal in his views, and sometimes relapses into what seems a merely popular level of thought. To keep his mind at the Platonic point of view would have been to Aristotle a great difficulty, especially for the simple purpose of criticizing Plato. Probably he went with Plato at one period in his youth, then became dissatisfied with parts of the system, with its poetical and enthusiastic character, and with its want of analytic distinctness; then he worked out his own

system, which at times bears a close similarity to that of Plato; then, after an interval of perhaps twenty years' alienation, he set himself to refute his master's doctrines. If we picture to ourselves this course, we shall be able in some degree to explain the tone of the arguments used in the present place, and elsewhere where Aristotle attacks the system of ideas.

To resume our examination, the fourth argument is one of which Aristotle seems fond, that the idea (*αὐτοέκαστον*) is a mere repetition of phenomena, exhibiting the same law as the particulars, indistinguishable from them, and therefore perfectly useless. This objection is expressed in the *Metaphysics* (I. ix. 1) by saying that 'The Ideas are as if one was unable to count a few things, and thought it would be easier to count them when they were more.' Nothing could be a greater misstatement of Plato's view, for this argument assumes the reality, the substantive and absolute existence of the particulars, and then speaks of the idea or the universal being appended to the end of the row, in order to explain them. Whereas Plato would say the particulars disappear out of sight, on looking into them I find they have no existence, while the universal grows more and more in reality, and absorbs all the attention of the mind. Instead of 'multiplying phenomena,' Plato would say, 'The idea reduces phenomena to unity.' Aristotle's account represents the universal or absolute existence as if it was gained inductively from a set of particulars, and added to the end of them; whereas Plato's account is that the idea is prior to all the particulars; we do not obtain it inductively, we are reminded of it, but we saw it before we were born. Another most captious objection quite unworthy of the gravity of a philosopher, Aristotle here adds; it is that 'Perhaps the idea of good may be said to be distinguished from the number of

phenomenal goods by being eternal. But in short this is no difference, the good is not any more good for this. Length of duration does not constitute a distinction between identical qualities. A white thing is not more white if it lasts long than if it only lasts for a day.' Perhaps this argument need only be stated for its weakness to be seen. Plato would never have consented to this confusion between length of duration (*πολυχρόνιον*) and eternity (*αἰδιον*). It is true, that in popular thinking we picture to ourselves the eternal under the form of duration of time, but the philosophical conception of the eternal is the necessary (*causa sui*), the absolute, the unconditional, the uncreate and indestructible (*Eth.* vi. iii. 2), that which is out of all relation to time. Aristotle's argument, then, consists in setting the popular way of thinking against the philosophical. He represents the idea to be a copy taken from the particular and made lasting. Whereas Plato meant, that without which we cannot know the particular or conceive it to exist; that which is utterly independent of this or that particular, though the particulars depend on it; that which is independent of yesterday, or to-day, or a thousand years hence.

At this point of the discussion Aristotle seems to have become conscious to himself (*Eth.* i. vi. 8) that the Platonists may complain of his attempting to disprove the unity of good by always setting relative goods in opposition to those that are good in themselves. He proposes then to take certain specimens of things good in themselves, and to make these the test of the theory. The specimens he adduces are 'thought, sight, and some pleasures and honours'; he adds that 'If these be not esteemed goods in themselves, nothing else but the pure Idea will remain to be called a good in itself; thus the Idea as a universal or class will lose all its meaning, having no individuals ranked under it.'⁶ The question then

⁶ *Η οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ιδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.

is, Do these goods, which are sought for their own sake, exhibit the same, or different laws of good? To answer this question would require a very deep and subtle investigation; this Aristotle does not enter upon, but he merely gives a summary assertion that 'The laws exhibited by honour, thought, and pleasure, viewed as goods, are distinct and different from one another.' This appears to be mere dogmatism and a trifling with the question. For we might urge that honour is not properly speaking a good sought for its own sake (cf. *Eth.* I. v. 5), and that thought, sight, and pleasure, are all of them *ἐνέργειαι* and therefore do according to the Aristotelian views exhibit the same law of good.

Aristotle winds up his polemic by assuming as concluded, that there is no realistic unity in the good.⁷ He asks, 'What is the account then of this one word good? It cannot surely have arisen from a mere chance coincidence in language. It must be either that all goods proceed from one source or tend to one end—or rather that they are analogous to one another.' He substitutes then arbitrarily, without proof or discussion (for he says these belong to metaphysics), a nominalistic theory for the realism of Plato. His view is apparently, that men inductively from a set of similar particulars formed the universal 'good,' and by analogy, where cases were analogous, came to extend the same term to dissimilar particulars. Plato's view was that by experience of a particular there is awakened in the mind the knowledge of a universal, which existed there prior to the particular, and is the law of the existence of that particular, and that by many different particulars we 'are reminded' of this same law or idea, and that hence arises sameness of name⁸ by reason of a sameness

⁷ Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.

⁸ Κατὰ μέθεξιν εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν

συνωνύμων τοῖς εἶδεσιν. — *Ar. Metaphys.* I. vi. 3.

of law under different relative circumstances and modifications. Realism makes the universal prior to and more real than the particular. Nominalism makes the particulars more real than the universal. Aristotle is by no means consistently a nominalist, though here he avows a sort of nominalism for the time. That he was not prepared with an answer to this question as to the nature of good, that he did not lay it down as the basis of his *Ethics*, is one indication amongst many of the tentative and uncertain method with which he approached the science.

The real difference between the metaphysical point of view of Plato and of Aristotle, and between their respective theories of cognition and existence, it would require a most subtle discussion to set forth, and one which it is quite out of the question at present to attempt. Their moral systems are characterized in general by divergent tendencies, which might be briefly summed up under the names synthetic and analytic. One of the points in regard to which the analytic tendency of Aristotle displays itself is his departure from Plato's list of the cardinal virtues. In his *Politics*⁹ (I. xiii. 10) he approves of the method of Gorgias, in enumerating the virtues in detail, saying that 'People deceive themselves by general definitions, as that virtue consists in a good condition of the soul, or again in uprightness of action (ὀρθοπραγεῖν), or some such thing.' And in the same spirit he says (*Eth.* II. vii. 1) that 'While general theories are of wider application' (κοινότεροι, see *infra*, the note on this passage), 'those that go into detail have more reality, since action consists in detail,' &c. Accordingly he proceeds to give a list of virtues which contain an exemplification of his principle of Μεσότης. This list does not appear formed on any scientific basis, it does not

⁹ The allusion is to the *Meno* of Plato, p. 71.

start afresh with any new psychological classification. It seems first to accept, in a way, the list of cardinal virtues, placing courage and temperance in the front of its ranks, reserving justice as being something peculiar, and dividing wisdom into practical and speculative. It then adds to these, different qualities, some of them sufficiently external, which were held in honour among the Greeks. In this procedure there is something which must be called empirical. Aristotle has two sides, the one speculative and profoundly penetrating and philosophic; the other side tending to the accumulation of details and of experience, regardless of a philosophic point of view, content with a shallow system of classification. His list, when formed, Aristotle seems to have believed in as complete. The same is repeated in the *Rhetoric* (I. ix. 5) with the omission of three here mentioned.

In Aristotle's theory of justice, as far as we can judge of it, there seems to be the same analytical reaction against Plato. Aristotle appears to regard with dislike the attempt to reduce all acts of justice to the manifestations of one general law, harmony, or balance in the mind, so as to make justice, in short, not different from virtue viewed as a whole. He wishes to separate and distinguish from this justice, which is no other than universal right, a distinct quality which shall deal with property alone or all that can be estimated as property. The way in which this subject is treated in the *Eudemian* book (*Eth.* v.) is very indistinct. Certain principles seem first laid down for the regulation of justice in the state, principles in short of Politics, Jurisprudence, and Political Economy. Then, by some remarks on the voluntary and by some casuistical problems, there is an apparent transition to consideration of this quality as existent in the mind of the individual. We cannot think that we have here Aristotle's theory in its entirety, any more than we should have his theory of pleasure

if we had only the Eudemian account in Book VII. to rely upon. But the general bearings of the account of justice are discernible, and amongst these is a polemic against Plato. This is perhaps to be traced in the remark that 'It is only by a sort of metaphor you can speak of justice in a man's own self between his higher and lower parts.' (*Eth.* v. xi. 9.)

We have seen already the separation made by Aristotle between Ethics and Metaphysics. The same of course holds good of Theology, this being with Aristotle but another name for Metaphysics. Practical theology was not a conception that Aristotle could have admitted. His great divergence from Plato on this head may be seen in the fact that while Plato speaks of 'being made like to God, through becoming just and holy, with thought and consciousness of the same' (*loc. cit.*, see above, p. 144), Aristotle, on the contrary, speaks of moral virtue as being totally unworthy of the Gods (*Eth.* x. viii. 7). If we compare Plato and Aristotle as to the tone in which they write, it will appear that Aristotle is on the one hand more human than Plato: this he shows in his respect for the opinions of the multitude. He will not affirm that the dead have no connexion with this life, because it would be 'a hard doctrine and going against opinions too much' (*ἀλὲν ἄφιλον καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον. Eth.* i. xi. 1). He is totally opposed to anything unnatural in life or institutions. And he recognizes, with a sort of enthusiasm, the worth of moral virtue,¹⁰ without the incessant demand which Plato made, that this should be accompanied by philosophy. On the other hand, Aristotle is less delicate and reverent than Plato in his mode of speaking of human happiness, especially as attained by the philosopher. In Plato there seems often, if not always, present, a sense of the weakness of the individual as contrasted

¹⁰ Cf. *Eth.* i. x. 12. Διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, said of the good man in misfortune. Cf. also the account of the

ἀνδρείος dying for a noble cause.—III. ix. 4.

with the eternal and the divine. If Plato requires philosophy to make morality, he also always infuses morality into philosophy; the philosopher in his pictures does not triumph over the world, but rather is glad to seize on 'some tradition' 'like a stray plank,' to prevent his being lost; he feels that his philosophy on earth is but 'knowing in part.' Aristotle, on the contrary, rather represents the strength than the weakness of human nature. And in his picture of the happiness of philosophy we cannot but feel that there is over much elation, and something that requires toning down. In the manner of the writing it is obvious that we miss the art, the grace, the rich and delicate imagination of Plato. Above all, we miss the subtle humour which plays round all the moral phenomena. Aristotle does not show any trace of archness. There are sayings in the *Ethics* which might cause a smile, but they are apparently given unconsciously, in illustration of the point in question. In *Eth.* x. v. 8, to show that the different creatures have each their different proper pleasures, Aristotle quotes from Heraclitus the saying that 'An ass likes hay better than gold,' without any sense of anything ludicrous in the illustration. The same thing occurs in one of the Eudemian books (vii. vi. 2), where it is mentioned to illustrate the hereditariness of hot temper, that 'A father being kicked out by his son, begged him to stop at the door, for he said *he* had kicked *his* father as far as that.' This is mentioned with perfect gravity among a list of arguments. Aristotle's rich and manifold knowledge of human nature exhibits itself in his *Ethics*. It might be doubted whether Plato would have written the masterly analytic account of the various virtues in Books III. and IV. These are not living dramatic portraits such as Plato would have made, there is nothing personal or dramatic about them; but they are a wonderful catalogue and analysis of very subtle characteristics.

Before quitting Plato, it may be well to mention two references made to him in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, each for different reasons worth notice. The first occurs *Eth.* I. iv. 5. 'Plato rightly used to doubt and question whether the course were *from* principles or *to* principles, as in the stadium whether from the judges to the goal, or reversely.' There is no passage in the extant dialogues of Plato corresponding to this reference. Hence it has been believed that the oral philosophy of Plato is here referred to, and this the use of the imperfect tense would seem to favour. But the metaphor here given is something definite, and probably belonged to Plato himself. This leads then to the conclusion, that Plato in speaking was accustomed to use the same imaginative illustrations as in his writings. The other reference occurs *Eth.* II. iii. 2. 'One ought to be well trained from youth up, as Plato says, to feel pleasure and pain at the right objects.' The passage alluded to is in the *Laws*, p. 653 A.¹¹ It contains a doctrine quite in accordance with Aristotle's own, but, at the same time, at variance with the view maintained in other dialogues of Plato. It gives a dogmatic theory of the inculcation of virtue, of the relation of nature to instruction, and of true education consisting in the learning to feel pleasure and pain aright. This then is a departure from the tentative uncertain attitude of the *Meno*. It is in harmony with the popular point of view, and much in the tone which Aristotle might himself have adopted. The peculiarity is that the genuineness of the dialogue called the *Laws* has been gravely

¹¹ Λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἰσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι.—παιδεῖαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετὴν, ἡδονὴν δὲ καὶ φιλίαν καὶ λύπην καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφω-

νήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ, ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν· αὐτῆς θ' ἡ συμφωνία ξύμπασα μὲν ἀρετὴ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς, ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδεῖαν προσαγορεύω κατὰ γὰρ τὴν μὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.

called in question. The reasons for doubting it are (1) The *à priori* improbability of Plato's taking the trouble to compose so long a work, which is to a great degree a repetition of the *Republic*. (2) The inferiority of style. (3) The abandonment of all that is essential in Plato's point of view. Polytheistic theology and Pythagorean notions are substituted for Plato's doctrine of Ideas. And, as in the place alluded to, a merely practical view of morals seems to be taken. We may ask, does all this denote a change in Plato's mind, or is his name forged, and have his views been garbled by his school?

Perhaps the strongest argument for considering the dialogue to be genuine is that it is quoted by Aristotle as Plato's; and not only quoted, but also criticized at length in the *Politics* (II. vi.), and compared with the *Republic*. Against this may be set the fact that Aristotle also quotes the *Menexenus*, which is of still more doubtful genuineness. Also, literary criticism was no part of his *métier*. Also, he was absent from Athens during thirteen years after the death of Plato. In the interval the *Laws* must have appeared, for even the testimony of antiquity makes it posthumous. On the whole, perhaps, the balance of probabilities may lead us to consider that the *Laws* stands nearly in the same relation to Plato's *Republic*, as the *Eudemian Ethics* to Aristotle's moral system; that is, that it contains much which is actually Plato's, the whole unskilfully filled up and put together, and the point of view being slightly altered. Partly, then, it may be said to represent a certain degree of change in Plato's mind at the last, and partly also certain tendencies in the Academic school, who seem to have taken a practical direction, and also more and more to have given themselves up to Pythagorean forms of thought.

The chief of these Platonists was Speusippus, nephew to Plato himself, and successor to him in the leadership of the

Academy. One of the Pythagoreizing opinions of Speusippus is alluded to by Aristotle, *Eth.* i. vi. 7. 'The Pythagorean theory on the subject seems more plausible, which places unity in the rank of the goods; to which theory Speusippus too seems to have given in his adhesion.' The question adverted to is the identity of 'the One' with 'the Good.' The Pythagoreans appear to have placed 'the One' among the various exhibitions of good, whether as causes or manifestations. Among the Platonists, as we are told (*Metaphys.* XIII. iv. 6-8), there arose a difference, a section of them identifying 'the One' with 'the Good,' the others not considering unity identical with, but an essential element of goodness. They saw that if 'the One' be identified with 'the Good,' it must follow that multitude, or, in other words, matter, must be the principle of evil. To avoid making 'the many' identical with evil, they found themselves forced to abandon the identification of 'the One' with 'the Good.' Of this section Speusippus was leader. He seems to have adopted a Pythagorean formula, saying, that 'the One must be ranked among goods.' Aristotle gives a sort of provisional preference to this theory over the system of Plato. Elsewhere, however (*Metaphys.* xi. vii. 10), he attacks and refutes the view of 'the Pythagoreans and Speusippus,' that 'Good is rather a result of existence than the cause of it, as the flower is the result of the plant.'

In morals, Speusippus seems to have continued the arguments begun by Plato, against the Hedonistic theory of Aristippus. In the list of his works given by Diogenes,¹² the following are mentioned—*περὶ ἡδονῆς α.* *Ἀριστιππος α.* His polemic appears to have been one-sided, and his views extreme. One of his arguments on the subject of pleasure is alluded to by Aristotle, *Eth.* x. ii. 5, and expressly men-

¹² Also he seems to have written on Justice, The Citizen, Legislation, and Philosophy.

tioned with his name by Eudemus, VII. xiii. 1. It seems very probable that other arguments against pleasure, which are refuted by Aristotle and Eudemus, may have occurred in the treatise on Pleasure written by Speusippus. Another Platonist, with exactly opposite views on pleasure, was Eudoxus. Of him hardly anything is known. He appears to have been an astronomer, and his personal character is highly praised by Aristotle, *Eth.* x. ii. 1.

Out of the school of Plato, Aristotle appears to have had a close personal friend, namely, Xenocrates, who accompanied him to Atarneus, on the death of Plato. He was a voluminous writer, and seems to have endeavoured to carry out the system of Plato on particular points, and to give it a more practical direction. Besides many treatises on dialectic, the Ideas, science, genera and species, divisions, thought, nature, the gods, &c., Diogenes also attributes to him two books on Happiness, two on Virtue, one on the State, one on the Power of the Law, &c. The ancients ascribed to him a high moral tone of thought, saying that he considered virtue as alone valuable in itself. He seems, however, to have allowed the existence of a *δύναμις ὑπηρετική* in external fortune, which is, perhaps, alluded to by Aristotle.¹³ His disciples, Polemo and Crantor, appear to have had almost exclusively an ethical direction. We must regret the loss of the writings of these early Academics, for we should, no doubt, find common to them much that is to be found in the system of Aristotle. A great work is always the creature of its times, and it is only by knowing those times that we can know it fully or judge it aright. And yet, on the whole, none of the Platonists appears individually to have been of sufficient importance to have greatly influenced Aristotle either in the way of communication or of antagonism.

¹³ "Ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαλαμβάνουσιν.—*Eth.* i. viii. 6.

ESSAY IV.

On the Philosophical Forms in the Ethics of Aristotle.

THE shade of Plato, we have observed, might have admired in the *Ethics* of Aristotle the advance of philosophy. This advance was twofold: on the one hand material, consisting in a rapid accumulation of experience and the carrying out of analysis in all directions; on the other hand it was formal, consisting in a new and more definite terminology, and the forms, categories, or leading ideas, upon which science was now made to depend. No account of the *Ethics* would be complete without some examination of what is most exclusively Aristotelian, not only in the material ideas which are interwoven with the subject, namely, those views of nature, the Deity, and the human soul, which to some extent pervade it; but also in the forms of thought on which the system is constructed, and which might be said to constitute the warp of the entire texture. Let us, then, first consider the formal element of this philosophy, leaving for a future Essay some notice of the physical and theological views of Aristotle, in so far as they influence his moral theories. The forms of thought which Aristotle worked out for himself are the most remarkable feature of his system; he applied them to all subjects, and to a great extent has left them stamped on language ever since. Besides the host of logical formulæ, which before Aristotle had no definite existence, the most universal of his leading ideas may be said to have been the doctrine of the four causes, and the opposition of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*. These forms we find repeatedly occurring in the

pages of the ethical treatise, and the more deeply we study it, the more we become aware that these are not mere modes of expression, but that in truth they constitute most important points of view in the analysis of human life and action. Another peculiarity has to be noticed, and that is, that these metaphysical ideas are re-acted on and changed by being brought into Ethics. *Τέλος* and *ἐνέργεια* are no longer mere abstractions, but are full of moral meaning. Unless we understand the philosophical bearing and the purport of these conceptions, not only will many a sentence of Aristotle remain for us written in an absolutely unknown language, but also it will be hopeless and out of the question to think of comprehending his moral system as a whole. To the above-mentioned, we may add some consideration of the doctrine of *Μεσότης*, as containing in itself an application to ethical subjects of a more general philosophical formula, and if we subjoin to these some account of the 'Practical Syllogism,' as it appears in Books VI. and VII., we shall be able to see how what was begun by Aristotle in these matters was carried out further by the Peripatetic school.

I. Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes arose probably from a combination and modification of conceptions which occur separately in Plato, namely, the contrast of matter and form, of means and end, of production and existence. Every individual object might be said to be the meeting-point of these oppositions; it is what it is by reason of the matter out of which it has sprung, the motive cause which gave it birth, the idea or form which it realizes, the end or object which it was intended to attain. Thus knowledge of anything implies knowing it from these four points of view, or knowing its four causes. The End or final cause, however, as is natural, rises to an eminence beyond the other conceptions, and though it must always stand opposed to matter, it tends to

merge the other two causes into itself. The end of anything, that for sake of which anything exists, can hardly be separated from the perfection of that thing, from its idea and form; thus the formal cause or definition becomes absorbed into the final cause (ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει, *Eth.* III. vii. 6).

In the same way the End mixes itself up with the efficient cause, the desire for the end gives the first impulse of motion, the final cause of anything becomes identical with the good of that thing, so that the end and the good become synonymous terms. And this is not only the case with regard to individual objects, but all nature and the whole world exist for the sake of, and in dependence on, their final cause, which is the good. This, existing as an object of contemplation and desire, though itself immovable, moves all things.¹ And so the world is rendered finite, for all nature desiring the good and tending towards an end is harmonized and united.

In this way is the unity of nature conceived by Aristotle, it is a unity of idea. The idea of the Good as final cause pervades the world, and the world is suspended from it. In the same form this ethical philosophy presents itself. Human life and action are rendered finite by being directed to their end or final cause, the good attainable in action. The question of the *Ethics* is, Τί ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος; And we might say, altering the words quoted from the *Metaphysics*—From this principle, from the End of action, the whole of human life is suspended.

An end or final cause implies intelligence, implies a mind to see and desire it. The appearance of ends and means in nature is a proof of design in the operations of nature, and this Aristotle distinctly recognizes (*Nat. Ausc.* II. viii.). When

¹ Κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε· τὸ ὁρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα.—Ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἡρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.—*Metaph.* XI. vii. 2-6.

we come to Ethics, What is meant by an End of human action? For whom is this an end? Is it an end fixed by a higher intelligence? In short, is the principle of Aristotle the same as the religious principle, that man is born to work out the purposes of his Maker? To this it must be answered, that Aristotle is indefinite in his physical theory as to the relation of God to the design exhibited in creation. And so, too, he is not explicit, in the *Ethics*, as to God's moral government of the world. On the whole, we may say at present that 'moral government,' in our sense of the words, does not at all form part of Aristotle's system. His point of view rather is, that as physical things strive all, though unconsciously, after the good attainable by them under their several limitations, so man may consciously strive after the good attainable in life. We do not find in the *Ethics* the expression *τέλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, but *τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος* (I. vii. 8), *τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τέλος* (x. vi. 1), *τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* (I. xiii. 5). It is best, therefore, to exclude religious associations (as being un-Aristotelian) from our conception of the ethical *τέλος*, and then we may be free to acknowledge that it is evidently meant to have a definite relation to the nature and constitution of man. Thus Aristotle assumes that the desires of man are so framed as to imply the existence of this *τέλος* (*Eth.* I. ii. 1). And he asserts that man can only realize it in the sphere of his own proper functions (*ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, I. vii. 10), and in accordance with the law of his proper nature and its harmonious development (*κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν*, I. vii. 15).

Is man, then, according to this system, to be regarded similarly to one of the flowers of the field, which obeying the law of its organization springs and blooms and attains its own peculiar perfection? This is no doubt one side, so to speak, of Aristotle's view. But there is also another side. For,

while each part of the creation realizes its proper end, and, in the language of the Bible, 'is very good,' this end exists not *for* the inanimate or unconscious creatures themselves, it only exists *in* them. But the ethical τέλος not only exists *in* man, but also *for* man; not only is the good realized in him, but it is recognized by him as such; it is the end not only of his nature, but also of his desires; it stands before his thoughts and wishes and highest consciousness as the absolute, that in which he can rest, that which is in and for itself desirable (ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἀεί, i. vii. 4). The ends of physical things are for other minds to contemplate, they are ends objectively. But ends of moral beings are ends subjectively, realized by and contemplated by those moral beings themselves. The final cause, then, in *Ethics*, is viewed, so to speak, from the inside. Or rather the peculiarity is, that the objective and subjective sides of the conception both have their weight in Aristotle's system, and are run into one another. The τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν, or absolute end of action, has two forms, which are not clearly separated; in the first place it is represented subjectively as happiness, and in the second place objectively as the right.

It has been said that the ancient Ethical systems were theories of the chief good, rather than theories of duty. And Kant brings against Aristotle the charge that his system is one of mere eudæmonism. We shall have an opportunity in a future Essay of touching upon the relations of this conception 'duty' to the ancient systems. At present it will suffice to show that there is some unfairness in the charge brought by Kant, and that it ignores the true characteristics of Aristotle's Ethical doctrine. It is unfair to charge Aristotle with mere 'eudæmonism' simply on account of his making a definition of 'happiness' the leading principle of his *Ethics*. This word 'happiness' is only a popular way of

statement; Aristotle tells us that it is the popular word for the chief good (*Eth.* I. iv. 2). Again, during his whole discussion on the virtues, and on moral actions, there is no mention of happiness as connected with these, as if good acts were to be done for the sake of happiness. There is only one place, and that is in the discussion on happiness itself, where he speaks of it as 'The end and prize of virtue.'² Elsewhere he speaks of 'the beautiful' as being the end of virtue.³ But again the 'happiness' which Aristotle defines as the chief good does not seem immediately, but only inferentially, to imply pleasure. Pleasure (as we shall see hereafter) is rather argued and proved to belong to happiness by a sort of after-thought, and is not with Aristotle a primary part of the conception. Happiness with Aristotle is something different from what we mean by it; so from this point of view, above all, the charge of eudæmonism falls to the ground.

Aristotle's question is, What is the chief good for man? But this he resolves into another form, What is the τέλειον τέλος? What in human life and action is the End-in-itself? How deep is the moral significance of this conception—the absolute end! Can anything small or frivolous, or anything like mere pleasure and enjoyment come up to its requirements, and appear in the deepest depths of the human consciousness to be something beyond which we cannot go—the absolute satisfaction of our nature? Essentially and necessarily, that only can be called a τέλος which has in itself a moral worth and goodness. This also Aristotle says 'has a sweetness and pleasure of its own, but one quite different from that which springs from any other sources. Men rarely attain to it; but desiring the satisfaction it affords, they seize in its place the pleasure derived from amusements, on account

² Τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος.—
Eth. I. ix. 3.

³ Τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος
τῆς ἀρετῆς.—*Eth.* III vii. 2.

of this latter having some sort of resemblance to the satisfaction which the mind feels in moral acts which are of the nature of an end.’⁴

The deep moral pleasure which attaches to noble acts, Aristotle describes as triumphing even over the physical pain and outward horrors which may attend the exercise of courage.⁵ And he acknowledges that in many cases this may be the *only* pleasure attending upon virtuous actions.⁶

We see in these passages how the objective and subjective import of the *τέλος* are blended together. The end and the consciousness of the end are not separated. In the pleasure which Aristotle speaks of as attaching to the moral *τέλος* we see something that answers to what we should call ‘the approval of conscience.’ Only to say that Aristotle meant this, would be to mix up things modern and ancient. It is better to keep before us as clearly as possible his point of view, which is, that a good action is an End-in-itself, as being the perfection⁷ of our nature, and that for the sake of which (*οὗ ἕνεκα*) our moral faculties before existed, hence bringing a pleasure and inward satisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest pleased and acquiescent; something

⁴ *Politics* VIII. V. 12. Ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίγνεσθαι. . . . Συμβέβηκε δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος· ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονὴν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν· ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων ἔχειν ὁμοιωμὰ τι. Cf. *Eth.* X. VI. 3.

⁵ *Eth.* III. IX. 2. Οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ.

⁶ *Eth.* III. IX. 5. Οὐ δὲ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ’ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.

⁷ In another passage (*Eth.* III. VII. 6), Aristotle seems to use the term

τέλος in a more purely objective sense to denote perfection. He says, ‘The *τέλος* of every individual moral act is the same with that of the formed moral character’ (*τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν*). The whole passage is a difficult one; it seems to come to this—An individual act can only be said to have attained perfection when it exhibits the same qualities as the formed moral character—e.g., a brave act is only perfectly brave when it is done as a brave man would do it, consciously for its own sake, or for the sake of the noble (*καλοῦ ἕνεκα*), &c.

which possesses the qualities of being *καλόν*, *ὠρισμένον*, and *ἐνέργεια τελεία*.

We observe how in the separate parts of life, in the development of each of the various faculties, Aristotle considers an end to be attainable; how he attaches a supreme value to particular acts, and idealizes the importance of the passing moment; how he attributes to each moment a capability of being converted out of a mere means, and mere link in the chain of life, to be an End-in-itself, something in which life is, as it were, summed up. But if in action, and in an exercise of the moral faculties, an end is attainable, this is, according to the system of Aristotle, only faintly and imperfectly an end, compared with what is attainable in contemplation by the exercise of the philosophic thought.

In both senses of the word *τέλος*, both as perfection and as happiness, Aristotle seems to have placed virtue below philosophy. Philosophy is in the first place the highest human excellence; it is the development of the highest faculty.⁸ In the second place, it contains the most absolute satisfaction, it is most entirely desirable for its own sake, and not as a means to anything else.⁹ Whereas the practical virtues are all in a sense means to this. Courage is for war, which is for the sake of the fruition of peace; and in what does this consist? If the practical side of our nature be summed up in the one faculty wisdom (*φρόνησις*), this may be regarded after all as subordinate and instrumental to philosophy *σοφία*, the perfection of the speculative side.¹⁰ So too in Politics, the end, or in other words the highest perfection and the highest happiness, being identical for the state and the individual, in

⁸ *Eth.* x. vii. 1. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου, κ.τ.λ.

⁹ *Eth.* x. vii. 5. Δόξαι τ' ἂν αὕτη μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι.

¹⁰ *Eth.* vi. xiii. 8. Ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνην.

what is this constituted? Not in the busy and restless action of war or diplomacy, not in means and measures to some ulterior result, but in those thoughts and contemplations which find their end and satisfaction in themselves. Philosophy, therefore, and speculation are, according to Aristotle, the end not only of the individual, but also of the state.¹¹ 'If it be true to say, that happiness consists in doing well, a life of action must be best both for the state, and for the individual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of action implies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts which are concerned with the results of action; but far rather we must consider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have their end in themselves, and which are for their own sake.'

A moment of contemplative thought (*θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια*) is most perfectly and absolutely an end. It is sought for no result but for itself. It is a state of peace, which is the crown of all exertion (*ἀσχολούμεθα ἵνα σχολάζωμεν*). It is the realization of the divine in man, and constitutes the most absolute and all-sufficient happiness,¹² being, as far as possible in human things, independent of external circumstances.¹³

This then constitutes the most adequate answer to the great question of Ethics, What is the chief good? or *Τί ἐστι τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*; as far as a separate and individual moment of life is concerned. But a difficulty suggests itself

¹¹ *Pol.* vii. iii. 7. 'Ἄλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετόν, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. 'Ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένης ἐκ τοῦ πράτ-

τειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτέλεις καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις.

¹² *Eth.* x. viii. 7. 'Ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία θεωρητικὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια.

¹³ *Eth.* x. vii. 4. 'Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστα' ἂν εἴη.

with regard to life viewed as a whole. ‘Philosophic thought,’ says Aristotle, ‘will be absolutely perfect happiness if extended over a whole life. For in happiness there must be no shortcoming.’¹⁴ But, as we shall see more clearly with regard to *ἐνέργεια*, it cannot actually be so extended. What then is the result? If Aristotle accepts the absolute satisfaction and worth of a moment as the end of life, his principle becomes identical with the *μονόχρονος ἡδονῆς* of the Cyrenaics (see above, p. 132). If, again, he requires an absolute *τέλος* of permanent duration, his theory of human good becomes a mere ideal. Here then is a dilemma between the horns of which Aristotle endeavours to steer, on the one hand acknowledging (*Eth.* I. vii. 16), that ‘A single swallow will not make a summer’; on the other hand urging objections against the saying of Solon (*Eth.* I. x.), that ‘No man can be called happy as long as he lives.’ He says the chief good must be *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*, not *a* perfect life, but *in a* perfect life—indicating by this expression that the absolute good, as it exists in and for the consciousness, is independent of time and duration; but still, as we belong to a world of time and space, that this inner supreme good must have its setting in an adequate complete sphere of external circumstances. About this word *τελείῳ* there is an ambiguity of which probably Aristotle, himself, was half conscious; its associations of meaning are twofold, the one popular, conveying the notion of the ‘complete,’ the ‘perfect,’ the other philosophic, implying that which is in itself desirable, that in which the mind finds satisfaction, the absolute. Taking a signification between the two, we may conceive Aristotle to have meant, that the chief good must be an absolute mode of the consciousness, and that this

¹⁴ Ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἀν- | λειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς
 εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μήκος βίου τέ- | εὐδαιμονίας, *Eth.* x. vii. 7.

must be attained in a sphere of outward circumstances themselves partaking of the nature of absolute perfection. Aristotle's conception, then, of the chief good has two sides, the one internal, ideal, out of all relation to time, which speaks of the happiness as the absolute good, that end which is the sum of all means, that which could not possibly be improved by any addition (*Eth.* I. vii. 8); the other side, which is external and practical, goes quite against the Cyrenaic principle of regarding the present as all in all, and also against the Cynic view which would set the mind above external circumstances (*Eth.* I. v. 6); this part of the theory considers happiness as compounded of various more or less essential elements, and shows how far the more essential parts (τὰ κύρια τῆς εὐδαιμονίας) can outbalance the less essential. It requires permanence of duration, but it looks for this in the stability of the formed mental state, which is always tending to reproduce moments of absolute worth.

The End-in-itself renders life a rounded whole, like a work of art, or a product of nature. The knowledge of it is to give definiteness to the aims, 'So that we shall be now like archers knowing what to shoot at' (*Eth.* I. ii. 2). In the realization of it, we are to feel that there need be no more reaching onwards towards infinity, for all the desires and powers will have found their satisfaction (*Eth.* I. ii. 1). Closely connected then is this system with the view that what is finite is good. 'Life,' says Aristotle, 'is a good to the good man, because it is finite' (*Eth.* IX. ix. 7). At first sight these sayings suggest the idea of a cramped and limited theory of life, as if all were made round and artistic, and no room were left for the aspirations of the soul. It must be remembered, however, that that which is here spoken of as making life finite, is itself the absolute,—that, above and beyond the outside of which the mind can conceive nothing. And this absolute

end is yet further represented as the deepest moments either of the moral consciousness, or of that philosophic reason which is an approach to the nature of the divine being. It must be remembered also that 'the finite' (τὸ ὀρισμένον) does not mean 'the restricted,' as if expressing that in which limits have been put upon the possibilities of good, but rather the good itself. Good and even existence cannot be conceived except under a law, and the finite is with Aristotle an essentially positive idea. Only so much negation enters into it as is necessary to constitute definiteness and form in contradistinction to the chaotic. Truly we cannot in our conceptions pass out of the human mind; that which is absolute and an end for the mind cannot be a mere limited and restricted conception; but rather nothing can be conceived beyond it. Something might be said on the relation of the Ethical τέλος to the idea of a future life, but this can be better said hereafter.

II. 'Actuality' is perhaps the nearest philosophical representative of the ἐνέργεια of Aristotle. It is derived from it through the Latin of the Schoolmen, 'actus' being their translation of ἐνέργεια, out of which the longer and more abstract form has grown. The word 'energy,' which comes more directly from ἐνέργεια, has ceased to convey the philosophical meaning of its original, being restricted to the notion of force and vigour. The employment of the term 'energy,' as a translation of ἐνέργεια, has been a material hindrance to the proper understanding of Aristotle. This is especially the case with regard to the *Ethics*, where there is an appearance of plausibility, though an utterly fallacious one, in such a translation. To substitute 'actuality' in the place of 'energy' would certainly have this advantage, that it would point to the metaphysical conception lying at the root of all the various applications of ἐνέργεια. But 'actuality' is a word

with far too little flexibility to be adapted for expressing all these various applications. No conception equally plastic with *ἐνέργεια*, and at all answering to it, can be found in modern thought. And therefore there is no term which will uniformly translate it. Our only course can be, first to endeavour to understand its philosophical meaning as part of Aristotle's system, and secondly to notice its special applications in a book like the *Ethics*. Any rendering of its import in the various places where it occurs must be rather of the nature of paraphrase than of translation.

'*Ενέργεια* is not more accurately defined by Aristotle, than as the correlative and opposite of *δύναμις*. He implies, that we must rather feel its meaning than seek to define it. 'Actuality' may be in various ways opposed to 'potentiality,' and the import of the conception depends entirely on their relation to each other.¹⁵ 'Now *ἐνέργεια* is the existence of a thing not in the sense of its potentially existing. The term 'potentially' we use, for instance, of the statue in the block, and of the half in the whole, (since it might be subtracted,) and of a person knowing a thing, even when he is not thinking of it, but might do so; whereas *ἐνέργεια* is the opposite. By applying the various instances our meaning will be plain, and one must not seek a definition in each case, but rather

¹⁵ *Metaphys.* viii. vi. 2. "Ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρῶγμα, μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει. Λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει, οἷον, ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθεῖη ἂν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, εἰάν δυνατόν ᾤ θεωρῆσαι· τὸ δὲ ἐνέργεια· ὁῦλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ, ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὄρον ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν—ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, καὶ τὸ γερηγορᾶν πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον,

καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν πρὸς τὸ μύον μὲν, ὅψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὄλης πρὸς τὴν ὄλην, καὶ τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον. Ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θάτερον μόνιον ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη, θατέρῳ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν. Λέγεται δὲ ἐνέργεια οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἡ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν, τὰ δ' ὡς οὐσία πρὸς τινα ὄλην.

grasp the conception of the analogy as a whole,—that it is as that which builds to that which has the capacity for building; as the waking to the sleeping; as that which sees to that which has sight, but whose eyes are closed; as the definite form to the shapeless matter; as the complete to the unaccomplished. In this contrast, let the *ἐνέργεια* be set off as forming the one side, and on the other let the potential stand. Things are said to be *ἐνεργεία* not always in like manner, (except so far as there is an analogy, that as this thing is in this, or related to this, so is that in that, or related to that,) for sometimes it implies motion as opposed to the capacity for motion, and sometimes complete existence opposed to undeveloped matter.'

The word *ἐνέργεια* does not occur in Plato, though the opposition of the 'virtual' and the 'actual' may be found implicitly contained in¹⁶ some parts of his writings. Perhaps there is no genuine passage¹⁷ now extant of any writer previous to Aristotle in which it occurs. It is the substantive form of the adjective *ἐνεργής* which is to be found in Aristotle's *Topics*, I. xii. 1. But Aristotle, by a false etymology, seems to connect it immediately with the words¹⁸ *ἐν ἔργῳ*. To all appearance the idea of its opposition to *δύναμις* was first suggested by the Megarians, who asserted that 'Nothing could be said to have a capacity for doing any thing, unless it was in the act of doing that thing.'¹⁹ This assertion itself was part of the

¹⁶ Cf. *Theætetus*, p. 157 A. Οὐτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι, κ.τ.λ.

¹⁷ For the fragment of Philolaus, apud Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* I. xx. 2, is very suspicious. It is as follows:—Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν κόσμον ἡμεν ἐνεργείαν αἰδίου θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος κατὰ συνακολουθίαν τῆς μεταβατικῆς φύσιος.

¹⁸ Cf. *Metaphys.* VIII. viii. 11. Διὸ καὶ τοῦνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν.

¹⁹ *Met.* VIII. iii. 1. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἳ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν.

dialectic of the Megarians, by which they endeavoured to establish the Eleatic principles, and to prove by the subtleties of the reason, against all evidence of the senses, that the world is absolutely one, immovable, and unchangeable. We cannot be exactly certain of the terms employed by the Megarians themselves in expressing the above-quoted position, for Aristotle is never very accurate about the exact form in which he gives the²⁰ opinions of earlier philosophers. We cannot be sure whether the Megarians said precisely *ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι*. But at all events they said something equivalent, and Aristotle taking the suggestion worked out the whole theory of the contrast between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, in its almost universal applicability.

At first these terms were connected, apparently with the idea of²¹ motion. But since *δύναμις* has the double meaning of ‘possibility of existence’ as well as ‘capacity of action,’ there arose the double contrast of action opposed to the capacity for action; actual existence opposed to possible existence or potentiality. To express accurately this latter opposition Aristotle seems to have introduced the term *ἐντελέχεια*, of which the most natural account is, that it is a compound of *ἐν τέλει ἔχειν*, ‘being in the state of perfection,’ an adjective²² *ἐντελεχής* being constructed on the analogy of *βουνεχής*. But in fact this distinction between *ἐντελέχεια* and *ἐνέργεια* is²³ not maintained. The former

²⁰ Cf. *Metaph.* xi. ii. 3. Καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν, ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ’ οὐ. xi. vi. 7. Διὸ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν αἰεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων. In these passages Aristotle expresses the ideas of his predecessors in his own formulæ.

²¹ *Metaph.* viii. iii. 9. Ἐλήλυθε δ’ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦνομα, ἡ πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἅλλα, ἐκ τῶν

κινήσεων μάλιστα, δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι.

²² *De Gen. et Corr.* ii. x. ii. Συνεπλήρωσε τὸ ὅλον ὁ θεὸς ἐντελεχῇ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν.

²³ Cf. *Metaph.* viii. i. 2. Ἐπὶ πλεον γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνων λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν. *Eth.* vii. xiv. 8. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεως ἔστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιας.

word is of comparatively rare occurrence, while we find everywhere throughout Aristotle *ἐνέργεια*, as he says, *πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη* 'mixed up with the idea of complete existence.' As we saw above, it is contrasted with *δύναμις*, sometimes as implying motion, sometimes as 'form opposed to matter.'

In Physics *δύναμις* answers to the necessary conditions for the existence of anything before that thing exists. It thus corresponds to *ὕλη*, both to the *πρώτη ὕλη*, or matter absolutely devoid of all qualities, which is capable of becoming any definite substance, as, for instance, marble; and also to the *ἑσχάτη ὕλη*, or matter capable of receiving form, as marble the form of the statue. Marble then exists *δυνάμει* in the simple elements before it is marble. The statue exists *δυνάμει* in the marble before it is carved out. All objects of thought exist either purely *δυνάμει*, or purely *ἐνεργείᾳ*, or both *δυνάμει* and *ἐνεργείᾳ*. This division makes an entire chain of all the world. At the one end is matter, the *πρώτη ὕλη*, which has a merely potential existence, which is necessary as a condition, but which, having no form and no qualities, is totally incapable of being realized by the mind. So it is also with the infinitely small or great; they exist always as possibilities, but, as is obvious, they never can be actually grasped by the perception. At the other end of the chain is God, *οὐσία αἰδῖος καὶ ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*, who cannot be thought of as non-existing,²⁴ as otherwise than actual, who is the absolute, and the unconditioned. Between these two extremes is the whole row of creatures, which out of potentiality spring into actual being. In this theory we see the affinity between

²⁴ It might be said that the being of God cannot be fully grasped or realized by our minds; but, according to the views of Aristotle, the everlasting

existence of God is an *ἐνέργεια* for His own mind. He is above all, the in and for Himself existing.

δύναμις and matter, ἐνέργεια and form. Thus Aristotle's conceptions are made to run into one another. Another affinity readily suggests itself, and that is between ἐνέργεια and τέλος. The progress from δύναμις to ἐνέργεια is motion or production (κίνησις or γένεσις). But this motion or production, aiming at or tending to an end, is in itself imperfect (ἀτελής), it is a mere process not in itself and for its own sake desirable. And thus arises a contrast between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια, for the latter, if it implies motion, is a motion desirable for its own sake, having its end in itself. Viewed relatively, however, κίνησις may sometimes be called ἐνέργεια. In reference to the capacity of action before existing, the action calls out into actuality that which was before only potential. Thus, for instance, in the process of building a house there is an ἐνέργεια of what was before the δύναμις οἰκοδομική. Viewed however in reference to the house itself, this is a mere process to the end aimed at, a γένεσις, or if it be called ἐνέργεια, it must strictly speaking be qualified as ἐνέργειά τις ἀτελής.²⁵ In short, just as the term τέλος is relatively applied to very subordinate ends, so too ἐνέργεια is relatively applied to what is from another point of view a mere γένεσις or κίνησις. This we find in *Eth.* I. i. 2, διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά.

Having traced some of the leading features of this distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, we may now proceed to observe how this form of thought stamped itself upon Ethics. We may ask, How is the category of the actual brought to bear upon moral questions, and how far is it reacted upon by moral associations? At the very outset of Aristotle's theory it appears. As soon as the proposition has been laid down that the chief good for man is only attainable in his proper work,

²⁵ *Metaph.* X. IX. II.

and that this proper work is a peculiar kind of life, *πρακτική τις (ζωή) τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος*, Aristotle proceeds to assume (*θετέον*) that this life must be no mere possession (*καθ' ἑξιν*) of certain powers and latent tendencies, but 'in actuality, for this is the distinctive form of the conception.'²⁶ He then transforms the qualifying term *κατ' ἐνέργειαν* into a substantive idea, and makes it the chief part of his definition of the supreme good.²⁷ Thus the metaphysical category of *ἐνέργεια*, which comes first into Ethics merely as a form of thought, becomes henceforth material. It is identified with happiness.²⁸ In short, it becomes an ethical idea.

In this connexion (like its cognate *τέλος*) *ἐνέργεια* becomes at once something mental. It takes a subjective character, as existing now both in and for the mind. Moreover, in an exactly parallel way to the use of *τέλος*, it receives a double application. On the one hand it is applied to express moral action and the development of the moral powers, on the other hand to happiness and the fruition of life. It is in its latter meaning that *ἐνέργεια* is most purely subjective. Taken as a formula to express Aristotle's theory of virtue, we may consider it as applied in its more objective and simpler sense, though even here it is mixed up with psychological associations. We shall see how, under newly-invented metaphysical forms, Aristotle accounts for the moral nature of man.

Aristotle divides *δυνάμεις* into physical and mental.²⁹ Of these mental *δυνάμεις* it is characteristic that they are equally capacities of producing contraries, while the physical are

²⁶ Διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. *Eth.* I. vii. 13.

²⁷ Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον, κ.τ.λ.—εἰ δ' οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν. *l. l.* 14, 15.

²⁸ *Eth.* I. xiii. 1. 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ

εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν. ' Cf. I. x. 2, ix. ix. 5, x. vi. 2.

²⁹ *Metaph.* viii. ii. 1. 'Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλλοι, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου.

restricted to one side of two contraries. The capacity of heat, for instance, is capable of producing heat alone; whereas the *δύναμις ἰατρική*, as being a mental capacity, and connected with the discursive reason, can produce indifferently either health or sickness. From this Aristotle deduces the first step of the doctrine of free-will, namely, that the mind is not bound by any physical necessity. For he argues that, given the requisite active and passive conditions, there is a necessity for a physical *δύναμις* to act or suffer in a particular way; but since the mental *δύναμις* is equally a capacity of contraries, if there were any necessity for its development, it must be necessitated to produce contraries at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore there must be some other influence which controls the mental *δύναμις*, and determines into which side of the two contraries it shall be developed, and this is either desire or reasonable purpose.³⁰ Connected with this point is another of still greater importance for the ethical theory. Not only in the use and exercise of a moral or mental *δύναμις* is the individual above the control of mere external or physical circumstances, but also the very acquirement of these *δυνάμεις* depends on the individual. For the higher capacities are not inherent, but acquired.

In considering how this can be, we may follow the logical order of the question according to Aristotle, and ask which exists first, the *δύναμις* or the *ἐνέργεια*? The answer is, that as a conception, in point of thought (*λόγῳ*), the *ἐνέργεια* must necessarily be prior; in short, we know nothing of the *δύναμις*, except from our knowledge of the *ἐνέργεια*. In point of time (*χρόνῳ*) the case is different; each individual creature exists first *δυνάμει*, afterwards *ἐνεργείᾳ*. This assertion, however, must be confined to each individual; for, as a necessity of

³⁰ Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἑτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον. Λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὑρεῖν ἢ προαῖρεσιν. *Metaphys.* VIII. V. 3.

thought, we are led to refer the potential existence of each thing to the actual existence of something before (a flower, for instance, owes its potential existence in the seed, to the actual existence of another flower before it); and so the world is eternal, for an *ἐνέργεια* must be supposed as everlastingly pre-existing. But even in the individual there are some things in which the *ἐνέργεια* seems prior to the *δύναμις*; there are things which the individual seems to have no 'power of doing' until he does them; he acquires the power, in fact, by doing them.³¹ This phenomenon gives rise to a classification of *δυνάμεις* into the physical, the passive, and the inherent on the one hand, and the mental or acquired on the other.³² The merely physical capacities of our nature exist independent of any act or effort on the part of the individual.³³ And so, also, is it with the senses.³⁴ But the contrary is the case with regard to moral virtue, which does not exist in us as a capacity (*δύναμις*); in other words, not as a gift of nature (*φύσει*), previous to moral action.³⁵ We acquire the capacity for virtue by doing virtuous things. It will be seen at once that a sort of paradox is here involved. 'How can it be said that we become just by doing just things? If we do just things,

³¹ *Metaphys.* VIII. viii. 6. Διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οἰκοδόμον εἶναι μὴ οἰκοδομήσαντα μηθέν, ἢ κιθαριστὴν μηθέν κιθαρίζοντα· ὁ γὰρ μαθητὴς κιθαρίζειν μαθητὴς οὐκ εἰς τὸ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον εἰς τὸ κιθαρίζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

³² *Metaphys.* VIII. v. 1. 'Ἀπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν, οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων· τῶν δὲ ἕξει, οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐτεῖν· τῶν δὲ μαθήσει, οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν ὅσαι ἕξει καὶ λόγῳ· τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη.

³³ *Eth.* I. xiii. 11. Τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς (τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ

αὔξεσθαι) ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τρεφόμενοις θεῖταις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις—δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη.

³⁴ *Eth.* II. i. 4. τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. This doctrine is opposed to some of the modern discoveries of psychology, as, for instance, Berkeley's 'Theory of Vision.' It is corrected, however, in some degree by Aristotle's doctrine of κοινὴ αἴσθησις.

³⁵ *Ibid.* Τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.

we are just already.' The answer of Aristotle to this difficulty would seem to be as follows :—

1. Virtue follows the analogy of the arts, in which the first essays of the learner may by chance, or by the guidance of his master (*ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου*), attain a sort of success and an artistic appearance, but the learner is no artist as yet.

2. These 'just acts,' by which we acquire justice, are, on nearer inspection, not really just; they want the moral qualification of that settled internal character in the heart and mind of the agent, without which no external act is virtuous in the highest sense of the term. They are tendencies towards the acquirement of this character, as the first essays of the artist are towards the acquirement of an art. But they are not to be confounded with those moral acts which flow from the character when developed and fixed.

3. The whole question depends on Aristotle's theory of the *ἕξις*, as related to *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*. There can be no such thing, properly speaking, as a *δύναμις τῆς ἀρετῆς*. As we have before seen, a *δύναμις*, except it be merely physical, admits of contraries. And therefore in the case of moral action there can only be an indefinite capacity of acting either this way or that, either well or ill, which is therefore equally a *δύναμις* of virtue and of vice. The *ἐνέργεια* in this case is determined by no intrinsic law of the *δύναμις*,—(*ἀνάγκη ἑτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον*, *Met.* VIII. v. 3), but by the desire or the reason of the agent. The *ἐνέργεια*, however, is no longer indefinite; it has, at all events, some sort of definiteness for good or bad. And by the principle of habit (*ἔθος*), which Aristotle seems to assume as an acknowledged law of human nature, the *ἐνέργεια* reacts upon the *δύναμις*, reproducing itself. Thus the *δύναμις* loses its indefiniteness, and passes into a definite tendency; it ceases to be a mere *δύναμις*,

and becomes an *ἔξις*, that is to say, a formed and fixed character, capable only of producing a certain class of *ἐνέργειαι*. Briefly then, by the help of a few metaphysical terms, does Aristotle sum up his theory of the moral character. Καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται. And it is quite consistent with his entire view of these metaphysical categories, that he defines virtue to be not on the one hand a *δύναμις*, else it would be merely physical, nor on the other hand a *πάθος*, (which is here equivalent to *ἐνέργεια*,) else it would be an isolated emotion,—but a sort of *ἔξις*. The *ἔξις*, or moral state, is on the farther side, so to speak, of the *ἐνέργειαι*. It is the sum and result of them. If *ἔξις* be regarded as a sort of developed *δύναμις*, as a capacity acquired indeed and definite, but still only a capacity, it may naturally be contrasted with *ἐνέργεια*. Thus in the above quoted passage, *Eth.* I. vii. 13, διπλῶς ταύτης λεγομένης means καθ' ἕξιν and κατ' ἐνέργειαν, as we may see by comparing VII. xii. 2, VIII. v. 1. From this point of view Aristotle says, that 'it is possible for a *ἔξις* to exist, without producing any good. But with regard to an *ἐνέργεια* this is not possible.' I. viii. 9. On the other hand, however, the *ἔξις* is a fixed tendency to a certain class of actions, and, if external circumstances do not forbid, will certainly produce these. The *ἐνέργεια* not only results in a *ἔξις*, but also follows from it, and the test of the formation of a *ἔξις* is pleasure felt in acts resulting from it. (II. iii. 1.) When Aristotle says, that there is nothing human so abiding as the *ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετὴν*—διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους, he implies, of course, that these *ἐνέργειαι* are bound together by the chain of a *ἔξις*, of which in his own phraseology they are the efficient, the formal, and the final cause. It is observable, that the phrase *ἐνέργειαι τῆς ἀρετῆς* occurs only twice in the ethical treatise. (III. v. 1, x. iii. 1.) This is in accordance

with the principle that virtue cannot be regarded as a *δύναμις*. Therefore Aristotle seems to regard moral acts not so much as the development of a latent excellence, but rather as the development or action of our nature in accordance with a law (*ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετήν*). Virtue then comes in as a regulative, rather than as a primary idea; it is introduced as subordinate, though essential, to happiness.

When we meet phrases like this just mentioned, we translate them, most probably, into our own formulæ, into words belonging to our own moral and psychological systems. We speak of 'moral acts,' or 'virtuous activities,' or 'moral energies.' Thus we conceive of Aristotle's doctrine as amounting to this, that 'good acts produce good habits.' Practically, no doubt, his theory does come to this; and if our object in studying his theory be *οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πράξις*, no better or more useful principle could be deduced from it. But in so interpreting him, we really strip Aristotle of all his philosophy. When he spoke of *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*, a wide range of metaphysical associations accompanied the expression. He was bringing the mind and moral powers of man into the entire chain of nature, at one end of which was matter, and at the other end God. He had in his thoughts, that a moral *ἐνέργεια* was to the undeveloped capacities as a flower to the seed, as a statue to the block, as the waking to the sleeping, as the finite to the undefined. And he yet farther implied that this *ἐνέργεια* was no mere process or transition to something else, but contained its end in itself, and was desirable for its own sake. The distinctness of modern language, and the separation between the various spheres of modern thought, prevent us from reproducing in any one term all the various associations that attach to this formula of ancient philosophy. As said before, we must rather feel, than endeavour to express them.

Hitherto we have only alluded to those conceptions which *ἐνέργεια*, as a universal category, imported into Ethics. We have now to advert to those which necessarily accrue to it by reason of its introduction into this science. It is clear that a psychical *ἐνέργεια* must be different from the same category exhibited in any external object. Life, the mind, the moral faculties, must have their 'existence in actuality' distinguished from their mere 'potentiality' by some special difference, not common to other existences. What is it that distinguishes vitality from the conditions of life, waking from sleeping, thought from the dormant faculties, moral action from the unevoked moral capacities? In all these contrasts there is no conception that approaches nearer towards summing up the distinction than that of 'consciousness.'

Viewed from without, or objectively, *ἐνέργεια* must mean an existence fully developed in itself, or an activity desirable for its own sake, so that the mind could contemplate it without seeing in it a means or a condition to anything beyond. But when taken subjectively, as being an *ἐνέργεια* of the mind itself, as existing not only *for* the mind but also *in* the mind, it acquires a new aspect and character. Henceforth it is not only the rounded whole, the self-ending activity, the blooming of something perfect, in the contemplation of which the mind could repose; but it is the mind itself called out into actuality. It springs out of the mind and ends in the mind. It is not only life, but the sense of life; not only waking, but the feeling of the powers; not only perception or thought, but a consciousness of one's own faculties as well as of the external object.

This conscious vitality of the life and the mind is not to be considered a permanent condition, but one that arises in us.³⁶

³⁶ *Eth.* ix. ix. 5. γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτήμα τι.

Oftenest it is like a thrill of joy, a momentary intuition. Were it abiding, if our mind were capable of a perpetual *ἐνέργεια*, we should be as God, who is *ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*. But that which we attain to for a brief period gives us a glimpse of the divine, and of the life of God.³⁷ ‘The life of God is of a kind with those highest moods which with us last a brief space, it being impossible that they should be permanent, whereas with Him they are permanent, since His ever-present consciousness is pleasure itself. And it is because they are vivid states of consciousness that waking and perception and thought are the sweetest of all things, and in a secondary degree hope and memory.’

This passage seems of itself an almost sufficient answer to those who would argue that Aristotle did not mean to imply consciousness in his definition of happiness. If our happiness, which is defined as *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, gives us a conception of the blessedness of God,’ which is elsewhere defined as the ‘thinking upon thought,’ we can hardly escape the conclusion, that it is the deepest and most vivid consciousness in us that constitutes our happiness. The more this idea is followed out, the more completely will it be found applicable to the theory of Aristotle; the more will it justify his philosophy and be justified by it. But here it is necessary to confess, that in using the term ‘consciousness’ to express the chief import of *ἐνέργεια*, as applied to the mind and to the theory of happiness, we are using a distinct modern term, whereas the ancient one was indistinct; we are making explicit what was only implicit in Aristotle; we are rather applying to him a deduction from his principles than exactly

³⁷ *Metaph.* xi. vii. 6. Διαγωγή δ' ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν· οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον) ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐνέργεια

τούτου· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἰσθησις νόσις ἡδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνήμαι διὰ ταῦτα.

representing them in their purest form. Aristotle never *says* 'consciousness,' though we see he meant it. But one of the peculiarities of his philosophy was the want of subjective formulæ, and a tendency to confuse the subjective and the objective together. About *ἐνέργεια* itself Aristotle is not consistent; sometimes he treats it purely as objective, separating the consciousness from it; as, for instance, *Eth.* ix. ix. 9, *ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν*. 'There is somewhat in us that takes cognizance of the exercise of our powers.' Again x. iv. 8, *τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονὴ ὥς ἐπιγιγνώμενόν τι τέλος*. 'Pleasure is a sort of superadded perfection, making perfect the exercise of our powers.' But this is at variance with his usual custom; for not only is pleasure defined in Book VII. (whether by Aristotle or Eudemus) as *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*, but also happiness is universally defined as *ἐνέργεια*. And if we wish to see the term applied in an undeniably subjective way, we may look to *Eth.* ix. vii. 6. *Ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγεννημένου ἢ μνήμη*, where we can hardly help translating, 'the actual consciousness of the present,' as contrasted with 'the hope of the future,' and 'the memory of the past.' In a similar context, *De Memoriá*, i. 4, we find *Τοῦ μὲν παρόντος αἰσθησις, κ.τ.λ.*

In saying that the idea of 'consciousness' is implied in, and might almost always be taken to represent, Aristotle's Ethical application of *ἐνέργεια*, we need not overshoot the mark, and speak as if Aristotle made the Summum Bonum to consist in self-consciousness, or self-reflection; that would be giving far too much weight to the subjective side of the conception *ἐνέργεια*. Aristotle's theory rather comes to this, that the chief good for man is to be found in life itself. Life, according to his philosophy, is no means to anything ulterior; in the words of Goethe, 'Life itself is the end of life.' The very use

of the term *ἐνέργεια*, as part of the definition of happiness, shows, as Aristotle tells us, that he regards the chief good as nothing external to man, but as existing in man and for man, — existing in the evocation, the vividness, and the fruition of man's own powers.³⁸ Let that be called out into 'actuality' which is potential or latent in man, and happiness is the result. Avoiding then any overstrained application of the term 'consciousness,' and aiming rather at paraphrase than translation, it may be useful to notice one or two places in which the term *ἐνέργεια* occurs. *Eth.* I. x. 2. Ἀρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; *Ἡ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; 'Is a man *then* happy, after he is dead? Or is not this altogether absurd, especially for us who call happiness a conscious state?' I. x. 9. Κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. 'Happiness depends (not on fortune, but) on harmonious moods of mind.' I. x. 15. Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργούντα, κ.τ.λ. 'What hinders us calling him happy who is in possession of absolute peace and harmony of mind?' VII. xiv. 8. Διὸ ὁ Θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνου κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιας. 'God is in the fruition of one pure pleasure everlastingly. For deep consciousness is possible, not only of motion, but also of repose.' IX. ix. 5. Μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶον. 'Now to the solitary individual life is grievous; for it is not easy to maintain a glow of mind by one's self, but in company with some one else, and in relation to others, this is easier.'

The formula we are discussing is applied by Aristotle to

³⁸ *Eth.* I. viii. 3. Ὅρθως δὲ καὶ ὅτι τέλος, οὕτως γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.

express the nature both of pleasure and of happiness. By examining separately these two applications of the term, we shall not only gain a clearer conception of the import of *ἐνέργεια* itself, but also we shall be in a better position for seeing what were Aristotle's real views about happiness.

1. The great point that Aristotle insists upon with regard to pleasure is, that it is not *κίνησις* or *γένεσις*, but *ἐνέργεια* (*Eth.* vii. xii. 3, x. iii. 4-5. x. iv. 2). What is the meaning of the distinction? In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*³⁹ we find pleasure defined in exactly the terms here repudiated, namely, as 'a certain motion of the vital powers, and a settling down perceptibly and suddenly into one's proper nature, while pain is the contrary.' This definition is there given merely as a popular one, sufficient for the purposes of the orator, who does not require metaphysical exactness. It corresponds with that given in Plato's *Timæus*.⁴⁰ It seems to have been originally due to the Cyrenaics; for these are said to be referred to by Socrates in the *Philebus* of Plato (p. 53 C), under the name of 'a refined set of men (*κομψοί τινες*), who maintain that pleasure is always a state of becoming (*γένεσις*), and never a state of being (*οὐσία*)' (see above, p. 132). Now in all essential parts of their views on pleasure Aristotle and Plato were quite agreed. Both would have said,⁴¹ pleasure is not the chief good; both would have made a distinction between the bodily pleasures, which are preceded by desire and a sense of pain—and the mental pleasures, which are free from this; both would have asserted the pleasure of the philosopher to be higher than all other pleasures. The difference between them

³⁹ *Rhet.* I. xi. 1. 'Ἐποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοῦναντίον.'

⁴⁰ Cf. Plato, *Timæus*, p. 64 D. Τὸ μὲν

παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγινόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπὸν πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ.

⁴¹ Cf. Plato, *Philebus*, p. 22 E, *Eth.* x. iii. 13.

resolves itself into one of formulæ. Plato has no consistent formula to express pleasure, he calls it 'a return to one's natural state,' 'a becoming,' 'a filling up,' 'a transition.' But all these terms are only applicable to the bodily pleasures, preceded by a sense of want. Plato acknowledges that there are pleasures above these, but he seems to have no word to express them. Therefore he may be said to leave the stigma upon pleasure in general, that it is a mere state of transition. Aristotle here steps in with his formula of *ἐνέργεια*, and says, pleasure is not a transition, but a fruition. It is not imperfect, but an End-in-itself. It does not arise from our coming to our natural state, but from our employing it.⁴²

Kant⁴³ defines pleasure to be 'the sense of that which promotes life, pain of that which hinders it. Consequently,' he argues, 'every pleasure must be preceded by pain; pain is always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continued advancement of vital power, but a speedy death for joy? Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another; but, between the one and the other, some pain must have place. It is the slight depressions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, which together make up a healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously-felt state of well-being; whereas, this condition consists only of pleasurable feelings, following each other by reciprocation, that is, with continually intervening pain. Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life; without it an inanimate state would ensue.' In these words the German philosopher seems almost exactly to have coincided with Plato. The 'sense of that which promotes life' answers to *ἀναπλήρωσις*, and Plato appears to have held,

⁴² *Eth.* vii. xii. 3. Οὐ γινόμενων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων.

⁴³ Kant's *Anthropology*, p. 169.

The above translation is given by Dr. Badham in an Appendix to his edition of Plato's *Philebus*. London, 1855.

with Kant, the reciprocal action of pleasure and pain. (Cf. *Phædo*, p. 60.) Kant's views, like Plato's, are only applicable to the bodily sensations, and do not express pleasures of the mind.

Aristotle in defining pleasure as ὁ τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, makes it, not 'the sense of what promotes life,' but rather the sense of life itself; the sense of the vividness of the vital powers; the sense that any faculty whatsoever has met its proper object. This definition then is equally applicable to the highest functions of the mind, as well as to the bodily organs. Even in the case of pleasure felt upon the supplying of a want, the Aristotelian⁴⁴ doctrine with regard to that pleasure was, that it was not identical with the supply, but contemporaneous; that it resulted from the play and action of vital powers not in a state of depression, *while* the depressed organs were receiving sustenance. To account for the fact that pleasure cannot be long maintained, Aristotle would not have said, like Kant, that we are unable to bear a continuous expansion of the vital powers; but rather, that we are unable to maintain the vivid action of the faculties.⁴⁵ Pleasure then, according to Aristotle, proceeds rather from within than from without; it is the sense of existence; and it is so inseparably connected with the idea of life, that we cannot tell whether life is desired for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life.⁴⁶

2. If happiness be defined as ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, and pleasure

⁴⁴ Cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 6. Οὐδ' ἔστιν ἔρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἢ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδοιτ' ἂν τις. vii. xiv. 7. Λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένουτος ἰγίους πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι, i. e. that it is the play, in some sort, of the undepressed vital functions, while

those that were depressed are being recruited.

⁴⁵ *Eth.* x. iv. 9. Πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.

⁴⁶ *Eth.* x. iv. 11. Συνεξεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐδέχασθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἢ ἡδονή.

as ὁ τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, what is the relation between them? Perhaps it is unfair to Aristotle to bring the different parts of his work thus into collision. Probably he worked out the treatise on Pleasure in Book X. without much regard to the theory of happiness, but merely availing himself of the formulæ which seemed most applicable. It is only in Book VII. (XIII. 2)—which we have seen reason to consider a later work, and the compilation of Eudemus,—that pleasure and happiness are brought together on the grounds that they both consist in ‘the free play of conscious life’ (ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος). This is a carrying out of Aristotle’s doctrine beyond what we find in Books I. and X.⁴⁷ Aristotle had prepared the way in these for the identification of happiness with the highest kind of pleasure, but had not himself arrived at it. However, we can find no other distinction in his theory between pleasure and happiness, than that the latter is something ideal and essentially moral (τέλος καὶ τέλειον πάντα πάντως), and extended over an entire life (λαβοῦσα μήκος βίου τελείου), and implying the highest human excellence, the exercise of the highest faculties (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην ἀρετήν). We have before alluded to the ideal character of happiness as a whole. This is shown especially by the fact, that while on the one hand Aristotle says that happiness (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς) must occupy a whole life, on the other hand he speaks of brevity of duration as necessarily attaching to every human ἐνέργεια. A δύναμις, he argues, is not only a δύναμις of being, but also a δύναμις of not-being. This contradiction always infects our ἐνέργειαι, and, like a law of gravitation, this negative side is

⁴⁷ It is true that among the unphilosophical definitions of happiness given in the *Rhetoric*, I. v. 3, this occurs,—βίος μετ’ ἀσφαλείας ἡδιστος.

Not only is this unphilosophical, but also the *Rhetoric* may be considered later in conception than the *Ethics*.

always tending to bring them to a stop. The heavenly bodies, being divine and eternal, move perpetually and unweariedly,⁴⁸ for in them this law of contradiction does not exist. But to mortal creatures it is impossible to long maintain an *ἐνέργεια*,—that vividness of the faculties, on which joy and pleasure depend. Happiness then, as a permanent condition, is something ideal; Aristotle figures it as the whole of life summed up into a vivid moment of consciousness; or again, as the aggregate of such moments with the intervals omitted; or again, that these moments are its essential part (*τὸ κύριον μέρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*), constituting the most blessed state of the internal life (*ζωὴ μακαριωτάτη*), while the framework for these will be the *βίος αἰρετώτατος*, or most favourable external career (*Eth.* ix. ix. 9). In what then do these moments consist? Chiefly in the sense of life and personality; in the higher kind of consciousness, which is above the mere physical sense of life. This is either coupled with a sense of the good and noble, as in the consciousness of good deeds done (*Eth.* ix. vii. 4); or it is awakened by friendship, by the sense of love and admiration for the goodness of a friend, who is, as it were, one's self and yet not one's self (*Eth.* ix. ix. 10); or finally it exists to the highest degree in the evocation of the reason, which is not only each man's proper self (*Eth.* ix. iv. 4, x. vii. 9), as forming the deepest ground of his consciousness, but is also something divine, and more than mortal in us.

III. Turning now to the consideration of *Μεσότης*, we shall see that it is only one application of this formula, to use it in reference to moral subjects; that it is indeed a most

⁴⁸ *Metaph.* viii. viii. 18. Διὸ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτε στῇ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. Οὐδὲ κά-

μνει τοῦτο δρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαροῖς, ἢ κίνησις.

widely applicable philosophical idea, and has a definite history and development previous to Aristotle. It would seem not to require a very advanced state of philosophy in order for men to discover the maxim, that ‘moderation is best,’ that ‘excess is to be avoided.’ Thus as far back as Hesiod we find the praise of μέτρια ἔργα. The era of the Seven Sages produced the gnome, afterwards inscribed on the temple of Delphi, Μηδὲν ἄγαν. And one of the few sayings of Phocylides which remain is Πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα, μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι. Now all that is contained in these popular and prudential sayings is of course also contained in the principle of Μεσότης, which is so conspicuous in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. But Aristotle’s principle contains something more—it is not a mere application of the doctrine of moderation to the subject-matter of the various separate virtues. We see traces of a more profound source of the idea in his reference to the verse ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί. For here we are taken back to associations of the Pythagorean philosophy, and to the principle that evil is of the nature of the infinite and good of the finite.⁴⁹

To say that what is infinite is evil, that what is finite is good, may seem an entire contradiction to our own ways of thinking. We speak of ‘man’s finite nature,’ or of ‘the infinite nature of God,’ from a contrary point of view. But by ‘finite’ in such sentences we mean to express limitations of power, of goodness, of knowledge, each limitation implying an inferiority as compared with a nature in which such limitation does not exist. But the Pythagoreans were not dealing with this train of thought, when they said ‘the finite is good.’ They were expressing what was in the first place a truth of

⁴⁹ *Eth.* II. vi. 14. Τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ’ ἐγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου.

number, but afterwards was applied as a universal symbol; they were speaking of goodness in reference to their own minds. The 'finite' in number is the calculable, that⁵⁰ which the mind can grasp and handle; the 'infinite' is the incalculable, that which baffles the mind, that which refuses to reduce itself to law, and hence remains unknowable. The 'infinite' in this sense remained an object of aversion to the Pythagoreans, and hence in drawing out their double row of goods and evils, they placed 'the even' on the side of the bad, 'the odd' on the side of the good. This itself might seem paradoxical, until we learn that with even numbers they associated the idea of infinite subdivision, and that even numbers added together fail to produce squares; while the series of the odd numbers if added together produces a series of squares; and the square, by reason of its completeness and of the law which it exhibits, is evidently of the nature of the finite. The opposition of the finite and the infinite took root in Greek philosophy, and above all in the system of Plato. Unity and plurality, form and matter, genus and individuals, idea and phenomena, are all different modifications of this same opposition. The Pythagoreans themselves appear to have expressed or symbolized matter under the term *τὸ ἄπειρον*, and Plato⁵¹ seems to have yet more distinctly conceived of this characteristic of matter or space, saying that it was an 'undefined duad,' that is, that it contained in itself an infinity in two directions, the infinitely small and the infinitely great.

Assuming therefore that the principle of the finite, or the limit (*πεπερασμένον* or *πέρας*), may be considered as identical

⁵⁰ Cf. Philolaus, apud Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* i. xxi. 7. *Καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὲν τὰ γιγνώσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι, οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνω-*

σθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτου. Whether this fragment be genuine or not, it expresses the doctrine.

⁵¹ Cf. *Ar. Metaphys.* i. vi. 6.

with that of form or law, we may now proceed to notice what appears to be the transition from the idea of fixed law or form (*εἶδος*), to that of proportion or the mean (*μεσότης*), that is, to law or form become relative. It is to be found in the *Philebus* of Plato, p. 23—27. Socrates there divides all existence into four classes: first, the infinite (*ἄπειρον*); second, the limit (*πέρας*); third, things created and compounded out of the mixture of these two (*ἐκ τούτων μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν*); fourth, the cause of this mixture and of the creation of things. The infinite is that class of things admitting of degrees, more or less, hotter and colder, quicker and slower, and the like, where no fixed notion of quantity has as yet come in. The limit is this fixed notion of quantity, as, for instance, the equal or the double. The third or mixed class exhibits the law of the *πέρας* introduced into the *ἄπειρον*. Of this Socrates adduces beautiful manifestations. Thus in the human body the infinite is the tendency to extremes, to disorder, to disease, but the introduction of the limit here produces a balance of the constitution and health. In sounds you have the infinite degrees of deep and high, quick and slow; but the limit gives rise to modulation, and harmony, and all that is delightful in music. In climate and temperature, where the limit has been introduced, excessive heats and violent storms subside, and the mild and genial seasons in their order follow. In the human mind, ‘the goddess of the limit’ checks into submission the wild and wanton passions, and gives rise to all that is good.

Both in things physical and moral these two opposites, the finite and the infinite, are thus made to play into one another, and to be the joint causes of beauty and excellence. Out of their union an entire set of ideas and terms seem to spring up, symmetry, proportion, balance, harmony, moderation, and the like. And this train of associations seems to have been con-

stantly present to the mind of Plato. It suited the essentially Greek character of his philosophy to dwell upon the goodness of beauty, and the beauty of goodness, on the morality of art, and the artistic nature of morality; so that words like *μετριότης* and *συμμετρία* became naturally appropriated to express excellence in life and action.⁵²

This Platonic principle, then, Aristotle seems to have taken up and adopted, slightly changing the formula, however, and speaking of *μεσότης* instead of *μετριότης*. The reason for this change may have been, that the formula became thus more exact and more capable of a close analytic application to a variety of instances, and at the same time gave scope for expressing that which is with Aristotle the complement of the theory, namely the doctrine of extremes and their relation to the mean. Aristotle does not ignore the physical and artistic meanings of the principle. On the contrary, the whole bearing of his use of the term *μεσότης* is to show that moral virtue is only another expression of the same law which we see in nature and the arts. Life has been defined to be ‘multeity in unity,’ in other words, it is the law of the *πέρας* exhibited in the *ἄπειρον*. The first argument made use of by Aristotle to show that virtuous action consists in a balance between extremes is drawn from the analogy of physical life; ‘For about immaterial things,’ he says, ‘we must use material analogies.’ ‘Excess and deficiency equally destroy the health and strength, while what is proportionate (*τὰ σύμμετρα*) preserves and augments them’ (*Eth.* II. ii. 6). Again, he points out that all art aims at the mean, and the finest works of art

⁵² Cf. *Republic*, p. 400 E. Ἔστι δὲ γέ που πλήρης μὲν γραφικὴ αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη δημιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὕφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία καὶ πᾶσα αὖ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν ἔργασία, ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων

φυτῶν· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀρρυθμία καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοσθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σῶφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἡθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ μμήματα.

are those which seem to have realized a subtle grace which the least addition to any part or diminution from it would upset (*Eth.* II. vi. 9). ‘And moral virtue,’ he adds, ‘is finer than the finest art.’ But it is by a mathematical expression of the formula, by reducing it to an absolutely quantitative conception, that Aristotle’s use of *Μεσότης* is chiefly distinguished. He says, that all quantity, whether space or number (*ἐν παντί δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ*), admits of the terms more, less, and equal. On making these terms relative, you have excess, deficiency, and the mean. The mean, then, is in geometrical proportion what the equal is in arithmetical progression. The middle term arithmetically is that which is equidistant from the terms on each side of it. Geometrically, the mean is not an absolute mean, but a relative mean, that is, if applied to action, it expresses the consideration of persons and of circumstances (*Eth.* II. vi. 4–5). This opposition of the mean to the too much and too little becomes henceforward a formula of almost universal application. It is no mere negative principle, not the mere avoiding of extremes, but rather the realization of a law. When Aristotle says that the *μεσότης* must be *ὠρισμένη λόγῳ*, he means that our action must correspond to the standard which exists in the rightly-ordered mind. What is subjectively the *λόγος*, law or standard, that is objectively the *μεσότης* or balance. ‘Each of our senses,’ says Aristotle, ‘is a sort of balance (*μεσότης*) between extremes in the objects of sensation, and this it is which gives us the power of judging.’⁵³

Thus again he says of plants, that they have no perceptions, ‘because they have no standard’ (*διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα*, *De An.* II. xii. 4). Again, he defines pleasure and

⁵³ *De Animâ*, II. xi. 17. ‘Ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. Καὶ

διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. Τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν.

pain to consist in 'the consciousness, by means of the discriminating faculty (τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι) of the senses, of coming in contact with good or evil.'⁵⁴ Each of the senses then is, or contains, a sort of standard of its proper object. And it is clear that Aristotle attributes to us a similar critical faculty in regard of morals. He says, that 'It is peculiar to man, as compared with the other animals, that he has a sense of good and bad, just and unjust.'⁵⁵ He seems to have regarded this 'moral sense' as analogous to the 'musical ear,' which in some degree is almost natural to all men, but again exists in very different degrees in different men, and also may be more or less cultivated. Thus (*Eth.* ix. ix. 6) he speaks of the good man being 'pleased at good actions, as the musical man is at beautiful tunes.' And in *Eth.* x. iii. 10 he says that 'It will be impossible to feel the pleasure of a just man if one is not just, as it will be to feel the pleasure of a musical man if one is not musical.' In the *Ethics*, its proper objective sense is preserved to Μεσότης, which accordingly means a 'balance,' and not the 'standard' for determining that balance, which is expressed by the term λόγος. A moment's consideration of this point will give an answer to the somewhat superficial question, Why does not Aristotle make the intellectual virtues mean states? In the original form of the principle of Μεσότης we have seen that it consisted in the introduction of the law of the πέρας into the ἄπειρον. The passions and desires are the infinite; moral virtue consists in introducing limit (πέρας) into them,—in bringing them under a law (λόγῳ ὀρίζειν)—in making them exhibit balance, proportion, harmony (μεσότητα), which is the realization of the

⁵⁴ Καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν, ἢ τοιαῦτα.—*De An.* III. vii. 2.

⁵⁵ *Pol.* I. ii. 12. Τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς ἅλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθησιν ἔχειν.

law. On the other hand, reason (ὁρθὸς λόγος) is another name for the law itself. It is the standard, and therefore does not require to be regulated by the standard. The intellectual virtues are not μεσότητες, because they are λόγοι.

The worth and validity of Aristotle's principle of the mean has been much canvassed and questioned. Kant has been very severe on Aristotle for making 'a merely quantitative difference between vice and virtue.' Some have thought the theory practically true, but scientifically untenable; others, on the contrary, that scientifically and abstractedly it is true, but that practically it gives an unworthy picture of morality, that it fails to represent the absolute and awful difference between right and wrong. Aristotle himself seems to have anticipated this last objection, by remarking⁵⁶ that 'It is only according to the most abstract and metaphysical conception that virtue is a mean between vices, whereas from a moral point of view it is an extreme (i.e. utterly and extremely removed from them'). Aristotle acknowledges that the formula of the mean does not adequately express the *good* of virtue; that when thinking of virtue under the category of good, and regarding it as an object for the moral feelings and desires, as an object to be striven after, we should rather seek some other formula to express its nature. In the same way it might be said in accordance with modern views, that 'the mean' does not adequately express the *right* of virtue in relation to the will and conscience.

The objections to Aristotle's theory arise from a partial misconception of what the term Μεσότης really conveys. Kant for 'the mean' substitutes 'law.' But we have already traced the identity or correlation of Λόγος and Μεσότης, and we have seen that Μεσότης really implies and expresses exactly what

⁵⁶ *Eth.* II. vi. 17. Κατὰ μὲν τὴν | λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ
οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι | δὲ τὸ ἅριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

is meant by 'law'—properly so called. The only advantage which the term 'law' can have over *Μεσότης*, as an ethical principle, comes to it unfairly. For there is a sort of ambiguity between the two meanings of the word law; on the one hand it may denote a general principle, or harmony, or idea in nature; on the other hand an authoritative command of the state. In applying the word to morals the associations of both meanings are blended together, and 'the law of right' accordingly expresses not only something harmonious, the attainment of an idea in action, but also there is a sort of association of authority conveyed, of the 'must,' of something binding on the will.

Supposing then we take the word 'law' or 'idea' as being the real representative of *Μεσότης*, it may still be asked, whether a quantitative term be a fit and worthy expression for so deep a moral conception. The Pythagoreans would not have understood this objection. They thought numbers the most sublime and the only true expression for all that was good in the physical and moral world. They would have used in reference to number the exact counterpart of Wordsworth's praise of Duty—'And the most ancient heavens by thee are fresh and strong.' They would have delighted to say that virtue is a square and vice an uneven-sided figure. When we look to the arts, following the analogy that Aristotle pointed out, we see clearly how the whole of beauty seems from one point of view to depend on the more and the less. It does not derogate from a beautiful form, that more or less would spoil it. We still think of beauty as something positive, and that more or less would be the negations of this. By degrees, however, we come to figure to ourselves beauty rather as repelling the more and the less, than as being caused by them. The capacity for more and less is matter, the *ἄπειρον*, the *ἀόριστος δυνάς* of Plato. The idea coming in stamps itself

upon this, we now have the harmonious and the beautiful, and all extremes and quantitative possibilities vanish out of sight. Matter is totally forgotten in our contemplation of form. So is it also with morals. We might fix our view upon the negative side of virtue, look at it in contrast to the extremes, and say it is constituted virtue by being a little more than vice and a little less than vice. But this would be to establish a positive idea out of the negation of its negations.

To look at anything in its elements makes it appear inferior to what it seems as a whole. Resolve the statue or the building into stone and the laws of proportion, and no worthy causes of the former beautiful result seem now left behind. So, also, resolve a virtuous act into the passions and some quantitative law, and it seems to be rather destroyed than analysed; though, after all, what was there else that it could be resolved into? An act of bravery seems beautiful and noble; when we reduce this to a balance between the instincts of fear and self-confidence, the glory of it is gone. This is because the form is everything, and the matter nothing; and yet the form, without the matter as its exponent, has no existence. It is, no doubt, true that the beauty of that brave act would have been destroyed had the boldness of it been pushed into folly; and equally so had it been controlled into caution. The act, as it was done, exhibits the law of life, 'multeity in unity;' or, in other words, the law of beauty. This is, then, what the term *Μεσότης* is capable of expressing; it is the law of beauty. If virtue is harmony, grace, and beauty in action, *Μεσότης* perfectly expresses this.

That beauty constituted virtue, was an eminently Greek idea. If we run through Aristotle's list of the virtues, we find them all embodying this idea. The law of the *Μεσότης*, as exhibited in bravery, temperance, liberality, and magnanimity,

constitutes a noble, free, and brilliant type of manhood. Extend it also, as Aristotle does, to certain qualifications of temper, speech, and manners, and you have before you the portrait of a graceful Grecian gentleman. The question now is, are there other virtues which exhibit some other law than this law of beauty, and to which, therefore, the *Μεσότης* would be inapplicable? Let us take as instances, truth, humility, charity, forgiveness of injuries, and ask what is the case with these. 'Truth' is treated of in a remarkable way by Aristotle; under this name he describes a certain straightforwardness of manner, which he places as the mean between boastfulness and over-modesty. That deeper kind of truth which, as he says, is concerned with justice and injustice, he omits to treat of. When we come to his theory of justice—taking this as an individual virtue—we find it either imperfectly developed, or else imperfectly set forth. Now, truth itself seems expressible under the law of the *Μεσότης*; it is a balance of reticence with candour, suitable to times and seasons. But the impulse to truth—the duty of not deceiving—the relation of the will to this virtue, seems something quite beyond the formula of the Mean.

So, also, with the other virtues specified; humility, charity, and forgiveness of injuries being Christian qualities, are not described by Aristotle; but if we ask if they are 'mean states,' we find that they are all beautiful; and, in so far as that, they all exhibit a certain grace and balance of the human feelings. There is a point at which each might be overstepped; humility must not be grovelling, nor charity weak; and forgiveness must at times give place to indignation. But there seems in them something which is also their chief characteristic, and which is beyond and different from this quality of the mean. Perhaps this might be expressed in all of them as 'self-abnegation.' Now, here, we get a

different point of view from which to regard the virtues; and that is, the relation of Self, of the individual Will, of the moral Subject to the objective in the sphere of action. This point of view Aristotle's principle does not touch. *Μεσότης* expresses the objective law of beauty in action, and, as correlative with it, the critical moral faculty in our minds, but the law of right in action as something binding on the moral subject it leaves unexpressed. To some extent this want is supplied by Aristotle's doctrine of the *τέλος*, which raises a beautiful action into something absolute, and makes it the end of our being.

But still the theory of 'Duty' cannot be said to exist in Aristotle, and all that relates to the moral will is with him only in its infancy. *Μεσότης*, we have seen, expresses the beauty of good acts, but leaves something in the goodness of them unexpressed. In conclusion, we must remember that *Ἀρετή* with Aristotle did not mean quite the same as 'virtue' with us; he meant the excellence, or perfection of man, just as he spoke elsewhere of the *Ἀρετή* of a horse. It is no wonder then that with his Greek views he resolved this into a sort of moral beauty.

IV. We have now traced the application of some of his leading philosophical forms in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. We have observed how he takes the same point of view in discussing man as in treating of nature in general. End, form, and actuality, are in human life, as in all nature, the good. If we look into the *Ethics* of Eudemus, and into those three books of his which are our only exposition of part of Aristotle's system, we see a carrying out of the same tendency, an effort to bring the psychology of the Will under some broader and more general law, and to express action and purpose under the form of a logical syllogism. It is uncertain how far this doctrine, even in its beginnings, is to be attributed to

Aristotle himself. But it is worth a passing consideration. It is made the vehicle of some interesting discussions; and it shows not only the sort of advance made by the Peripatetic school, but also it lets us know what was the nature of the psychology of the day. We have already observed that it is only in the Eudemian books of the *Ethics* that this formula occurs. But it is also set forth very explicitly in the treatise *De Motu Animalium*, which has been placed among the works of Aristotle, but which is now generally considered spurious, and is in all probability a Peripatetic compendium.

For clearness' sake, let us refer at once to the summary account of the doctrine of the practical syllogism which is given in the last-mentioned work.

The practical syllogism depends on this principle, that 'No creature moves or acts, except with a view to some end.'⁵⁷ What therefore the law of the so-called 'sufficient reason' is to a proposition of the understanding, that the law of the final cause is to an act of the will. 'Under what conditions of thought is it,'⁵⁸ asks the writer, 'that a person at one time acts, at another time does not act; at one time is put in motion, at another time not? It seems to be much the same case as with people thinking and reasoning about abstract matter, only *there* the ultimate thing to be obtained is an abstract proposition, for as soon as one has perceived the two premises, one perceives the conclusion. But here the

⁵⁷ Πάντα τὰ ζῷα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς πάσης τῆς κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα.
—*De Mot. An.* vi. 2.

⁵⁸ *De Mot. An.* vii. 1. Πῶς δὲ νοῶν ὅτε μὲν πράττει ὅτε δ' οὐ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὅτε δ' οὐ κινεῖται; Ὅμοια παραπλησίως συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων διανοουμένοις καὶ συλλογιζομένοις. Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ

τέλος (ὅταν γὰρ τὰς δύο προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνόησε καὶ συνέθηκεν), ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίγνεται ἢ πρᾶξις, οἷον ὅταν νοήσῃ ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἀνθρώπος, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἂν δ' ὅτι οὐδενὶ βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἀνθρώπος, εὐθὺς ἡρεμεῖ· καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφω πράττει, ἂν μὴ τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ.

conclusion that arises from the two premises is the action ; as, for instance, when one has perceived, that Every man ought to walk, and I am a man, he walks immediately. Or again, that No man ought now to walk, and I am a man, he stops still immediately. Both these courses he adopts, provided he be neither hindered nor compelled. . . . That the action is the conclusion, is plain ; but the premisses of the practical syllogism are of two kinds, specifying either that something is good, or again, how it is possible.⁵⁹ This then may shortly be said to be the form of the practical syllogism :

either (1) Major Premiss. Such and such an action is universally good.

Minor Premiss. This will be an action of the kind.

Conclusion. Performance of the action.

or (2) Major Premiss. Such and such an end is desirable.

Minor. This step will conduce to the end.

Conclusion. Taking of the step.

In other words, every action implies a sense of a general principle, and the applying of that principle to a particular case ; or again, it implies desire for some end, coupled with perception of the means necessary for attaining the end. These two different ways of stating the practical syllogism are in reality coincident ; for assuming that all action is for some end, the major premiss may be said always to contain the statement of an end.⁶⁰ And again, any particular act, which is the application of a moral principle, may be said to

⁵⁹ *De Mot. An.* vii. 4. "Οτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διὰ τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ.

⁶⁰ *Eth.* vi. xii. 10. Οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.

be the means necessary to the realization of the principle. 'Temperance is good,' may be called either a general principle, or an expression of a desire for the habit of temperance. 'To abstain now will be temperate,' is an application of the principle, or again, it is the absolutely necessary means toward the attainment of the habit. For 'it is absurd,' as Aristotle tells us, 'when one acts unjustly to talk of not wishing to be unjust, or when one acts intemperately of not wishing to be intemperate.'⁶¹

The distinction between end and means, which plays so important a part throughout the moral system of Aristotle, comes out, as might be expected, very prominently in Book III., where what must be called a sort of elementary psychology of the Will is given. But no application is there made of the scheme of the syllogism. Indeed a mathematical formula seems used in Book III., where a logical formula is in Book VI.: for in the former, the process of deliberation is compared to the analysis of a diagram (*Eth.* III. iii. 11); in the latter, error of deliberation is spoken of as a false syllogism, where the right end is attained by a wrong means, that is, by a false middle term.⁶²

It is to Books VI. and VII. that we must look to see the use made of the practical syllogism. It is applied, first, to the explanation of the nature of Wisdom (*φρόνησις*), which is shown to contain a universal and a particular element.⁶³

2. To show the intuitive character of moral judgments and

⁶¹ *Eth.* III. v. 13. "Ἐτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον.

⁶² *Eth.* VI. ix. 5. 'Ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τοῦτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι.

⁶³ *Eth.* VI. vii. 7. Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ

φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν, κ.τ.λ. VI. viii. 7. "Ἐτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοῖς βαρύσταθμον.

knowledge.⁶⁴ 3. To prove the necessary and inseparable connexion of wisdom and virtue.⁶⁵ 4. In answer to the question, how is it possible to know the good, and yet act contrary to one's knowledge? In short, how is incontinence possible? This phenomenon is explained in two ways; either the incontinent man does not apply a minor premiss to his universal principle, and so the principle remains dormant, and his knowledge of the good remains merely implicit; or, again, desire constructs a sort of syllogism of its own, inconsistent with, though not directly contradictory to, the arguments of the moral reason.⁶⁶ Incontinence therefore implies knowing the good, and at the same time not knowing it. It would be impossible to act contrary to a complete syllogism which applied the knowledge of the good to a case in point; for the necessary conclusion to such a syllogism would be good action. But there is broken knowledge and moral obliviousness in the mind of the incontinent man, and the practical syllogism gives a formula for expressing this.

The foregoing references serve to show, that in itself this formula is only a way of stating certain psychological facts. The question whether people do really go through a syllogism in or before every action, is much like the question whether we always reason in syllogisms. Most reasonings seem to be from particular to particular, that is to say, by analogy; and yet some sort of universal conception, if it be only the sense of the uniformity of nature, lies at the bottom of all inference. And so too in action, most acts seem prompted by the instinct of the moment, and yet some general idea, as, for instance, the desire of the creature for its proper good,

⁶⁴ *Eth.* vi. xi. 4. Καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα, κ.τ.λ.

⁶⁵ *Eth.* vi. xii. 10. Ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις . . . ἀρχάς.

⁶⁶ *Eth.* vii. iii. 6. Ἔτι ἐπεὶ . . . οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. vii. iii. 9, 10. Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε . . . κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

might be said to lie behind this instinct. This theory acknowledges⁶⁷ that the mind constantly passes over one of the premisses of the practical syllogism, as being obvious; that we act often instantaneously, without hesitation, just because we see an object of desire before us. Thus it is merely a way of putting it, to say that we act from a syllogism. But granting the formula, it becomes immediately a powerful analytic instrument. It seems to suggest and clear the way for a set of ulterior questions, in which most important results would be involved. For now that action has been as it were caught, put to death, and dissected, and so reduced to the level of abstract reasoning, it seems that we have only to deal with its disjointed parts in order to know the whole theory of human Will. We have only to ask what is the nature of the major premiss, and how obtained? What is the nature of the minor premiss, and how obtained? The answer to these questions in the *Ethics* is not very explicit. This is exactly one of the points on which a conclusive theory seems to have been least arrived at. With regard to our possession of general principles of action, there appear to be three different accounts given in different places.

- (1) They are innate and intuitive (vi. xi. 4, vii. vi. 6, 7).
- (2) They are evolved from experience of particulars (vi. viii. 6).
- (3) They depend on the moral character (vi. xii. 10, vii. viii. 4).

⁶⁷ *De Mot. An.* vii. 4, 5. "Ὡσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτῶντων ἐνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δὴλην οὐδ' ἡ διάνοια ἐπιστάσα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπου, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπος, οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει. Διὸ καὶ ὅσα μὴ λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺ πράττομεν. Ὅταν γὰρ ἐνεργήσῃ ἡ τῇ αἰ-

σθήσει πρὸς τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἡ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἡ τῇ νῶ, οὐ ὁρέγεται, εὐθὺς ποιεῖ· ἀντ' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἡ νοήσεως ἡ τῆς ὁρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. Ποτέον μοι, ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει· τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, ἡ αἰσθησις εἶπεν ἡ ἡ φαντασία ἡ ὁ νοῦς· εὐθὺς πίνει.

These three accounts are not however incompatible with one another. For as in explaining the origin of speculative principles (*Post. An.* II. xix.) Aristotle seems to attribute them to reason as the cause and experience as the condition; so in regard to moral principles, we might say that they were perceived by an intuitive faculty, but under the condition of a certain bearing of the moral character, which itself arises out of and consists in particular moral experiences. This reconciliation of the statements is not made for us in the *Ethics*. There the different points of view stand apart, and there is something immature about the whole theory. So too with regard to the minor premiss in action; on the one hand we are told that it is a matter of perception (VI. viii. 9), as if it belonged to everybody; on the other hand we are told that the apprehension of these particulars is exactly what distinguishes the wise man.⁶⁸ But it is unnecessary to attempt to go beyond the lead of the *Ethics* in answering these questions, for we should ourselves most probably state them in an entirely different way.

We see in the practical syllogism a limited and imperfect attempt to graft on a logical formula upon Aristotle's system. We also see in it a still more important fact, namely, the progress of psychology, and the tendency now manifesting itself to give attention to the phenomena of the Will. The manner in which the theory is stated, abstractedly, and with a full belief in logical formulæ, rather than an appeal to life and consciousness,—shows something of the scholastic spirit. To reduce action to a syllogism dogmatically is a piece of scholasticism. Plato would have put it in this way for once, and would then have passed on to other modes of expression. But it is remarkable that this formula is one of those that

⁶⁸ Πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις. *Eth.* VII. II. 5.

remains most completely stamped upon the language of mankind. When we talk of 'acting on principle,' or speak of a man's 'principles,' perhaps we do not reflect that this expression is a remnant of Aristotle's practical syllogism. 'Principle' is no other than the *ἀρχή* or major premiss. There is however this difference, that while with the Peripatetics the major premiss contained the idea of a good to be desired for its own sake (*τέλος*), 'principle' often implies an expression of duty, that is to say, rather that which is right in itself, than that which is desirable in itself.

ESSAY V.

On the Physical and Theological Ideas in the Ethics of Aristotle.

A RISTOTLE'S limited and separate mode of treating the problem which he has assigned to himself in this treatise, his exclusive adherence to an ethical (or, as he would call it, a political) point of view, and his rejection of many great questions¹ connected with the nature of man, because he conceived them to belong to other sciences, might seem to exonerate us from the task of discussing here his opinions on the gravest matters of all. But yet it is impossible that an ethical treatise should be written uncoloured by the writer's view of nature, the Deity, and the human soul. And accordingly we find more than one passage in this work of Aristotle which really depends on his views of those subjects. If then we make no attempt to understand parts of his philosophy that lie outside his *Ethics*, we shall not only miss that which in the mind of Aristotle must have been the setting of the whole piece, but also we shall be in danger of substituting our own point of view for his, and thus wrongly explaining many of his allusions. In the present Essay it may be useful to collect a few passages from the different works of Aristotle, which may throw light upon the general bearing of his mind, though it would be out of place, if indeed it were possible, to

¹ For instance, the metaphysical question concerning the good, *Eth.* i. vi. 13. The question of Providence,

i. ix. 3. The physical aspect of the question about friendship, viii. i. 7, &c.

give anything like a dogmatic or explicit account of his opinions, with regard to many of which we are not in a position to form a certain estimate.

The most interesting notices of his general views of nature may be gathered from the second book of Aristotle's *Physical Lectures*. He there speaks of 'nature'² as 'a principle of motion and rest implanted and essentially inherent in things, whether that motion be locomotion, increase, decay, or alteration.' 'It is absurd³ to try to prove the existence of nature; to do so would be to ignore the distinction between self-evident and not self-evident things.' 'Nature⁴ may be said in one way to be the simplest and most deep-lying substratum of matter in things possessing their own principle of motion and change; in another way it may be called the form and law of such things.' That is, nature is both matter or potentiality and form or actuality. It is also the transition from one to the other. 'Nature,'⁵ says Aristotle, 'spoken of as creation is the path to nature.' Again, 'Nature⁶ is the end or final cause.' In relation to this system of causation, it remains to ask what place is to be assigned to chance or the fortuitous, to necessity and to reason? 'Some⁷ deny the existence of chance altogether, saying that there is a definite cause for all things.' 'Others,'⁸ again, have gone so far as

² *Nat. Ausc.* II. i. 2. 'Ὡς οὐσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρῶτως καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

³ *Nat. Ausc.* II. i. 4. 'Ὡς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι, γελοῖον· . . . οὐ δυναμένου κρίνειν ἐστὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὸ γνώριμον.

⁴ *Nat. Ausc.* II. i. 8. "Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἐκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὅλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς,

ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

⁵ *Nat. Ausc.* II. i. 11. 'Ἐτι δ' ἡ φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδὸς ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν.

⁶ *Nat. Ausc.* II. ii. 8. 'Ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα.

⁷ *Nat. Ausc.* II. iv. 2. "Ἐνιοὶ γὰρ καὶ εἰ ἐστὶν ἡ μὴ ἀποροῦσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἀπὸ τύχης φασὶν, ἀλλὰ πάντων εἶναι τι αἰτίον ὀρισμένον.

⁸ *Nat. Ausc.* II. iv. 5. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες

to assign the fortuitous as the cause of the existence of the heaven and the whole universe.' 'Others⁹ believe in the existence of chance, but say that it is something mysterious and supernatural, which baffles the human understanding.' With none of these opinions does Aristotle seem exactly to agree. He will not hear of attributing the existence of 'the heaven'¹⁰ and the divinest things that meet our eyes' to blind chance. Again, while allowing the existence of chance as an undefined or incalculable principle of causation, and awarding to it a certain sphere, namely, things contingent, he does not appear to have believed in anything supernatural attaching to it. He distinguishes 'the fortuitous' from 'chance,' considering 'chance' to be only a species of the latter, and restricted to the sphere of human actions.¹¹ As a proof of this he alleges that 'good fortune is held to be the same or nearly so with happiness;' now happiness is a kind of action, *i.e.* 'doing well.' Where there is no action, there is no chance. Hence no inanimate object, nor beast, nor child, does anything by chance, because it has no choice, nor have these either good or bad fortune, except metaphorically, in the same sense that Protarchus said 'the stones of the altar were fortunate, because they were honoured.' The fortuitous and chance both are merely accidental, and not essential principles of causation; they therefore presuppose the essential, since the accidental is posterior to and dependent on the essential. Therefore¹² of whatever things chance may be the cause, it

οἱ καὶ τοῦρανὸν τοῦδε καὶ τῶν κοσμικῶν
πάντων αἰτιῶνται τὸ αὐτόματον.

⁹ *Nat. Ausc.* II. iv. 8. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες
οἷς δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰτία μὲν ἡ τύχη, ἄδηλος
δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ ὡς θεῖον τι οὐσα
καὶ δαιμονιώτερον.

¹⁰ *Nat. Ausc.* II. iv. 6. Τὸν οὐρανὸν
καὶ τὰ θεϊότατα τῶν φανερῶν.

¹¹ *Nat. Ausc.* II. vi. 1. Διὸ καὶ

ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην·
σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἦτοι ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ
εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἢ εὐτυχίᾳ ἢ ἐγγύς, ἢ δ'
εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τις· εὐπραξία γάρ.
This passage was probably written
previously to the Ethical researches
of Aristotle.

¹² *Nat. Ausc.* II. vi. 8. Ὅστερον
ἄρα τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ νοῦ

necessarily follows that nature and reason, which are essential causes, should be presupposed, that they should be in short the causes of the universe.

Has necessity, then, a conditional¹³ or an absolute sway in relation to nature? To say that it had an absolute sway, would be equivalent to assigning as the cause of the existence of a wall that the heavy stones *must* be put at the bottom, and the light stones and earth a-top. In reality, however, this necessity in regard to the wall is only a necessary¹⁴ condition, not a cause, of the making of the wall. Given a certain end, and certain means to this are necessary; thus far and no farther has necessity a sway in regard to nature. But the end is the real cause, the necessary means are a mere subordinate condition.

Lastly, What is the position of design or intelligence in relation to nature? Some reduce all nature to a mechanical principle; if they recognize any other principle at all (as Empedocles spoke of 'love and hatred,' and Anaxagoras of 'reason'), they just touch it and let it drop.¹⁵ They say it rains, not that the corn may grow, but from a mechanical necessity, because the vapours are cooled as they are drawn up, and being cooled are compelled to fall again, and by coincidence this gives growth to the corn.¹⁶ 'Why should it not also be by accident and coincidence, they ask, that in the teeth of animals, for instance, the front teeth grow sharp

καὶ φύσεως· ὥστ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αἴτιον τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀνάγκη πρότερον νοῦν καὶ φύσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τοῦδε πάντος.

¹³ *Nat. Ausc.* II. IX. I. Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πρότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἀπλῶς; Νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε

φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς.

¹⁴ *Nat. Ausc.* II. IX. 2. Οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐχόντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ὥς ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἐνεκά του.

¹⁵ *Nat. Ausc.* II. VIII. I. Καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ἄλλην αἰτίαν εἴπωσιν, ὅσον ἀψάμε-μοι χαίρειν ἐῷσιν, ὁ μὲν τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, ὁ δὲ τὸν νοῦν.

¹⁶ *Nat. Ausc.* II. VIII. 2.

and suitable for cutting, while the hind teeth grow broad and suitable for grinding?' Hence their theory is, that whenever blind necessity did not hit by coincidence on results as perfect as if they had been designed, its products perished, while the lucky hits were preserved; and thus Empedocles says that whole races of monsters perished¹⁷ before a perfect man was attained.

Aristotle says, 'It is impossible that this theory can be true;¹⁸ our whole idea of chance and coincidence is something irregular, out of the course of nature, while nature is the regular and the universal. If, then, the products of nature are either according to coincidence or design, it follows that they must be according to design. We see how a house is built; if that house were made by nature, it would be made in exactly the same way, *i.e.* with design, and according to a regular plan. The same adaptation of means to ends we see in the procedure of the animals, which makes some men doubt whether the spider, for instance, and the ant, do not work by the light of reason or an analogous faculty. In plants, moreover, manifest traces of a fit and wisely planned organization appear. The swallow makes its nest and the spider its web by nature, and yet with a design and end; and the roots of the plant grow downwards and not upwards, for the sake of providing it nourishment in the best way. It is plain, then, that end and design is a cause of natural things. And if nature be figured both as matter and as end, we may surely regard the matter as a mere means to an end, and the end itself as really and essentially the cause. The failures of nature, the abortions and monsters which Empedocles spoke of as if they were the normal

¹⁷ *Nat. Ausc.* ii. viii. 4. Ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα.

¹⁸ *Nat. Ausc.* ii. viii. 5-10.

products of nature, are in reality its mere exceptions. They are mistakes and errors, exactly analogous to the failures in art. It is absurd to doubt the existence of design because we cannot see deliberation actually taking place. Art does not deliberate. If the art of ship-building were inherent in the wood, ship-building would be a work of nature. Perhaps the best conception we can have of nature is, if we think of a person acting as his own doctor and curing himself.' ¹⁹

On these views of Aristotle's several observations at once suggest themselves. They contain a recognition quite as strong as that in Paley's *Natural Theology* of the marks of design in creation. But we see that it is possible to recognize these marks of design, and to be led by them to a different view from that of Paley; that Aristotle does not discover in them, as it were, the works of a watch, and proceed immediately to infer the existence of a watchmaker; but rather that the products of nature appear to him according to the analogy of a watch that makes itself. If we ask, how it is that the watch makes itself? Aristotle would reply, that all things strive after the good; that on the idea of the good, as seen and desired, the whole heavens and all nature depend. Aristotle views the world with a kind of natural optimism. He says (*Eth.* i. ix. 5), 'All things in nature are constituted in the best possible way.' If we ask, what is it that perceives the good—what gives to nature this eye of reason to perceive an idea and to strive after it?—on this head Aristotle is not explicit. He says there is something divine in nature. 'Even ²⁰ in the lower creatures there is a natural good above their own level, which strives after the good proper for them.'

¹⁹ *Nat. Ausc.* ii. viii. 15. Μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον ὅταν τις ἰατρὲν αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν ἢ φύσις.

²⁰ *Eth.* x. ii. 4. Ἵσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς

φάλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. A similar doctrine is given in the Eudemian Book, vii. xiii. 6.

We see the indistinctness of this phrase. He speaks of 'the natural good' striving after 'their proper good.' If it be said that Aristotle's theory is Pantheism, this would not be exactly true, for Aristotle does not identify God with nature, nor deprive Him of personality. But what the relation is of 'the divine' in nature to God, it must be confessed that Aristotle does not make clear. We only see that Aristotle, while tracing design, beauty, and harmony in the world, is not led to figure to himself God as the artist or architect of this fair order, but as standing in a different relation to it. If we ask, how can the beginning be accounted for, how did the watch begin to make itself? Aristotle would say, in looking back we do not find in the past merely the elements (*δύναμις*) of a watch, we find of necessity the idea and the actuality (*ἐνέργεια*) of the watch itself (see above, p. 189). A perfect watch must always precede the imperfect one. It is impossible to think of nature as having had a beginning. 'The universe is eternal' (*Eth.* III. iii. 3). 'The parts²¹ may be regarded as changeable, but the whole cannot change, it is increate and indestructible' (*De Cælo*, I. x. 10).

One of the most interesting points to notice in this part of the subject is the way in which Aristotle regards man in relation to nature as a whole. His view appears to be twofold; on the one hand he regards man as a part of nature. He says,²² 'You may call a man the product of a man, or of the sun.' He looks at the principle of human life as belonging to the whole chain of organized existence. Man has much in common with the animals and the plants. On the other hand, he looks at the human reason and will as a principle of causation, which is not part of nature, but distinct. 'Man,'

²¹ "Ὅστ' εἰ τὸ θλον σῶμα συνεχὲς ὂν
ὅτ' ἐμὲν οὕτως ὅτ' ἐ' ἐκείνως διατίθεται
καὶ διακεκόσμηται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ θλον σύ-
στασις ἐστὶ κόσμος καὶ οὐρανός, οὐκ ἂν

ὁ κόσμος γίγνοιτο καὶ φθείροιτο, ἀλλ' αἱ
διαθέσεις αὐτοῦ.

²² *Nat. Ausc.* II. ii. 11. "Ἀνθρώπος
γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος.

he says, 'is the cause of his own actions.' Thus he classifies causation into 'nature, necessity, chance, and again reason and all that comes from man' (*Eth.* III. iii. 7). 'In art²³ and in action the efficient cause rests with the maker or doer, and not as in nature with the thing done.' Aristotle's Ethical theory depends on this principle, that the moral qualities are not by nature, *i.e.* self-caused, but produced in us in accordance with the law of our nature, by the exercise of will, by care, cultivation, and in short the use of the proper means. We have already observed (see above, p. 108) that one of the first steps of Grecian Ethics, as exhibited in the philosophy of Archelaus and Democritus, consisted in severing man and human society from the general framework of nature. This Aristotle follows out in his *Ethics*, and he seems so easily to content himself with the practical assumption of freedom for man, as to give a narrow and unphilosophical appearance to part of his writing.

While, however, assuming freedom for human actions, Aristotle seems to do so, not so much from a sense of the deep importance of morality, but rather from an idea of the slightness of man and of his actions in comparison with nature, and what he would call the 'diviner parts' of the universe. There is a strange passage in his *Metaphysics* (XI. x. 2-3), which is obscure indeed, but it seems to bear on the question. He says,²⁴ 'All things are in some sort ordered and harmonized together, fishes of the sea, birds of the air, and plants that grow, though not in an equal degree. It is not true to

²³ *Eth.* VI. iv. 4.

²⁴ Πάντα δὲ συντάσσεται πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτὰ· ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θατέρον μῆθέν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τι. Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἅπαντα συντάσσεται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς

ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὃ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὃ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἐκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἢ φύσις ἐστίν.

say that there is no relation between one thing and another ; there is such a relation. All things are indeed arranged together towards one common centre ; but as in a household the masters are by no means at liberty to do what they please, but most things, if not all, are appointed for them, while the slaves and the dogs and cats do but little towards the common weal, and mostly follow their own fancies. For so the nature of each of the different classes prompts them to act.' This curious metaphor seems to represent the universe as a household. The sun and stars and all the heaven are the gentlemen and ladies, whose higher aims and more important positions in life prevent any time being left to a merely arbitrary disposal ; all is filled up with a round of the noblest duties and occupations. Other parts of the universe are like the inferior members of the family, the slaves and domestic animals, who for most part of the day can sleep in the sun, and pursue their own devices. Under this last category it seems almost as if man would be here ranked. Aristotle does not regard the unchanging and perpetual motion of the heavenly bodies as a bondage, but rather as a harmonized and blessed life. All that is arbitrary (*ὅπως ἔτυχε*) in the human will, Aristotle does not consider a privilege. And man (especially in regard of his actions, the object of *φρόνησις* and *πολιτική*) he does not think the highest part of the universe ; he thinks the sun and stars²⁵ ' far more divine.' This opinion is no doubt connected with a philosophical feeling of the inferiority of the sphere of the contingent, in which action consists, and with which chance intermixes, to the sphere of the absolute and the eternal. In this feeling Plato shared, but in Plato's mind there was set against it, what Aristotle seems deficient in, a deep sense of the even eternal import

²⁵ *Eth.* vi. vii. 4.

of morality. To the heavenly bodies both Plato and Aristotle appear to have attributed consciousness, which explains in some degree the sayings of Aristotle. We see, however, that there was necessarily something peculiar, contrasted with our views, in the way Aristotle approached Ethics. This no doubt his actual researches in Ethics led him to modify. But he never would have accepted the saying, 'In the world there is nothing great but man; in man there is nothing great but mind'—and as we may surely go on to add, 'in mind there is nothing great but what is moral.'

We can never, perhaps, adequately comprehend Aristotle's philosophical conception of the Deity. The expression of his views that has come down to us seems so incomplete, and contains so much that is apparently contradictory, that we are in great danger of doing Aristotle injustice. Even had we a fuller and clearer expression, there might be yet something behind this remaining unexpressed, as an intuition in the mind of the philosopher. The first thing we may notice is Aristotle's idea of 'Theology' as a science. In classifying the speculative sciences, he says (*Metaphys.* x. vii. 7), 'Physics are concerned with things that have a principle of motion in themselves; mathematics speculate on permanent, but not transcendental and self-existent things; and there is another science separate from these two, which treats of that which is immutable and transcendental, if indeed there exists such a substance, as we shall endeavour to show that there does. This transcendental and permanent substance, if it exists at all, must surely be the sphere of the divine—it must be the first and highest principle. Hence it follows that there are three kinds of speculative science—physics, mathematics, and theology.' In the same strain he speaks in the succeeding book (*Metaphys.* xi. viii. 19), as if the popular polytheism of Greece were a mere perverted fragment of this deeper and

truer 'Theology,' which he conceives to have been, in all probability, perfected often before in the infinite lapse of time, and then again lost. He says,²⁶ 'The tradition has come down from very ancient times, being left in a mythical garb to succeeding generations, that these (the heavens) are gods, and that the divine embraces the whole of nature. And round this idea other mythical statements have been agglomerated with a view to influencing the vulgar, and for political and moral expediency; as, for instance, they feign that these gods have human shape and are like certain of the animals; and other stories of the kind are added on. Now, if any one will separate from all this the first point alone—namely, that they thought the first and deepest grounds of existence to be gods—he may consider it a divine utterance. In all probability, every art and science and philosophy has been over and over again discovered to the farthest extent possible, and then again lost, and one may conceive these opinions to have been preserved to us as a sort of fragment of those lost philosophies. We see then to some extent the relation of the popular belief to those ancient opinions.' Aristotle having thus penetrated to a conception, which he imagined to lie behind the external and unessential forms of the Grecian religion, that is, the conception of a deep and

²⁶ Παραδέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἐν μύθου σχήματι καταλειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον ὅτι θεοὶ τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρήσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις. "Ὡν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοὺς φόντο τὰς πρῶτας

οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν εἰρῆσθαι νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος πολλάκις ἐδρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισσεῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπῆριος δόξα καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανερά μόνον. Cf. *Pol.* ii. viii. 21, and Plato, *Politicus*, 270. *Laws*, 677 A: Τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγρονέναι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχὺ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος.

divine ground for all existence, proceeds now to develop it for himself, and in doing so, he lays down the following positions (*Metaphys.* XI. vi.—x.).

(1) It is necessary to conceive an eternal immutable existence, an actuality prior to all potentiality. According to this view, all notions of the world having sprung out of chaos must be abandoned. God is here represented as the eternal, unchangeable form of the whole, immaterial (*ἄνευ δυνάμεως*), and free from all relation to time.

(2) With this idea it is necessary to couple that of the source of motion, else we shall have merely a principle of immobility. We must therefore conceive of a ceaseless motion; this motion must be circular, no mere figure of philosophy,²⁷ but actually taking place. Thus the highest heaven with its revolutions must be looked on as eternal. In this we make a transition to the world of time and space. The succession of seasons and years flows everlastingly from the motion of the circumference of the heavens. It would seem as if we were thus attributing local and material conditions to the Deity himself, if we say that God moves the world by moving the circumference of the heaven. But here, again, Aristotle is saved from this conclusion by merging physical ideas into metaphysical. He says, ‘The mover²⁸ of all things moves them without being moved, being an eternal substance and actuality, and he moves all things in the following way:—the object of reason and of desire, though unmoved, is the cause of motion.’

(3) God has been thus represented as the cause of all things by being the object of contemplation and desire to nature and the world. In this doctrine, as before mentioned,

²⁷ Καὶ ἔστι τι αἰὲν κινούμενον κίνησιν ἑπανστον, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ κύκλω· καὶ τοῦτο

οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ' ἔργῳ δῆλον. XI.vii.1.

²⁸ See above, p. 172, note.

there is something unexplained; for to attribute thought and rational desire, as well as the power of motion, to nature, seems really to place the Deity in nature as a thinking subject, as well as outside nature in the form of the object of thought and wish. Aristotle, however, does not explicitly do so; in relation to nature he seems to represent God only as an object, and he now passes on to depict God in relation to Himself as a subject, as a personal being, possessing in Himself conscious²⁹ happiness of the most exalted kind, such as we can frame but an indistinct notion of, by the analogy of our own highest and most blessed moods. This happiness is everlasting, and God 'has or rather is' continuous and eternal life and duration.³⁰

(4) Aristotle next reverts to the impersonal view of God, and asks whether these principles are one or manifold? Whether there be one highest heaven or more than one? He concludes that there can be one only, for multitude implies matter, and the highest idea or form of the world must be absolutely immaterial.³¹

(5) But again, figuring to ourselves God as thought; on what does that thought think? Thought thinking upon nothing is a contradiction in terms; thought with an external object is determined by that object. But God as the supremest and best cannot be altered or determined by an external object. With God, object and subject are one; the thought of God is the thinking upon thought.³²

(6) Lastly, how is the supreme good of the world to be

²⁹ See above, p. 194, note.

³⁰ *Metaphys.* XI. vii. 9. Καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδῖος· φαμέν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον αἰδῖον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἶων συνεχὴς καὶ

αἰδῖος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ. τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

³¹ *Metaphys.* XI. viii. 13. Τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὅλην τὸ πρῶτον· ἐντελέχεια γάρ.

³² *Metaphys.* XI. ix. 4. Αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον· καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.

represented—whether as existing apart from the world, like the general of an army, or as inherent in the world, like the discipline of an army?³³ In other words, are we to hold that the Deity is immanent or transcendent? Aristotle gives no direct answer to this question; but seems to say that God must be conceived of both ways, just as the army implies both discipline and general, and the discipline is for the sake of the general. In these speculations we see an attempt made by Aristotle to approach from various sides the metaphysical aspect of the existence of the Deity. All metaphysical views of God are entirely foreign to most minds. The profound difficulty of them may be appreciated, if we set before ourselves this question, for instance, If the Deity be immaterial, how can He act upon a material universe? Aristotle does not appear to make any endeavour to obtain a complete view, or to reconcile the contradictions between his different statements,—between the impersonal view of God as the chief good and object of desire to the world, and the personal view of Him as a thinking subject. He acknowledges these two sides to the conception, ‘the discipline in the army’ and ‘the general ruling the army,’ but does not attempt to bring them together.

In the *Ethics* there are several popular and exoteric allusions to ‘the gods,’ as, for instance, that ‘It would be absurd to praise the gods’ (I. xii. 3); ‘The gods and one’s parents one cannot fully requite, one must honour them as much as possible’ (IX. ii. 8), &c. There are also some traces of Aristotle’s thoughts as a metaphysician; for instance, he speaks of ‘the good under the category substance’ being ‘God and

³³ *Metaphys.* XI. x. 1. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κενωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στρα-

τευμα. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν.

reason' (I. vi. 3). And he gives an elaborate argument (x. viii. 7) to demonstrate that speculative thought and the exercise of the philosophic consciousness is the only human quality that can be attributed to the Deity. In this argument it is observable that he first begins by speaking of 'the gods,' saying, 'We conceive of the gods as especially blessed and happy. What actions can we attribute to them? whether those of justice? but it would be absurd to think of their buying and selling,' &c. He then argues that 'If life be assigned to them, and all action, and still more, all production, be taken away, what remains but speculation?' And he concludes, 'The life of God then, far exceeding in blessedness, can be nothing else than a life of contemplation.' Thus he reverts to a monotheistic form of speaking, though he says again afterwards, 'The gods have all their life happy, man's life is so, in as far as it has some resemblance to the divine consciousness of thought.' This passage then contains a sort of transition from exoteric to philosophical views. Aristotle attributes to 'the gods' that same mode of existence, which in his own metaphysical system he attributed to God, according to the deepest conception that he had formed of Him.³⁴ It is true, however, that in assigning speculative thought to the Deity, there is no mention made of the distinction which exists between the thought of the philosopher where object is distinct from subject, and the thought of God in which subject and object are one.

The passage to which we are referring in the *Ethics* contains not only a positive assertion with regard to the nature of God, but also a negative one. It asserts that all moral virtue is unworthy of being attributed to God. This, as we

³⁴ The same point of view is maintained in the Eudemian Book, vii. xiv. 8. 'Hence God enjoys ever one and

the same pleasure; that is, the deep consciousness of immutability.'

have before noticed (see above, p. 164), was a total departure from the view of Plato. Still more opposed is this view of Aristotle's to modern ideas. We feel that however great may be the metaphysical problems about the nature of God, the deepest conception of Him that we can attain to is a moral one. In this respect there is not only a great weakness in Aristotle's 'Theology,' that it is so exclusively metaphysical, but also his ethical system suffers from this depression of all that we should call morality below philosophical speculation. This is one of the points which will most strikingly remind us that we are reading a Greek treatise of the 4th century B.C. It appears to be connected with the tendency in Aristotle before mentioned, to consider human actions as slight and insignificant. By his doctrine of the moral *τέλος*, this tendency was in some degree counteracted; but it still remained, and it breaks out prominently in the passage just quoted.

There are yet two other passages in the *Ethics* where theological considerations are entertained. These are both connected with the question of a divine providence for and care of men. The first is where it is asked (*Eth.* i. ix. 1) whether happiness comes by divine allotment (*κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν*) or by human means. The second is where the philosopher is spoken of (x. viii. 13) as being most under the favour of God (*θεοφιλέστατος*). With regard to Aristotle's general views of the question of providence, it is often argued that he must have denied its existence, inasmuch as he attributes no objective thought to God. But Aristotle does not himself argue this way; when the question comes before him, he does not appeal to his own *à priori* principle, and pronounce contrary to the general belief—rather he declines to pronounce at all. In the former of the two passages mentioned, he says, 'One would suppose that if anything were

the gift of God to men, happiness would be so, as it is the best of human things. But the question belongs to another science. Happiness, if not sent by God, but acquired by human means, seems at all events something divine and blessed.' The latter part of this argument partly seems to be a setting-aside of the question, partly to be a sort of reconciliation of the existence of a providence (*θεῖόν τι*) with the law of cause and effect. In the second passage Aristotle repeats from Plato the assertion that the philosopher is under the favour of heaven (*θεοφιλέστατος*). He says, 'If there is any care of human things by the gods, as there is thought to be (*ὥσπερ δοκεῖ*), we may conclude that they take pleasure in the highest and best thing, reason, which is most akin to themselves, and do good to those who cherish and honour it.' In these words there may possibly be an esoteric sense, meaning that the philosopher in the exercise of his thought realizes something divine. Aristotle may imply that the popular doctrine of providence admits a deeper explanation, but he by no means here or elsewhere denies it. Nor can we presume to tell what Aristotle would include in his conception of the subject-object thought of God. As we saw before, he is not explicit as to the relation of God to nature, neither is he as to the relation of God to man.

If we ask now, What were Aristotle's opinions as to the nature of the human soul, as far as they influenced his Ethics? we are met at once by a difficulty. For the Aristotelian word *ψυχή* does not exactly correspond with our word soul. It implies both more and less. More, as having on one side, at all events, a directly physical connexion; less, as not in itself implying any religious associations.

We cannot translate *ψυχή* 'vital principle,' because though it is this, it is also a great deal beside; nor 'mind,' because this would leave out as much at the one end as the former

translation did at the other. In short, we cannot *translate* *ψυχή* at all, we can only see what Aristotle meant by it. He meant (advancing, as he shows us, upon the more or less indistinct views of his predecessors)—he meant in the first place to conceive of the *ψυχή* as a vital principle manifesting itself³⁵ in an ascending scale through vegetable, animal, and human life. To this scale of life Aristotle appeals in the *Ethics* (I. vii. 10–12). He there argues that man must have some proper function. ‘This cannot be mere life in its lowest form, *i.e.* vegetable; nor again merely sensational, *i.e.* animal, life; there remains therefore the moral and rational life.’ From this point of view man is regarded as part of the chain of nature. Aristotle doubts, but on the whole concludes, that the *ψυχή* is the proper subject of physical science.³⁶ This he justifies by the fact³⁷ that the psychical phenomena, anger, desire, and the like, are inseparable from the body, and from material conditions. Reason itself, if dependent on conceptions derived from the sense (*μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας*), will fall under the same head. Following out this direction of thought, Aristotle defines the *ψυχή* to be ‘The³⁸ simplest actuality of a physical body, which potentially possesses life, that is, of an organic body.’ Of the meaning of the word *ἐντελέχεια*, used here, we have spoken above (see p. 184); the whole of this definition we see accords with Aristotle’s physical philosophy in general, which conceived great and beautiful results coming out of physical conditions, not by any mechanical system of causation, rather that these ends necessitated the means; the whole was prior to and necessitated

³⁵ *De Animâ*, II. iv. 2.

³⁶ *De Animâ*, I. i. 18.

³⁷ *De Animâ*, I. i. 11. φαίνεται δὲ τῶν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρβέειν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι.

Cf. I. i. 15. τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἐνυλοὶ εἰσιν.

³⁸ *De Animâ*, II. i. 6. Διὸ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζῶνι ἔχοντος. Τοιοῦτο δέ, δ’ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν.

the parts. The *ψυχή*, says Aristotle, is to the body as form to matter,³⁹ as the impression to the wax, as sight to the eye. It is the essential idea of the body (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδὶ σώματι). It is as the master⁴⁰ to the slave, as the artist to the instrument. It is the efficient, the final, and the formal cause of the body. It is impossible to treat of the *ψυχή* without taking account of the body; 'as to the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls, they might as well speak of the carpenter's art clothing itself in flutes. For a soul⁴¹ can no more clothe itself in a foreign body, than an art can employ the instruments of some foreign art.' While maintaining this close connexion between the *ψυχή* and the body, as between end and means, Aristotle was kept aloof by the whole tenour of his philosophy from anything like materialism. He sums up this part of his reasonings in the following words—'That the *ψυχή*, therefore, is inseparable from the body is clear, or at all events some of its parts, if it be divisible. Nothing,⁴² however, hinders that some of its parts may be separable from the body, as not being actualities of the body at all. Moreover, it is not certain whether the *ψυχή* be not the actuality of the body in the same way that the sailor is of the boat.'

Here then is the point at which the interest in Aristotle's conception of the *ψυχή* begins for us. As long as the soul is described as bearing the relation to the body of sight to the eye, of a flower to the seed, of the impression to the wax, we may be content to consider this a piece of ancient physical philosophy. Our interest is different when the soul is said to

³⁹ *De Animâ*, II. i. 7.

⁴⁰ *Eth.* VIII. xi. 6.

⁴¹ *De Animâ*, I. iii. 26. Παραπλήσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις,

τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι.

⁴² *De Animâ*, II. i. 12. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνὶ γὰρ οὐθέν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας. Ἔτι δὲ ἀδελον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἢ ψυχῇ ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου.

be related to the body, 'as a sailor to his boat.' But here is the point also where Aristotle becomes less explicit. Having once mooted this comparison, he does not follow it up. The only further intimations of his opinion that he affords us are to be found in the places where he speaks of 'those parts of the ψυχή which are not actualities of the body at all.' A striking notice on this subject is to be found in his treatise *De Generatione Animalium*⁴³ (II. iii. 10), where he argues that 'The reason alone enters in from without, and is alone divine; for the realization of the bodily conditions contributes nothing to the realization of its existence.' We have had before a contradictory point of view to this, in the saying that 'Reason may be looked on as dependent on conceptions derived from the senses,' which is also elsewhere repeated. But this contradiction is reconciled in Aristotle's account of the two modes of reason, the receptive or passive (νοῦς παθητικός), and the creative or active (νοῦς ποιητικός). 'These two modes, he says, it is necessary should be opposed to each other, as matter is opposed everywhere to form, and to all that gives the form. The receptive reason,⁴⁴ which is as matter, becomes all things by receiving their forms. The creative reason gives existence to all things, as light calls colour into being. The creative reason transcends the body, being capable of separation from it, and from all things; it is an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with

⁴³ Λέγεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισεῖναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια.

⁴⁴ *De An.* III. γ. 2. Καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξιν τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. Καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς

καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμικτὴς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνεργεία.—'Ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν (ἐπιστήμη) χρόνον προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐ χρόνον· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. Χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδῖον· οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

matter, or affected by it; prior and subsequent to the individual mind. The receptive reason is necessary to individual thought, but it is perishable, and by its decay all memory, and therefore individuality, is lost to the higher and immortal reason.'

In the *Ethics* this distinction between the creative and the receptive reason (which, were this the place for it, might be made the subject of much discussion) is not kept up. The reason is there spoken of in its entirety, as containing in itself the synthesis of the two opposite modes. It is spoken of as constituting in the deepest sense the personality of the individual.⁴⁵ On the other hand, it is spoken of as something divine, and akin to the nature of God.⁴⁶ The evocation of this into consciousness constitutes what Aristotle calls 'the divine' in happiness; it gives us, according to him, a momentary glimpse of the ever-blessed life of God.

If we were to follow out logically the consequences of the above-mentioned doctrine of the two modes of the reason, we should come to the conclusion that, while Aristotle held the eternity of the universal reason, it would be impossible for him to hold what is really meant by the immortality of the soul. For the only immortal part in us is one which is impersonal, bearing the same relation to individuality as light to colours, being incapable of even receiving any impressions. But we do not find in Aristotle anything like such a logical application of the doctrine. Aristotle still leaves on record the saying, 'It is hard to pronounce whether the soul be not related to the body as a sailor is to his boat.' While he thus avoids dogmatism, he seems to decline entering on the question. Though the treatise *De Anímâ* is incomplete, yet we may well be surprised that it neither touches, nor shows any

⁴⁵ *Eth.* ix. iv. 4, x. vii. 9.

⁴⁶ *Eth.* x. viii. 13.

indication of an intention to touch, upon Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul. With Plato the grounds of this doctrine were in the last resort moral; they amounted to a kind of faith. With this sort of grounds Aristotle does not seem to consider it his province to deal. In the *Ethics*, while there is no direct contradiction of the doctrine, yet the whole system of morals is one that is irrespective of the doctrine, and uninfluenced by it. Aristotle's discussion of the gnome of Solon (*Eth.* I. x.) exhibits some remarkable peculiarities. He first asks, 'Can Solon have meant by this that "a man is happy when he has died?"' and replies, 'This would be utterly absurd, especially since we consider happiness to be an actuality.' The assertion here is merely summary and dogmatic, where there might have been an elaborate argument. For does it follow that the *ἐνέργεια* which constitutes happiness is so entirely dependent on the body as not possibly to exist without it? How, if the sailor at death were to step out of his boat? Again, according to Aristotle's own view, the higher reason is an immortal *ἐνέργεια*,—What is the relation of this to personality and happiness? Aristotle further on is led to revert again to the state after death, and to ask is one safe after death from the influence of the vicissitudes of fortune. Allowing, as a concession to popular feeling, that the dead may be affected by the fortunes of the living, he argues that the effect on them must be at any rate so small as not really to influence their happiness or unhappiness, and he reminds us, in conclusion,⁴⁷ of the extreme doubtfulness as to whether the dead do share at all in the interests of this world. Aristotle, while conceding for a moment the popular point of view, pictures the dead as shadowy existences, just as if in some Homeric Hades. There is evidently no philosophic

⁴⁷ *Eth.* I. xi. 4; see notes on this passage.

earnestness about his mention of the subject, though he avoids all dogmatism and all ungracious expression of opinions. Other notices in the *Ethics*, such as that 'Death seems the boundary of all things, with no good or evil beyond it' (*Eth.* III. vi. 6), are too slight and unscientific to bear upon the question. Nothing that Aristotle says of man's moral nature seems to have any connexion with the idea of a future life. His doctrine of the End-in-itself seems indeed rather to supersede such an idea; it does not contradict it, but rather absorbs all thought of time and space, of present and future in itself, as being the absolute.

Thus in his interesting picture of the death of the brave man (*Eth.* III. ix. 4), Aristotle represents him as consciously quitting a happy life—he does not represent him as buoyed up by the hope of future fame, or a reward in heaven,—but as attaining there and then to an End-in-itself. This ideal doctrine, which sets the mind above all circumstances, and even above death, constitutes a merit and a defect in the system of Aristotle. Its merit is the discernment of the absolute ideas of the inner consciousness. Its defect is, as we have before observed (see p. 165), that it is tinctured with philosophic pride; that it is a doctrine for the few and not for the many. Closely connected with his apparent limitation of morality to the present life is his opinion that 'Moral virtue is unworthy of being attributed to God.' This view gives to the moral system of Aristotle a restricted and even shallow appearance, as compared with Plato and with modern times.

ESSAY VI.



The Ancient Stoics.

DOWN to the time of Aristotle, Greek philosophy may be said to have lived apart. It contained within itself a gradual progress and culmination of thought, but the great philosophers who were the authors of this progress moved on a level far above the ordinary modes of comprehension. After the death of Aristotle, a new spectacle is presented,—philosophy no longer an exclusive and esoteric property of the schools, but spreading its results over the world. Speculation has really now ceased; the desire of knowledge purely for its own sake is gone. In the place of this we find other human needs pressing forward their claims. Perhaps we may best and most shortly express the change that at this period took place in the thought of mankind, by saying that the soul now, instead of the mind, sought for itself an explanation of the world. This change, of unspeakable importance, might be called the transition to modernism. Taking the Stoical doctrine as the most striking, the most earnest, and the most widely-spread exposition of the results of Grecian philosophy, we shall, if we study it attentively, find reason to assert that its authors, the early Stoics, were in some sense the beginners of the modern point of view. Fully to set this forth is not the work of a few sentences, but can only be accomplished by an examination of the law or idea of Stoicism, and by tracing this in its various phases throughout its history in the Greek and Roman world. Perhaps, as the conclusion of such a

review, we may be enabled to explain to ourselves why it is that in any modern book of morals, or even in any practical sermon, we are sure to come upon much that has a close affinity with the modes of thinking of the ancient Stoics, while with the modes of thinking of Plato and Aristotle we shall find no real affinity at all.

Stoicism took its rise after the loss of Grecian freedom, and yet not in times that were by any means dangerous or oppressive. It sprang up in the gardens and the porch of genial Athens, where Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus lived, as Plutarch¹ says, ‘as though they had eaten of the lotus, spell-bound on a foreign soil, enamoured of leisure, spending their long lives in books, and walks, and discourses.’ It was, then, no external pressure, but the internal impulse of the human spirit, that gave birth to this new principle. Down to the death of Aristotle we see philosophers carried out of themselves in dealing with great ideas. The subjective consciousness was lost and overpowered in physical or dialectical conceptions. The saying, ‘There are many things diviner than man,’² might be taken as a symbol of the views of the age. Even ethics were so mixed up and involved in politics—the individual was so much absorbed into the State—that the will and inner consciousness of man received as yet no adequate attention. But now we enter upon a new era. A new question gradually wins its way to the light,—namely, What is the position of the individual in the world? What is the nature and destiny of man as a moral being? And the true essence of Stoicism is, that it is an answer to this question. It may seem a paradox to assert that the problem of man’s moral nature came forward at so late a period of history as the end and aftermath of Greek philosophy. The

¹ *De Repugnantiis Stoicis*, c. ii.

| ² Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* vi. vii. 4.

highest degree of moral consciousness seems to us moderns so natural a state, the ideas of duty and responsibility are so engrained into our minds, the notion that the individual stands independent and related to God alone is so habitual, that the really late introduction of this condition of thought appears strange. But, in order to explain the fact, we must remember the child-like and unconscious spirit which characterised the Grecian mind, and its tendency to objective thought and the enjoyment of nature, rather than to self-reflection and subjective analysis. We must remember that the Greeks had no moral religion, and that their philosophy began with the universe as a whole, and only slowly worked its way back to the human mind. In short, if we wish to see thought, in which the moral consciousness of the individual, the moral *ego*, is, as it were, the centre and starting-point (as is the case, for instance, in the Psalms of David), we must look, not to the conversations of Socrates, nor to the dialogues of Plato, nor even to the ethics of Aristotle, but to the post-Aristotelian schools.

It was no sudden revolution in Greece that gave to the moral problem a paramount importance. Its entrance had been prepared, first, by the gradual progress of speculation, for it was on the basis of the results of physical, ethical, and psychological enquiries that Stoicism took its start; secondly, by the very decline of thought, which, as it fell away on the speculative side, left the moral side prominent. The new era, of which Stoicism is the beginning and the representative, was unheralded and unrecognized. Indeed, so little marked was its entry that Cicero³ wonders why Zeno should have founded a new school, since he was an innovator in words only, while essentially he agreed with the Peripatetics.

³ *De Fin.* iv. ii. 3; iv. xxvi. 72.

Again, the new attitude of thought does not seem to owe its origin to any remarkable force of genius. Rather we might say that Stoicism throughout its history, from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius, reckons no really great man, certainly no great genius, among its ranks, though it exhibits to us a series of more or less interesting personages, all of whom are characterized by a certain peculiar element. This peculiar element may be briefly expressed as intensity—a quality by which the early Stoics, as well as their successors, were strongly marked. Perhaps it may be not wholly fanciful to conceive that this quality, and the kind of thought that accompanied it, may have been in some degree attributable to the influence of race. At all events, if we cast our eyes on a list of the early Stoics and their native places, we cannot avoid noticing how many of this school appear to have come of an Eastern, and often of a Semitic stock. Zeno, their founder, was from Citium, in Cyprus, by all accounts of a Phœnician family. Of his disciples, Persæus came also from Citium; Herillus was from Carthage; Athenodorus⁴ from Tarsus; Cleanthes from Assos, in the Troad. The chief disciples of Cleanthes were Sphærus of the Bosphorus; and Chrysippus, from Soli, in Cilicia. Chrysippus was succeeded by Zeno of Sidon, and Diogenes of Babylon; the latter taught Antipater of Tarsus, who taught Panætius of Rhodes, who taught Posidonius of Apamea, in Syria. There was another Athenodorus, from Cana, in Cilicia; and the early Stoic Archedemus is mentioned by Cicero as belonging to Tarsus. When we notice the frequent connexion of Cilicia with this list of names, we may well be reminded of one who was born at Tarsus, in Cilicia, a citizen of no

⁴ Placed here by Lipsius in his *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam* (Antwerp, 1604), I. x. But if this be

the same as Athenodorus Cordylion, he must have lived much later.

mean city ; and we may be led to ask, is there not something in the mental characteristics of the early Stoics analogous to his ?

The true character of Stoicism appears most prominently when it is placed in contrast with Epicurism, that rival system with which it stands in perpetual antithesis. If we ask on what does this antithesis rest ? we shall find that it rests on the twofold essence of man, as a thinking and as a feeling subject ; as consisting, on the one hand, of spirit, or free and self-determined thought ; and, on the other hand, of nature, or an existence determined by physical laws expressing themselves in the sensuous feelings and desires. These two sides of man's being may often stand in opposition to each other ; or again, they may be harmonized so as to give either the one side or the other the precedence and authority. Either we may say 'a thing is good because it is pleasant,' and thus refer the decision to the natural feelings ; or we may say 'it is pleasant because it is good,' and thus refer the decision to the inner spirit or reason. How far these two sentences actually express the leading principles of the Stoic and the Epicurean schools, we may best see by considering the ideal of man which they each proposed to themselves. The Epicurean ideal was a being moving harmoniously according to natural impulses ; one, in short, in whom the spirit and thought should rather form a part of the natural life than prominently control it. The Stoic ideal, on the contrary, was a being in whom the natural impulses and desires should be absolutely subjected to the laws of abstract thought. Epicurism is essentially Greek and essentially Pagan ; the beautiful and genial Greek mythology is but a deification of the natural powers and impulses. Stoicism is a reaction against this : it consists in an inner life, in a drawing away from the body, and in

disregarding as worthless and of no moment the 'law in the members.' Epicurism and Stoicism both received as an inheritance the results of Grecian speculation, Epicurus reproducing the Physics of Democritus, as Zeno did those of Heraclitus. In both, the moral attitude was what was essential. Of both it has been truly said that they were less and more than philosophy. Less, because they were thoroughly unspeculative in their character, and indeed consisted in the popularising of speculation; more, because they were not mere systems of knowledge, but a principle for the whole of life. They soon lost their local and restricted character as schools; they assimilated to themselves more and more broadly human thought, and thus became 'the two great confessions of faith of the historical world.'⁵ Thus were these two ideas set against each other. Regarding, however, Stoicism, with its weakness and its strength, as far the more interesting and important, as it is, of course, also far the higher tendency of the two, we shall henceforth, in tracing its history, only incidentally allude to the fortunes of its rival.

In the history of Stoicism, the following parts of the subject seem naturally to stand apart from each other, and to demand in some sort a separate treatment:—First, the period of the formation of the Stoical dogma, from Zeno to Chrysippus; second, the period of the promulgation of Stoicism and its introduction to the knowledge of the Romans; third, Stoicism in the Roman world, its different phases, and its influence on individual thought and on public manners and institutions. I. The first period of Stoicism takes us down to the year 207 B.C., which was the date of the death of Chrysippus. The chronology of the commence-

⁵ Dr. Braniss, *Uebersicht des Entwicklungsganges der Philosophie* (Breslau, 1842), p. 218, whence several points of this comparison are taken.

ment of this period is difficult to fix. Zeno probably lived till after the year 260 B.C., and he may have been born rather before 340 B.C. It is uncertain whether he came to Athens in his twenty-second or his thirtieth year. On the whole, we may assume that he did not arrive there till after the death of Aristotle, which took place in the year 322 B.C. Chrysippus may possibly in early youth have heard some of the discourses of Zeno; but Cleanthes, who succeeded Zeno as leader of the Porch, was the true link between them. By these three the Stoical doctrine, properly so called, received its completion. Nothing was afterwards added to it, except the eclectic amalgamation of other doctrines. These three personages come before us with great distinctness. The anecdotes that have been handed down about them, though perhaps in some cases mythical, are at all events highly symbolical, and give us a very definite conception of their separate characteristics. Zeno is described⁶ as a slight, withered little fellow, of a swarthy complexion, and with his neck on one side. The story goes, that in trading to Athens he was shipwrecked at the Piræus, and was thus 'cast on to the shores of philosophy.' Going up to the city, he sat down at the stall of a bookseller, where he read the second book of the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, and asked with enthusiasm 'where such men lived?' Crates, the Cynic, happened to be passing at the moment, and the bookseller cried 'Follow him.' Zeno then studied under Crates, but held himself aloof from the extravagant unseemliness of Cynicism. He is also said to have studied under the Megarians, Stilpo, Cronus, and Philo, and under the Academicians, Xenocrates and Polemo. After twenty years, he opened his school in the Stoa Pœcile, the porch adorned with the frescoes of Polygnotus.

⁶ Diog. Laert. vii. i. 1.

Zeno appears to have impressed the Athenians with the highest admiration for his character. Their treatment of him was a contrast to their treatment of Socrates. It is perhaps an apocryphal tradition which relates that they deposited the keys of their citadel with him, as being the most trustworthy person; but it may be true that they decreed to him a golden crown, a brazen statue, and a public entombment. In extreme old age he committed suicide. Cleanthes, the disciple of Zeno, was perhaps the most zealous disciple that a philosopher ever had. He is said to have been originally a boxer, and to have come to Athens with four drachmas in his possession. By his strength, his endurance, and his laborious life, he acquired the name of 'the New Hercules.' 'Falling in with Zeno,'⁷ it is said, 'he took to philosophy most bravely.' He wrote notes of his master's lectures on potsherds and the bladebones of oxen, not being able to afford to purchase paper. He was summoned before the Areopagus to give an account of his way of living, since his whole days were passed in philosophy, and he had no ostensible calling nor means of support. He proved to his judges that he drew water by night for a gardener, and ground the corn for a flour-dealer, and thus earned a maintenance. The story goes on that his judges, on hearing this account, voted him ten minæ, which the rigid Zeno forbade him to accept. There is something quaint about the whole personality of Cleanthes. He was nicknamed 'the Ass,' for his stubborn patience. He seems to have left the impression that it was this indomitable perseverance, rather than the superiority of his genius, that gave him precedence over other noteworthy disciples of Zeno. 'High thinking,' however, appears to have accompanied the 'plain living' of

⁷ Diogenes Laertius, vii. v. 1.

Cleanthes. His reflections on Destiny, and his *Hymn to Jupiter*, will best be treated of hereafter. When asked,⁸ ‘What is the best way to be rich?’ he answered, ‘To be poor in desires.’ No reproaches or ridicule ever ruffled the sweetness and dignity of his presence. His calm bearing, when satirized on the stage by the comic poet Sositheus, caused the spectators to applaud him and to hiss off Sositheus. The idea of death seems to have been long present to his mind. Being taunted with his old age, he said, ‘Yes, I am willing to be gone, but when I see myself sound in every part, writing and reading, I am again tempted to linger.’ The story of his death is characteristic. Having suffered from an ulcer on the tongue, he was advised by his physician to abstain from eating for a while in order to facilitate the cure. Having fasted for two days he was completely cured, and his physician bade him return to his usual course of life, but he said that ‘Since he had got so far on the road, it would be a pity not to finish the journey;’ so continuing his abstinence, he died.

Hardly any personal details of the life of Chrysippus have come to us. On the other hand, we have more fragments of his actual writings than of those of all the early Stoics put together. In Chrysippus the man seems swallowed up in the writer and disputer. He is said⁹ to have been slight in person, so that his statue in the Cerameicus was totally eclipsed by a neighbouring equestrian figure, and from this circumstance Carneades nicknamed him Crypsippus. His literary activity was almost unrivalled: he wrote above seven hundred and five works on different subjects. Epicurus alone, of the ancient philosophers, outstripped him in voluminousness of writing. He is said to have been keen and

⁸ Stobæus, *Florileg.* xciv. 31.

| ⁹ Diogenes Laertius, vii. vii. 4.

able on every sort of subject. He told Cleanthes that he 'only wanted the doctrines and he would soon find out the proofs.' This boast appears to betray a want of earnestness as to the truth, and somewhat too much of the spirit of a dialectician. In this respect Chrysippus must have differed widely from his two distinguished predecessors, with whom Stoicism was above all things a reality and a mode of life. However, there is no doubt that Chrysippus did great service to the Stoic school by embodying their doctrines and stating them in manifold different ways. Hence the saying, 'But for Chrysippus, the Porch would never have been.' He developed Stoicism on its negative and antagonistic side by arguing with trenchant dialectic against Epicurus and the Academy. We shall see that he really mooted and boldly strove to reconcile some of the deepest and most difficult contradictions of human thought—difficulties which are ever present in modern metaphysics, but which had never truly occupied the ancients before the death of Aristotle. We know most about Chrysippus from Plutarch's book *On the Inconsistencies of the Stoics*. It consists really of the inconsistencies of Chrysippus, extracted from various parts of his voluminous writings. This interesting book gives the impression that Plutarch is unphilosophical, though we are not able to exonerate Chrysippus from inconsistency. Such rapid and extensive writing, such a warm spirit of advocacy, such an attempt to round off and complete a doctrine in spite of all difficulties, such a various controversialism, such an elevated theory, paradoxical even in the grandeur of its aims, combined, on the other hand, with an extremely practical point of view,—could not fail to give rise to manifold inconsistencies. Chrysippus was inconsistent, just as Seneca afterwards was inconsistent, because it suited the genius of Stoicism to abandon the stern simplicity and unity of a

scientific principle. Stoicism became learned, complex, and eclectic; embracing in its grasp a far greater variety of problems than the philosophy of Plato or Aristotle had done, it treated these more loosely, and often oscillated between mere empiricism and an ideal point of view.

Taking now the Stoical doctrine as it gradually formed itself during the entire course of the third century B.C., we may proceed to trace its essential features, though in the lack of direct writings¹⁰ of the successive masters of the school we must give up attempting to fix their several contributions, and their differences from each other. Early Stoicism consisted of two elements—the one might be called dynamical: it was the peculiar spirit, tendency, and mental attitude assumed; the other element was material, being an adaptation of the results of existing philosophy. The material side of Stoicism was comparatively unimportant. This it was, however, which caused Cicero to make the mistaken observation that Zeno was no real innovator, but only a reproducer of the Peripatetic doctrines. And indeed it is sufficiently striking at first sight of the Stoical compendia, that their ethic seems a patchwork of Peripatetic and Platonic formulæ; their logic, a development of the doctrine of the syllogism; and their physic, a blending of Heraclitus with Aristotle. Yet, in spite of all this, Zeno was no mere eclectic; all that was Peripatetic in his system was the outward, and not the inner and essential part. And in short, the vestiges of previous Greek philosophy existing in

¹⁰ No fragment even, of any length, belonging to the early Stoics, has come down to us, except the hymn of Cleanthes. Our main sources of information with regard to them are Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, and Stobæus. We have the

reflection of their doctrine in the writings of the Roman Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius; and numberless scattered allusions to them in the later literature of antiquity may be easily combined into a complete and tolerably certain view.

Stoical books may be said, *mutatis mutandis*, to bear the same relation to Stoicism as the vestiges of Jewish and of Alexandrian ideas existing in the New Testament bear to Christianity. What we have called the dynamical element of Stoicism constitutes its real essence. This it derived partly from the idiosyncrasy and perhaps the national characteristics of its founder, partly from the peculiarities of the Cynical school in which it was nurtured.

Zeno agreed with Crates, and Stoicism coincides with the Cynic view thus far, that it makes the starting-point of all thought to be the conception of a life. The setting of this moral and practical conception above all speculative philosophy separates Zeno from the previous schools of Greece. We have now to ask, What is it that distinguishes him from Crates?—what is the essential difference between the Stoic and the Cynic creeds? This is generally stated as if the former were merely a softened edition of the latter. The Cynic said, ‘There is nothing good but virtue; all else is absolutely indifferent.’ The Stoic said, ‘Yes, but among indifferent things some are preferable¹¹ to others: health, though not an absolute good, is, on the whole, preferable to sickness; and this, though not an evil, is, on the whole, to be avoided.’ Again, it is said that Cynicism is unseemly and brutal, and tramples upon society; Stoicism is more gentle, and outwardly conforms with the world. But this comparison does not go sufficiently deep, and does not explain the facts of the case, for the Stoics were often as paradoxical as the Cynics in denying that anything was a good besides virtue; and if they were outwardly less ferocious, we want to

¹¹ This was the famous Stoical distinction between things *προηγμένα* and *ἀποπροηγμένα*; see Diog. Laert. vii. i. 61. It was a compromise between the

paradox that ‘nothing is good but virtue,’ and the practical facts of life. Stoicism is forced to be full of such compromises.

know what was the inward law of their doctrine that made them so. Perhaps we nearest touch the spring of difference, by observing that Cynicism is essentially mere negation, mere protest against the external world; while Stoicism is essentially positive, essentially constructive, and tends in many ways to leaven the external world. Cynicism despised the sciences, disdained politics, exploded the social institutions, and ridiculed patriotism or the distinctions of country. Zeno, on the contrary, re-arranged the sciences according to his views: he enjoined the wise to mix in affairs; and he conceived not a mere negation of patriotic prejudices, but the positive idea of cosmopolitanism. Cynicism, therefore, is a withdrawal from the world into blank isolation, while Stoicism is the withdrawal into an inner life, which forms to its votaries an object of the highest enthusiasm. Hence the elation, often hyperbolic, which tinges the Stoical austerity; hence the attractiveness of the doctrine and its spread over the world. And connected, too, with the positive and constructive impulse of Stoicism, we may reckon its plastic character, its external eclecticism, and its tendency to be influenced and modified by the course of surrounding civilization.

Lists have been preserved¹² for us by the ancients of the different formulæ in which the Stoical masters expressed the leading principle of life. They are all modifications of the same idea, that 'the end for man is to live according to nature.' Nature here means that which is universal—the entire course of the world, as opposed to individual and special ideas and impulses. Until we remember this interpretation, the Stoical formula appears surprising; for how

¹² Stobæus, *Ecl.* ii. 134; Clemens Alexandrinus, *Strom.* ii.; Diog. Laert. vii. i. 53.

could *they* enjoin life according to nature, whose whole endeavour was to be superior to nature—to overcome and subdue desire, sorrow, pain, the fear of death, and all that in another sense we are accustomed to call the natural instincts? If ‘nature’ were taken to mean the involuntary and immediate impulses, then the phrase ‘follow nature’ would express not the Stoical, but the Epicurean, principle. The Stoical ‘nature’ was the conception of an abstract and universal order, and was to be apprehended by the discursive Reason. This clear-sightedness and authority of the Reason is, of course, only slowly arrived at, and the Stoics explained their theory by saying that ‘all our duties come from nature, and wisdom among the number. But as when a man is introduced to anyone, he often thinks more of the person to whom he is introduced than of him who gave the introduction,—so we need not wonder that, while it was the instinctive impulses of nature that led us to wisdom, we hold wisdom more dear than those impulses by which we arrived at her.’¹³ In order to avoid seeming to approximate to the Epicureans, they denied that pleasure and pain are among the principles of nature. In short, starting from nature, the Stoics came round utterly to supplant nature (in the usual sense), and to substitute in her room pure thought and abstract ideas.

The phrase ‘follow nature,’ to express the highest kind of life, has never yet established itself in language. ‘One touch of nature makes the whole world kin’—that is, any perfectly simple and instinctive feeling, the very opposite of anything abstract or cultivated. Again, the ‘natural man,’ as opposed to the ‘spiritual man,’ denotes something utterly different from the Stoical idea of perfection. Thus, common parlance

¹³ Cicero, *De Fin.* III. vii. 23.

retains its own associations connected with the term nature, and rejects those of the Stoics. But it is interesting to observe that Bishop Butler has espoused their formula, and has argued that 'nature' does not mean single impulses or desires, but the idea of the constitution of the whole, reason and conscience as regulative principles being taken into consideration. Butler's object in maintaining this position was obviously one relative to his own times. As in appealing to a selfish age he thought it necessary to assert that virtue was not inconsistent with the truest self-love, so also he argued that virtue was not against nature, but in reality man's natural state. He here takes up, just like the Stoics, an abstract ideal of nature; for he makes the basis of his reasoning a proviso that the moral rules of conscience not only exist, but that they have authority—that is, that they control, as they *ought* to do, the rest of the human principles. Into the difficulties of the question Butler has not entered. For instance, while he is perfectly successful in establishing against the Hobbists the reality of the moral elements in man's nature, he does not tell us whether or not he would agree with the Stoics in ultimately giving the entire supremacy to man's reason and conscience, so as to supplant the other instincts, or at what point he would stop. Again, we would ask him to define more accurately his idea of 'life according to nature.' Is the life of the saints and martyrs to be called a life according to nature? If not, is it better or worse? and if better, is not man to aim at the better? The whole question is not one of mere words, but implying the discussion of a very important subject—namely, the way in which life is to be conceived. There is one mode of representation which describes life as a progress, a conflict, a good fight; another which makes it the following of nature. On the one hand, there is the spirit of aspiration and effort, the

tendency to asceticism, the victory of the will; on the other hand, there are the genial, kindly, human feelings, there is the 'wise passivity' of mind, and there is the breadth of sympathy which counterbalances an over-concentrated intensity of aim. To make the formula 'life according to nature' of any value, we require to have these contradictory tendencies harmonized with each other. We should then see whether the term 'nature' is at all capable of expressing the highest kind of life, or whether we must continue to think that this is something rather above 'nature' (as it exists in man) than a following of nature. We should see how far it is really possible to conceive a harmony, without the suppression of either, not only between the 'law of the members' and the 'law of the spirit,' but also between the inner life and the interests and enjoyments of the external world.

The commonest ideal of virtue according to nature is the picture of mankind in a state of innocence, whether the scene be laid in some far-off island, or remote in point of time, in the golden age of the world. To imagine a primitive and pastoral existence, in which every impulse is virtuous and every impulse is to be obeyed,—this is an easy reaction from a vitiated and over-refined civilization. Some have supposed that the Stoics made this ideal of uncorrupted nature part of their views; but in reality it would not suit the genius of Stoicism to do so. Though they railed at the actual state of the world, their remedy was placed rather in the power of the will, in the effort to progress, than in dreams of a bygone state of innocence. The only allusion which we can trace in their fragments to this conception is a saying of the later Stoic, Posidonius, that 'in the golden age the government was in the hands of the philosophers.'¹⁴ The context, how-

¹⁴ Seneca, *Ep.* xc.

ever, of this remark, makes it appear rather as a rhetorical praise of philosophy than as a serious piece of doctrine. Seneca, in one of whose epistles it is quoted, comments upon it in an interesting manner. After echoing for a while the strain of Virgil, and praising those times of innocence 'before the reign of Jupiter,' when men slept free and undisturbed under the canopy of heaven, he returns to the true Stoical point of view, and asserts that in those primitive times there was, in fact, no wisdom. If men did wise things, they did them unconsciously. They had not even virtue; neither justice, nor prudence, nor temperance, nor fortitude. It is a profound truth that Seneca perceives—namely, that the mind and the will evoked into consciousness and perfected even by suffering, are greater possessions than the blessings, if they were attainable, of a so-called golden age and state of nature.

The Stoical principle of 'life according to nature' would have been, like Bishop Butler's, a blank formula, were it not for the further exposition of their doctrine which they have left us in their ideal of the Wise Man. This ideal exhibits not the pursuit of wisdom for its own sake—not the excellence of philosophy in and for itself, as Plato and Aristotle used to conceive it, but rather the results of wisdom in the will and character,—results which Zeno summed up in the terms an 'even flow of life.'¹⁵ The notion that equanimity is the most essential characteristic of a philosopher is perhaps traceable to this conception of the Stoics; according to whom the Wise Man is infallible, impassive, and invulnerable.¹⁶ And while possessing this external immunity from harm, he is in himself full of divine inspirations—he is alone free, alone king and priest, alone capable of friendship or affection.

¹⁵ Εὔροια τοῦ βίου. Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 138.

¹⁶ Diog. Laert. vii. i. 64.

These and other splendid and exclusive attributes did the Stoics attach to their imaginary sage, till Chrysippus, becoming conscious in one place¹⁷ of the paradoxical character of the picture, allows that he 'may seem, through the pre-eminent greatness and beauty of his descriptions, to be giving utterance to mere fictions, things transcending man and human nature.' At the Stoical paradox Horace laughed. Plutarch wrote a book (now lost, but of which the outlines remain) to prove that it surpassed the wildest imaginations of the poets. But in truth 'the curtain was the picture;' the paradox was an essential part of the doctrine. For of necessity these pictures of the inner life are paradoxical. They speak of a boundless freedom and elevation, with which the narrow limits of external reality come into harsh contrast. And in the vaunts of the Stoics we only see what is analogous to one side of Lord Bacon's famous 'character of a believing Christian, drawn out in paradoxes and seeming contradictions.' 'He is rich in poverty, and poor in the midst of riches; he believes himself to be a king, how mean soever he be; and how great soever he be, yet he thinks himself not too good to be servant to the poorest saint.'

Some of the qualities of the Stoic ideal seem inferior to the conception of goodness afterwards developed by the school. The Wise Man of Zeno was represented as stern and pitiless, and as never conceding pardon to any one. This forms a great contrast with the gentle and forgiving spirit of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Doubtless such harsher traits of the picture belonged to Cynicism, and were afterwards discarded during subsequent transmutations of the Stoical principle. More inward meaning is there in the saying, paradoxical as it might appear, that nothing the Wise

¹⁷ Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.* c. xv.

Man can do would be a crime. Cannibalism, and incest, and the most shocking things, are said to be indifferent to the sage. This, however, though stated so repulsively, can only have meant something resembling the principle that 'whatever is of faith is no sin.' The chief interest of the Stoical ideal consists in the parallel it affords at many points to different phases of religious feeling. One of these points is the tendency, more or less vaguely connecting itself with the Stoic doctrine, to divide all the world into the good and the bad, or, as they expressed it, into the wise and the fools—an idea evidently belonging to the inner life, and hard to bring into conformity with external facts. Entirely in the same direction, the Stoics said that short of virtue—in other words, short of the standard of perfection—all faults and vices were equal. Chrysippus, indeed, tried to soften down this assertion; but in its extreme form it only reminds us of certain sayings which have been heard in modern times, about the 'worthlessness of morality.' In the presence of a dazzling ideal of spiritual perfection, the minor distinctions of right and wrong seem to lose their meaning.

The Stoics, after portraying their Wise Man, were free to confess that such a character did not exist, and indeed never had existed. With small logical consistency, but with much human truth, while they allowed their assertions about the worthlessness of all except absolute wisdom to remain, and always held up this unattained and unattainable ideal, they admitted another conception to stand, though unacknowledged, beside it—namely, the conception of 'advance.'¹⁸ Zeno and the rest, though they did not claim to be wise, yet claimed to be 'advancing.' This notion of conscious moral progress and self-discipline is too familiar now for us easily

¹⁸ προκοπή, προκόπτειν (Diog. Laert. vii. i. 54). In Latin, *profectus*, *proficere* (Seneca, *Ep.* 71).

to believe that it was first introduced into Greece in the third century B.C. It may be said, indeed, to be contained implicitly in Aristotle's theory of 'habits;' but it is in reality the expression of a new and totally different spirit. By this spirit we shall find the later Stoics deeply penetrated. It constituted perhaps the most purely 'moral' notion of antiquity, as implying the deepest associations which are attached to the word 'moral.'

Another great idea, of which the introduction is generally attributed to the Stoics, is the idea of 'duty;' but on consideration we shall perceive that this, entirely conformable as it was with their point of view, was not all at once enunciated by them, but was only gradually developed in or by means of their philosophy. There were two correlative terms introduced by the early Stoics, signifying the 'suitable'¹⁹ and the 'right.' The 'right' could only be said of actions having perfect moral worth. The 'suitable' included all that fitted in harmoniously with the course of life—everything that could on good grounds be recommended or defended. This term, the 'suitable,' seems to fall short of the moral significance of what we mean by duty; and yet it is remarkable that this term became translated into Latin as *officium*, and thus really stands to our word 'duty' in the position of lineal antecedent. So much casuistical discussion took place upon what was, or was not, 'suitable,' that a train of associations became attached to the word, associations which were inherited by the Romans. Thus the idea of duty grew up, more belonging, perhaps, to the Roman than to the Greek

¹⁹ καθήκον and κατόρθωμα, Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 158. Cicero's *De Officiis* is taken, with but little alteration and addition, from the work of Panætius, περὶ τῶν καθήκόντων. Cicero complains that

Panætius gave no definition of his subject (*De Off.* i. ii. 7). Thus we see that the Greek Stoics had really no formula to express what we mean by duty.

elements in the Stoical spirit, fostered by a national sternness and a love of law, and ultimately borrowing its modes of expression from the formulæ of Roman jurisprudence.²⁰

The most prominent conception in the Stoical system being the effort to attain a perfect life in conformity with universal laws, we may now ask what forms the background to this picture? Aristotle and Plato would certainly have conceived to themselves a limited state, essentially Greek in character, the institutions of which should furnish sufficiently favourable conditions for the life of the Wise Man. But in the third century B.C. these restricted notions had become exploded. Zeno now imagined, what surpassed the *Republic* of Plato, a universal state, with one government and manner of life for all mankind. This admired polity,²¹ which Plutarch calls ‘a dream of philosophic statesmanship,’ and which, he rhetorically says, was realized by Alexander the Great, owed, no doubt, its origin to the influence upon men’s minds produced by the conquests of Alexander. This influence, partly depressing,—in so far as it diminished the sense of freedom, and robbed men of their healthy, keen, and personal interest in politics,—was also partly stimulating, since it unfolded a wider horizon, and the possibility of conceiving a universal state. Thus were the national and exclusive ideas of Greece, as afterwards of Rome, changed into cosmopolitanism. The first lesson of cosmopolitanism, that said, ‘there is no difference between Greeks and barbarians—the world is our city,’ must have seemed a mighty revelation. To say this was quite natural to Stoicism, which, drawing the mind away from

²⁰ For instance, the word ‘obligation’ is a Latin law term. The word ‘law’ itself is employed with a moral meaning, and on consideration it will be found that our notions of duty (‘what

is owing’) are intertwined inextricably with legal associations.

²¹ Plutarch, *De Alexandri Magni fortunâ aut virtute*, c. vi.

surrounding objects, bids it soar into the abstract and the universal. By denying the reality and the interest of national politics, the moral importance of the individual was immensely enhanced. Ethics were freed from all connexion with external institutions, and were joined in a new and close alliance to physics and theology.

The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics was a cosmopolitanism in the widest etymological sense, for they regarded not the inhabited earth alone, but the whole universe, as man's city. Undistracted by political ideas, they placed the individual in direct relation to the laws of the Cosmos. Hence Chrysippus said,²² that 'no ethical subject could be rightly approached except from the preconsideration of entire nature and the ordering of the whole.' Hence his regular preamble to every discussion of good, evil, ends, justice, marriage, education, and the like, was some exordium about Fate or Providence. So close and absolute a dependence of the individual upon the Divine First Cause was asserted by the Stoics, that their theological system reminds us, to some extent, of modern Calvinism, or of the doctrines of Spinoza. Body, they said, is the only substance. Nothing incorporeal could act upon what is corporeal, or *vice versâ*. The First Cause²³ of all is God, or Zeus—the universal reason, the world-spirit, which may also be represented as the primeval fire, just as the soul of man, which is an emanation from it, consists of a warm ether. God, by transformation of his own essence, makes the world. All things come forth from the bosom of God, and into it all things will again return, when by universal conflagration the world sinks into the divine fire, and God is

²² *Ap. Plutarch, De Repug. Stoicis*, c. ix.

²³ For the particulars of their physical and theological system, and the authorities which establish the various

parts of the doctrine, see Dr. Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. iii. This book contains the most complete and accurate account of the Stoics which has yet been written.

again left alone. The universe is a living and rational whole ; for how else could the human soul, which is but a part of that whole, be rational and conscious ? If the Cosmos be compared to an individual man, then Providence is like the spirit of a man. Thus all things are very good, being ordered and preordained by the divine reason. This reason is also destiny, which is defined to be²⁴ ‘the law according to which what has been, has been ; what is, is ; and what shall be, shall be.’ The round world hangs balanced in an infinite vacuum. It is made up of four elements—fire and air, which are active powers ; water and earth, which are passive materials. Within it are four classes of natural objects—inorganic substances, plants, animals, and rational beings. First and highest among rational beings are the sun and the stars and all the heavenly bodies, which, as Plato and Aristotle used to say, are conscious, reasonable, and blessed existences. These, indeed, are created gods, divine but not eternal. They will at last, like all things else, return into the unity of the primeval fire. Other gods, or rather other manifestations of the one divine principle, exist in the elements and the powers of nature, which, accordingly, are rightly worshipped by the people, and have received names expressive of their different attributes. Heroes, also, with divine qualities, are justly deified ; and the Wise Man is divine, since he bears a god within himself. In this city of Zeus, where all is holy, and earth and sky are full of gods, the individual man is but a part of the whole—only one expression of the universal law.

Abstractedly, the theology of the Stoics appears as a materialistic pantheism ; God is represented as a fire, and the world as a mode of God. But, practically, this aspect of the

²⁴ Plutarch, *De Placitis Philosophorum*, i. 28.

creed is softened by two feelings—by their strong sense, first, of the personality of God; and secondly, of the individuality of man. These feelings express themselves in the hymn of Cleanthes, the most devotional fragment²⁵ of Grecian antiquity. In this hymn, Zeus is addressed as highest of the gods, having many names, always omnipotent, leader of nature, and governing all things by law.

‘Thee,’ continues the poet, ‘it is lawful for all mortals to address. For²⁶ we are thy offspring, and alone of living creatures possess a voice which is the image of reason. Therefore, I will for ever sing thee and celebrate thy power. All this universe rolling round the earth obeys thee, and follows willingly at thy command. Such a minister hast thou in thy invincible hands, the two-edged, flaming, vivid thunderbolt. O King, most high, nothing is done without thee

²⁵ Preserved by Stobæus, *Ecl. Phys.* i. 30.

²⁶ Ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἔσμεν, ἡς μύμημα λαχόντες Μοῦνοι. It is difficult to believe that the first part of this line, and the hymn of Cleanthes in general, is not alluded to by St. Paul in his speech at Athens. It was after encountering certain philosophers of the Epicureans and of the Stoics that he ‘stood up in the midst of Mars’ Hill’ and addressed the multitude. While speaking to the mass of the Athenians, and making the popular superstition his starting-point, St. Paul appears also to appeal to the philosophic part of his audience, weaving in their ideas into his speech, and referring to their literature. Thus the cosmopolitan theory of the Stoics seems to be distinctly assumed, and both Aratus and Cleanthes may be comprehended under the terms ‘certain of your own poets.’ It is interesting, after reading the Stoical verses, to turn to the exact words of

St. Paul:—‘God, that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men’s hands as though he needed anything, seeing he giveth to all life and breath and all things, and hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation; that they should seek after the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him, though he be not far from every one of us. For in him we live and move and have our being, as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring.’ The saying that ‘God dwelleth not in temples made with hands’ agrees remarkably with the expressions of Zeno, ap. Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.* c. 2.

neither in heaven or on earth, nor in the sea, except what the wicked do in their foolishness. Thou makest order out of disorder, and what is worthless becomes precious in thy sight; for thou hast fitted together good and evil into one, and hast established one law that exists for ever. But the wicked fly from thy law, unhappy ones, and though they desire to possess what is good, yet they see not, neither do they hear, the universal law of God. If they would follow it with understanding, they might have a good life. But they go astray, each after his own devices—some vainly striving after reputation, others turning aside after gain excessively, others after riotous living and wantonness. Nay, but, O Zeus, giver of all things, who dwellest in dark clouds, and rulest over the thunder, deliver men from their foolishness. Scatter it from their souls, and grant them to obtain wisdom, for by wisdom thou dost rightly govern all things; that being honoured we may repay thee with honour, singing thy works without ceasing, as is right for us to do. For there is no greater thing than this, either for mortal men or for the gods, to sing rightly the universal law.'

In this interesting fragment we see, above all, a belief in the unity of God. This, Plato and Aristotle had most certainly arrived at. Even in the popular ideas it probably lay behind all polytheistic forms, as being a truth necessary to the mind. But Monotheism here, as in the early Hebrew Scriptures, is co-existent with a mention of other gods besides the one highest God. These are represented as inferior to Zeus, and singing his praises. The human soul is here depicted as deriving all happiness from wisdom and a knowledge of God. The knowledge of God and a devotional regard to Him are mentioned as needs of the human soul, though the knowledge spoken of appears partly under the aspect of an intuition into the universal and impersonal law.

When Cleanthes speaks of ‘repaying God with honour,’ we see a strong assertion of the worth of the individual. Heraclitus had said of old that ‘Zeus looks on the wisest man as we look on an ape.’ But now the feeling about these things was changed, and Chrysippus²⁷ even went so far as to say, that ‘the sage is not less useful to Zeus than Zeus is to the sage,’—a saying which is rendered less offensive by taking it partly in a metaphysical sense, to mean that the individual is as necessary to the universal law as *vice versâ*.

As strong an assertion as this would seem almost required to counterbalance the absorbing necessarian element in early Stoicism. At first it excites surprise that a system putting so great store on the moral will should on the other hand appear to annihilate it. If all proceeds by destiny, what scope is left for individual action, for self-discipline and moral advance? But we must leave this contradiction unresolved. Other systems with a profoundly moral bearing have also maintained the doctrine of necessity. And it was plainly the intention of the Stoics that the Wise Man, by raising himself to the consciousness of universal necessity, should become free, while all those who had not attained to this consciousness remained in bondage. ‘Lead me, Zeus, and thou Destiny,’²⁸ says Cleanthes, in another fragment, ‘whithersoever I am by you appointed. I will follow not reluctant; but even though I am unwilling through badness, I shall follow none the less.’ Yet still with the Stoics the individual element remained equally valid; the individual consciousness was the starting-point of their thought; and

²⁷ Plutarch, *Adversus Stoicos*, 33.

²⁸ ἄγου δέ μ' ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ἡ Πε-
ρωμένη,
ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος,

ὡς εἶπομαι γ' ἄοκνος· ἦν δὲ μὴ θέλω
κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἥττον εἶπομαι.
These verses are translated by Seneca.

hence the difficulty arose, as in modern times, how to reconcile the opposite ideas of individual freedom, and of a world absolutely predetermined by divine reason. To the task of this reconciliation Chrysippus devoted himself, and Cicero describes him as 'labouring painfully to explain how all things happen by Fate, and yet that there is something in ourselves.'²⁹ To effect this, he drew a distinction between 'predisposing' and 'determinant' causes, and said that only the 'predisposing' causes rested with Fate,³⁰ while the 'determinant' cause was always in the human will. This distinction will hardly bear much scrutiny. When Chrysippus was confronted with what philosophers called the 'lazy argument'³¹—namely, the very simple question, Why should I do anything, if all is fated? Why, for instance, should I send for the doctor, since, whether I do so or not, the question of my recovery is already fixed by fate?—to this he replied, It is perhaps as much fated that you should send for the doctor, as that you should get well; these things are 'confatal.' In other words, the fate of the Stoics was, of course, a rational fate, acting, not supernaturally, but by the whole chain of cause and effect. The reasonings of Chrysippus are interesting historically, as being the first attempt to meet some of the difficulties of the doctrine of human freedom; and much that he urges has been repeated in after-times. We have already seen the optimism of Cleanthes expressed in his hymn. He says on the one hand, that nothing is evil in the hands of God; God fits good and evil together into one frame. On the other hand, he says that 'God does all that is done in the world, except the wicked-

²⁹ Fragment of Cicero, *De Fato*, ap. Aul. Gell. vii. ii. 15.

³⁰ Plut. *De Repug. Stoic.* xlvii.: οὐκ αὐτοτελή τούτων αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ προκα-

ταρτικὴν μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν εἰμαρμένην.

³¹ ἀργὸς λόγος (Cicero, *De Fato*, xii.—xiii.).

ness.' Chrysippus, touching on the existence of evil and the afflictions which happen to good men, says that the existence of evil is necessary, as being the contrary to good ;³² without it, good could not exist. Again, that as in a large family a little waste must occur, so in the world there must be parts overlooked and neglected. Again, that the good are afflicted, not as a punishment, but ' according to another dispensation.' Again, that evil demons may preside over some parts of the world. These inconsistent arguments show a great advance in theology. The first is, perhaps, the most philosophical. It is taken from Heraclitus, according to whom all things exist by the unity of contradiction. Plutarch objects to this argument, that if good can only exist by implying evil, what will become of the good after the conflagration of the world, when Zeus is all in all? If evil is destroyed, then good will be destroyed also; an objection hard to answer from the point of view of Chrysippus.

The Stoics generally professed themselves on the side of the ' common notions.' They accepted the popular theology, in an allegorizing spirit, as being a slightly perverted expression of the truth. Though denying the marvellous and the supernatural, and being quite unable to attribute to God a meddling in the *minutiæ* of human affairs, they yet declared³³ for the reality of omens, oracles, and portents. They explained their belief by saying that there was no special revelation, but that certain signs were universally preordained to accompany certain events. The portent and the thing to be signified were ' confatal.' Thus the world was full of divine coincidences, if men could but discern them. We can well fancy that this theme would suit the subtle intellect of Chry-

³² Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.* xxxv.—
xxxvii.

³³ Cicero, *De Divinatione*, i. iii., &c.
—Seneca, *Quæst. Nat.* ii. 52.

sippus, who appears to have written two books on Divination, one on Oracles, and one on Dreams. But a difference on the subject afterwards arose in the school, and Panætius expressed his doubts as to the reality of divination. With regard to the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, the Stoics were opposed to the general belief. Chrysippus finds fault with Plato for having, in the person of Cephalus, adopted such a vulgar bugbear.³⁴ But they asserted the moral government of the world, saying that the good alone are happy, and that misfortunes happen to the wicked by Divine Providence. The Stoics would seem excluded by their theological system from holding the immortality of the soul. If all the world by conflagration sinks into the essence of God, how can the individual soul continue to exist? But, on the other hand, if there be any principle in the human mind, short of revelation, which would lead men to trust and believe in their own immortality, it must assuredly be that principle which so largely animates Stoicism—the principle of aspiration, of moral energy, of a life above all ordinary pleasures and interests. ‘Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,’ is the maxim of extreme Epicurism; and though the Stoic might say, through the force of his will, ‘I die to-morrow, yet I will do the right’—this preference of the right above all things will be found in the long run to have more affinity for the ‘immortal longings,’ than for any mere system of materialism. As a matter of fact, we find that the Roman Stoics came gradually to blend the thoughts of another life with the practice of their stern virtue. Cleanthes and Chrysippus had spoken only of a possible continuance of the souls of the wise until the next conflagration; but Cato fortified his last hours with ideas not drawn

³⁴ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφειοῦς, δι’ ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ

κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσι.—
Plut. *De Repug. Stoic.* c. xii.

from these authorities, but from the *Phædo* of Plato. It may be questioned whether a frequent dwelling on the thought of suicide, as allowable and even praiseworthy, is most often accompanied, or not, by the belief in a future life. The first Stoics, by their precept and example, recommended the wise, on occasion, to ‘usher themselves out’³⁵ of life. If suicide, thus dignified by a name, were an escape from mere pain or annoyance, it would be an Epicurean act; but as a flight from what is degrading—as a great piece of renunciation, it assumes a Stoical appearance. The passion for suicide reached its height in the writings of Seneca, under the wretched circumstances of the Roman despotism; but, on the whole, it belongs to immature Stoicism—Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius dissuaded from it. In saying this, we cannot for a moment pretend that the Stoical principle ever entirely purified itself from alloy; it was too wanting in objective elements—it had too little to draw men out of themselves ever to satisfy the human spirit, ever to be otherwise than very imperfect. Stoical pride will always be a just subject of reproach; for the development of the subjective element of morality necessary to the deepening of the thoughts of the world was overdone by the Stoics, and they supplied nothing in counterbalance. It is not as a complete system, or with any inherent capacity for completeness, certainly not as a rival to Christianity, that we regard the Stoical Idea; but rather as the manifestation amongst the Greeks and Romans of a peculiar kind of human tendency,—one which exists within Christianity also—which constantly appears in history, and which meets us in daily life.³⁶

³⁵ ἐξάγειν ἑαυτούς,—ἐξαγωγή is the regular word with the Stoics for suicide.—Diog. Laert. vii. i. 66.

³⁶ This Essay, which cannot in the least aim at being exhaustive, has

hitherto omitted all mention of the non-ethical doctrines of the Stoics, their threefold division of philosophy, and their achievements in the province of logic. Suffice it to say, that these

II. Let us turn now to watch the promulgation of that doctrine, the leading traits of which we have endeavoured to describe, and which was destined not to remain the property of a mere school in Athens, but rather to become an active influence among the Roman spirits, and to some extent a regenerating element in the last days of Pagan civilization. There was a direct succession, as we have seen above (p. 246), in the lists of the Stoic doctors from Chrysippus to Posidonius, and Posidonius was master to Cicero. During the interval spanned by these successive teachers (from 200 B.C. to 50 B.C.), many circumstances turned the tide of philosophy towards Rome, and commenced the intellectual subjugation of the victors in the domain of thought as well as of imaginative literature. The first awakenings of the national curiosity are somewhat obscured. Aulus Gellius records a decree of the Senate, of the date B.C. 161, for banishing from Rome philosophers and rhetoricians, at the instance of M. Pomponius, the prætor. This fact appears to stand in isolation. Six years later (B.C. 155), we hear of the famous embassy of the philo-

were the least essential parts of Stoicism. Still they exhibit a characteristic approach to modern views. The division of science into logic, physic, and ethic, arose naturally out of the position which philosophy had assumed under Aristotle. But to give ethic and logic such an independent footing was original and modern. Small thanks are due to the Stoics for elevating logic, so-called, into a separate science. By so doing they have caused a great waste of human thought. With them, as ever since, logic was a vague name, including grammar, rhetoric, and metaphysics. They adopted and carried out the principles of the syllogism. One of their first questions was, as to the 'Criterion,' What

is the test of truth in our ideas? They seem to have professed, on this head, a sort of 'natural realism,' and a theory of knowledge similar to that of Locke. This was a descent from the old philosophic height; it was in opposition to the scepticism of the New Academy, and was connected with their practical point of view. Chrysippus, however, as a dialectical *tour de force*, wrote six books 'against custom,' in which he collected all that could be said against common ideas arising from association. Plutarch says that his arguments on his own side were not of equal force. However, the Stoics remain true to their own theory as 'common-sense philosophers.'

sophers sent from Athens to Rome to obtain the remission of a fine. Doubt³⁷ has been thrown on the reality of this event. But independent of the constant oral tradition from Scipio and Lælius down to Cicero, the historical certainty of the embassy is established by a reference which Cicero makes³⁸ to the writings of Clitomachus, a Carthaginian philosopher who settled at Athens, and was disciple to Carneades immediately after the date assigned to the embassy, and who therefore is an undoubted authority for the facts. However, we may easily believe that the story has been decked out and improved. In some accounts, Carneades the Academic, and Diogenes the Stoic, are mentioned as the envoys; but other accounts, probably for completeness' sake, add Critolaus the Peripatetic. And hence it came to be said³⁹ that these three represented the three styles of oratory—the florid, the severe, and the moderate. Cicero⁴⁰ tells us of a philosophic party at Rome, in compliment to whom these particular ambassadors were sent; while, on the other hand, Cato the Censor viewed with impatience their favourable reception, and urged upon the Senate their speedy dismissal. The most interesting anecdote connected with this embassy is that quoted from the works of Clitomachus,—that A. Albinus, the prætor, said to Carneades in the Capitol, before the Senate, ‘Is it true, Carneades, that you think I am no prætor because I am not a wise man, and that this is no city, and that there is no true state in it?’ To which Carneades replied, ‘I don’t think so, but this Stoic does.’ This story amusingly represents the confusion in the mind of the Roman prætor, who did not distinguish between the philosophical schools, but was struck by the great paradox he had heard, and was not able to compre-

³⁷ Mr. Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, ii. p. 511, note.

³⁸ *Academics*, ii. XLV.

³⁹ Aulus Gellius, vii. xiv. 3.

⁴⁰ *De Oratore*, ii. XXXVII.

hend that inner point of view from which it was said that mighty Rome was no city, and the august prætor had no real office or authority at all.

The anti-philosophical party seem to have continued their exertions at Rome, and under the date 93 B.C. we read⁴¹ of a decree of the censors Domitius Ænobarbus and Licinius Crassus against the schools in which a new sort of learning was taught by those who called themselves Latin rhetoricians, and where youths wasted their whole days in sloth. This decree is in fine grand Roman style; it says, 'these things do not please us.' But it was in vain to attempt resisting the influx of Greek philosophy, when the leading and most able men warmly welcomed it. Africanus, C. Lælius, and L. Furius were extremely pleased at the embassy, and always had learned Greeks in their company. A little later than 150 B.C., no one was more instrumental in recommending Stoicism to the Romans than Panætius of Rhodes, whose instructions in Athens were attended by Lælius and his son-in-law, C. Fanucius, and also by the conqueror of Carthage. Panætius accompanied the latter on his famous mission to the courts in Asia Minor and Egypt. He is always spoken of as the friend and companion of Scipio and Lælius. He is recorded to have sent a letter to Q. Tubero, on the endurance of pain. Not only by personal intercourse did Panætius influence the cultivated Romans, but also still more by his books. These seem to have been of a character eminently fitted for the comprehension of the Romans, being extremely practical, avoiding the harshness and severity of the early Stoics, and being free from 'the thorns of dialectic.'⁴² One peculiarity above all, while it made Panætius a worse Stoic, made him at the same time a more attractive expositor of

⁴¹ Aulus Gellius, xv. xi.

⁴² Cicero, *De Fin.* iv. xxviii. 79.

philosophy, and was only a fulfilment, after all, of the destiny of Stoicism—namely, his tendency to eclecticism. He constantly had Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, Dicæarchus, in his mouth; he was always speaking⁴³ of Plato as divine, most wise, most holy, and the Homer of philosophers. We can form a very good conception of his writings from Cicero's work *On Offices*, which is taken almost exactly from Panætius' *On Things Suitable*. An extract *verbatim*, from the latter, is preserved by Aulus Gellius. It recommends those who are mixed up in affairs to be on their guard, like pugilists, against every sort of attack. It is in rhetorical style, and full of a sensible worldly prudence. Such prudence is no more alien from a particular phase of Stoicism, than it is from a particular phase of religion.

Posidonius (B.C. 135–50) maintained the same intercourse with the Romans, and the same eclectic tendencies as his master. After the death of Panætius (B.C. 112), he made some extensive travels for the sake of physical inquiry. At Cadiz he spent some time in observations on the sunset; he visited Sicily, Dalmatia, and other countries, and finally settled in Rhodes. Strabo, with a sympathy for his geographical knowledge, called him 'the most learned philosopher of the day.' In the year 86 B.C. he was sent as ambassador to Rome, and became acquainted with Marius. Pompey visited Posidonius twice in Rhodes (67 and 62 B.C.); and the story goes that on one of these occasions Posidonius, having a bad fit of the gout, discoursed from his bed to Pompey on the topic 'that virtue is the only good, and that pain is no evil.' Cicero also studied under him in Rhodes; and finally, coming to Rome in his old age (B.C. 51), he died there a short time afterwards, having had as his hearers

⁴³ Cicero, *Tusculan. Disputat.* i. xxxii. 79.

C. Velleius, C. Cotta, Q. Lucilius Balbus, and probably Brutus. Posidonius wrote a commentary on the *Timæus* of Plato, apparently to reconcile it with the Stoical physics. He approximated in some things to Aristotle, and even, it is said, to Pythagoras. On divination, however, he reverted to the old Stoical view, abandoning the scepticism of Panætius. The ancients make mention of the elegance of his style; and Cicero, while dissenting from his opinions on fate and other subjects, speaks of him at the same time with the greatest respect.

Beside those Stoics who were of eminence and originality enough to advance, though only by amalgamation, the traditional doctrine, there were by this time many others who received it merely and adopted it as an article of faith, without thinking of addition or change. Such was probably Antipater of Tyre, who became the friend and instructor of Cato the younger. And now we find, in the last half-century before Christ, frequent instances of a new fashion in Rome—namely, for a great man to maintain a philosopher in his house, as in modern days a private confessor. Of this custom Cato⁴⁴ of Utica was himself an instance, for he is reported to have made a journey to Pergamus with the express object of inducing the famous Stoic Athenodorus, surnamed Cordylion, to accompany him to Rome, in which mission he succeeded, and brought back the sage in triumph, who ended his days in the house of Cato. After this, at Utica, Cato appears to have had among the members of his family Demetrius a Peripatetic, and Apollonides a Stoic. On the night before Cato's suicide, they disputed with each other on the paradox that the Wise Man only is free, Cato

⁴⁴ Plutarch, *Cato Minor*, c. x.

warmly supporting the Stoical side. Another⁴⁵ Athenodorus, of the same sect, but surnamed Cananites, was highly honoured by the great Augustus. Attracting the notice of the Emperor at Apollonia, where he held a school, he was invited to Rome, and had the young Claudius placed under his instruction. In his old age returning to Tarsus, he seems to have procured some advantages for his country through his influence with Augustus. Among the few works attributed to him there is one with an eminently Stoical title, *On Earnestness and Education*.

Arguing by analogy from these external indications, we may imagine the Roman nation at this period imbibing Greek philosophy, or so-called philosophy, at every pore. The Romans, indeed, had not the slightest stomach for metaphysics, and in no one of their writers do we find any trace of a real acquaintance with the systems of Plato or Aristotle. But we can find abundant traces of an acquaintance with Epicurus and Chrysippus, and Panætius and Posidonius. The inducement of the Romans in taking up with this kind of literature was twofold: first, a natural affinity for practical moralizing and maxims of life; second, a rhetorical necessity—the desire to turn sentences, to be terse, apposite, and weighty. The constant practice of declamation gave an immense stimulus to the sermonizing tendency of the day, and as the despotism of the Empire shut up other subjects, declamation became more and more exclusively moral. Instruction under some Greek rhetorician became part of the education of a Roman youth, and in Athens, Rhodes, Marseilles, and Alexandria, everywhere throughout the great Roman world, Sophists and declaimers might be heard setting forth the theses of the different schools, among which

⁴⁵ Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography*, sub voce.

the florid paradoxes of the Stoics were no doubt most striking and attractive.

The Romans who took any side in philosophy invariably became either Epicureans, Stoics, or Academics, or else, as was not unfrequent, they combined⁴⁶ the Academical opinions on knowledge with the Stoical morals and some admixture of the Stoical physics. This was the case with L. Lucullus, with M. Brutus, and Terentius Varro. Cicero's creed we know to have been a learned and sensible eclecticism, a qualified Stoicism with a use of the Academic arguments, and an approach in some things to the Peripatetic views. Such a compound was suitable to a statesman and a man of letters; it exhibits acuteness, refinement, breadth of view, and an affinity to what is elevated in the different systems: but at the same time it avoids all extremes, and shuns that unity of principle on which philosophy, properly so called, depends. When such a balance as this was wanting, the Romans joined the opposite ranks of the Stoics or the Epicureans. To either side they had certain elements that inclined them. Their capacity for the physical enjoyment of life, their taste for rural ease and the delights of their beautiful villas, and that healthy realism which we find expressed by Lucretius, all tended to recommend the Epicurean doctrine to the Romans. And added to these predisposing causes was the fact that the first book of philosophy written in the Latin language was the work of one Amafinius,⁴⁷ setting forth Epicurism. This treatise, though of no merit according to Cicero, had immense influence, and brought over the multitude to adopt its views. 'Other works of a similar character followed, and through

⁴⁶ Ritter's *History of Ancient Philosophy* (translated by Mr. Morrison), vol. iv. pp. 78, 79.

⁴⁷ Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iv. iii.; *Acad. Post.* ii.

their popular style took possession of the whole of Italy.' Of this phase of feeling hardly any trace remains to us, if we except the splendid poem of Lucretius, and the record of one or two great names among the Roman Epicureans, such as Atticus, the friend of Cicero, Cassius, the murderer of Cæsar, L. Torquatus, and C. Velleius. Perhaps its most lasting result was the spread of 'a wisdom,' as Livy calls it, 'which had learned to despise the gods.' Epicurism was transient in Rome, like Sentimentalism in England, because alien to the national characteristics; for on the whole the Romans were far more disposed to energy and sublime virtue, and the conquest of external circumstances, than to easy and harmonious enjoyment. Without a great intellectual capacity for the apprehension of the universal, there was yet something abstract about their turn of mind; this is shown in their love of law, and in the sternness of the high Roman mood. It has been often said that the old Roman worthies were unconscious Stoics. And now, from Cato to M. Aurelius, we find through the Roman empire an immense diffusion of Stoical principles and of the professors of Stoicism.⁴⁸

III. These professors assumed, it appears, not only distinctive principles, but also certain external marks and

⁴⁸ Among the most celebrated of these is to be named Q. Sextius, contemporary with Julius Cæsar, who founded a school. This school, Seneca tells us (*Quest. Nat.* vii. xxxii.), began with great *éclat*, but soon became extinct. He says of Sextius that he was 'a great man and a Stoic, although he himself denied this.' Sextius appears to have followed Pythagoras in some points, and to have enjoined abstinence from animal food. Sotion, the disciple of Sextius, was Seneca's mas-

ter, and induced him to practise this kind of asceticism at one time; but after a year's trial of it, he was persuaded by his father, who 'hated philosophy,' and who dreaded the imputation of certain foreign superstitions, to return to the common mode of diet. (*Ep.* cviii.) What is most remarkable about Sextius is his daily habit, according to Seneca (*De Ira*, iii. xxxvi.), of self-examination. This shows the spirit of the times.

badges of their sect. We read in Juvenal⁴⁹ of the 'long robe' as synonymous with Stoicism; in Persius we read of their close-cropped hair,⁵⁰ and their look of having sat up all night; in Tacitus,⁵¹ of their set countenances and gait expressive of virtue. Like their Jewish counterpart, the Pharisees, they were formal, austere, pretentious, and not unfrequently hypocritical. Under the mask of asceticism, they appear sometimes to have concealed gross licentiousness,⁵² and under their sanctimonious face the blackest heart. With bitter indignation does Tacitus⁵³ record the perfidy of Publius Egnatius Celer, the Stoic philosopher, the client, the instructor, and the false friend of Barea Soranus, whom, with his daughter, he betrayed to Nero, by giving the lying evidence which procured their deaths. Such cases as this, however, are to be regarded like stories of the corruption of priests and monks, and to be judged apart, as giving no sufficient clue to the working of the system. Partly they illustrate the maxim that 'that corruption is worst which is the corruption of the best;' partly they show that an elevated and spiritual creed is apt, by the very nobleness of its appearance, to attract unworthy followers. We may also add that, beside the antinomian tendencies which might logically be connected with this creed,⁵⁴ there was a narrowness in the intensity of Stoicism, and an abstract unreality about its ideas, not favourable to the development of the more human virtues. Acknowledging these things, we may turn away from this ungracious side of the system, and leave

⁴⁹ 'Facinus majoris abollæ.'—*Sat.* iii. 115.

⁵⁰ 'Insomnis . . . et detonsa juvenus.'—*Sat.* iii. 54.

⁵¹ 'P. Egnatius . . . auctoritatem Stoicæ sectæ præferebat, habitu et ore ad exprimendam imaginem honesti exer-

citus.'—*Annal.* xvi. 32.

⁵² 'Frontis nulla fides, quis enim non vicus abundat Tristibus obscænis?'
Juv. *Sat.* ii. 8.

⁵³ *Ann.* xvi. 32, 33.

⁵⁴ See above, p. 261.

it to the tender mercies of the satirists. For even externally, Stoicism, on the whole, presented a better aspect and won a better opinion than this from intelligent observers during the early Roman empire. Nothing can be more significant than the accusation brought against C. Rubellius Plautus⁵⁵ by Tigellinus. This Plautus was son of Julia, and great-grandson of Tiberius. Becoming an object of suspicion to Nero, he retired—not from the Roman world, for that was impossible, but from the Court—to Asia, where he lived in the pursuit of the Stoic philosophy. Tigellinus, to stir up Nero's hatred against him, declared, 'That man, though of immense wealth, does not even pretend a wish for enjoyment, but is always bringing forward the examples of the ancient Romans. And he has now joined to these ideas the arrogance of the Stoics—a philosophy which makes men turbulent and restless.' It is easy to see that this accusation was a panegyric. It was followed up by an order sent from Nero that Plautus should be put to death. His friends counselled resistance, but Cæranus and Musonius Rufus, two philosophers who were with him, preached the doctrine of resignation and fortitude; and armed with their suggestions, he met his death unmoved. This manner of death and life was not confined to Plautus: the reigns of Claudius and Nero exhibit a constellation of noble characters, formed on the model of the younger Cato, and showing the same republican front and the same practical conception of Stoicism as he did. Such were Cæcina Pætus and his heroic wife Arria, who died at the command of Claudius. Such was Soranus Barea, already mentioned, and such Thræsea, and his son-in-law Helvidius. Seneca, too, in his death, at all events, must

⁵⁵ Tacitus, *Annal.* xiv. 57. Cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Cleom.*—Ἐχει τι ὁ Στωϊκὸς λόγος πρὸς τὰς μεγάλας καὶ

ὀξείας φύσεις ἐπισφαλὲς καὶ παράβολον· βαθεῖ δὲ καὶ πρᾶφ κεραννόμενος ἤθει μάλιστα εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδίδωσι.

be added to the list—a list of martyrs at a time when all good eminence was sure to attract the stroke. There is something perhaps theatrical and affected about the record of these death-scenes. When we think of Cato arguing on the freedom of the wise man, and then reading the *Phædo* through the night, before he stabs himself; when we think of Thræsea pouring out a libation of his own blood to Jupiter the Liberator, and discoursing in his last moments with the Cynic Demetrius on immortality—it seems as if these men had played somewhat studied parts. Such scenes appeal to the rhetorical faculty, rather than to the imagination and the heart. But it is the privilege of certain unhappy periods to be rhetorical. It is the privilege of patriots in miserable days to be excited, strained, unnatural. And hence we can understand how it was that from the Girondists in France the Roman Stoics obtained such sympathy and admiration.

And now let us take some notice of the character and the thought of Seneca, a man who has been most differently estimated, according to the temperament of his judges, and according as he has been taken at his best or his worst. Probably we may admit almost all the accusations against him, and yet end without judging him too hardly. When just rising into success, Seneca was banished by Claudius, on an obscure charge preferred by Messalina. From Corsica, his place of banishment, he addressed what was called a ‘Consolation’ to Polybius, the freedman of the Emperor, on the death of his brother. Seneca’s object in this ‘Consolation’ was to effect his own recal, and the means he used were the most fulsome and cringing terms of flattery towards Claudius. His mean adulation quite failed in obtaining his pardon; and he was only recalled after eight years’ exile, through the influence of Agrippina, who made him tutor to her son Domitius, the future emperor Nero. In the museum at

Naples one sees frescoes brought from Pompeii, which represent a butterfly acting as charioteer to a dragon. These designs were meant to caricature the relationship of Seneca to his pupil Nero. No doubt he was drawn violently and without the power of resistance through much that was unseemly by his impetuous charge. No doubt he tried, with the help of Burrus, to keep the reins straight. But he was obliged to connive and even assist at things which made people say, with natural surprise, 'This is a strange part for a Stoic to play.' The poor painted butterfly behind the dragon could not choose what part he should play. Other things that have been complained of in Seneca are his violent reaction of spite against Claudius, shown in the satire which he wrote upon his death; his reputed avarice, and the enormous fortune which in a short time he actually amassed under Nero; certain scandalous intrigues, with regard to which there really is not evidence enough to enable us to say whether Seneca was guilty of them or not; and lastly, his possible complicity in the murder of Agrippina. Seneca was no Roman, but a Spaniard, and we can fancy how the milk of his flattery towards Claudius turned sour during his eight years' exile, and how deep resentment settled in his heart. With regard to his accumulating wealth when it was in his power to do so, we may perhaps explain it to ourselves, by remembering that many ecclesiastics professing a still more unworldly creed than Stoicism have done the same. With regard to his privity to the death of Agrippina, all that can be said is that Seneca was, towards the end of his career, so thoroughly scared by Nero, that all power of independent action was taken from him. Physically timid and gentle by nature, Seneca was not born to play a consistent and unyielding part. Considering his hideous position, we may well condone his offences. If we study his writings, and especially

his letters, we shall see that he possessed one essentially Stoical characteristic, namely, the intense desire for advance and improvement. The picture of the inner life of Seneca, his efforts after self-discipline, his untiring asceticism, his enthusiasm for all that he esteems holy and of good report—this picture, marred as it is by pedantry, and rhetoric, and vain self-conceit, yet stands out in noble contrast to the swinishness of the Campanian villas, and is in its complex entirety very sad and affecting.

The works of Seneca are over-harshly judged by those who have no taste except for metaphysical philosophy, or who, expecting to find such in Seneca, have been disappointed. But if we approach these writings from a different side, and look at them historically and psychologically, as the picture of the times and the man, we find them full of interest. If we can endure being a little cloyed with excess of richness in the style, if we can pardon occasional falsity and frequent exaggeration, we shall discover in them a most fertile genius, and a vein of French wit, so to speak, which is always neat and clever, and often surprising on the tritest moral subjects. Of all sets of letters that have ever been preserved, there is none that exhibits better and more vividly the different phases of a peculiar idiosyncrasy—of a mind under the dominion of a peculiar kind of thought—than the *Epistles* of Seneca. Let us take a glance at the more striking features of their contents, and see what sort of a working in the heart was produced by Stoicism under the circumstances of the case. The *Epistles* of Seneca consist of one hundred and twenty-four letters, written almost continuously in the old age of their author, and all addressed to a person of the name of Lucilius. The first point to be noticed about them is their entire abstraction from all public events of the day, an abstraction very Stoical in itself, and very significant also of

the ungenial atmosphere of the political world. Only one allusion is there to Nero, where Seneca takes occasion (*Ep.* 73) to find fault with the opinion that philosophers are necessarily turbulent and refractory, and despisers of the ruling power. 'On the contrary,' he says, 'none are more grateful to him who affords them security and tranquillity of life. They must regard the author of these blessings in the light of a parent.' 'Like Tityrus, they must say that a god has provided them tranquillity, and left their cattle to roam and themselves to play the pipe.' 'The leisure thus granted them is indeed godlike, and raises them to the level of the gods.' In such terms does Seneca appreciate the hours of gilded oppression and treacherous reprieve which were conceded him. Most naturally the topics of his correspondence were not political. His letters were uniformly didactic and moral. In them we see developed the passion for self-improvement and for the cultivation of others. Both by nature and from the influences of Stoicism, Seneca was essentially a schoolmaster; it was evidently the foible of his life to be bringing some one on; he was a pedagogue to himself, and he wanted somebody else whom he might lecture. Of this tendency Lucilius was made the victim. On one occasion he seems to have remonstrated, and to have reminded Seneca that he was forty years of age, and rather old for schooling (*Ep.* 25). But Seneca will not be deterred. He says it shall not be his fault if his friend does not improve, even though the success be not very brilliant. In every shape and from every side he urges upon him cultivation, and once fairly tells him he cannot remain on the footing of friend unless he cultivates himself and improves (*Ep.* 35). He hails his good deeds with triumph; rejoices to hear that Lucilius lives on terms of familiarity with his slaves (*Ep.* 47)—'are they not,' he asks, men like ourselves, breathing the same air,

living and dying like ourselves?'—praises a book he has written, lectures him on the economy of time (*Ep.* 1); tells him to be select in his reading (*Ep.* 2); bids him examine himself to see whether he is progressing in philosophy or in life, since only the latter is valuable (*Ep.* 16); above all, exhorts him without ceasing to get rid of the fear of death, 'that chain which binds us all' (*Ep.* 26), though he is half afraid, as in one place he naïvely confesses (*Ep.* 30), that Lucilius may come to dread his long-winded letters more even than death itself. However, as a compensation, he promises his friend that these epistles shall ensure him a literary immortality, just as the letters of Cicero had made the name of Atticus immortal (*Ep.* 21).

Such is a specimen of the didactic element in the letters of Seneca; the indications of his own self-discipline and conscious self-culture are equally pregnant and still more characteristic. One sentence of his might be taken as the summary and expression of his entire spirit. In speaking of the state of the 'advancing man' as distinguished in Stoical parlance from the 'wise man,' he says (*Ep.* 71), 'It is a great part of advance to will to be advancing. Of this I am conscious to myself; I will to advance, nay, I will it with my whole heart.' In the will thus fixed and bent there is often a sort of unreal triumph, independent of actual success or failure. Seneca does not conceal from us his failures in realizing his conception of philosophic behaviour. But while he confesses, he is never humbled. Rather he seems proud of detecting his own falling off. On one occasion (*Ep.* 87) he relates an excursion which he made into the country with a friend, and in which he says they spent 'two delightful days.' They took very few slaves, and one rustic vehicle. On meeting with persons riding in grander equipages, he tells us, he could not refrain from blushing, and secretly wished

that they should not think that this sordid conveyance belonged to *him*. 'I have made but little progress as yet,' he sighs, 'I dare not yet openly assume frugality. I mind the opinions of passers-by.' Whereupon he proceeds to lecture down this weakness in the grandest terms, and occupies many pages of a letter in proving that riches are not a good. On another occasion he recounts a voyage which he had undertaken from Naples to Puteoli (*Ep.* 53). In these few miles the sea became rough, and the philosopher grew sick, and, unable to endure the horrible sufferings of his position, he commanded the pilot to set him ashore. 'As soon as I had recovered my stomach,' he says, 'I began to reflect what a forgetfulness of our defects follows us about.' Pursuing this train of reasoning, he enters upon the praises of philosophy, and soaring far above sea-sickness, he exclaims, 'Philosophy sets one above all men, and not far behind the gods. Indeed, in one point the wise man might be said even to surpass the Deity; for the Deity is fearless by the gift of nature, but the wise man by his own merits.' This last saying, which is often quoted against Seneca, is perhaps the most foolish thing he ever said, and must not be taken as an average specimen of his thoughts. One failure which he ascribes to himself may be justly reckoned as a merit; for while dissuading Lucilius (*Ep.* 63) from overmuch grieving at the loss of a friend, he says, 'I myself so immoderately wept for Annæus Serenus, that I must rank among the bad examples of those who have been overcome by grief.' And he reflects that the reason of this weakness must have been that he had not sufficiently considered the possibility of his friend dying first. We may also attribute it to the existence in Seneca of an affectionate heart, which had not been entirely supplanted by the abstractions of Stoicism, nor entirely 'sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought.' After alluding

to cases where Seneca confessed to have fallen from the philosophic height, it is surely fair not to leave unrecorded an occasion where he effected an important triumph of the will. The kind of self-discipline chosen was somewhat surprising; it is related in the Fifty-sixth Epistle, where Seneca tells his friend that he had taken lodgings 'over a bath.' He details with minuteness the various mixed and deafening sounds by which his ears were perpetually assailed. He could hear distinctly the strong fellows taking their exercise—throwing out their hands loaded with the dumb-bells—straining and groaning—hissing and wheezing—breathing in every kind of unnatural way—at another moment some one having his shoulders slapped by the shampooer—a hue and cry after a thief—a man practising his voice in the bath—people leaping and splashing down into the water—the various cries of the piemen and sellers of baked meats, as they vended their wares—and several other sounds, to all of which Seneca compelled his mind to be inattentive, being concentrated on itself. The power of abstraction gained by such a discipline he seems to have thought very valuable. At the end of his letter, he declares that as the experiment is quite successful, and as the sounds are really abominable, he has now determined to change his quarters.

About such moral peddling as this, there is of course nothing great. But the spirit which actuates it is in its origin deep and good, and is only not admirable when it becomes perverted. The conscious desire for moral progress becomes unfortunately very easily perverted; it degenerates too often into small self-analysis, and that weak trifling which is most utterly opposed to real progression. We find Seneca remaining in his moral nature a strange mixture of the pedant and the schoolboy; on the one hand always teaching himself, and on the other hand with everything to learn; and

yet still, with all its imperfections, we may question whether this attitude is not more human and better than anything like an Epicurean acquiescence and content in one's nature as it is. That self-reflection, that communing of man with his own heart, which the tendencies of Stoicism and the course of the world's history had now made common, produced in Seneca occasionally intuitions into the state of the human race, which he expresses in language curious to meet with in the writings of a Pagan. He says (*De Clementia*, I. vi.):—

‘Conceive in this vast city, where without cease a crowd pours through the broadest streets, and like a river dashes against anything that impedes its rapid course—this city, that consumes the grain of all lands—what a solitude and desolation there would be if nothing were left save what a severe judge could absolve of fault! We have all sinned (*peccavimus omnes*), some more gravely, others more lightly; some from purpose, others by chance impulse, or else carried away by wickedness external to them; others of us have wanted fortitude to stand by our resolutions, and have lost our innocence unwillingly and not without a struggle. Not only we *have* erred, but to the end of time we shall continue to err. Even if anyone has already so well purified his mind that nothing can shake or decoy him any more, it is through sinning that he has arrived at this state of innocence.’

Those who have been anxious to obtain the authority of Aristotle for the doctrine of ‘human corruption’ will find on consideration that this idea, which was historically impossible for a Greek of the fourth century B.C., came with sufficient vividness into the consciousness of persons in the position of Seneca, but not till much later than Aristotle, probably not before the beginning of our era. On the other hand, we are not to fancy that the thoughts of Seneca received any in-

fluence from Christianity. The stories of his intercourse with St. Paul are merely mythical. We learn from passages like that above quoted, not that Seneca had any acquaintance with Christian doctrines, but that some of the thoughts and feelings which St. Paul had about the world were held also by Pagans contemporaneous with him.

There is one more characteristic of the letters of Seneca which ought not to be left unmentioned, and that is, the way in which they are perpetually overshadowed by the thought of death. The form assumed by this *meditatio mortis* is a constant urging of arguments against fearing to die. These arguments are, as might be expected, infinitely varied and ingenious. 'Death,' he says, 'lurks under the name of life. It begins with our infancy.' 'It is a great mistake to look forward to death, since a great part of it is already over. We die daily' (*Ep.* 1). 'Death is no punishment, but the law of nature.' 'Children and idiots do not fear death, why cannot reason attain to that security which folly has achieved?' (*Ep.* 36). 'Death is the one port in a stormy sea—it is either end or transition (*aut finis est aut transitus*)—it brings us back to where we were before birth—it must be a gain or nothing.' 'The apparatus of death is all a cheat; if we tear off the mask, there is nothing fearful.' 'Behind fire and steel and the ferocious crowd of executioners there is death hiding—merely death, which my slave or my waiting-maid has just despised' (*Ep.* 24). Not content with bringing forward these considerations dissuasive of terror, Seneca in other places does all he can to familiarize the mind with the idea of suicide. He says, 'There is nothing more contemptible than to wish for death. Why wish for that which is in your power?—die at once, if you wish to do so' (*Ep.* 117). He relates with approbation the suicide of his friend Marcellinus, who being oppressed with a long and troublesome

invalidism, was recommended by a Stoic to give up the trivial round of life; whereupon, having distributed his goods among his weeping slaves, he effected death by a three-days' abstinence from food, betaking himself to a hot bath when his body was exhausted, wherein he fainted and died (*Ep.* 77). Other instances of self-destruction are scattered through the letters of Seneca, some of which give a sad illustration to the unhappiness of the times. It seems to have been not uncommon for the wretched captives who were doomed to the conflicts of the arena to steal themselves away, sometimes by the most revolting modes of death. And it is surely a miserable sign when cultivated men of the day look on such deeds with pleasure and admiration. So great was the tendency to suicide under Claudius and Nero, that even Seneca on one occasion acknowledges that it is excessive. He says, 'We ought not to hate life any more than death, we ought not to sink into that mere life-weariness to which many are prone who see nothing before them but an unvarying routine of waking and sleeping, hungering and eating.' But the majority of Seneca's arguments are in the other direction. They are the results of a deep sense of unhappiness and insecurity, which existed side by side with his philosophic self-complacency. They were connected, on the one hand, with a timidity of nature and a real love of life; on the other hand, with a presentiment of evil and a sense of the necessity of preparing for the worst. When death suddenly and actually came upon Seneca,—like Cicero, he met it with fortitude, in spite of his timidity, and probably not on account of his previous reasonings, but from an innate elevation of mind called out on emergency. We have observed that Seneca spoke of death as 'either end or transition;' this sums up his views of the future under an alternative. But his real tendency was to Platonic visions of the soul freed from the

trammels of the body and restored to freedom. He is unwilling that Lucilius should arouse him from the 'pleasant dream' of immortality. He likes to expatiate on the tranquillity of mind and absolute liberty which await us 'when we shall have got away from these dregs of existence into the sublime condition on high.'⁵⁶

It is a great contrast if we turn from Seneca to Epictetus. It is going from the florid to the severe, from varied feeling to the impersonal simplicity of the teacher, often from idle rhetoric to devout earnestness. No writings of Epictetus remain, but only (what is perhaps equally interesting for us) records of his didactic conversations, preserved as near as possible in his own words by Arrian, the historian, who studied under him at Nicopolis. Epictetus was a lame slave, the property of Epaphroditus, who was himself the freedman and the favourite of Nero. While yet a slave, Epictetus was won over to the Stoic doctrine by Musonius Rufus.⁵⁷ Obtaining his

⁵⁶ We have not entered upon the analysis of Seneca's philosophical works, because, in short, they are not speculative and philosophical, but of the same moralizing stamp as his letters. It is, however, just to pay a tribute to the force of imagination shown by him in preconceiving the physical discoveries of future ages (see his *Naturales Quaestiones*, vii. xxxi.). 'Quam multa animalia hoc primum cognovimus sæculo! quam multa negotia ne hoc quidem! Multa venientis ævi populus ignota nobis sciet. Multa sæculis tunc futuris, cum memoria nostri exoleverit, reservantur.' Through his vividness of mind, this Spaniard of the first century has got the credit of predicting elsewhere, in terms remarkably coincident, the discovery of America.

⁵⁷ Musonius Rufus, whom we have noticed before as the companion of Rubellius Plautus in Asia, 'returned from exile on the accession of Galba; and when Antonius Primus, the general of Vespasian, was marching upon Rome, he joined the ambassadors that were sent by Vitellius to the victorious general, and going among the soldiers of the latter, descanted upon the blessings of peace and the dangers of war, but was soon compelled to put an end to his unseasonable eloquence.' (Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Biog.*) He afterwards obtained the condemnation of Publius Celer, the traducer of Barea. (Tac. *Hist.* iii. 81; iv. 10, 40.) Fragments of his philosophy are preserved by Stobæus.

freedom, he taught in Rome, and afterwards, when the philosophers were banished from the city by Domitian, in Nicopolis of Epirus. What is most striking about his discourses is their extremely religious spirit, and the gentle purity of the doctrines they advocate. In them Stoicism reached its culmination, and attained an almost entirely un-pagan character; its harsher traits were abandoned, and while Epictetus draws the picture of the wise man under the name of Cynic, there is hardly a trace of anything cynical in the life which he recommends. To mention the subjects of some of his discourses may serve to give an idea of their nature. The following headings strike the eye:—‘On things in our power and not in our power.’ ‘How to preserve one’s own character in everything.’ ‘How to follow out the conception that God is Father of mankind.’ ‘On moral advance.’ ‘On Providence.’ ‘On equanimity.’ ‘How to do all things pleasing to the Gods.’ ‘What part of a sin is one’s own.’ ‘On moral training.’ As might be conjectured, there is nothing speculative in these discourses. Epictetus both received and imparted philosophy as a fulfilling of the needs of the soul, not as a mere development of the intellect. His words on this and other subjects present very often a strange coincidence with the language of the Gospel. He says (*Dissert.* II. xi. 1), ‘The beginning of philosophy is the consciousness of one’s own weakness and inability with regard to what is needful.’ ‘The school of the philosopher is a physician’s house; you should not go out from it pleased, but in pain. For you come not whole, but sick—one diseased in his shoulder and another in his head’ (*Dissert.* III. xxiii. 30). ‘Young man, having once heard these words, go away, and say to yourself, ‘Epictetus has not spoken them to me (from whence came they to him?), but some kind god by his means. It would not have come into the mind of Epictetus to say these things, since he is not

accustomed to reason with anyone. Come, then, let us obey God, lest we should move God to anger.”⁵⁸ ‘The true Cynic should recollect that he is sent as a messenger from Zeus to men, to declare to them concerning things good and evil, and to show them that they seek good where it is not to be found, and where it is to be found they do not desire it’ (*Dissert.* III. xxii. 23).

With regard to the manifestations of Providence, Epictetus says (*Dissert.* i. 16, 19):—‘What, then; since ye are all blind, is there not need of one who should fill up this place, and sing in behalf of you all the hymn to God? Of what else am I capable, who am a lame old man, except to sing the praises of God? Were I a nightingale, I would do as the nightingale; were I a swan, I would do as the swan. But now, since I have reason, I must sing of God. This is my office, and I perform it, nor will I leave my post, as far as in me lies, and I exhort you to join in the same song.’ ‘If anyone will properly feel this truth, that we are all especially born of God, and that God is the father of men and gods, I think that such an one will henceforth allow no mean or unworthy thoughts about himself. If Cæsar were to adopt you, would not your pride be unbearable; and now that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated?’ (*Dissert.* i. 3, 1).

Such sayings as these are a specimen of the vein of piety which runs through the teachings of Epictetus. In moral life, he exhorts to purity, equanimity, and forgiveness of injuries. He draws a broad line of distinction between things in our power and things out of our power. Within our power are the will and our opinion of things; beyond our power, the body, possessions, authority, and fame. The will itself nothing can touch; bonds, imprisonment, and death itself, do

⁵⁸ ἵνα μὴ θεοχόλωτοι ᾖμεν (*Dissert.* III. i. 36).

not impair the internal freedom of the will. Lameness impedes the leg, but not the will. True wisdom and happiness consist in placing all one's thoughts and hopes on things within our power,—that is to say, on the will itself and the internal consciousness. This attitude will render happiness impregnable, for the wise man will enter no contest save where he is sure of the victory.

In an exaltation of the will, and in thus withdrawing into its precincts, the Stoicism of Epictetus declares itself. To some extent he provided an objective side for his thought, by the pious and theological reflections which he introduced into his philosophy. But these were not sufficiently made to pervade his whole system, and with regard to the question of immortality he contented himself, as far as we know, with certain brief remarks, implying the utter resolution of personality after death. 'Come,' he says, 'but whither?—to nothing dreadful, but only to what is near and dear to thee, to the elements whence thou hast sprung' (*Diss.* III. xiii. 14). 'This is death, a mighty change, not into the non-existent, but into what is now non-existent. 'Shall *I* then not exist?' No, *thou* wilt not exist, but something else of which the universe has need' (*Diss.* III. xxiv. 94). While placing the will in our own power, Epictetus at the same time adopted an entirely necessarian scheme. He followed Plato in making vice the result of ignorance, and he considered that men differed from brutes, not in freedom, but only in consciousness (*Diss.* II. viii. 4).

The same spirit as that of Epictetus the slave expresses itself in Marcus Aurelius the emperor, whose thoughts have come down to us in the shape of a monologue in twelve books. These two last great Stoical writers appear both to have been influenced by Neo-Platonic views, for which Stoicism, on its spiritual side, had a considerable affinity. The weakness of humanity is a leading idea with M. Aurelius.

‘Of human life,’ he says (ii. 17), ‘the duration is a point ; the substance is fleeting ; the perception is dim ; the fabric of the body is corruptible, the soul is an idle whirling ; fortune is inscrutable, and fame beyond our judgment. In short, all that there is of the body is a stream, and all that there is of the soul is a dream and a smoke. Life is a war, and a lodging in a strange country ; the name that we leave behind us is forgetfulness. What is there, then, that can conduct us ? Philosophy alone. . . . Oh, my soul ! wilt thou ever be good, and simple, and one, and naked, and more transparent than the body which clothes thee ? Wilt thou ever be full and without a want, desiring nothing, hankering after nothing, whether animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasure, but content with thy present condition ?’ (x. 1.)

Such are the mystical ecstasies into which Antoninus rises in communing with himself. With these, honest self-examinations and humility of feeling are often combined, and the whole is tempered by a cold spirit of Stoical resignation. Of the philosophy of the Emperor we need not add anything further beyond one slight point, namely, that we find in him⁵⁹ the same psychological division of man into body, soul, and spirit, as was employed by St. Paul. The mode of expression, however, is slightly different, showing that there was no direct borrowing, but only a general community of view. We may take our leave of the monologue of Antoninus by quoting from it his feeling about the Christian martyrs. ‘The soul,’ he says, ‘when it must depart from the body, should be ready to be extinguished, to be dispersed, or to

⁵⁹ Ὁ τίποτε τοῦτό εἰμι σαρκία ἐστὶ καὶ πνευμάτιον καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν (ii. 2). Cf. iii. 16. Σῶμα, ψυχὴ, νοῦς xii. 3. Τρία ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκες, σῶμάτιον, πνευμάτιον, νοῦς. Cf. St.

Paul, *Thessal.* i. v. 23. Τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα. The πνεῦμα of St. Paul answers to the νοῦς or ἡγεμονικόν of Antoninus.

subsist a while longer with the body. But this readiness must proceed from its own judgment, and not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians; it must be arrived at with reflection and dignity, so that you could even convince another without declamation' (xi. 3).

In Marcus Aurelius we appear at first sight to have the desire of Plato fulfilled. We see a philosopher on the throne. But even absolute power does not give influence or sway. Plato wished the whole State to bend and turn under the control of omnipotent wisdom, as the limbs of a man would follow the impulses of his mind. But very far was Marcus Aurelius from being gifted with that sort of electric force which could put itself out and transform the world, even if the Roman empire were not too huge and too corrupt for such a process. Philosophy in general must be considered as something incapable of coming immediately into contact with politics and practical life, and the philosophy of Antoninus consisted peculiarly in a withdrawal from the world, in self-examination, moral progress, and thoughts about God. While the Emperor was thus busied more with his own soul than with penetrating State reforms, the world enjoyed a halcyon time. The ruler was mild, just, and forgiving; he had only one deficiency, but that the greatest which could possibly attach to him, namely, an utter want of insight into character. The sole exception to his clemency was that excited probably by the narrow malignance of his fellow Stoics—he condescended to persecute the Christians. The adoration of the people showed how much the gentleness of Marcus Aurelius was appreciated,—but it is not the mild monarchs who leave permanent blessings to their country. Among his most public tastes seems to have been a fondness for jurisprudence; he produced several volumes of *Constitutions*. This province of industry was the one most attractive of the

day. In the absence of literature, Roman jurisprudence is the one great and lasting product of the age of the Antonines. And now a word must be said upon an often mooted and never thoroughly discussed subject — the influence of the Stoic philosophy upon Roman law. Acquaintance with Grecian philosophy in general began at Rome contemporaneously with a change in the laws. The first epoch of Roman law was an epoch of rigid forms, and a narrow but coherent system, exclusively adapted to Roman citizens. Commerce and conquest made it necessary that law should widen so as to embrace the inhabitants of the Italian States. Hence the growth of the prætor's adjudicating power. By degrees the decisions of the prætors in regard to the hitherto over-exclusive laws of property, and the rights of persons born out of the Roman city, grew up into a body of equity by the side of the civil law. This body of equity, which was framed on the principles of natural reason, of course reflected the highest general enlightenment and the most cultivated ideas of the jurisconsults of the day. We have already seen that during the first and second centuries B.C. the most eminent Romans attached themselves to the direct study of Greek philosophy. To the list of the disciples of the Stoics we may add some names more immediately connected with jurisprudence. Q. Mutius Scævola (as well as Q. Ælius Tubero) appears to have been among the hearers of Panætius. C. Aquilius Gallus and Lucilius Balbus, distinguished jurisconsults of the time of Cicero, studied again under Scævola; and Balbus, who in Cicero's *De Naturâ Deorum* is made the expositor of the Stoical view, was teacher of Servius Sulpicius. Equity attained in the eyes of such persons an immense preference over the civil law. To this tendency of opinions Cicero gave a great stimulus, maintaining, as he did always, that justice must be based on humanity and reason, and 'that the source

and rule of right were not to be sought in the laws of the Twelve Tables, but in the depths of the human⁶⁰ intelligence.' Now, if we wish to form an idea to ourselves of the sort of way in which philosophy at Rome influenced jurisprudence, we may think of the philosophy of Cicero, that is, a philosophy not exclusively Stoical, but eclectic, practical, and human. Even the philosophers of the Stoic school themselves were by this time, as we have seen, all eclectic. Much more, then, would the lawyers avoid any rigid adherence to one set of formulæ; they would be sure to accept a certain mixture and modification of views. A number of humane and enlightened principles were now diffused, and it is perhaps true that the most noble of these ideas were due to Stoicism—as, for instance, the cosmopolitan thought, that the world is our State, and that mankind are of one race, being all the children of God. But it is true also that the general course of history had tended to foster and develope this and other ideas which Stoicism forcibly enunciated.

In the growth, then, of the Roman 'Jus Gentium,' and in the amelioration and softening of many austere legal usages (as, for instance, the absolute authority of fathers over their children), we see not simply and solely the influence of Stoicism, but of a generally enlightened practical philosophy, in which Stoicism was not more than an important element. But besides the material alterations which occurred in the spirit of the Roman laws, besides the era of the Jus Prætorium, we must look in another direction—to the era of 'codification,' if we wish to trace philosophical influences. An eminent authority maintains that 'the Stoical philosophy was to Roman jurisprudence what Benthamism has been to English law'—namely, a directing influence

⁶⁰ Mr. Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. ii. p. 528.

that came into play in the absence of any absolutely determining causes. These two principles of action might be said to be diametrically opposite to each other; for Benthamism, which looks to utility, commences with the concrete; while it is the essence of Stoicism to take an abstract point of view. The political writings of Zeno and Chrysippus are lost, and we know not the details of the 'universal state' as conceived by the former, but we may be sure that if Stoicism had had the framing of the laws for the Roman empire entrusted to its hands, there would have been a logical deduction from the principle of the natural freedom and equality of the whole human race. But what do we find? That slavery, even under Justinian, was mitigated, and not abolished; that men of different ranks were not equal in the sight of the law; that the civil incapacity of women (which Zeno had denied) still remained; that the application of cruel punishments, and even of torture, were treated by the new codes in a way which showed more a respect for existing usage and for the old statutes than a disposition to legislate synthetically from philosophical principles. 'Gaius, Ulpian, Papinian, and Paulus, appear very timid by the side of Seneca and Epictetus.'⁶¹ Perhaps this belongs of necessity to the progress of jurisprudence, that it must not break too hastily with the past; but we are obliged, if this view be correct, to confine the influence of Stoicism on Roman law to the introduction of an idea of form, to the endeavour to bring the actual under the scope of certain abstract formulæ. We must not expect to find the logical and systematic development of these formulæ, but rather we must recognise a frequent antithesis between abstract principles and the

⁶¹ M. Denis, *Histoire des Théories et des Idées Morales dans l'Antiquité*, vol. ii. p. 215. Paris, 1856.

details where one might have expected them to be applied. And yet again it appears, if we look a little further, that the philosophical ideas to which the Jurists appealed, though not immediately triumphant over all other considerations in the Roman Code, did yet in some cases come into direct application; and what is of far more importance, that these principles, being enunciated with reverence, were held up for the admiration of posterity, and so came to exert an influence on the whole bearing of subsequent jurisprudence. When we read in the *Digest* the stately preamble concerning the Jus Naturale—which nature has taught all animals, and which is prior even to the Jus Gentium prevailing among the human race—we are apt to be most struck with the abstract and, we might almost say, futile appearance of such a principle, followed out afterwards with so little consistency. But the idea of the ‘Law of Nature,’ enunciated here and elsewhere in the Roman Code, being taken up by Grotius and the Continental Jurists, became a leading idea of jurisprudence, the characteristic principle of a particular school, and the antithesis of Benthamism. What is the meaning of this conception, the ‘Law of Nature,’ and whether it has any reality or value as separate from, or opposed to, utility and experience, is a matter of keen debate amongst philosophical Jurists. It is not the province of the present Essay to enter upon this question. That which is our concern we may dismiss with only two remarks of recapitulation:—First, the idea of the Law of Nature, as introduced into the Roman law, was not by any means purely Stoical, but was the result of the general growth of ideas in the first century B.C., and was vividly apprehended by the eclectic and practical Cicero; second, this idea, though subsequently so influential, was not by any means uniformly applied in the details of the Corpus Juris.

Whatever fragments of Stoicism were preserved in the Roman law descended, no doubt, as a contribution not only to modern law, but also to modern morals. In other channels the direct connexion of our own thoughts with the ancient Stoics is hard to trace, because, long before modern thought began a separate existence, Stoicism had sunk into the world, and had influenced the ideas of men far beyond its own immediate school. But in acknowledging the influence of ancient civilization at all, in acknowledging the impress of Cicero and Tacitus, and even of the Fathers of the Church, we acknowledge to an appreciable extent a debt to Stoicism. This, while arising in a form of a Greek philosophy, was at the same time a reaction against the Grecian and the philosophical spirit. Hence its affinity to modern feelings. We have seen how it held up the delights of an inner life as preferable to all tangible and palpable enjoyments, however innocent they might be; we have seen how it drew the mind away from external realities into an abstract ideal; how it delighted in the conception of moral progress and the triumph of the will; how it developed the thought of duty and the responsibility of the individual; how, deserting the restrictions of national politics, it raised itself to conceive of all mankind as one brotherhood, each member standing in direct relation to God; finally, we have seen how, following its natural tendencies, Stoicism became more and more exclusively theological in its views. To some extent, then, this doctrine supplied the needs of the human soul and the want of a spiritual religion. Running parallel with Christianity, and quite uninfluenced by it, it yet exhibited the development of pure, gentle, and unworldly thoughts in the mind. It showed us how high it was possible for the Pagans to reach. At the same time it bore upon its face its own imperfection, its onesidedness, and its unnatural and paradoxical character.

While Stoicism passed away, the Stoical spirit has continued, and still continues to reproduce itself in the world. This spirit, in its extremest form, animates the various religious ascetics — Fakirs, Trappists, and the like. The Society of Jesus, like the school of the Stoics, was founded by men the intensity of whose moral will was more prominent than the fineness of their intellect. The parallel presented by Calvinism in its external gloom and its high necessarianism to the Stoical system has been already hinted at, and might be followed out at length. The Puritans stood to the Cavaliers much as the Stoics to the Epicureans. We might say that, changing sides, the same spirit manifested itself in the recurring austerities of the High-Church party, only here the attention to ceremonial showed a susceptibility to what is external alien from the Stoical tendency. Stoicism is essentially abstract; hence it is ungenial to the imagination and unfavourable to poetry. While the Epicurean school could boast of Lucretius as their poet, the ancient Stoics had only the crabbed satires of Persius and the rhetorical verses of Lucan to set against him. In modern times two great works of the imagination have been claimed for the Stoical side, that is, for the Puritans; namely, Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, and Milton's *Paradise Lost*. These works coming from such a source must be said to be exceptional; though in the last resort no form of our religion is to be treated as if absolutely like Stoicism, or absolutely wanting in the objective element. However, in each of the works in question, traces of the spirit to which we refer can be readily traced: in Bunyan the basis of the whole conception is abstract, it is a detailed picture or history of an inner life; in Milton, also, the imaginativeness is sublime, but cold and unearthly, and the inspiration is drawn rather from a rich learning than from vivid impressions of external

life. Stoicism, while deficient in that sensuous impressiveness which is necessary for poetry, is, on the other hand, extremely suitable for rhetoric, for splendid didactic preaching, for patriotic invocations, for historical *tableaux*. To this cause we may attribute the partiality manifested by the French, that nation with such perfect rhetoric and so little poetry, for the ancient Stoics and all belonging to them. In fact, the works of Seneca read like a fine French sermon, and Cato and Thræsea were a model to the Girondists. On quite other grounds we may say that there is a Stoical tinge also in the English character. It might be enough to allege that Puritanism is English; but independently of religious feeling, the tendency 'to shun delights and live laborious days,' to sacrifice life to an idea of success, this is Stoical because it is abstract. Of the spirit of Stoicism we may now take our leave, having seen in its various manifestations what it is. Existing by itself it is narrow and harsh, it has too great an affinity to pride and egotism, it is too repressive of the spontaneous feelings, of art, and poetry, and geniality of life. On the other hand, it is the stimulus to live above the world. Hence while the bare Stoical spirit, in whatever form, produces only an imperfect and repulsive character, a certain leaven of it, to say the least, is necessary; else would a man be wanting in all effort and aspiration of mind.

ESSAY VII.

On the Relation of Aristotle's Ethics to Modern Systems.

TO trace fully the historical relations of Aristotle's *Ethics* forwards as well as backwards would imply first an examination of the Stoical system to see how in it the Ethical idea was developed. Then we should require to consider broadly the action of Christianity upon the philosophic thought of the world; to trace in the Alexandrian schools the mingling of various elements, and to ask what in the thought of these schools was lasting and germinant, and what was only temporary and isolated. We should have to observe the condition of philosophy within the pale of the Church itself, to notice the awakening of the question of free-will in connection with the heresy of Pelagius; to see how Aristotle, at first excommunicated and kept aloof by the Church, was afterwards received for the sake of his method, and then almost incorporated with Christianity; to see how, when he was now taken up, his point of view had been lost, and how, accordingly, Aristotle's words were used to set forth the point of view of the schoolmen; how his logical, metaphysical, and ethical formulæ became stamped upon the language of the world; how at the revival of learning there was a reaction against the garbled Aristotelian philosophy of the schoolmen, which indiscriminately fell upon Aristotle himself; how in Bacon and Descartes modern philosophy took a fresh start with two divergent but highly fruitful and important tendencies; how Ethics also began anew quite independently of

ancient philosophy, with a fresh problem and a deeper eye. We should find Ethics now predominated over by two pervading and all-important conceptions, the product of ten centuries of theology,—namely, the will of God, and the will of man. We should see how the first speculative Ethics of modern times, in the persons of Spinoza and Leibnitz, essayed to fix the relation to each other of these two conceptions by the attainment of some higher conception in which they might both be solved; how the freedom of the will was pertinaciously, but less philosophically, re-asserted by Cudworth; how in the eighteenth century a smaller question was mooted, one, however, that was quite distinct from the ancient Ethical point of view,—namely, the ground of action, whether selfishness or utility, or an internal so-called authoritative principle—conscience or the moral sense; how this was variously argued, not on a metaphysical but a psychological basis, by Hobbes, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Mandeville, Adam Smith, Hume, and Paley; how Kant taking up the question endeavoured to throw aside, as unworthy, all external motives and inducements to right action, and to reduce all to the idea of duty, existing as an *à priori* law of the will.

It is obvious that to fill up the outline which we have here merely indicated would require, not an Essay, but a Volume. At the same time it would be writing the history, not of Aristotle's *Ethics*, but of modern moral philosophy. All we need at present is to make it felt, that between the point from which Aristotle started in writing his *Ethics*, and that from which any thinker of the present day or of the last two centuries would commence,—a great interval is set, an interval, too, full of powerful influences, during which the whole spirit of the world has been changed. The influence of Aristotle himself is no doubt one of those that has worked upon the

history of our thought, but only as one influence among many. It would then be an utter ignoring of facts and of the growth of the human mind if we were to try to read Aristotle's book merely as if it were a modern treatise, or to set him side by side with some modern writer and to ask, Does Aristotle agree with Bishop Butler (for instance) on this or that question, without having first recognized the essential difference in their points of view.

Perhaps the simplest way to set this difference in its strongest light will be to take some modern system, and place an outline of its contents in comparison and in contrast with Aristotle. Let us take, for instance, Dugald Stewart's *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man*, as being not deeply speculative and original, but at the same time able, clear, and learned, and therefore representing fairly the general run of modern Ethical science. Dugald Stewart, at the commencement of this work, proposes to begin with an analysis of the 'active propensities' of men, 'on account of the intimate relation which this analysis bears to the theory of morals, and its practical connection with our opinions on the duties and the happiness of human life. Indeed,' says Dugald Stewart, 'it is in this way alone that the light of nature enables us to form any reasonable conclusions concerning the ends and destination of our being, and the purposes for which we were sent into the world: *Quid sumus et quidnam victuri gignimur*. It forms, therefore, a necessary introduction to the science of Ethics, or rather is the foundation on which that science rests.'

This passage set forth its writer's view of the method of Ethics, also of their matter or contents. The method, then, of Ethics, according to Dugald Stewart, is entirely psychological; our only source of knowledge consists in an analysis of 'the active propensities' of the human mind. This is

very different from the procedure of Aristotle, who establishes his leading principle for Ethics, his conception of the practical chief good, long before he commences any psychological divisions. It is true, indeed, that Aristotle gave the first impulse to psychology, but it was all wavering and tentative with him, and never harmonized into a completed system. In one place you have the division of the *ψυχή* into rational, irrational, and semi-rational (*μετέχον λόγου*); at another place a division into *δύναμις*, *πάθος*, *ἔξις*; then a psychology of the will with the distinctions of *βούλησις*, *βούλευσις*, and *προαίρεσις*; then a psychology of the intellect, and the divisions of art, science, wisdom, reason, and philosophy. These different analyses of the mind stand apart from one another. It would be, then, totally at variance with Aristotle's point of view to found Ethics upon a classification of the 'propensities' in the mind of an individual. He does not take this subjective view; he rather says 'the end for the state and the individual are the same.'

The object of this psychological analysis is, according to Dugald Stewart, that we may 'form reasonable conclusions concerning the ends and destination of our being, and the purposes for which we were sent into the world.' In speaking of the 'ends of our being,' it is observable that he makes use of an Aristotelian formula, and we might accordingly suppose that the problem of Ethics was the same with him as with Aristotle, namely, What is the final cause of action? But by the addition he makes of 'the purposes for which we were sent into the world,' he shows what a different thing with him 'the ends and destination of our being' is from the *τέλος* of Aristotle. It is obvious that in Dugald Stewart the conception is a religious, rather than a philosophical one. He means that psychology should point out to us the designs of God, in order that when we know them we may be able to fulfil them.

The end, according to him, is something existing rather for the mind of God than for the mind of man. It conveys here no sense of the absolute, of that which is in and for itself desirable, of the chief good, of the sum of all means. Whatever the conception has gained in earnestness owing to its religious application, it has lost in philosophic depth. From the addition also of the word 'destination,' it would almost seem as if Dugald Stewart went off altogether from the Aristotelian sense of the term 'end' into another association—that of ultimate issue or termination. This view would place the Ethical 'end' entirely outside of the present life, and it would make the problem for Ethics to consist in asking what is to be our lot in the life to come. It is not to be asserted that Dugald Stewart would clearly and definitely have thus identified Ethics with religion. What is to be remarked rather is the indefiniteness of his view, and the way in which unconsciously he suffers it to be mixed up with theology.

In following out the method he has proposed himself, Dugald Stewart classifies the 'Active Principles' of man as follows:—1. Appetites; 2. Desires; 3. Affections; 4. Self-love; 5. The Moral Faculty. The three first he calls 'Instinctive or Implanted Propensities;' the two last 'Rational and Governing Principles of Action.' After enumerating the appetites, he proceeds to classify the desires, and it may surprise us to find that he gives the following list of original and elementary desires. The desire of knowledge—of society—of esteem—of power—of superiority. He subdivides the affections into love of kindred—friendship—patriotism—pity to the distressed, and resentment, 'with various other angry affections grafted upon it.' In these lists it is easy to see that no very profound point of view is taken. The writer seems to content himself with an empirical and superficial arrangement. It could scarcely be shown that there is an

absolute and primary distinction between the desire of society on the one hand, and love of kindred, friendship, and patriotism on the other. The account, then, of these different propensities is not to be looked at as in the least philosophical, it is only as a sort of psychological diversion. The real point of importance in the whole discussion is not the nature or number of these subordinate, or, as Dugald Stewart calls them, 'instinctive,' propensities,—but to show that how many and whatsoever they be, they are under the control of 'the two rational and governing principles,' self-love and the moral faculty. The writer shows that self-love, or a prudential regard to our own happiness, is not inconsistent with virtue. He establishes more by quotation than argument the existence of a supreme moral faculty, and bases moral obligation to do right upon the authority of this faculty.

We have taken this outline of moral science from Dugald Stewart, because it is by him stated dogmatically, and with the utmost clearness,—as far as clearness is possible in a theory where the conceptions are arbitrarily, rather than naturally, distinguished from each other. But every one will recognize in it a reproduction of Bishop Butler's system. Only certain details are more worked out; there is a more broad, though an arbitrary, separation between self-love and the moral faculty than Bishop Butler had made; and instead of the laborious course of a close argument we have a foregone conclusion. Butler, indeed, may be regarded as the parent of a certain family of modern moral systems. Let us briefly advert to some points which suggest themselves, on a comparison of the bearing of these systems with the *Ethics* of Aristotle.

We have already pointed out the psychological method of modern Ethics, as constituting a difference from the procedure

of Aristotle. The causes of this difference lie very deep. If the thought of Plato and Aristotle was 'conscious,' as compared with that of the Seven Sages, the thought of modern times might be called 'self-conscious,' as compared with theirs. In morals, we find Aristotle dealing profoundly with those conceptions that form the *object* of moral action, the good or happiness, and the beautiful or virtue. But with regard to the *subjective* side of these conceptions—the moral *subject*—the relation of the 'me,' of the will and consciousness of the individual, to the good in life and action,—his theory seems not equally complete. Now, it is this subjective side of morals which, in modern times, has assumed a paramount importance. Duty, right, moral obligation—all these conceptions imply bringing home an act to the innermost consciousness. They are all dependent on the relation of the moral subject to the outer world. In modern systems, man is no longer depicted as capable of realizing the absolute, the supreme End-in-itself, by means of noble actions and moments of philosophic thought. The spirit of the world seems deeper and sadder, and the good and the joy of life are no longer its predominant conceptions. Individual will, and therefore individual responsibility, are now the first thoughts of Ethics. It is no more a question of happiness, or, as with Aristotle, what is the chief good? but, rather, what constitutes duty? why is anything right, and why are we obliged to do the right?

It is true that we find scattered through the *Ethics* of Aristotle applications of the formula τὸ δέον, ὡς δεῖ, &c. Perhaps the most striking use of this term occurs *Eth.* III. i. 24, where it is argued that all desires cannot be involuntary, because there are some things one *ought* to desire (ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι). This implies the connection between duty or responsibility and the freedom of

the will. But the conception contained in this argument is not developed by Aristotle, as it might have been, systematically. It is a human instinct to say, 'We ought ($\delta\epsilon\iota$) to do some things;' but all that is contained in this word, 'ought,' had not been made explicit in the time of Aristotle, and certainly it was as yet by no means a leading conception. The foundation of the Ethical notion of duty is partly owing to the Stoics; but, undoubtedly, the whole idea of moral obligation and individual responsibility, which goes to make up its full significance, has taken hold of the thought of mankind through, and by reason of, the long influence of religion and theology. This deep conception is now an heir-loom of moral philosophers, they cannot get rid of it, any more than a man can return to the unconsciousness of a child. The inheritance, then, of this conception forms the first great difference between modern Ethical philosophers and Aristotle. However comparatively feeble may be the individual thought of any modern thinker, there is yet a sort of background to his system provided by the spirit of the age; a conception which he cannot help availing himself of, which, through no merit of his own, is on the whole deeper than anything which Aristotle had attained to. In modern times the system, or parts of the system, are often far greater than the individual thinker.

The question of Ethics which has most exercised and divided the moderns is one that in Aristotle's day had never been mooted, namely, Why are we obliged to do any particular right action instead of its contrary? The answers to this question are virtually only two. The assignable reasons reduce themselves, in short, to (1) utility, (2) duty. Against those who assigned utility as the ground of moral obligation, it was urged, that the idea of utility could never give rise to the idea of obligation. To this Paley replied that you must

take into your calculation of utility some account of the consequences in another world, that is to say, of the rewards and punishments appointed by God. This fuller notion of utility, he argued, would completely explain all that was meant by obligation. In Bishop Butler's sermons a wavering account seems to be given. The inducements to right action are partly eudæmonistic—it being urged that virtue is for our interest even in this life, and how much more for our interest in case there be rewards and punishments hereafter—partly they appeal to the authority of conscience. Only, what is the exact nature of conscience; how it pronounces; whether it be infallible; what is its relation to the will and the reason; and many other difficulties that might be started, Bishop Butler leaves unexplained.

In these specimens of eighteenth-century Ethics we may see how little a philosophical point of view was maintained or even aimed at. Why should not Paley have taken his stand on the inherent desire for the good, inalienable from every creature, and which *obliges* it to pursue the course most conducive to the good? Why should not Butler, if he perceived so strongly the existence in us of this authoritative principle taking cognizance of the right, have been content to develope its nature, and to base all inducement to action upon obedience to its mandates? Even though Aristotle himself was occasionally prone to empiricism, and to falling away from the highest point of view, yet we feel that in his principle of the chief good and of the end there is something philosophical which we utterly miss in the views above mentioned. If Aristotle could possibly ever have had the question of moral obligation put before him, we can fancy how much more great and penetrating would have been the answer given. Turning from these English divines, who were most excellent writers but not profound philosophers,

to the German thinker, Kant, we find in him no lack of endeavour to maintain a philosophical point of view. He at once discards all external inducements to action, reduces virtue to a state of the will, and the law of action to an *à priori* mandate of the will itself. It is true, that in carrying out this system, Kant is led into certain inconsistencies. He is unable to give his *à priori* law of duty any content, without going to experience, and asking what will be the effect if such and such a course of action were to become universal? He seems also to think that the idea of a future life is necessary to supplement the morality of this present world, a view which is a little inconsistent with his former discarding of all notions of happiness, or of external reward for virtue. In spite of its defects and irregularities, Kant's *Metaphysics of Ethics* is a fine book, in which a noble and stern conception of duty is upheld, and in which there is an attempt at least to obtain a central point of view, and to give expression to some one deep principle of man's moral nature.

As compared with Aristotle, Kant's characteristics are prominent. They consist in an intensifying to the utmost of the great modern ethical conception, the individual will. Kant says, 'The only good thing in the world is a good will.' We saw before (pp. 174 and 208) that he found fault with Aristotle for basing Ethics on eudæmonism, and for assigning a merely quantitative difference between virtue and vice. But we also saw there was a certain degree of misunderstanding in these criticisms upon Aristotle. When we look narrowly into it, we find that Aristotle asserts the only good to be 'an act of the consciousness duly harmonized;' and that if ideally he requires this to be prolonged through a life, and assisted by external good fortune, he practically speaks (*Eth.* I. x. 12; III. ix. 4) of the triumph of the internal consciousness over adverse external circumstances. Kant,

then, hardly does justice to the depth of Aristotle's moral conception. But it remains true, that the starting-point of the two philosophers was broadly different—that Aristotle started with the question of his day, What is the practical chief good—or, as it is popularly called, Happiness? and only gradually, by thought and the progress of his own analysis, came to assign a definition which is really above the vulgar conception of happiness. Kant, on the contrary, commencing with the stern and sublime idea of Duty due to the deeper thought of modern time, and wishing to free this from all considerations of external reward and happiness, comes round in the end to take in some account of consequences, and to supplement his view with the hopes of a future life—thus testifying, perhaps, that the good and the right are ultimately inseparable conceptions for Ethics. We have seen above that Aristotle's principle of 'the mean,' objected to by Kant, is a sufficient expression of the objective law of virtue, but only insufficient to express the subjective side of right action—the feeling of duty, the attitude assumed by the will and consciousness in relation to a moral act. Kant commences burthened with the notion of obligation; this he proceeds to analyse. Aristotle, writing as it were in the childhood of the world, commences with an idea of the beautiful and the good in human life and action, and of the inner joy of the human mind.

Another question of modern Ethics, also mooted by the Stoics, but developed in its full proportions since, is the question of the freedom of the will. This may have two bearings—either theological, in relation to the will of God; or metaphysical, in relation to the law of cause and effect in the order of nature. How is the freedom of the will compatible with the omnipotence of God? How is it reconcilable with the unalterable sequence of cause and effect in

nature? Is the will a cause only, or is it also an effect? The various answers to these questions, in modern times, it would be out of place to discuss. The only thing to be observed here is, that the questions themselves are virtually excluded from consideration in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. That all theological or metaphysical considerations with regard to the freedom of the will should be set aside by Aristotle, and that he should have restricted himself to a mere 'Political' discussion (cf. *Eth.* III. i. 1), is quite in keeping with the general tenour of his treatise; but it must be called a weakness. It proceeds from an uncertainty of view about the nature of Ethics—from the confusion (so often alluded to) between Ethics and Politics. We might almost say, that could Aristotle have thought and written for ten years more, this narrowness of view would have been abandoned. The question of free-will had been touched upon by Democritus, who said that 'in the whirl of necessity man was only half a slave.' Also, in the conclusion of Plato's *Republic*, we find man's responsibility asserted even in spite of the transmigration of souls. From all this aspect of the question Aristotle shuts himself out. He restricts himself to a polemic against a smaller proposition, belonging probably to the early, or Socratic Platonism—namely, that as virtue is knowledge, vice is ignorance, and therefore involuntary. Aristotle answers to this, that we act in society as if vice were free; that vice must, after all, stand on the same level as its contrary virtue; that, assuming virtue to be free, vice must be free also; that if it be said our ideas of the end (or the good) be beyond our control, that this will make virtue involuntary; and, again, it will ignore two considerations—first, that we probably contribute at all events something to our ideas of the end; second, that we are at all events free to choose our means to the end. Obviously all

these different arguments might be shown to be insufficient. It might be answered, that our acting as if free in society proves nothing—that the puppet-show moves as if it were free, unless we look at the strings—that legislator, judge, and criminal may all be equally under the bands of necessity—that each individual step by which ‘we form our own character’ may be determined for us, so our ‘contribution’ to our own ideas comes to nothing—that there is no proof given of the choice of the means being free—in fact, that the idea of the end necessarily determines the means. We see, then, the insufficiency of all such merely practical arguments to solve a question of this magnitude and difficulty. Certainly we may live and act without solving the question of free-will; but if we ever attempt to solve it, we must do so in a philosophical spirit. Aristotle’s method of dealing with the subject constitutes a difference between him and modern thinkers. No so great philosopher as himself could, in modern times, have virtually discarded, as not necessary for Ethics, the difficulties regarding the freedom of the will. Had Aristotle’s starting-point been an idea of individual responsibility, he would, in all probability, have written otherwise.

Having once known and acknowledged the deep-lying variations which exist in point of view and in spirit between any modern moral system and the early half-immature system of Aristotle,—we are the better able to deal with the traces of his influence which still remain. There is indeed so great a field of derived terms and conceptions that the sense of similarity has often overpowered the sense of difference, and people have been led still further to seek for likeness between their own views and Aristotle’s, where there was only dissimilarity really existing. All systems of morals present, on their surface, terms that seem perfectly Ari-

stotelian ; the 'law of habits,' the opposition of 'the passions' and 'the reason,' 'motives,' 'principles,' 'energy,' the doctrine that 'extremes meet,' the contrast of 'moral' and 'intellectual,' the 'end of man,' and perhaps others such like are instances of words and phrases which, when we first meet them in a Greek form in Aristotle, seem to us quite familiar, so that we are apt to substitute their modern context for their original and genuine philosophic import. An examination, however, of these terms, will show that almost all of them are at all events slightly altered, and that we cannot understand Aristotle without restoring to them a lost association. 'Habits' is no doubt only the Latinized form of *ἔξεις*, but the meaning which attached to *ἔξεις* does not remain pure in 'habit' as it is generally used. Rather it implies *ἔθος*, i.e. that process by which a *ἔξεις* is formed. The 'passions' with us, though a translation of *πάθη*, do not quite correspond with them, they more nearly answer to the *ἐπιθυμίας* of Aristotle. 'Motive' is properly the 'efficient cause' (*ὄθεν ἡ κίνησις*), but applying it to action we use it invariably for the 'final cause' (*οὐ ἕνεκα*) which was Aristotle's term for the motive of an action. 'Principle,' as above mentioned (p. 219), corresponds with the *ἀρχή* of the practical syllogism, but according to the Peripatetic system this major premiss contained an idea of the good, while our 'principle' is meant to imply an idea of the right. 'Energy,' though identical in form with *ἐνέργεια*, has quite lost all notion of a contrast and correlation with *δύναμις* or potentiality, and implies merely the exercise of physical or moral force. In saying 'extremes meet,' we forget the philosophical antithesis between the extremes and the mean, and all which that 'mean' originally implied. In translating Aristotle's *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* by the terms 'moral virtue' we omit to notice how much all these associations connected with the

individual will, which go to make up our conception of 'moral,' were wanting in Aristotle's *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*, while this, strictly speaking, might perhaps be better represented by the words 'excellence of the character,' and, as has been already made apparent, in speaking of 'the end of man,' we substitute a religious for a philosophical association.

The above-mentioned terms, however, have all a direct affinity to, and a lineal descent from, the system of Aristotle. They have only suffered that degree of change to which all language is liable, and which so many ancient words have undergone in their transition to modern use. Modern terms of this derivative character present, for the most part, two characteristics, as contrasted with their antique originals. In the first place, they are more definite. In the second place, they are less philosophic. The philosophy, however, that once surrounded them and formed their proper context, in ebbing away from them has really sunk into the general thought of the world and become absorbed in it. If 'energy' no longer represents *ἐνέργεια*, 'actuality' and many other forms of thought contain and reproduce all that was philosophical in the original word. If 'habit' is not exactly *ἔξῃς*, the 'law of habits' is a received doctrine in all practical Ethics. And so in a variety of ways Aristotle has influenced our views, while our particular terms do not exactly square with his. Our words, we have said, are more definite than his. This with regard to psychological words is particularly the case. *Ψυχή*, as we have seen, is very inadequately represented by 'soul,' which, on the one hand, expresses too little, on the other hand, too much. We cannot properly translate *φρόνησις* by 'prudence,' still less by 'conscience.' *Πολιτικὴ* means something different from our 'politics.' *Ἀρετή* conveys a somewhat false impression when translated 'virtue.' It would be an anachronism to make 'duty' stand for *τὸ δέον*.

And the most flagrant instance of all of an attempt to find modern notions among the ancients, and Christian notions among the Greeks, is where persons have thought that they have discovered in one or two places of Aristotle's *Ethics* the doctrine of 'human corruption.'

It is only by an effort of mind, and not immediately, or at first sight, that we can understand Aristotle's *Ethics*, as they really are. It is a difficult task to throw aside our associations and views, which all belong to what Bacon calls the 'old age of the world,' and to go back to the era of Alexander, and put ourselves into the position of this early but deeply-penetrating thinker. We have seen that much of his thought has been amalgamated with our own. There is much else in the profounder parts of his Ethical system, which is, when properly discerned and felt, a real revelation with regard to human life. Taken as a whole, however, when we consider this noble treatise in relation to modern thought, we feel there is something about it that stands apart from ourselves; that its main interest is historical; that we look back on it as on an ancient building shining in the fresh light of an Athenian morning.

APPENDIX A.



On the Ethical Method of Aristotle.

SOME notice of Aristotle's Ethical method seems necessary for completeness;—it is a subject too long for a note and too short for an Essay, and may be briefly dispatched here. Incidentally we have already alluded to several characteristics of his point of view. And in the last resort a philosopher's method, whatever be the subject or science, depends on the whole bearing of his mind and thought. With regard to Ethics, we may first observe, that while Aristotle seems to occupy himself much with the logic of the science, and the question, What is its appropriate method? he is quite tentative and uncertain, and to some extent confused, in all he directly answers to this question. In the second place, we may notice that his method unconsciously declares itself, not in the abstract but in the concrete, throughout the pages of his treatise.

At the very outset of his work, in the first seven chapters, he has no less than three digressions on the logic of Ethics. In the first (*Eth.* I. iii. 1—4), he cautions his readers against expecting too much ἀκρίβεια in the present science. This term ἀκρίβεια (see the notes on *Eth.* I. vii. 18) seems to imply both mathematical exactness and also metaphysical subtlety. The Ethical treatise of Spinoza might be said to exhibit ἀκρίβεια in both senses of the word, on account of its demonstrative statement, combined with its metaphysical

character of thought. Kant's system, without aiming at a mathematical method, might be called *ἀκριβής*, on account of its speculative depth of view. The question then is, of how much *ἀκρίβεια* is this 'branch of Politics' (*πολιτική τις*) capable? Aristotle tells us, that 'the matters of which it treats—virtue and justice—have so much about them that is fluctuating and uncertain, as even to have given rise to the opinion that they are only conventional distinctions. Hence, with such conceptions on which to reason, we cannot expect demonstrative and exact conclusions, we must be content with rough and general theories.' It is to be observed here, that Aristotle departs from the point of view with which he had started. He started with an *à priori* conception of the End-in-itself, which 'must be identical with the chief good for man.' Here he goes off into another point of view—that which looks at action from the outside, recognizes the variations in the details of action, and allows the empirical casuistry of the Sophists to have an influence in determining the character of his science.

In his second digression upon this topic (*Eth.* i. iv. 5) he shows even more plainly a tentative and uncertain attitude. He says, 'We must not forget the distinction drawn by Plato between the two methods of science—the method which proceeds *from* principles, and that which proceeds *to* principles. The question is, Which must we adopt at present? We must begin, at all events, with things known. But again, things are *known* in two ways, absolutely and relatively. Perhaps *we* may be content to begin with what *we* know (*i.e.*, relative and not absolute truths). Hence the necessity of a good moral training previous to the study of this science. For one who has been so trained is in possession of facts which either already do, or soon can, stand in the light of principles.' In this passage there appears to be more than one play upon

words :—(1) In saying, ‘*we* must begin with what *we* know,’ there is a sort of bantering implication that the method of Ethics must be inductive, starting from relative and individual facts. But there is a fallacy in such an insinuation, because, though the individual must begin with what ‘he knows,’ there is nothing to prevent an absolute truth (τὸ ἀπλῶς γινώριμον) forming part of the intuitions and experience of the individual. (2) There appears to be a play on the word ἀρχή; for while Aristotle implies that the procedure must be *to* principles, and not starting from them, he says, on the other hand, that ‘the fact is a principle.’ Now, this may mean two things. It may mean that ‘a moral fact or perception really amounts to a law.’ But, in this case, the science of Ethics, beginning with moral facts, really begins ἀπ’ ἀρχῶν. Or it may mean that ‘the fact is a beginning or starting-point for discussion.’ In this latter case the word ἀρχή should not have been used, as it introduces confusion into the present passage—the upshot of which, on the whole, seems to be, to assert in a very wavering way that Ethics must be inductive rather than deductive, and must commence with experience of particulars rather than with intuitions of the universal.

The third digression on the same subject occurs *Eth.* i. vii. 17—21, where Aristotle points out his definition of the chief good as ‘a sketch to be filled up;’ and also, it would appear, as an ἀρχή or leading principle, which in importance amounts to ‘more than half the whole’ science. In filling up the sketch, he again cautions us that too much ἀκρίβεια is not to be expected. But it is plain that he has deserted his former view of the science as inductive; he now makes it depend on a general conception of the chief good, which is to be applied and developed.

Elsewhere in the *Ethics* Aristotle appears puzzled how to

deal with the casuistry of his subject. He says (*Eth.* II. II. 3—4) that 'the actions and the interests of men exhibit no fixed rule, any more than the conditions of health do; and if this is the case with the universal theory, still more is the theory of particular acts incapable of being exactly fixed, for it falls under the domain of no art or regimen, but the actors themselves must always watch what suits the occasion, as is the way with the physician's and the pilot's art. And yet, though the theory is of such a kind, we must do what we can to help it out.' He reverts to the same point of view, *Eth.* IX. II. 6, mentioning some casuistical difficulties, and saying it is impossible to give a fixed rule on such points.

Much as Aristotle speaks of the logic of science, we find, when we come to examine his real procedure, how little he is influenced by his own abstract rules of method. It has been sometimes said that his *Ethics* exhibits a perfect specimen of the analytic method. But this is not really true. The discussions are very frequently of an analytic character, different parts and elements of human life are treated separately, and indeed are not sufficiently considered in their mutual relationship. But the leading principles of the science are not obtained by this sort of analysis, there is not by any means a procedure *ἐν' ἀρχάς*. Aristotle's bias of mind was only on one side analytical, he was on the other side deeply speculative and synthetical, and viewed all the world as reduced to unity under certain forms of thought, and, as we have said before, every philosopher's modes and forms of thought, his genius, his breadth of view, and his power of penetration, will constitute in reality his logic of science and his method of discovery.

Aristotle's Ethical system, as we saw more in detail in Essay IV., depends on certain profound *à priori* conceptions, end, form, and actuality. We are enabled to some extent to

trace how these conceptions grew up out of Platonism, but in their ultimate depth and force they must be regarded as lightning-flashes from the genius of Aristotle. These great ideas, by which human life is explained, are no mere results of an induction, no last development of experience, rather they come in from above, and for the first time give some meaning to experience. Aristotle shows how his definition of the chief good includes all the previous notices of the requisitions for happiness. But his definition is not derived from combining these, nor yet from any analysis of happiness in the concrete, but from an inner intuition of a law of good as manifested in life. The same procedure manifests itself throughout. Whatever use Aristotle may make of his *ἀπορίαι*, of appeals to language and experience, of the authority of the many and the few, these are only means of testing, correcting, illustrating, and amplifying his conceptions, and not the source from whence they spring. However, it is just the maintenance of this constant reconciliation with experience and with popular points of view that is the characteristic of Aristotle's method, as distinguished from Plato's. That it gives rise at times to an empirical and unphilosophical mode of writing, we have had more than once an opportunity of observing. But it is Aristotle's strength as well as his weakness. His width of mind, which is as distinguished as its profundity, enabled him to sum up all the knowledge of ancient times, as well as all its philosophy. Bacon accuses him of being 'a dogmatic,' and of resembling the Ottoman princes who killed all their brethren before they could reign themselves. This accusation is an invidious and utterly unfair way of stating the real case. Aristotle is 'a dogmatic,' inasmuch as his philosophy is *γνωριστικὴ οὐ πειραστική*, conclusive, and not merely starting the questions. Also he shows the relationship of all previous philosophies and contem-

porary opinions to his own system, by which he does not so much 'kill his brethren' as demonstrate that they are evidently 'younger brethren,' leaving his own right to the throne indefeasible. If in the term 'dogmatist' arrogance or assumption is implied, this would not be true either of his style of writing, or tone of thought. And he is by no means dogmatic on all points; on some, as we have already seen (in Essay V.), he declines to decide.

APPENDIX B.



On the ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.

THERE is a question of minor importance which has still been thought worthy of a good deal of discussion, namely, what is meant by the *ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, which Aristotle occasionally mentions? We are told by Aulus Gellius (xx. 4) that Aristotle, the master of Alexander of Macedon, had two sorts of teaching, and that his writings admit of a twofold division. That in the morning he used to give to intimate disciples instructions, which were called Acroatic, in the deeper parts of philosophy; that in the afternoon he gave discourses, which were called exoteric, to the public in general. That Alexander, hearing that the Acroatic discourses had been published, wrote from the East to complain of what had been done, since he ‘should now have no superiority over the vulgar’; and that Aristotle replied that ‘the treatises, though published, were not published, since nobody would understand them.’

When we look this story in the face, and ask what is its historical foundation, how much of it can be relied on?—one fact alone seems to remain with any stability, and that is, that the words *ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* are occasionally used in the writings of Aristotle. All the rest is a mere fabrication put together to adorn the rhetorical topic of the relationship of Aristotle to Alexander. When we consider that Alexander was a mere boy when Aristotle was his tutor—that he probably learnt from him Homer and mathematics—that

Aristotle himself speaks of the impossibility of a boy being a proficient in ethics, physics, or philosophy—that even these early years of instruction were broken by domestic troubles and the premature cares of state—that Aristotle was working out for himself, up to the time of his death, the deeper parts of his philosophy, and could not have had it ready, like a sort of mystery, to reveal to his pupil—when we consider all this, we may well come to the conclusion that Alexander knew no more of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle than any soldier in his army; and that as the latter part of the story is a fabrication, so the former is not worthy of the very least reliance. In short, we have not any sufficient ground for believing in the above-mentioned division of the teaching of Aristotle, and we still have to ask afresh for ourselves, what does he mean by the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*?

We have already (p. 5) accepted the tradition of Cicero, that Aristotle wrote certain exoteric, that is, popular, discourses. We saw that their first characteristic, as compared with the philosophical works, was that they were finished in point of style. Cicero was probably acquainted with these better than with the more difficult remains of Aristotle. He mentions other characteristics of them, namely, that they had proems to them; he says, in writing to Atticus, ‘*Quoniam in singulis libris utor proœmiis, ut Aristoteles in iis quos ἐξωτερικούς vocat.*’ Now we can trust Cicero about the proems; but about the more subtle point of interest, that Aristotle *called some of his own works* exoteric, he is not a sufficiently discriminating authority to be relied on. In another of his letters (*Ep. ad Famil.* i. 9, 23), he speaks of his three books *De Oratore*, as ‘a dialogue in the style of Aristotle.’ And again (*Ep. ad Atticum*, xiii. 19) he says that he has copied Aristotle, ‘who in his dialogues always assigns to himself the leading part in the conversation.’ We have now gained some idea of

the appearance of Aristotle's popular works, as they were read by Cicero. The names probably of some of them, as, for instance, the '*Gryllus*,' &c., are preserved in the list of Diogenes Laertius, but the works themselves are all lost. The question then is, does Aristotle refer to this class of his writings under the name of οἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι?

The great *à priori* improbability of such a thing is almost a sufficient answer to the question. For though it is conceivable that a philosopher should in certain higher and more rhetorical dialogues (which might be analogous to a novel written in moments of relaxation by a philosopher of modern times) quote and appeal to his own scientific treatises,—it is quite inconceivable that he should in those scientific treatises appeal for the support of any doctrines to his 'exoteric works.' And when we look to particular passages where the references to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι occur, it becomes still more manifest, from several little indications, that Aristotle cannot be quoting his own dialogues.

In *Eth.* i. xiii. 9, in speaking of the ψυχή, he says, Λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἓνια καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. In this not only is there the *à priori* improbability of Aristotle's referring, for a psychological division on which so much of his *Ethics* is based, to a merely popular set of dialogues written by himself; but also we see at once the unlikelihood of his having summed up his own popular works under one head, and spoken of them as 'the exoteric treatises,'—this would imply a sort of completeness about the 'Works of Aristotle' suitable to times like those of Cicero, when editions of these works had been before the world for two hundred years, and when a recent recension had been made by Andronicus, but utterly unsuitable to Aristotle's own lifetime, and his own feeling about his multifarious, but un-

completed labours. Again, the word λέγεται is in the manner of a general reference and not a special quotation. Again, the word καί prefixed to ἐν τοῖς ἐξ. λόγ., as it invariably is by Aristotle, implies a sort of disparagement, not natural in a writer appealing for arguments to others of his own writings. It short, it is obvious that here Aristotle says that 'even in popular accounts there is a sufficiently accurate division of the ψυχή,' which he will 'make use of' for his present purposes. This same interpretation of οἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι to mean 'unscientific talk,' theories and opinions belonging to the outer world, outside the schools of philosophy—will be found to hold good in the other four places where the terms are used by Aristotle. We will subjoin them without comment.

(1) *Metaphys.* XII. i. 4. Σκεπτέον πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν,—ἔπειτα μετὰ ταῦτα χωρὶς περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν αὐτῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ ὅσον νόμον χάριν· τεθρύλληται γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων.

(2) *Nat. Ausc.* IV. x. 1. Ἐχόμενον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶ ἐπελθεῖν περὶ χρόνου· πρῶτον δὲ καλῶς ἔχει διαπορῆσαι περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων (even from the popular point of view) πότερον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, εἴτα τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ.

(3) *Politics*, III. vi. 5. Ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥάδιον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις.

(4) *Politics*, VII. i. 2. Διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον ὁμολογεῖσθαι, τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰρετώτατος βίος· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος. Νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. The last passage does not contain, as some think, a reference to the *Ethics*, but rather an exact parallel to the way of speaking quoted above, *Eth.* I.

xiii. 9. Aristotle proceeds, not to give any doctrine established in the *Ethics*, but to collect certain popular and universally received conceptions of happiness. In addition to these places of Aristotle, we may mention three passages in which Eudemus uses the terms ἐξ. λόγ. One of these occurs *Eth. Eud.* II. i. 1, where the writer speaks of the threefold division of goods, as a popular division (καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις). In another (*Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 4) he says that the doctrine of Ideas has been variously discussed, both philosophically and from a popular point of view (καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν). In the Eudemian book (*Eth.* VI. iv. 1) it is said that the popular distinction between ‘action’ and ‘production’ is quite sufficient (ἕτερον δ’ ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πράξις. Πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις).

Another term used by Aristotle in exactly the same sense as ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι is ἐγκύκλιοι λόγοι, for an explanation of which see the note on *Eth.* I. v. 6.

APPENDIX C.

On the Political Ideas in the Ethics of Aristotle.

IT may seem a strange omission that, while we have so often alluded to Aristotle's identification or confusion of Ethics with Politics, we have never specified any very important consequences of this view; except, indeed, that we have noticed sometimes a restricted mode of dealing with certain questions, more appropriate to Politics than to philosophy. It remains then to ask, were there any such consequences? Does Aristotle write on Ethics differently because he considered that his science was a kind of Politics? Is the individual in his eyes always regarded as a citizen? Do his views of law, the state, and different questions of the constitution influence his views upon moral action? Every one will be ready to answer that such effects are hardly traceable. We read the *Ethics* as containing discussions on happiness, virtue, friendship, pleasure, and philosophy; we find it replete with anthropology, dealing with the heights and the depths of the human consciousness, and quite away from any consideration of the welfare of masses of mankind. Happiness, as here described, does not depend on any particular constitution or form of government. Aristotle, indeed, specifies the various forms of government, and declares which is the best among them (*Eth.* VIII. x.), but this is only for the purpose of illustration, for the sake of comparing the different degrees of equality in various kinds of friendship with the different degrees of liberty in various forms of the

constitution. Aristotle's entering into detail here with regard to the governments is not so much a mark of consistency in preserving a political point of view, but rather it is a want of art and an entrenchment upon the subject of Politics proper. It would be called too long a digression, supposing there were a settled coordination of subject between the different parts of Aristotle's system. A still greater entrenchment on the province of Politics occurs in the theory of justice given in Book V. It is remarkable that this book, in all probability by Eudemus, sets forth a closer dependence of moral on political principles than any other book in the *Ethics*. Eudemus, as we saw before (p. 18), does not, at the outset, like Aristotle, commence under the name of Politics. But in Book V. he probably merely reproduced, in perhaps a somewhat garbled form, the theory of Aristotle. Justice is here defined according to principles of Jurisprudence and Political Economy. To make these a part of morals would be a confusion we should never now fall into; though we might confess that it would be hard to give the ethical idea of justice its full content without appealing to these extraneous sciences.

Other allusions to Politics occur, (*Eth.* I. xiii. 2) where he says that 'the true politician must study the nature of virtue;' (III. i. 1) where he says that 'a theory of the voluntary and involuntary will be useful to legislators;' (VII. xi. 1) where it is said that 'it belongs to the political philosopher to consider pleasure, since he is the architect of the End-in-itself;' (VIII. i. 4) 'friendship holds states together; legislators seem more anxious for this than for justice.' Lastly, we have the most remarkable place of all, when, at the conclusion of his ethical treatise (x. ix. 8), he makes the transition to Politics proper, by saying that 'for virtue, not only nature, but habits and teaching are requisite, and these

last must be provided by the state. Hence,' he says, 'the nurture and the discipline should be fixed by law, and use will make them easy. Not only, perhaps, ought men while youths to receive good discipline, but also we want laws about their conduct when they are grown up; and, in short, about the whole of life. For the many will rather obey necessity than reason, punishment than the inducements of the beautiful.'

With these evidences before us, let us now sum up the bearing of Aristotle's political thought upon what we now call his *Ethics*. There seems to be an analogy between Aristotle's views of man in relation to the state, and his views of man in relation to nature. We have seen before (Essay V.) that in his *Physics* he considers man as part of nature, and, because he is a part, inferior to and less divine than the heaven and the universe; so, too, in his political system, he considers the state prior to and greater than the individual (*Politics*, i. ii. 13), just as the whole is prior to and greater than the part. The individual without the state has no meaning; the state must be presupposed; man is not a whole in himself (*αὐτάρκης*), he is born to live in relationship to others (*πολιτικός*), if he lived alone he must be either more or less than man (*ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός*). Just as Aristotle said 'the universe is diviner than man,' so he says 'the End for the state is diviner than that for the individual.' Politics, then, is the greatest science, the legislator is an *ἀρχιτέκτων*, a master builder laying the plan of that greatest practical thing, a fitly framed human society. This idea, if it were carried out, would tend to overwhelm all individuality. It actually does so in Plato's *Republic*, and the last-quoted passage (*Eth.* x. ix. 8) is a reproduction of the same feeling as Plato's. The laws are to regulate the whole of life, and to force a good discipline on

those who would not choose virtue for its own sake. This idea then forms one side of Aristotle's view, it is a sort of background to his ethical system. The End for the state, as he depicts it (see above, p. 178), is something almost mystical, it is like the identification of state and church. But the other side of his view is that which seems forced on him by the truth, as soon as he commences a course of ethical inquiries. It consists in an acknowledgment, to the full, of the absolute worth of the individual consciousness. Not only is a reaction thus made against the system of Plato, but also, by the whole treatment which Aristotle gives his subject, Ethics is virtually and for ever separated from Politics.

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.



BOOKS I.—II.

PLAN OF BOOK I.

THIS Book may be roughly divided into the following four parts:—

(1.) The statement of the leading question of political science; namely, What is the Practical Chief Good? Ch. I.—VI.

(2.) The answer to this question as given by Aristotle himself. Ch. VII.

(3.) A comparison of Aristotle's definition of the Chief Good with existing opinions on the subject. Ch. VIII.—XII.

(4.) A commencement of the analysis of the different elements which constitute his definition. Ch. XIII.

With respect to these divisions, we may remark that they are not with entire precision separated from one another. For the first part professes to examine the most important opinions on the subject of Happiness or the Chief Good (Ch. IV. § 4), and accordingly reviews men's conceptions of it as exhibited in their lives (Ch. V.), and refutes Plato's theory that the Chief Good is a transcendental Idea, on the ground of its being both metaphysically untenable and practically inapplicable.

After developing his own conception, Aristotle returns (in Ch. VIII., *sqq.*) to compare it with *τὰ λεγόμενα*—‘that goods of the mind are highest;’ ‘that happiness consists in virtue,’ &c. Now we may ask, why did not a statement of these theories open the Book? Both in Part 1st and Part 3rd we have to do with the existing opinions. Had Aristotle pursued his usual method, he would have preluded his *Ethics* with a brief critical history of the previous progress of the science, in which the leading systems would have been refuted or shown to be inadequate. But it seems as if he did not set out with so clear a conception of ethics as he does of physics and metaphysics. Before

Aristotle, Ethics cannot be said to have existed as a separate science. Even in the present work there is no name for it as yet. Though ἠθικοὶ λόγοι and τὰ ἠθικά are spoken of in the *Politics* (III. xii. 1, VII. xiii. 5), and in the *Metaphysics* (I. i. 17), yet the word ἠθική does not occur. The science is still πολιτική τις (*Eth.* I. ii. 9); and even in the *Rhetoric*, which contains the results of the present enquiries, we find it specified as ἡ περὶ τὰ ἥθη πραγματεία ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν (I. ii. 7).

Hence we may recognise something tentative and uncertain in Aristotle's treatment of the subject. He seems not clear as to how far he is entering on a merely practical and political science, and how far on something speculative. He professes to lay the foundations for his science inductively (Ch. IV. §§ 5-7) in experience, but really obtains his own theory from *a priori* grounds, arguing what the Chief Good *must* be. That Aristotle's principle, thus obtained, is truly profound, we need not fail to acknowledge. Only, with regard to the science as a whole, we see that he was feeling his way; and we must not expect to find, even in the First Book of his *Ethics*, a finished work of art.

With this proviso, we may rapidly trace the sequence of ideas contained by the Book, as follows. The distinction between means and ends characterizes every part of life and action. Given the subordination of means to ends, there must be some end which is never a means. This End-in-itself of all action is obviously identical with the Practical Chief Good (δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον). What, then, is this Chief Good—which must be the determinator of life—and which is the object of Politics, the supreme practical science?

To this question no answer is to be obtained from the common opinions of men; nor from their lives, for the most part; nor from the metaphysical system of Plato.

The Good and the End are always identical; hence, as already said, the Chief Good is identical with the End-in-itself. In this conception the idea of absoluteness and all-sufficiency would seem to be implied (τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ). It must be realised in the proper sphere of man, which a consideration of the scale of life leads us to see must be a rational and moral existence. To give meaning to the conception of this existence, we must assume

that it falls under the category of the actual ; in other words, that it is 'conscious life;' and this must be in accordance with its own proper law of excellence, and not frustrated by external adversity or shortness of duration. Hence we get a definition of the Chief Good for man—that it consists in 'a rightly harmonized consciousness in adequate external conditions.'

Comparing this fundamental principle (*ἀρχή*) with the opinions and theories of others, we find that it includes or supersedes them. From it we get an answer to the common question, 'Is happiness to be acquired by human efforts?' and by means of it we are able to see the shallowness of Solon's view implied in the saying that 'No man can be called happy while he lives.' It at once renders nugatory the question, Is happiness praiseworthy or above praise?

Assuming, then, the definition as above, let us examine its component parts. And, first, what is that law of excellence (peculiar to man) which is to regulate his mind? A popular psychology serves as a basis for discussing this. Man is a compound of a rational and an irrational nature. Part of his irrational nature (the passions) rise into communion with reason. This part, then, and the reason itself, are two elements in which human excellence may be exhibited. According to this division, we distinguish, on the one hand, intellectual excellence ; on the other hand, moral excellence or virtue : and these two may henceforth be separately discussed.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ Ι.



Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. [διὸ

I. The opening of Aristotle's *Ethics* might be paralleled with that of his *Metaphysics*—πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. As there it is first said that 'all by a natural instinct desire knowledge,' and then Aristotle proceeds to distinguish among the various kinds of knowledge a supreme kind, which is Philosophy or Metaphysics; so here he says that every human impulse is prompted by the desire of some good, or is, in other words, a means to some end, and among ends there is one supreme end, which is never a means, the object of politics—the chief good, or human happiness. The beginning of the *Politics* is also very similar. All actions are done for the sake of what is thought to be good. Therefore all societies aim at some good, and that society which includes all others aims at the highest good. See p. 16.

ἡ πᾶσα τέχνη—δοκεῖ) 'Every art and every science, and so, too, every act and purpose, seems to aim at some good,' i.e. 'every exercise of the human powers.' The enumeration here given answers to the division of the mind (*Eth.* vi. ii) into speculative, productive, and practical. Μέθοδος is literally 'way' or 'road' to know-

ledge, i.e. a research or inquiry. The metaphor still appears in such places as Plato's *Republic*, vii. p. 533 c, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται. *Phædrus* 269 d, οὐχ ἡ Τισίας—πορεύεται δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος. It is farther used in the sense of a regular or scientific method, and it stands here, as elsewhere (*Eth.* i. ii. 9, *Poet.* xix. 2, *Phys.* i. i. 1), for science itself. The word is well defined by Simplicius (in *Arist. Phys.* fol. 4), ἡ μετὰ ὁδοῦ τινὸς εὐτάκτου πρόοδος ἐπὶ τὸ γνωστόν. Πρᾶξις and προαίρεσις, action and purpose, go to make up one conception, that of 'moral action.' They are related as language to thought, the outer to the inner. Δοκεῖ does not imply any doubt in the assertion. Sometimes it denotes the opinion of others, not of Aristotle himself (*Eth.* i. iii. 2, x. viii. 13, where see note), but sometimes it is a part of style, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism. With this use of δοκεῖ may be compared that of similar words, such as ἴσως, 'no doubt,' (iv. viii. 9) εἶδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν (κωλύειν); σχεδόν, 'nearly,' 'something like,' (i. viii. 4) σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία; μάλιστα, 'upon the whole,' (i. v. 2) τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ

2 καλῶς ἀπεφάναντο τὰγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. [διαφορὰ
 δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι,
 τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ
 τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν
 3 τὰ ἔργα. πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ
 ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ
 ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονο-
 4 μικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν

προὔχοντες (βίοι). Such phrases arise partly from Attic usage, partly from the genius of Aristotle's philosophy. A similar hesitation or moderation of statement is observable in his use of interrogations; *e. g.* (i. vi. 12) ἀλλ' ἄρα γε τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι; In such questions πότερον is very frequent, (i. vii. 11) Πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτῶς ἐστὶν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις; and ἥ, which generally introduces the opinion to be preferred, *l. l.* ἥ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ—οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θεῖη τις ἀν ἔργον τι; Also ἥ frequently stands by itself, (i. vii. 1) τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἥ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται;

διὸ καλῶς—ἐφίεται] 'Hence people have well defined the good to be, that at which all things aim.' This same definition is mentioned in the *Rhetoric*, i. vi. 2, i. vii. 3. It is of uncertain authorship. At first sight its introduction here appears parenthetical; but rather it constitutes a sententious way of opening the subject. 'All we do aims at good, the very idea of good is that which is aimed at. But among ends (or aims) there is a subordination of one to the other.'

2 τὰ μὲν γὰρ—ἔργα τινά] 'For sometimes the end consists in the exercise of a faculty for its own sake, at other times in certain external results beyond this.' Strictly, according to the Aristotelian system, to speak of

an 'Ἐνέργεια not containing its end in itself is a contradiction in terms. But in a subordinate and relative sense, just as some τέλη are also means to ulterior ends, so some functions may be called ἐνέργειαι, which are also mere γενέσεις of external results; cf. *Metaphysics*, x. ix. 11, and see Essay IV. p. 186.

4 ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ—διώκεται] 'Now all such operations as fall under some one faculty, as under riding, bridle-making, and all other manufactures of the instruments of riding; while this again, and every warlike operation, falls under strategy; and so (δή) in the same way, other operations under some different faculty—in all, I say (δέ), the ends of the master faculties are more excellent than all those that are subordinate, for, for the sake of the former, the latter are sought after.' This sentence exhibits many of the peculiarities of Aristotle—(1) the indefiniteness of ὅσαι. Cf. a similar indefiniteness as to the substantive referred to in *Περὶ αὐτῆς* (*Eth.* i. viii. 1). It would be most natural to supply to the first ὅσαι the word πράξεις, to the second the word τέχναι. But τέχνη and πᾶσις are not here sharply distinguished, as appears by the words πολεμικὴ πᾶσις. (2) Δύναμις is here used in a sense from which the modern application of the word 'faculty' to law and medicine, &c., has been de-

τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἰππικὴν ἢ χαλινοποιικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἰππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν· αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πράξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἐτέρας. ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κακέϊνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.]

Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, 2 τᾶλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα

rived, through the term *facultas*, which was used by the Schoolmen. This belongs to the associations connected with *δύναμις* in Aristotle's metaphysical system. The use of this word for 'an art' appears, though less distinctly, in Plato. Aristotle, opposing *δύναμις* to *ἐνέργεια*, treats the arts as a class of *δυνάμεις*, i. e. certain capabilities of action; though they differed from other *δυνάμεις* in being themselves not only developed into *ἐνέργειαι*, but also formed out of them: cf. *Eth.* II. i. 4, *Metaph.* VIII. v. 1, and see Essay IV. p. 190. (3) δὲ ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ is used to mark the apodosis. This is common in Aristotle, cf. *Eth.* VII. iv. 5, X. ix. 11. Looking to the protasis *ἴσαι*, we must also say that the sentence is an anacoluthon. The whole style might be called a *σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον*. (4) The adjective *ἀρχιτεκτονικός*, as applied to the 'hierarchy' of the sciences, is not found in writers before Aristotle. The metaphor implied by it may have been suggested by Plato; cf. *Politicus*, p. 259 B: καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικός, ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων. The architect conceives the design, the labourers carry out the details: the former is concerned with the end, the latter with the means. In like manner the higher

arts and sciences subject to themselves the lower; cf. *Eth.* I. ii. 7, VI. viii. 2.

5 διαφέρει δ'—ἐπιστημῶν] 'But it makes no difference (to our argument) whether the development of faculties be in itself the end of the different actions, or something beyond this again, as in the case of the arts above mentioned,' i. e. the principle of subordination in the scale of means and ends will not be affected by the fact that *ἐνέργειαι* are ends as well as *ἔργα*. In taking a walk, the end is walking for its own sake, i. e., an *ἐνέργεια*. In house-building, the end is the house, an external result, or *ἔργον*. But walking may again be viewed as subordinate to some other end, e.g. health or life, just as the house is.

ἐπιστημῶν] When speaking strictly (*Eth.* III. iii. 9), and in his later terminology, as represented by Eudemus (*Eth.* VI. iii. 1), Aristotle distinguishes between *ἐπιστήμη* and *τέχνη*. But he frequently uses the former indiscriminately with the latter (cf. *Eth.* I. vi. 15), as also Plato had done, cf. *Philebus*, p. 57 B, and as 'science' is now in common language often used for 'art.'

II. 1 Εἰ δὴ—ἄριστον] 'If then there is some end of action which we wish for its own sake, while we wish

(πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὀρεξίν), ὁῦλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γυνῶσις αὐτοῦ
 2 μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπὴν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες,
 3 μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον

all other things only as a means to this—and if we do not choose all things merely as means to something beyond (since in that case it will go on to infinity, so that our desire will be empty and useless), it is plain that this end of action must be the chief good and the best.' This sentence contains the 'punctum saliens' of the whole argument on which the *Ethics* are based. But from the undogmatic way in which it is expressed it is rendered at first sight obscure. It might be put thus: We have desires, these cannot be in vain; hence we cannot always be desiring means. There must be some end which is never a means, and which constitutes the true object of desire.

τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν] This is emphatic. Aristotle is not enquiring after a transcendental good, like the Platonic Idea, but after a good attainable in action. τὰ πρακτά implies the whole class and sphere of means and ends which fall under the control of human will. A sort of scholium upon this word is to be found in the *Eudemian Ethics*, i. vii. 4.

πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον] The opposite and correlative terms εἶναι εἰς ἄπειρον and ἴστασθαι are used with various nominatives in Aristotle, and sometimes, as here, impersonally. Cf. *Eth.* i. vii. 7, εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. vi. viii. 9, στήσεται γὰρ κακεί.

ὥστ' εἶναι κενήν, κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle applies here to the human mind and

to the human desires his principle of universal import, οὐδὲν ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις. As everything in nature has its proper end, so too has human desire. There must therefore be some absolute good, desirable for its own sake, towards which our life ought to be directed.

2 ἄρ' οὖν—δέοντος] 'Must it not be, then, that for the conduct of life the knowledge of the good is of weighty influence, and that, like archers who have a mark to aim at, we shall be more likely to attain the requisite?' Cf. *Rhet.* i. v. 1: Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπὸς τίς ἐστιν, οὗ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἰροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν.

μᾶλλον] i.e., 'more than if we lived at haphazard without knowledge of the true end to be aimed at.' The metaphor of the archers comes from Plato; cf. *Repub.* p. 519 B: ἀνάγκη μήτε τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους ἱκανῶς ἂν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεύσαι, μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν ὅτι σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἓνα, οὗ στοχαζόμενοι δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ, κ.τ.λ.

τοῦ δέοντος] not 'our duty' in the modern sense, this conception not having been as yet developed, but more generally 'what we ought to do' from any motive. The word δέον was a received term with reference to moral subjects. Cf. Plato's *Repub.* p. 336 D, where Thrasymachus, calling upon Socrates to define justice, says, 'Mind you don't tell me that it is the

τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ 4 μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς· τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. 5

δέον, or the ὠφέλιμον, or the λυσιτελοῦν, or the κερδαλέον, or the συμφέρον.' Cf. also Charmides, p. 164 B. Xen. *Memorab.* i. ii. 22. But the exact import of the term was not fixed. Aristotle in the *Topics*, ii. iii. 4, mentions among the πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα, Οἷον εἰ τὸ δέον ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἢ τὸ καλόν.

3 εἰ δ' οὕτω—δυνάμεων] 'But if this be the case, we must endeavour to comprehend, in outline at all events, what it is, and which of the sciences or faculties it belongs to.' Aristotle, proceeding tentatively to work, does not ask, 'What science treats of the supreme end?'—but 'To what science or art does its production belong?' He seems at first encumbered with Platonic associations—that virtue is a science—that there is an art of life, &c. Just as in a Platonic dialogue, we might have found this train of questions—'What is the science of healing called?'—Medicine. 'What is the science of counting called?'—Arithmetic. 'What then is the science of the welfare of states and individuals called?'—Politics. So here Aristotle says, 'Every art has an end. There is some supreme end: of what art then is it the end?' Accordingly he starts with the impression that the present treatise is an art rather than a science (cf. *Eth.* i. iii. 6, ii. ii. 1). He speaks of his present method aiming at the chief good. (i. iii. 1) 'Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα. Cf. i. iv. 1, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι. Afterwards (*Eth.* x. ix. 1) he makes an imperfect separation between the scientific theory of

virtue and the practical attainment of it.

4 δόξειε δ' ἂν—ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς] 'Now it would seem to be the end of that which is the most absolute, and most of a master science.' The word *κυριωτάτης* seems used somewhat indefinitely. Two trains of association are mixed up in it. *κύριος* means (1) what is authoritative, what has control; cf. *Eth.* i. x. 9, *κύρια εὐδαιμονίας*. (2) What has validity, especially the validity of custom, what is established. Cf. *Poet.* xxi. 5, 6, and *Rhetor.* iii. ii. 2, where *κύριον ὄνομα* stands for 'a word in its proper sense,' opposed to all uncommon turns and applications. In *Eth.* vi. xiii. 1, *κυρία ἀρετή* is 'virtue in the full sense of the term,' opposed to *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*, 'a virtuous disposition.' *Eth.* vii. iii. 14, *τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης*, 'that which might properly be called science.' Hence τὸ κύριον comes to mean that which is striking, characteristic, and essential in a conception. Cf. *Eth.* i. vii. 13, *κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι*. ix. ix. 7, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. In the passage above, *κυριωτάτης* seems partly to mean 'most authoritative' or 'absolute,' partly 'that which is most absolutely a science.'

5 τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται] Plato generally represents virtue as a science, and politics as inseparable from dialectic or metaphysics. In the *Euthydemus*, however, (p. 291 B) he describes politics as the supreme art, in terms from which the present passage is obviously borrowed. See Essay III, p. 140. Aristotle says that all the other arts and faculties, how-

6 τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην 7 οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν, οἰκονομικὴν, ῥητορικὴν. χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχει ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν 8 εἴη τὰνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῶζειν. ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, 9 κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα.

ever dignified, are subordinate to this (ὑπὸ ταύτην) and are its instruments (χρωμένης ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς). Their very existence depends on the *fiat* of politics (τίνας εἶναι χρεῶν διατάσσει). Hence, as all others are means to it, the end of politics must embrace the ends of all the other arts. Politics will be the art whose end is the chief human good.

8 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν—πόλεσιν] 'For even supposing the chief good to be identical for an individual and a state, that of the state appears at all events something greater and more absolute (τελεώτερον) both to attain and to preserve. Even for an individual by himself it is indeed something one might well embrace with gladness, but for a nation and for states it is something more noble and divine.' The identity of the end for states and individuals is a principle on which would depend the relation of Morals to Politics, and to some extent that of Church to State. See Essays, Appendix C. In Aristotle's *Politics* (vii. iii. 8) the chief good, or end-in-itself, for a state is portrayed as consisting in the development and play of specu-

lative thought, all fit conditions and means thereto being implied and presupposed. To this high, but indefinite, ideal, the term *θεῖον* would be naturally applied. Like the word 'divine' with us, *θεῖος* is used by Aristotle to express the highest kind of admiration, tinged with a feeling of enthusiastic joy, but also with some degree of vagueness. It is especially applied to the inner consciousness of the reason; cf. *Eth.* x. vii. 1, (νοῦς ἐστὶ) τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον: also to happiness (*Eth.* i. ix. 3), which, if not *θεόπεμπτον*, is at all events τῶν θειοτάτων: also to the constituent parts of the Cosmos (*Eth.* vi. vii. 4), which are said to be diviner than man.

9 πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα] Aristotle has not yet arrived at the conception of Ethics as a separate science. He still, following Plato, identifies it with politics, or makes it 'a kind of politics.' By his treatment however of the questions of Ethics he prepared the way for its separation from politics, which indeed was partly made by Eudemus, and afterwards entirely by the Stoics.

Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην δια-3
σαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις
ἐπιζητητέον ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ 2
καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει
διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει

III. In connexion with every science, Aristotle never fails to pay attention to the logic of science,—to ask what the proper method of the science ought to be. In Ethics, where he is entirely feeling his way, without predecessors to guide him, it was especially natural that he should make a pause to enquire what is the proper form and logical character of the science on which he is entering. Accordingly we find three digressions relative to the logic of Ethics in this first book. (1) In the present chapter he decides that it cannot be an exact science. (2) Chapter 4th, § 5—7, he declares, though not dogmatically, that it must be rather inductive, than based on *a priori* principles. (3) In chapter 7th, § 17—21, not quite consistently with the last assertion, he dwells upon the importance, for the future development of the science, of the principle (ἀρχή) which he has evolved in his definition of the chief good; which principle is henceforth to be applied to the elucidation of all difficulties in detail. See Essays, Appendix A.

1 λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς—δημιουργου-
μένοις] 'Now we must be satisfied with the statement of our science, if its distinctness be in proportion to the nature of the subject matter. For exactness is not to be expected equally in all reasonings, any more than in the productions of art.' Matter as opposed to form was called by Aristotle ὕλη, or τὸ ὑποκείμενον, that which underlies the form. Cf. *Pol.* i. viii. 2 :

Λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, ὅλον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια, ἀνδριαντοποιῶ δὲ χαλκόν. The matter of a science, *i. e.* the facts or conceptions with which it deals, must determine its method or form, according as they admit of being stated with more or less ἀκρίβεια. It is one of the first questions about a science, how much ἀκρίβεια it admits: cf. *De Anima.* i. i. 1; *Metaphys.* α' ἐλαττον, iii. 2, &c. On the different shades of meaning implied in the word ἀκρίβεια, see below, i. vii. 18, note. It combines the notions of mathematical exactness, metaphysical subtlety, minuteness of detail, and definiteness of assertion. Also as applied to the arts (ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις) it denotes finish or delicacy.

2 τὰ δὲ καλὰ—μή] 'But things beautiful and just, about which the political science treats, exhibit so great a diversity and uncertainty that they are thought to exist by convention only, and not by nature.' Nothing can be more characteristic of Greek morality than these words, 'the beautiful' and 'the just,' applied to sum up all that we should call 'the right.' The former is the more enthusiastic term, and is connected with all the artistic feelings of the Greeks. In the present passage we may notice two indications of the immaturity of Aristotle's ethical system. (1) He speaks of *Politics* as the science treating of right action. (2) He seems to accept for the moment, as at all events worth considering, the scepticism of the Sophists,

3 ὅε μή. τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες
4 ἀπώλουντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τὰληθῆς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεῶν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγόμενων· πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς

and to start accordingly with an empirical point of view about moral distinctions, which in reality his subsequent procedure entirely sets aside.—νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. On the position of this opinion in the history of philosophy, see Essay II.

3 τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ] 'And things good also exhibit a similar sort of uncertainty.' The two leading questions of morals may be said to be, what is right? and what is good? The ancient Ethics rather tend to absorb the former into the latter, the modern systems *vice versa*. Aristotle here, from his present empirical ground, says there is an equal uncertainty about things good, as about things right. Cf. *Eth.* v. i. 9; *Xen. Mem.* iv. ii. 34.

4, 5 ἀγαπητὸν οὖν—πεπαιδευμένος] 'We must be content then, while speaking on such subjects, and with such premises, that the truth should be set forth roughly and in outline, and, as we are reasoning about and from things which only amount to generalities, that our conclusions should be of the same kind also. In the same way must each particular statement be received. The man of cultivation will in each kind of subject demand exactness so far as the nature of the thing permits: for it appears equally absurd to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to

demand demonstration from an orator. Every one judges well of things which he knows, and of these he is a good critic. In particular subjects then the man of particular cultivation will judge, and in general the man of general cultivation.'

περὶ τοιούτ. καὶ ἐκ τοιούτ.] A common formula in Aristotle. Cf. *Rhetor.* II. i. 1.

γένος] is with Aristotle the object of a single science; μία ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνὸς γένους (*Anal. Post.* I. xxviii). Cf. the whole of *Met.* II. iii.

πεπαιδευμένον] In his preliminary inquiries as to the right method of different sciences, Aristotle generally adds that it will be the office of παιδεία, or the πεπαιδευμένος, to arbitrate on the question. Παιδεία has of course in these places a restricted sense. It does not imply the cultivation of the whole man, but a certain special cultivation in relation to science, in short much the same state of acquirement as in modern times is expressed by the name *connoisseur*. The chief passage on this subject occurs *De Partibus Animal.* I. i. 1: περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι· τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδείαν τιτᾶν. Then follow the characteristics of the πεπαιδευμένος, which are said to be κρίναι

ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ 5 τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος. ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως 6

εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μη καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. Thus the chief function of this 'cultivation' is acute criticism. It is critical as opposed to science, which is productive. It will have certain standards (ἄρους) by reference to which it will form a judgment on the shape and manner of the propositions presented, quite independently of their truth and falsehood (ἀποδέχεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τἀληθές, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως). This, which was a current popular conception of παιδεία, Aristotle not only accepts as related to all matters of science (τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον—περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικὸν τινα νομίζομεν)—but also he adds a refinement on his own part by constituting a special παιδεία in relation to each separate science (περὶ τίνος φύσεως ἀφορισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τις ἕτερος περὶ ἐν μέρει). The idea of the πεπαιδευμένος as a judge of method is to be found in Plato. Cf. *Timæus*, p. 53 c: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπεὶ μετέχετε τῶν κατὰ παιδευσιν ὁδῶν, δι' ὧν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα ἀνάγκη, ξυνέψεσθε. In the *Erastæ*, p. 135, a popular description of the philosopher is given, exactly answering to Aristotle's πεπαιδευμένος. Among the qualifications is mentioned ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλευθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον, ἐπακολουθήσαι τε τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἶόν τε εἶναι

διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων. Socrates on this remarks, that it makes the philosopher like a Pentathlos, —πακρός τις, or second-best in all specialities.—We see in the present passage Aristotle's distinction of περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδ. from καθ' ἕκαστον πεπαιδ. The latter term shows that not only is a general knowledge of logic (ἀναλυτική) requisite to constitute παιδεία (cf. *Metaph.* i. *min.* iii. i, iii. iii. 5, iii. iv. 2); but also that some acquaintance with the special subject is requisite for the connoisseur of that subject. Cf. *Pol.* iii. xi. 11: Ἰατρός δ' ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἥττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσιν. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* i. vi. 6.

μαθηματικοῦ, κ. τ. λ.] Taken from Plato, cf. *Theætetus*, p. 162 B: εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν (τῷ εἰκότι) χρώμενος γεωμετεῖν, ξίσιος οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίαν τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τούτων λεγομένους λόγους.

5 διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς, κ. τ. λ.] From a want of sufficient knowledge of the special subjects to be treated, the youth is not fit to be a hearer, i.e. (1) critic, (2) student of political science.

6 ἔτι δὲ—πρᾶξις] 'Nay, more—

- ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνώσις
 7 ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ
 ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ
 διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ
 τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνώσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρα-
 8 τῆσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ
 πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ
 περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέ-
 μεθα, πεφροimiάσθω τοσαῦτα.
- 4 Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνώσις καὶ
 προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὁρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν
 τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον
 2 τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν

over, as he is given to follow his passions, he will hear uselessly and without profit, since the end (of our science) is not knowledge but action.' Aristotle goes off into a digression here, and adds that the youth will not only be an incompetent, but also an unprofitable student, on account of a moral disqualification in the weakness of his will. This addition, however, throws light on Aristotle's conception of his science. In saying that 'its end is action,' we must not suppose that Aristotle meant to imply that it was 'practical' in the modern sense, *i. e.* hortatory, as opposed to philosophical. As before, he is viewing Politics as a sort of supreme art. Cf. *Eth.* II. II. 1.

ματαιῶς ἀκούσεται] Shakespeare had seen the present passage quoted somewhere, and by a remarkable anachronism he puts it into the mouth of Hector. Cf. *Troilus and Cressida*, act II. sc. 2. 'Paris and Troilus, you have both said well:

And on the cause and question now in hand

Have glozed—but superficially; not much

Unlike young men, whom Aristotle thought

Unfit to hear moral philosophy.'

7 οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις] 'For the deficiency is not caused by time.' Cf. Thucyd. I. 141, οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν οἴεται βλάψειν. Arnold compares παρὰ in this sense with the English vulgarism, 'all along of.' Cf. *Eth.* III. V. 19, τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν.

IV. 1 Returning from a parenthetical discussion of method, Aristotle takes up (λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες) the original question, 'What is it that politics aims at, what is the highest practical good?' The original four terms τέχνη, μέθοδος, πρᾶξις, προαίρεσις, are here reduced to two, γνώσις and προαίρεσις. In the latter πρᾶξις is implied. And τέχνη is omitted as falling under the practical powers in man (cf. *Eth.* VI. II. 5). Thus human nature, which was before classified as productive, scientific, and moral, is here summed up as moral and intellectual.

2 There is a verbal agreement, but under this an essential difference, between men as to their opinion of the

πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται. τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτόν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ' ὥντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καὶ αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν αἰτίον ἐστι

chief good. All use the same word, 'happiness.' They go a step beyond this together, and say it consists in 'living-well and doing-well.' Any further attempt at definition shows the discrepancy of their notions. On theories of the chief good, see Essay II. p. 66.

οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες] 'The many and the refined.' This classifies the whole body of thinkers. The many are opposed to the philosophers (οἱ σοφοί) and to the educated, the refined, the few. This opposition has always existed. It appears most strongly in the philosophic isolation of Heraclitus the ὀχλαλόδοτος. It is a natural distinction, since philosophical views are not inborn, but acquired, and imply education, leisure, development. That both classes, however, are in a different way possessed of the truth (wholly or partially), Aristotle would always acknowledge. Cf. *Eth.* i. viii. 7.

εὖ πράττειν is an ambiguous phrase. In its usual acceptation it would rather mean 'faring-well' than 'acting-well.' It occurs in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 507 c, in a way which seems to contain the transition between these two ideas—πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὃ καλλίσκεις, τὸ σάφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντ

καὶ ἀνδρείον καὶ δσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἂν πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον. Aristotle was at no pains to solve the ambiguity. Cf. *Eth.* vi. ii. 5.

3 οἱ μὲν γὰρ—ἀγαθὰ] 'For the one class (i.e. the many) specify something palpable and tangible, as, for instance, pleasure, or wealth, or honour; in short, different of them give different accounts, and often the same individual gives an answer at variance with himself, for when he has fallen sick he calls it health, but being poor wealth; and when people are conscious of ignorance they look up with admiration to those who say something fine and beyond their own powers. On the other hand certain (philosophers) have thought that beyond all these manifold goods there is some one absolute good, which is the cause to these of their being good.' *Ἐνιοι* δέ corresponds to οἱ μὲν γάρ. 'Palpable and tangible' are analogous though not identical metaphors with ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν.

συνειδότες, κ. τ. λ.] Consciousness of ignorance makes people fancy wisdom to be the chief good.—So the Paraphrast explains the passage.

4 τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας
 ματαιώτερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολα-
 5 ζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω δ'
 ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ
 τὰς ἀρχάς· εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπóρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει,
 πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός,
 ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ
 ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ

ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι] This of course relates to Plato's theory of the Idea.

4 ἱκανὸν δὲ—λόγον] 'But it is sufficient to examine the opinions most in vogue, or that seem to have some reason in them.' A similar canon of authority is given, *Eth.* i. viii. 7.

ἐπιπολαζούσας] 'Lying on the top,' 'obvious.' The original sense is found in *Hist. Anim.* viii. ii. 17: Πονοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀπόλλυνται πολλάκις (αἱ χελῶναι), ὅταν ἐπιπολάζουσαι ξηρανθῶσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου· καταφέρεισθαι γὰρ πάλιν οὐ δύνανται βράδιως. Hence ἐπιπολάζω and ἐπιπόλαιος come to mean 'what is current,' 'easily to be found.' *Eth.* iv. viii. 4, ἐπιπολάζοντος τοῦ γελοίου, 'meeting one at every turn:' and in the *Axiochus* which bears Plato's name, p. 369 D, ἐκ τῆς ἐπιπολαζούσης τὰ νῦν λεσχηνείας. *Rhet.* iii. x. 4, ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα καὶ ἃ μὴδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι. *Eth. Eud.* iii. ii. 4, ἔστι δ' οὐ πάνυ γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον. From this meaning to that of 'superficial' is but a slight transition. i. v. 4, φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιώτερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου.

5 From hence to the end of the chapter follows the second digression on the method of ethics. The question now is, whether the Science is to be inductive or deductive, whether the reasoning is to be 'to principles,' or 'from principles.' Aristotle gives a

qualified decision in favour of the former of these alternatives.

εὖ γὰρ—ἀπλῶς] 'For Plato rightly used to doubt and question whether the way was from principles or to principles, as, in the stadium, whether from the judges to the goal, or reversely. We must begin, at all events, with things known, and these are of two kinds; for some things are known to us, and some absolutely.' There is no particular passage in the extant works of Plato, which we can say is here referred to. That at the end of Book vi. of the *Republic* has a widely different scope. It does not compare the Inductive with the Deductive Method, but describes dialectic as a progress up the ladder of hypotheses to the idea of good, and a descent again without any help from the senses, by successive steps, which are ideas, and are connected with the idea of good. The use of the word Πλάτων here without the article shows that a personal reference to the philosopher is intended (see note on *Eth.* vi. xiii. 3). The use of the imperfect ἠπóρει shows that the reference is *general*; when Aristotle quotes from a particular passage in the *Laws* of Plato (*Eth.* ii. iii. 2), he says ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν.

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ ἀπλῶς] This is Aristotle's favourite division of knowledge, into things 'relatively' and things 'absolutely'

διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε 6
 ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθελαι
 καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλων τῶν πολιτικῶν
 ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαί- 7
 νοιτο ἀρκοῦντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦ-
 τος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. ὃ δὲ μὴδέτερον
 ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
 ἔσθλός δ' αὖ κάκεινος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.

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known. The former implies the knowledge of experience, as far as it depends on the individual perception; it is therefore concrete (ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, *Post. Analyt.* i. ii. 5) while the latter is abstract (τὰ πορρώτερον), but being independent of individual experience, it is absolute (τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα, *Phys. Ausc.* i. i. 1). We must observe that the distinction is not between things relatively and absolutely 'knowable,' but 'known.' The highest truths are actually in themselves better known than the phenomena of the senses. This is said independently of individual minds, and implies a reference to the impersonal and absolute reason; when Aristotle speaks of the universal being in itself more known than the particular, this is as much as to say it has a more real existence, just as Plato said that the Ideas were most true, while phenomena only partake of truth (μετέχει τῆς ἀληθείας).

6 ἴσως οὖν—γνωρίμων] 'Perhaps then we at all events must commence with what we know.' In a sort of bantering way, which is not unusual with him (cf. *Eth.* i. ix. 3, viii. vi. 4), Aristotle seems to announce the principle that personal experience must be made the basis for a scientific knowledge of morals. See Essays, Appendix A.

6—7 διὸ δεῖ—ῥαδίως] 'Therefore he should have been well trained in

his habits who is to study aright things beautiful and just, and in short the whole class of political subjects. For the fact is a principle, and if the fact be sufficiently apparent we need not ask the reason. Now he who has been well trained either has principles already, or can easily obtain them.' He returns to the qualifications of the ἀκροατής. But here previous knowledge seems required in a different way from that mentioned above (i. iv. 5). The object is here not κρίνειν τὰ λεγόμενα, but ἐπίστασθαι.

ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι] The same is repeated below (i. vii. 20). The term ἀρχή appears to be used here ambiguously. It may either mean a starting-point, or a universal principle. It seems to hover between those meanings, and to express that a moral fact has something at all events potentially of the nature of a universal. Ἀρχάς (in § 7) is used definitely for universal principles.

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος] i. e., ὁ καλῶς ἡγμένος. Such a one is in possession of moral facts, which either stand already in the light of principles, or can be at once recognised as such on the suggestion of the philosopher. In the former case he will resemble Hesiod's πανάριστος, in the second case the ἔσθλος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται. If he can neither discover nor recognise principles, he is ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.

οὗτος μὲν, κ. τ. λ.] Hesiod, *Works*

ὅς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοεῖ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὁ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρηῆος ἀνὴρ.

5 Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν, τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπο-
2 λαμβάνειν· οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν, διὸ
καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι
μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς

and *Days*, 291—295. After *νόησι* in the editions of Hesiod, in some MSS. of the *Ethics*, and in the *Paraphrase*, comes this verse, φρασσάμενος τὰ κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ἥσιν ἀμείνω. The whole passage succeeds one quoted by Plato, *Repub.* ii. 364 c; *Legg.* iv. 718 e; and by Xenophon, *Memorab.* ii. i. 20, on the difficulty of virtue. The sentiment is borrowed by Livy, xxi. xxix. Cf. Cicero *pro Cluentio*, c. xxxi.; Soph. *Antig.* 720; Herod. vii. xvi.

V. 1 Ἡμεῖς δὲ—ὑπολαμβάνειν] 'But to return from our digression,—since people seem with reason to form their conceptions of the chief good and of happiness from men's lives,' (sc. 'let us examine these'). The γάρ shows that the above clause explains the object of this chapter, which is, to examine men's opinions of the chief good, in the concrete, by a criticism of their lives. Men's lives exhibit practically their ideas of what is desirable.

ἐκ τῶν βίων] βίος is the external form, opposed to ζωή, the internal principle of life. Thus βίος is 'line of life,' 'profession,' 'career.' Cf. *Eth.* ix. ix. 9, x. vi. 8; Plato, *Repub.* x. 618, ἂ τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα.

2 οἱ μὲν—θεωρητικός] 'Now the many and the vulgar (conceive) pleasure (the chief good), whence also they follow the life of sensuality. For the most prominent lives are on the whole (μάλιστα) three in number, that just mentioned, and the political life,

and thirdly the life of contemplation.' With τὴν ἡδονήν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰγαθόν must be supplied, though it was used in a different way in the sentence before. The punctuation of Zell has been adopted. Bekker places no stop after ὑπολαμβάνειν, but ends the sentence after ἡδονήν.

ἀπολαυστικόν] a word not occurring in Plato, nor perhaps in any writer before Aristotle.

τρεῖς γάρ, κ. τ. λ.] In the celebrated metaphor attributed to Pythagoras (cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 3), the world is compared to an Olympic festival, in which some are come to contend, for honour; others to buy and sell, for profit; the best of all, as spectators, for contemplation. In Plato a similar division occurs, *Repub.* ix. 581 c: Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγωμεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφων, φιλόνηκων, φιλοκερδῆς; κομιδῇ γε. This passage appears to be alluded to in the words at the opening of the chapter, οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. The Paraphrast explains Aristotle's omission of the life of gain by saying that 'the seekers both of pleasure and honour are wont to amass money also.' Plato, on the contrary, says that pleasure and gain are merely two forms of concupiscence. The life of pleasure then was included under Plato's γένος φιλοκερδῆς. Aristotle's classification, which separates these, is much more true to nature. But the reason given by the Paraphrast

καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς³ ἀνδραποδάδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλῳ. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτι-⁴ καὶ τιμὴν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ *superficial* γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμᾶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τάχα-⁵ θὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ἔτι

is untenable. Aristotle omitted the βίος χρηματιστής, as he tells us presently, because, as not being purely voluntary (βλαίος τις), it does not exhibit a conception of happiness. Though it may have many adherents, these do not seek it spontaneously, as containing happiness in itself.

3 οἱ μὲν οὖν—Σαρδαναπάλῳ] The life of sensuality is that which the vulgar propose to themselves as their ideal of happiness. This they would pursue if they could obtain the ring of Gyges (Plato, *Repub.* ii. p. 359, c). And though Aristotle repudiates it immediately as vile and abject, yet he places it on the scale (τυγχάνουσι λόγου) because great potentates (πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις) show themselves of the same mind as Sardanapalus, thinking nought but sensuality 'worth a fillip,' while they have everything at their disposal, and are of all men most free to choose.

τυγχάνουσι λόγου] 'They obtain consideration,' i. e. both in the eyes of men in general, and also in the present treatise. Cf. *Eth.* x. vi. 3.

Σαρδαναπάλῳ] Cicero, in *Tusc. Disp.* v. xxxv. (cf. *De Finibus*, ii. xiii.), mentions the epitaph of Sardanapalus as quoted by Aristotle. 'Ex quo Sardanapali, opulentissimi Syriæ regis, error agnoscitur, qui incidi jussit in busto:

Hæc habeo, quæ edi, quæque exsaturata libido

Hausit; at illa jacent multa et præclara relicta.

Quid aliud, ait Aristoteles, in bovis, non in regis sepulcro inscriberes? No such passage is to be found in any of the extant works of Aristotle.

4 οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες—τέλος] 'But the refined and active conceive honour to be the chief good; for this may be said to be (σχεδόν) the end of the political life.' οἱ δὲ answers to οἱ μὲν. πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι. The desire for honour is of course a higher instinct than the desire for pleasure. It is 'the last infirmity of noble minds.' Honour is the price paid for political service, the garland of the magistrate and the statesman. Cf. *Eth.* v. vi. 7: μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας.

φαίνεται δ'—μαντευόμεθα] 'But it appears too superficial for that which we are in search of, for it seems to rest more with the honourer than the honoured; whereas we have a presentiment that the chief good must be one's own, and not in the power of others to take away.' Honour is evidently a precarious advantage depending on others. No labours or merits could prevent its being withheld by an ungrateful or unappreciating age.

μαντευόμεθα] A phrase worthy of attention. It occurs again, vi. xiii. 4: εἰκάσι δὴ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξι ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ἢ κατὰ

δ' εοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμαῖσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γιννῶσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ 6 γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι· φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλης· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις

τὴν φρόνησιν. Cf. also *Rhet.* i. xiii. 2 : ἔστι γὰρ ὃ μαντεύονται τι πάντες φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον. It is probably suggested by Plato, in whom both *μαντεύεσθαι* and *ἀπομαντεύεσθαι* frequently occur; e. g. *Crat.* 411 B : δοκῶ γέ μοι οὐ κακῶς μαντεύεσθαι ὃ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐνενόησα, ὅτι, κ. τ. λ.

5—6 Moreover, honour is not only an insecure possession, but it seems not even desired for its own sake. It is desired by men as an evidence of their merits. Cf. *Eth.* viii. viii. 2, where he says more at length that most men appear to seek honour κατὰ συμβεβηκός; the many seek it at the hands of those in power, as an earnest of future advantage; the good seek it from the excellent and from competent judges, as a confirmation of their own opinion about themselves. Thus the consciousness of virtue is the end, to which honour is the means. If virtue then be regarded as the end of the political life, will this answer to the chief good? No, it falls short of being a supreme end (ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη). For it might subsist in a life of absolute inaction, or of the heaviest misfortunes. And to call this happiness would be paradoxical.

ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν] It is the ἔξις τῆς ἀρετῆς, virtue regarded as a mere quality, which Aristotle repudiates.

Past merits, or the passive possession of qualities, whose existence depends on the attestation of fame, cannot be thought to constitute the chief good. Very different from this is ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν, the consciousness of a virtuous life.

εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων] 'Unless defending a paradox.' Θέσεις in demonstration are those unproved principles necessary to the existence of each separate science, just as ἀξιώματα are to the existence of reasoning in general (*Post. Analytics*, i. ii. 7), but θέσεις in dialectic (the kind here meant) are paradoxical positions resting on the authority of some great name; *Topics*, i. xi. 4 : θέσις δὲ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οἷον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης, κ. τ. λ. The above paradox (ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) was one the Stoics afterwards ventured to maintain. Cicero (*Paradoxa* ii.) defends it with rhetorical arguments—arguing the greatness of Regulus in his misfortunes, as though that were identical with his happiness.

καὶ περὶ μὲν—αὐτῶν] 'But enough on this subject, for it has been sufficiently discussed even in popular philosophies.' Cf. *De Caelo*, i. ix. 16 : καὶ γὰρ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλο-

εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὗ

σοφίᾳσι περὶ τὰ θεῖα πολλάκις προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀμετάβλητον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον, on which Simplicius notes with regard to ἐγκυκλίους—ἄτινα καὶ ἐξωτερικὰ καλεῖν εἴωθε. We may translate the passage, 'As in the popular philosophical doctrines about things divine, it is often set forth in argument that the divine must necessarily be unchangeable, being the First and the Highest.' (There seems to be something wrong in the Greek text. Perhaps we should read ὅν for πᾶν.) This evidently refers to no work of Aristotle's, but to the common unscientific discourses of men upon scientific subjects. So above, it is intimated that the insufficiency of virtue for happiness had been the subject of commonplace discussion. Ἐγκύκλιος is used three times in the *Politics* of Aristotle to express 'that which belongs to the daily round of life.' *Pol.* i. vii. 2, τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα, 'daily duties of servants'; cf. ii. v. 4, τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίουσιν; ii. ix. 9, χρησίμου δ' οὐσης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, 'Boldness is of no use for every-day life.' Hence the word comes to mean 'commonplace,' 'popular,' 'unscientific.' Two other explanations need only be mentioned to be rejected: (1) Eustratius thinks that a poem of Aristotle's is meant, ending with the same line with which it began—hence called Encyclic; (2) Julius Scaliger refers us to two books, Ἐγκυκλίαν, α', β', mentioned in the list of Diogenes Laertius, v. 26.

7 τρίτος δ'—ποιησόμεθα] 'Third is the life of contemplation, about

which our investigation shall be made hereafter.' This promise is fulfilled in Book x. We have here undoubted proof of an idea of method, of a constructive whole; see Essay I.

8 ὁ δὲ χρηματιστής—χάριν] 'But the life of gain is in a way compulsory, and it is plain that wealth is not that good we are in search of, for it is an instrument and means to something else.' With χρηματιστής understand βίος. Lambinus finds in two MSS. χρηματιστής βίος ἄβίός τις ἐστι. This is evidently a gloss. βίαιος is to be explained by comparing the parallel passage in *Eth. Eudem.* i. iv. 2: Διηρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν [οὐδ'] ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, ἀλλ' ὥς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμῶν καὶ τὰς βαναύσους—τῶν δὲ εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων τριῶν ὄντων. 'Now the lives of men being divided, and the one class laying no claim at all to this kind of good fortune, but being devoted to the obtaining the necessities of life, as for instance those engaged with mean arts and lucre and sordid crafts; while the others, which are ranked severally as in the enjoyment of Happiness, are three in number.' Here οὐδ' is restored by the absolutely certain conjecture of Bonitz. βίαιός τις exactly corresponds with οὐδ' ἀμφισβητούντων—σπουδαζομένων, and so it is understood by the Paraphrast: καὶ ἐστὶ βίαιος. Οὐτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διώκει, οὔτε πάνυ δοκεῖ διώκειν. Ὅθεν οὐ πολλοῖς ἐστὶν ἐραστός· ὀλίγοι γὰρ εἴλοντο πάσης τῆς ἐν βίῃ σπουδῆς τέλος τὰ χρήματα ἔχειν. It is to be taken in a passive, not an

τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν.
 διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι·
 δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκείνα· καίτοι
 πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται.

6 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως

active sense. It is the opposite of ἐκούσιος, meaning 'forced,' as in *Eth.* iii. i. 3. It implies that no one would devote himself, at the outset, to money-making, except of necessity, 'parce qu'il faut vivre.' It assigns the reason for not discussing the life of gain. An additional and final reason is subjoined—that wealth is a mere means. Other and mistaken explanations of this place are (1) that of Eustratius. 'The usurer is violent,' *ἔτι βίαν ἐνδείκνυνται πρὸς τὸ κτήσασθαι*. The same has been adopted in the Latin translations, where 'violentus' is used. In Dante's *Inferno*, Canto XI., is a complete commentary on this. Dante, who only knew Aristotle in the Latin, but studied him much, places usurers among 'the violent' in hell, and gives learned reasons for this classification. (2) That of Giphanius, who, rightly taking βίος to be the omitted word, interprets 'vita naturæ contraria.' It is true that in several places βίαιος is opposed to κατὰ φύσιν, and in such contexts means 'unnatural'; *Phys. Ausc.* iv. viii. 4. v. vi. 6; *Politics*, i. iii. 4. But without such a context, it cannot simply stand for παρὰ φύσιν. Besides it is not easy to see why the life of gain, more than the life of ambition, should be called 'unnatural.'

καίτοι—καταβέβληνται] The general meaning is: 'Although much has been said to show that each of these is the chief good, it has been unavailing.' But a doubt remains as to the precise force of καταβέβληνται. Does it mean, 'have been wasted?' or

simply 'have been laid down, promulgated?' This latter rendering is confirmed by *De Mundo*, vi. 3: διὸ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰπεῖν τινὲς προήχθησαν, ὅτι πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι θεῶν πλία . . . τῇ μὲν θεῖᾳ δυνάμει πρέποντα καταβαλλόμενοι λόγον, οὐ μὴν τῇ γε οὐσίᾳ. By a slight extension of meaning we have in the *Politics*, καταβεβλημένα μαθήσεις (viii. ii. 6), καταβεβλημένα παιδεύματα (viii. iii. 11), 'ordinary, usual, branches of learning.'

VI. Aristotle now proceeds to examine, or rather to attack, Plato's doctrine of the Idea of Good. To test the worth of this criticism belongs to a consideration of the entire relation of Aristotle to the views of his master. See Essay III. The arguments used are as follows: (1) the Platonists allow that where there is an essential succession between two conceptions, these cannot be brought under a common idea—but there is such between different manifestations of good, *e. g.*, the useful is an essentially later conception. (2) If all good be one, it ought to fall under only one category, whereas it can be predicated under all. (3) If it were one, it would be treated of by only one science. (4) The Idea is, after all, only a repetition of the phenomena, for with these it is really identical. (5) Even the most essential and absolute goods seem incapable of being reduced to one idea. (6) It is more natural to consider good an analogous word, and to assign to it a nominalistic, rather than a realistic, unity.

ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντιον φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες²

(7) But however this may be, it is plain that the Idea can have no relation to practical life, and therefore it does not belong to ethics.

I τὸ δὲ καθόλου—ἀλήθειαν] 'But perhaps it were better to consider the Universal, and to ask what it means, although the inquiry is made disagreeable owing to the authors of the doctrine of ideas being our friends. Still it is better and even incumbent on us, where the safety of truth is concerned, to sacrifice that which is nearest to us, especially as we are philosophers. For where both are dear, friends and the truth, it is our duty to prefer the truth.' Τὸ καθόλου—'the universal'—is, of course, Plato's idea of good. The Idea was the universal element in existence and in knowledge; without it, according to Plato, the particular could neither be, nor be known. Still the use of the word καθόλου here is remarkable, for it does not at all distinctively belong to Plato's system. Aristotle also held the necessary existence of universals, only more as a nominalist, saying that they were κατὰ πολλῶν (predicable of particulars), not παρὰ τὰ πολλά (existing independent of particulars). Cf. *Post. Anal.* I. xi. 1: Εἶδη μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἢ ἐν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλά οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰ ἀποδείξει ἔσται, εἶναι μὲν τοι ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ καθόλου ἂν μὴ τοῦτο ᾗ.

καίπερ προσάντους] The personal feeling expressed by Aristotle towards Plato, here as elsewhere, is in the

highest degree cordial. But in the arguments used there is something captious.

καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν] Cf. *Thuc.* I. 41: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα χεῖρον τίθεται φιλονεικίας ἔνεκα τῆς αὐτίκα.

ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν] This is Plato's own sentiment about Homer; *Repub.* x. p. 595 c, ἀλλ' οὐ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ. He also applies the word ὅσιον in a similar context, *Repub.* II. p. 368 b: δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορούμενη ἀπαγορεύειν, κ.τ.λ.

2. οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες—κατεσκευάζον] 'Now they who introduced this opinion used not to make ideas of things of which they predicated priority and posteriority, and hence they constructed no idea of numbers.'

κομίσαντες] Cf. *Top.* VIII. v. 6, κομίζοντες ἄλλοτρίας δόξας. The words δόξαν ταύτην and ἐποίουν ιδέας seem used, as if purposely, to express an arbitrary and fictitious system. With the above cf. *Metaph.* II. iii. 10: ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷον τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα· οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δυάς, οὐκ ἔστι τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν. *Eth. Eudem.* I. viii. 8: ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον. Πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρουμένον τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον. Οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλα-

τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι· παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἑπὶ τούτων ἰδέα. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ

σίῳ, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον, εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν. Aristotle often remarks about Plato, that he distinguished with regard to number, making two species of it, mathematical number, and transcendental or ideal number. We may ask of which kind of number it is here asserted, that it contains priority and posteriority, and therefore admits of being brought under no one idea? The answer is to be found, Arist. *Metaph.* xii. vi. 7: Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ἰδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ἰδέας. It is the ideal numbers of which Aristotle says that they stand in essential and immutable succession to and dependence on each other, and therefore can be brought under no common idea. Hence the mention of the *δυάς* and the *διπλάσιον* in the above-quoted passages, which refer to the Platonic doctrine of the *δυάς ἀόριστος*, which by union with the one becomes ἡ πρώτη *δυάς*, the first actual number. This *δυάς* is itself the first idea of all number, there can be no idea of it. (Cf. *Met.* xii. vii. 18 sqq.) In some cases the ideas are identical with the manifestations of those ideas. Cf. *Metaph.* vi. xi. 6: καὶ τῶν τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων οἱ μὲ αὐτογραμμῇ τὴν *δυάδα*, οἱ δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς γραμμῆς· ἓν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτα

τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὐ τὸ εἶδος, οἷον *δυάδα* καὶ τὸ εἶδος *δυάδος*.

παραφυάδι—ὄντος] 'For this may be compared to an offshoot and accident of substance.' Cf. *Rhet.* i. ii. 7, *συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι*. Aristotle argues that the relatively good (ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι) must be a sort of deduction from the substantively good (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι), therefore posterior to it in thought, and therefore incapable of being brought under a common idea.

3 ἔτι ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν—τῷ ὄντι—δηλον—μόνη] 'Again, since the good is predicated in just as many ways as existence is, it plainly cannot be a common universal, or a unity, else it would not have been predicated in all the categories, but in one alone.' Good cannot be one, because it is predicated in all the categories. This is a logical, not a metaphysical test of Plato's doctrine. That Aristotle made ten categories—that these were metaphysical *summa genera*, or an ultimate classification of all existence, is rather a deduction from his philosophy than what he had actually arrived at. The Categories with Aristotle were a classification of the modes of predication, and the number ten seems by no means fixed. The so-called book of the 'Categories' is in all probability not from the hand of Aristotle himself, but it shows a tendency in the Peripatetic school to merge the logical into

ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν⁴ μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστικὴ. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλου-⁵ται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἦ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἦ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται,⁶ εἴπερ μῆδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφήμερου. ^π^ι-⁷ θανώτερον δ' εἰκόασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ,

a metaphysical classification. Cf. *Topics*, I. iv. 12.

4 There are many sciences of the good, therefore it cannot be reduced to unity.—This argument is certainly unsatisfactory if applied to Plato's point of view. Plato would say dialectic is the science of the Idea of good, and in this all other sciences find their meeting-point. Even of the *πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν* it might be said that according to Aristotle's own account it falls (in all its manifestations, whether as means or ends) under the one supreme science—Politics.

5—6 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις—ἐφήμερον] 'Now one might be puzzled to say what they mean by an "absolute" thing—if for instance in man and absolute-man there is one and the same conception of man. For *quā* man they will not differ. If so, the same will apply to good. Nor is it any use to say that the absolute good will be more good by being eternal,

since what is ever so old is not whiter than that which lasts but a day.' Aristotle brings against the idea an accusation which he has also used in the *Metaphysics* (I. ix. 1), that it only multiplies phenomena, as it exhibits the same law or conception as they. He adds to it a captious objection, that it is no use to say the absolute differs from the conditional, in being eternal, since length of duration does not constitute a distinction between identical qualities;—as if length of duration were the same as eternity. Cf. *Eth.* vi. iii. 2; and see Essay III. p. 160.

7 *πιθανώτερον* δ'—δοκεῖ] 'But the Pythagoreans seem to give a more probable account of it, placing unity in the row of goods; whom Speusippus too, it must be observed (*δή*), appears to follow.' We have to deal here with the subtle differences between the Greek schools of metaphysical philosophy. There came in

τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἓν· οἷς δὲ καὶ
 8 Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθήσαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων

succession,—first, the Eleatic principle, that ‘the One’ is the only really existent. Second, the Megarian development of this, ‘the One is identical with the good.’ Third, Plato’s adoption of this with modifications,—the One is the idea, opposed to plurality, or phenomena; the highest idea, and most essential, is that of the Good; this is transcendental, self-existent, the cause of existence to phenomena, and also of our knowing them; phenomena, however, have still a conditional existence, dependent on the idea (μετέχει τῆς οὐσίας). Fourth, opposed to Plato, and here contrasted with him, we find the Pythagorean doctrine which places ‘the One’ among the various exhibitions of good, whether as causes of good, or manifestations of it. The Pythagorean system was said to be devoid of dialectic (διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον, Ar. *Metaph.* i. vi. 7.) We do not find in them anything like ‘critical’ philosophy, nor any *rationale* of cognition. They seem content to have seized on a few principles, the conception of harmony, order, and proportion in the world, &c. Their system, however, had a definite bearing, and part of this seems to have been the ignoring any transcendental principle, any principle otherwise than as exhibited in phenomena. In *Metaph.* xi. vii. 10, we find Aristotle repudiating a doctrine which Speusippus shared with the Pythagoreans, namely, that good is rather a result of things than their cause. Speusippus, nephew of Plato and successor to him as head of the Academy, seems, after the death of his master, to have manifested in several points a Pythagorean leaning (see Essay III. p. 168). It is

mentioned, *Metaph.* xiii. iv. 10, that of those who held the doctrine of ideas, some considered ‘the One’ as identical with ‘the good,’ others not as identical, but as an essential element. If the one be identified with the good, it follows that multitude, or, in other words, matter, will be the principle of evil. To avoid making ‘the many’ identical with evil, some Platonists denied the identity of the one with the good. Of this section Speusippus was leader. He accordingly adopted a Pythagorean formula, saying that ‘the one’ must be ranked among things good. In the present place Aristotle must be regarded as not really entering on the question. His own metaphysical system stood quite beside all these mentioned. But he does not enter here upon a metaphysical consideration of the good, as not belonging to ethics. He merely states objections to Plato’s doctrine, and in a cursory way alleges a *prima facie* preference (πιθανώτερον εἰκόασιν λέγειν) for the Pythagorean theory, according to which the good was not transcendental, or separate from phenomena.

8 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος] ‘But let us put off to another occasion the discussion of these questions,’ i.e. the whole subject of the good and its relation to unity—to existence—to the world. This is, in short, the scope of Aristotle’s entire *Metaphysics*. We need not confine the reference of περὶ τούτων to the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, or refer it, with some commentators, to the books mentioned in the list of Diogenes (v. 25), περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων, α’. περὶ τῆς Σπευσίππου καὶ Ζενοκράτους, α’.

ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφοισβήτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρησθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικὰ πῶς ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰγαθὰ, καὶ τὰ 9 μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἂν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ 10 μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἂν. ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ 11 καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμμουβίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθὰ.

τῶς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν—ἄλλον] ‘But against my arguments an objection suggests itself, namely, that the Platonic theory was not meant to apply to every good (διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρησθαι), but that under one head are classified those goods that are sought and loved in and for themselves (καθ' αὐτά), while things productive of these, or in any way preservative of them, or preventive of their opposites, are spoken of as “secondary goods” (διὰ ταῦτα), and in another fashion.’ It seems best to refer τοὺς λόγους to the Platonic theory. The words καθ' ἓν εἶδος are used not in the peculiarly Platonic sense, ‘under one idea,’ but in the more common and also Aristotelian sense, ‘under one species.’

10 ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο—εἶδος] ‘Or is none of these, nor anything except the idea, to be called an absolute good? in which case the class good will be devoid of content and indivi-

duals.’ The Platonic idea was meant to be not only an ἰδέα, or absolute existence, transcending the world of space and time, but also an εἶδος, or universal nature, manifesting itself in different individuals. This latter property, Aristotle argues, will be lost if we keep denying of different attainable goods, even those that seem most plainly so, that they are goods in themselves.

11 φρονήσεως] ‘Thought.’ The word is used in a general sense as the substantive of φρονεῖν (cf. *Eth.* vii. xii. 5), and not in its technical sense as restricted to ‘practical wisdom.’

τιμῆς δὲ—ἀγαθὰ] ‘Now honour, thought, pleasure, exhibit distinct and differing laws when viewed as goods.’ The same instances are given below, i. vii. 5, of goods sought for their own sake. Obviously here Aristotle is not doing full justice by the question he has started—what the ‘different laws’ of good in these objects call for,

class.

- 12 οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι, ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὥς γὰρ ἐν σώματι
- 13 ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν. ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἓν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χαριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, δῆλον ὥς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ. νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖ-
- 14 ται. τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ,
- 15 καὶ εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεές ἐπιζητοῦ-

a subtle investigation; whereas there is here a summary assertion. We might urge, on the other hand, that honour is not an instance of an absolute good (cf. I. v. 5), that pleasure and thought really exhibit the same law of good—as being both *ἐνέργειαι*. But Aristotle here partly trifles, and partly dogmatizes. He would, of course, refer us to metaphysics for the question in point.

11 — 12 οὐκ ἔστιν — ἀναλογίαν] 'Good, therefore, is not something generic under one idea. But how then is the term used? For it does not resemble accidental coincidences of name. Shall we say then that it is so used because all goods spring from one source, or because they all tend to one end, or rather that it is on account of an analogy between them?' 'Ὁμώνυμα answers to 'equivocal' words in logic. The so-called 'Categories' of Aristotle begin 'Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὃν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν. A nominalistic

explanation of the general conception of good is here substituted *provisionally* for the realism of Plato.

13 ἀλλ' ἴσως—ζητεῖται] 'But perhaps we should dismiss these questions for the present, for to refine about them belongs more properly to another kind of philosophy. So too about the idea. Even if there is any one good universal and generic, or transcendental (*χαριστόν*) and absolute, it obviously can neither be realised nor possessed by man, whereas something of this latter kind is what we are inquiring after.' Cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 4. The whole force of the present chapter is contained in this sentence. The Idea is not *πρακτόν τι*, and therefore does not belong to ethics. The concluding paragraphs of the chapter are occupied with proving that the Idea is not available even as a model (*παράδειγμα*) for practical life.

15 ἐνδεές] Cf. *Pol.* vii. xvii. 15: πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσ-

σαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα
 τηλικούτου ἀπάντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιζη-
 τεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήθησεται ὑφάν-
 16 τῆς ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τὰγαθόν, ἢ
 πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ιδέα
 αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν
 οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ'
 ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ
 μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

Πάλιν δ' ἐπ' ἀνέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί
 7 ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ

λεῖπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπλη-
 ροῦν.

15—16 καίτοι—τεθεαμένος] 'And yet it is not likely that all artists should be ignorant of, and never so much as inquire after, so great an aid, if really existing. But it is hard to see in what a weaver or carpenter will be benefited with regard to their respective arts by knowing the absolute good; or how one is to become a better doctor or general by having contemplated the absolute Idea.' It has been objected that Aristotle fixes on too mean specimens of the arts, that he might have spoken differently if he had adduced the fine arts. But the question is, whether for practical life the Idea, that is, a knowledge of the absolute, could be made available? This forms a great point of divergence between Plato and Aristotle. The latter seems to regard the Idea as an object of the speculative reason alone, something metaphysical and standing apart; and between the speculative and practical powers of man he sets a gulf. Plato, on the other hand, speaking without this analytical clearness, seems to think of the idea as an object for the imagination, as well as the reason, as being an ideal as well as an

idea. In this its many-sided character he would make it affect life, as well as knowledge; for by contemplation of it the mind would become conformed to it. Cf. *Repub.* vii., and see Essay III. p. 153.

VII. 1 πάλιν δ' ἐπ' ἀνέλθωμεν—εἴη]

'But let us return to the good we are in search of, and ask what is its nature.' τὸ ζητούμενον is emphatic; it distinguishes the *πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν* of ethics, here 'sought for,' from the transcendental supreme good of metaphysics. Failing to obtain a satisfactory answer to his question, either from the common opinions of men, or from the philosophers, Aristotle starts anew, by asserting that though the conception of good may vary 'in each art and action,' yet it has this unvarying characteristic, that it is the 'end.' From this starting-point the argument easily comes round to the position already anticipated (*μεταβαίνον δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτον ἀφίκεται*), that the *πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν* is identical with the *τέλος τέλειον*, or end-in-itself of action, and with this basis, by a series of *a priori* principles, some already enunciated by Plato and others peculiar to his own system, Aristotle de-

It might follow that there is in the cause of falling short

Aristotle has again laid on just the opposite this. 9th X ch

Aristotle's father was a physician hence his frequent illustrations of that science

τέχνη· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἱατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἱατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁλόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφί-
 2 κται. τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ
 3 δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελει-
 4 ὄτερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μά-

velopes his conception of happiness or the chief good. (1) It is τέλειον; (2) Also, it must be αὐταρκές; (3) It must be found in the Ἔργον of man. (4) This Ἔργον is a rational and moral life; (5) We must conceive of it 'in actuality,' in other words, as 'conscious life;' (6) We must add the condition of conformity to its own proper law; (7) And also the external condition of sufficient duration and prosperity.

3 οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα] 'As for instance, wealth, flutes, and instruments in general.' Wealth is a mere means (cf. I. v. 8). Αὐλοί seems a stock example with Aristotle of the instruments to an art. Cf. *De Animā*, I. iii. 26, where he argues against the doctrine of the migration of souls, saying, you might as well speak of the carpenter's art migrating into flutes: παραπλήσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι—δεῖ

γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὄργανοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. Cf. Xenophon, *Æcon.* I. 10, where Socrates says: ὥσπερ γε αἱλοὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ἀξίως λόγον αὐλοῖν χρήματ' εἰσι, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀχρηστοὶ λίθοι, εἰ μὴ ἀποδιδοῖτό γε αὐτοῖς.

4 καὶ ἀπλῶς—ἄλλο] 'And therefore we call that absolutely of the nature of an end which is desirable in and for itself always, and never in order to anything else.' The conception of ends was not fully developed in Plato; at the beginning of the second book of the *Republic*, those are said to be the highest goods which are desired both for themselves and for their results (cf. *Eth.* I. vi. 10). Aristotle's conception of the practical chief good is that while it is solely an end, it yet sums up the results of all means. Hence he adds that it is not only τέλειον, but αὐταρκές. These two

λιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσκειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκές εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐταρκές λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικός ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνουντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυθις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκές τίθεμεν ὁ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηθενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην, συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἰρετώτερον ἀεί. τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκές ἢ εὐδαιμονία,

Against the
Lysis v. 1
of the Lysis

qualities are attributed to the chief good in the *Philebus* of Plato, p. 20 c: τὴν τὰγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι; πάντων δὴ που τελεώτατον, ὧς Σώκρατες. τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τὰγαθόν; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; κ.τ.λ.

6 τὸ δ' αὐταρκές—ἄνθρωπος] 'We do not mean "all-sufficiency" to apply to the individual alone leading a solitary life, but to one living in the midst of parents and children and in general friends and fellow-citizens, since man is by nature social.' The Greek οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ—ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι is defective in the grammar; the meaning apparently is, that αὐτάρκεια does not imply isolation.

7 τούτων δὲ—ἐπισκεπτέον] 'But of these we must take some limit; for if

one extends the circle to parents and descendants and the friends of a man's friends, it will go on to infinity. But this point we must consider hereafter.' Man, as a social being, having been represented as the centre of a circle, Aristotle adds we must fix some limit to this circle within which his αὐτάρκεια is to radiate. He promises to return to the question. But the promise is unfulfilled; see Essay I. p. 30. Among the definitions of happiness given in the *Rhetoric*, I. v. 3, is Αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς.

8 ἔτι δὲ πάντων—ἀεί] 'Moreover we think it (οἰόμεθα) the most desirable of all goods, provided it be not (μὴ) reckoned as one among them; but if it were so reckoned, it is

9 τῶν πρακτῶν οὐσα τέλος. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται,
 10 ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστὶν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα
 δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
 που. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ
 τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν
 τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν

plain that it would become more desirable with the addition of the slightest good, for the addition constitutes a preponderance of goods, and the greater good is always the more desirable.' This remark points out the difference between the τέλειον καὶ αὐταρκές ἀγαθόν and any other thing to which the word 'best' can ever be applied. The all-comprehensive and supreme good, happiness, is indeed the best, but not as being really placed on a level with other goods, or ranked among them; not as being 'best of the lot,' but as including all the lot in itself, so that beside it there is no good left that could possibly be added to it. The Paraphrast gives exactly this meaning to the passage, rendering the word συναριθμουμένην by σύστοιχον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς. καὶ εἰ σύστοιχον αὐτὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήσομεν ἀγαθοῖς, φανερόν ὅτι, εἰ προσθήσομέν τι τῶν ἄλλων αὐτῇ, αἰρετωτέραν ποιήσομεν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτὴ τὸ ἄκρον τῶν αἰρετῶν. And that the above was the meaning of Aristotle is shown by the author of the *Magna Moralia* (i. ii. 7), who starts the question: Πῶς τὸ ἄριστον δεῖ σκοπεῖν; πότερον οὕτως ὥς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναριθμουμένου; to which he answers: 'Ἀλλ' ἄτοπον. τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ τέλος τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλειον τέλος ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐθὲν ἂν ἄλλο δόξειεν εἶναι ἢ εὐδαιμονία,—ἐὰν δὴ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ συν-αριθμῆς, αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔσται βέλτιον· αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἔσται. In other words,

the end is the sum of the means, and therefore cannot be compared with the means, for that would only be comparing it with itself. The whole consists of parts, and cannot be called the best of the parts. Nor can it be made better by the addition of one of the parts, than it was in itself. The present passage is quoted by Alexander Aphrodis. *ad Ar. Topica*, iii. 2, (Brandis's *Scholias*, 274b, l. 17) to illustrate the point that knowledge *plus* the process of learning cannot be called better than knowledge by itself, ὅτι τὸ μαθάνειν διὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἰρούμεθα. 'Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εὐδαιμονία μετὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν αἰρετωτέρα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας μόνης, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ περιέχονται καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί.—οὐ γὰρ συναριθμεῖται τοῖς περιέχουσιν τινα τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὥς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἐβλήθη. The word συναριθμεῖσθαι in the sense of 'to be reckoned as one of a class,' 'to be placed in the same scale,' occurs *Rhet.* i. vii. 3: ἀνάγκη τὰ τε πλείω, τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μείζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. 'The more numerous must be a greater good than the fewer, if they be placed in the same scale of comparison with it.' Eustratius takes the passage to mean that 'happiness would be the most desirable of all things, even if not *joined with* other goods, though with any addition it would be *a fortiori* better.' This contradicts the very principle that Aristotle wished to establish, that 'best'

ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότε-
 ρον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ
 πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ
 καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου
 τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ
 πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη
 ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυ-
 τοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν
 καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν. ἐπομένῃ δὲ αἰσθητικῇ τις ἂν εἴη, φαί-
 νεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ.
 λείπεται δὴ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. [τούτου δὲ
 τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.]

and 'most desirable' are to be applied to the supreme good; not meaning that which merely as a fact is better than other things, but, ideally, that than which nothing can be better. Aristotle accepts from the Platonists the doctrine, that the chief good is incapable of addition. Cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 3.

II πότερον οὖν τέκτονος κ.τ.λ.] This argument—by which, from the analogy of the different trades, of the different animals, and of the separate parts of the body, the existence of a proper function for man is proved—comes almost *verbatim* from Plato's *Republic*, i. 352-3. The ἔργον of anything Plato there defines as that which can alone or best be accomplished by the thing in question. Ἄρα οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θέλῃς καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁπουοῦν ἔργον ὃ ἂν ἡ μόνῃ ἐκείνῃ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα; Of course ἔργον in this sense is to be distinguished from such uses as in *Eth.* i. i. 2, where it means an 'external result;' iv. ii. 10, 'a work of art;' ii. ix. 2, 'a labour,' or 'achievement.'

12 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν—ἔχοντος] 'Now mere life is shared even by the plants, whereas we are seeking something peculiar. We may set aside therefore the life of nutrition and growth.

Succeeding this will be a principle of life that may be called the perceptive; but this too appears shared by horse and ox and every animal. There remains then what may be called a moral life of the rational part.' The argument here as to the proper function of man, and the division on which it is based, belongs entirely to the physiological and psychological system of Aristotle. See Essay V. p. 237. The meanings of the word *πρακτικός* are (1) with a genitive 'able to do,' or 'disposed to do,' as iv. iii. 27, *ὀλίγων πρακτικόν*, i. ix. 8, *πρακτικούς τῶν καλῶν*. (2) 'Active,' 'practical,' opposed to quiescent or speculative, i. v. 4. *Οἱ δὲ χαλριεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμὴν*. vi. viii. 2. (3) 'Moral,' as here, opposed to the life of animal instinct. Cf. vi. ii. 2, *τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν*. Or, as vi. iv. 2, vi. xii. 10, opposed to the artistic and the scientific.

13 τούτου δὲ—διανοούμενον] With regard to the present passage, Bekker exhibits no variation in the MSS., and the Paraphrast evidently had it in his text. All that can be said, therefore, is that the present sentence interrupts the sense and grammar of the

διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον.
 14 κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον
 ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ
 δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπου-
 δαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ
 ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρε-
 τὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
 καθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὔ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ
 τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ
 πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὔ ταῦτα καὶ

context, and that it is conspicuously awkward in a book which for the most part reads smoothly.

διττῶς δὲ—λέγεσθαι] 'But further, since this life may be spoken of in two ways' (either as an existing state or developed into actuality), 'we must assume it to be in actuality; for this seems the more distinctive form of the conception.' καθ' ἕξιν is the opposition to κατ' ἐνέργειαν. Cf. I. viii. 9.

14 We have here a fourfold protasis: εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον—τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον—ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν—ἕκαστον δ' εὔ. The apodosis to all of these is εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, where γίνεται is used as denoting a deduction from premises, just as the future tense is often employed. Similar long-drawn arguments occur II. vi. 9, III. v. 17, &c.

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν—λόγον] 'Now if the function of man be conscious life according to a law, or implying a law.' ψυχῆ, substituted for the previous term ζωή, denotes the entire principle of life, thought, and action, in man. The additional term κατὰ λόγον gives an equivalent to πρακτικῆ, since the reason necessarily introduces a moral point of view into every part of life (cf. *De Animâ*, II. x. 7). It is difficult to translate κατὰ λόγον, because the word λόγος is ambiguous. Partly it

means reason, partly a law or standard (cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 2). As compared with μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, κατὰ λόγον would express a marked, direct, and prominent control. In the εὐφυΐς and the σώφρων, where the desires flow naturally to what is good, reason would seem rather to be presupposed (οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ) than directly to assert itself. The more significant expression, however, is that which follows, πράξεις μετὰ λόγου. A machine might be said to move κατὰ λόγον, 'in accordance with a law,' but not μετὰ λόγου, 'with a consciousness of a law.' It is this consciousness of the law, which, according to Hegel, distinguishes morality (Moralität) from mere propriety (Sittlichkeit). On the transition of meaning from κατ' ἐνέργειαν to ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, and on the translation of these terms, see Essay IV. p. 187, 193.

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ—κιθαριστοῦ] 'And we say that the function is generically the same of such a one, and such a one good of his kind, as, for instance, of a harper, and of a good harper.' φάμεν is an appeal to language and general consent. τοῦδε is used indefinitely as above, I. vi. 16, τὴν τοῦδε, 'the health of such and such an individual;' VI. xi. 6, ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία, &c. The present passage vindicates the introduction of κατ' ἀρετὴν into the definition by

καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· 15
 εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια
 γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν
 ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείω. μία γὰρ 16
 χελιδὼν ἕαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ
 μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.
 περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰγαθὸν ταύτη. δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως 17
 ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἴθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ'
 ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς
 ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετῆς
 ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν
 αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλείπον. μεμνη- 18

showing there is nothing illogical in doing so, that by taking a genus in its best form we do not go off into another genus.

15 ἕκαστον δ' εὖ—ἀποτελεῖται] 'And everything is well completed in accordance with its own proper excellence.' Cf. *Eth.* II. vi. 2. This principle of the connexion between the proper function of a thing and the peculiar law of excellence of that thing is taken from Plato; cf. *Repub.* I. p. 353. It is introduced here to justify the term κατ' ἀρετὴν in the definition of happiness. This term is not at once to be interpreted 'according to virtue,' which would destroy the logical sequence of the argument. It comes in at first in a general sense, 'according to the proper law of excellence in man,' whatever that may be.

εἰ δ' οὕτω—τελειοτάτην] 'If so, I say, it results that the good for man is conscious life according to the law of excellence; and if the excellences be more than one, according to that which is best and most absolutely in itself desirable.' Whatever awkwardness and strangeness there may appear in this attempt to render the definition of Aristotle, it will be found on consideration to approach, at all events,

nearer to his meaning than the usual rendering: 'an energy of the soul, according to virtue,' &c.

16 ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ—χρόνος] 'But we must add also 'in a complete period and sphere of circumstances.' For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so neither one day nor a brief time constitutes a man blest and happy.' βίος, the external form and condition of life, implies both fortunes and duration. By adding this last consideration, Aristotle gives a practical aspect to his definition. Ideally, a moment of consciousness might be called the highest good, independent of space and time. τέλειος, as we have seen above (§ 4), means 'that which is of the nature of an end,' 'that which is desirable for its own sake.' But no doubt the popular sense of the word comes in to some degree in the present passage; partly Aristotle had before his mind the conception of a 'complete' or 'perfect' duration of life, partly of an external history and career that could be designated as 'desirable for its own sake.'

17 περιγεγράφθω—ἐλλείπον] 'Thus far, then, for a sketch of the chief good; for we ought surely to draw the

- σθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ᾅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ
- 19 μεθοδῷ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τί· θεατὴς γὰρ τάληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ
- 20 τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ᾅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι

outline first, and afterwards to fill it up. And it would seem that any one could bring forward and complete what fits in with the sketch, and that time is a good discoverer of such things, or at least a good cooperator. Hence it is, too, that the development of the arts has taken place, for every man can supply that which is defective.' From this point to the end of the chapter, Aristotle dwells on the importance of a principle (like his definition of the chief good) as an outline or comprehensive idea, afterwards to be developed and filled up. (Cf. a similar phrase in *De Gen. Anim.* II. vi. 29: καὶ γὰρ αἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι ταῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῶον, *et preced.*) He adds, however, the caution that mathematical exactness must not be required in filling up the sketch. He seems here to dwell with some pride on the foundation he has laid for ethics; a similar feeling betrays itself with regard to his logical discoveries, *Sophist. Elench.* xxxiii. 13, where is a parallel passage to the present on the importance of ἀρχαί: τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε, χρησιμώτερον μέντα πολλῷ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ἀδείξεως. μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται.

18 τὴν ἀκρίβειαν — ἐπιζητεῖν] Cf. I. iii. 1. The word 'Ακρίβεια, with its

cognate ἀκριβής, has different shades of meaning which may be here specified. (1) 'Minuteness of details.' Cf. Plato, *Repub.* III. 414 A, ὡς ἐν τύφῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας. *Eth.* II. vii. 5. (2) 'Mathematical exactness,' which implies every link of argument being stated, and the whole resting on demonstrative grounds. Cf. *Metaph.* α' ἑλαττον, III. 2. *Eth.* VII. iii. 3. (3) 'Definiteness,' or 'fixedness.' Cf. VIII. vii. 5, 'Ακριβὴς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός. II. ii. 4, 'Ο λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές, answering to ἐστηκός, IX. ii. 2, III. iii. 8. (4) Applied to the arts it denotes 'finish.' Cf. I. iii. 1, II. vi. 9, VI. vii. 1. (5) By a slight transition from the last, when applied to sciences, it means also 'metaphysical subtlety.' This transition is made VI. vii. 2: cf. X. iv. 3; *De Animâ*, I. i. 1. In the passage before us ἀκρίβεια seems to combine several of the above-mentioned meanings. It seems to say that *mathematical exactness* is not suited to ethics—that too much *subtlety* is not to be expected (καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης, κ. τ. λ.)—that too much *detail* is to be avoided (ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα, κ. τ. λ.).

20 οὐκ—ἀρχή] 'Nor must we demand the cause in all things equally,—in some things it is sufficient that the fact be well established, as is the case with first principles. Now the

πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή· τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεω- 21
ροῦνται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ'
ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἢ πεφύκασιν, καὶ
σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι
ρόπην πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἡμισυ παντὸς
εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῇ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν
ζητούμενων.

fact constitutes a first point and principle.' The bearing of this somewhat obscure sentence seems to be to repeat the remark made, I. iv. 6-7, that in morals a fact appealing to the individual consciousness has a paramount validity. Just as in the other sciences we do not ask the why and wherefore of the axioms, so in morals we accept the facts because we feel them without their being demonstrated. Cf. *Eth.* VI. viii. 9.

21 τῶν ἀρχῶν δ'—ἐπόμενα] 'But of principles some are apprehended by induction, others by intuition, others by a sort of habituation of the mind, and, in short, different principles in different ways. But we must endeavour to attain each in the natural way, and we must take all pains to have them rightly defined, for they are of great importance for the consequences drawn from them.' This digression seems partly suggested by the immediately preceding paragraph on the relation of facts in morals to principles of science, partly it belongs in general to this part of the subject. Aristotle, having laid down his ground-principle of ethics, makes a pause, in which some remarks are introduced on principles, their importance, and the method of attaining them. The words καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως show that the list of methods is not meant to be exhaustive. The commentators, misunderstanding the Greek, have inquired by what 'other methods other principles' could be

sought? But, of course, these words only generalize the whole proposition (cf. *Eth.* I. iv. 3, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο).

θεωροῦνται] 'are perceived;' cf. VI. iii. 2, VII. iii. 5. Answering to μετιέναι we have the term *θηρέειν ἀρχάς*, *Prior Analytics*, I. xxx. 2. With ἢ πεφύκασιν we must understand a passive infinitive, 'in the way in which they are meant by nature to be reached.' As to the method of obtaining principles, cf. *Prior Analytics*, I. xxx. 1, where the study of nature and of facts is pointed out as the only source of ἀρχαί or universal premises. 'Ἡ μὲν οὖν δόδος κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὅποιον οὖν καὶ μάθημα· δεῖ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει περὶ ἕκαστον ἀθερεῖν.—Διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἐμπερίας ἐστὶ παραδοῦναι. Connecting then, the recognition of ἀρχαί with the knowledge of facts, we see that (1) ἐπαγωγή is the evolution of a general law out of particular facts, (2) αἰσθησις is the recognition of the law in the fact. Αἰσθησις is not to be restricted to the perception of the senses, or confined (as the Paraphrast would have it) to the physical sciences. Rather it is opposed to ἐπαγωγή, as intuition to inference. Cf. *Eth.* VI. xi. 5, τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. (3) ἐθισμός is a sort of unconscious induction, a process by which general truths may be said to grow up in the mind. Nor is this process peculiar to moral truths

8 Σκεπτέον δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεὶ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές. νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ. τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς

alone: it is a question whether even the truths of number do not derive part of their validity as necessary axioms from their frequent repetition. See *Mill's Logic*, book II. ch. v.

VIII. We now enter upon a fresh division of the Book. From hence to the end of Chapter 12th Aristotle tests his great ethical principle, his definition of the chief good, by comparing it with various popular or philosophic opinions, and by applying to it certain commonly mooted questions and distinctions of the day.

1 σκεπτέον δὴ—τὰ ληθές] 'We must consider it (*i.e.* the first principle) therefore not only from the point of view of our own conclusion and premises, but also from that of sayings on the subject. For with what is true all experience coincides, with what is false the truth quickly shows a discrepancy.'

περὶ αὐτῆς] especially with δὴ, can only be referred to ἡ ἀρχή in the preceding line. This is a general doctrine of science, though Aristotle immediately exemplifies it with regard to his definition of happiness.

ἐξ ὧν] is compressed for ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν. The clause τῷ μὲν—τὰ ληθές contains an indistinctness and a difficulty overlooked by the commentators. For they content themselves with explaining that 'truth in the thought is identical with existence in

the thing.' Ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἀληθές, τοῦτο ἢ ὑπαρξὺς ἐν τῷ πράγματι· ὅταν οὖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ πράγματι συνάδει τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις, δῆλον ἂν εἴη, ὅτι ἀληθὲς ὁ λόγος (*Eustratius*). The difficulty is, that Aristotle is not talking of comparing theory with facts, but his own theory with the theories of others. Τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, however, cannot exactly mean 'opinions' or 'theories.' It is plain that there is some confusion in the expressions used, which is increased by the word τὰ ληθές in the second part of the sentence answering to τὰ ὑπάρχοντα in the first. There is here a mixing up of the objective and the subjective sides of knowledge. Our word 'experience' may perhaps serve to represent τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, meaning neither 'facts' nor 'opinions,' but facts as represented in opinions. In the same way τὰ ληθές is not simply the true fact, nor the true theory, but 'the truth,' that is, fact embodied in theory. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα would usually mean the natural attributes of a thing, the facts of its nature. Cf. *Prior Anal.* I. xxx. 1 (quoted above). *Eth.* I. x. 7.

2 νενεμημένων—ἀγαθὰ] 'To apply our principle (δὴ), goods have been divided into three kinds, the one kind being called external goods, and the others goods of the mind and body; and we call those that have to do with the mind most distinctively and most especially goods.' This classification

ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὔσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις 3 τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός. συναδῇ δὲ 4 τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ 5 καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλ- 6

is attributed by Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Ethicos* xi. 51, to the Platonists and Peripatetics; but in the *Eudemean Ethics* ii. i. 1, it is spoken of as a popular division, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. Accordingly here Aristotle calls it 'an ancient division that is admitted by the philosophers.' It is only as in contrast to σῶμα that we can venture to call ψυχή 'mind.' Our psychological words are so much more definite and restricted than those of Aristotle, that we cannot hope to give a uniform rendering of terms which he employs in varying senses. We must follow his context, and try to catch the association which is for the time most prominent.

3 ὀρθῶς δὲ—ἐκτός] 'And our definition is right in that certain actions and modes of consciousness are specified as the End. For thus it comes to be one of the goods of the mind, and not one of those that are external.' πράξεις stand for the development of the moral nature of man, ἐνέργειαι more generally for the development of any part of his nature into consciousness. In either case the man departs not out of himself; the good is one existing in and for his mind.

4 συναδῇ—εὐπραξία] 'And with our definition the saying' (cf. *Eth.* i. iv. 2) 'agrees that "the happy man lives well and does well." For we have

described happiness pretty much as a kind of well-living and well-doing.'

5 φαίνεται δὲ—λεχθέντι] 'Moreover the various theories of what is requisite with regard to happiness seem all included in the definition.' There is a sort of mixed construction here, ἐπιζητούμενα being used in a doubtful sense. The meanings of the word ἐπιζητεῖν are: (1) to 'require' or 'demand,' viii. xiv. 3, τὸ δυνατόν ἢ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ; (2) to 'search after,' i. vi. 15, ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν; (3) to 'examine' or 'investigate,' i. vii. 19, ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν. viii. i. 6; (4) to 'question,' like ἀπορεῖν, ix. vii. 1. In the passage before us, τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα partly means 'the things demanded, or thought requisite;' partly, as going with περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, 'the discussions or investigations on the subject of happiness.' The words δὲ καὶ mark a transition from considering the merely popular opinions, to the more philosophic 'investigations' of the subject.

6 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ—συμπαλαμβάνουσιν] As we learn from the next section, Aristotle is rather running over the chief heads of opinion than giving any accurate classification of the different schools of philosophy. The opinion that identified happiness with virtue may perhaps be attributed to the Cynics; with practical wisdom (φρόνησις) to Socrates; with philosophy (σοφία) to Anaxagoras (cf. *Eth.* x.

λοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἑτεροὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐ-
 7 ετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ
 καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδε-
 τέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἔν
 8 γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι

viii. 11), Heraclitus, Democritus, &c. 'That it consisted in these things or one of these, with pleasure added or implied,' is the doctrine asserted by Plato in the *Philebus*. That 'favourable external conditions' must be included, seems to have been the opinion of Xenocrates, who attributed to such external things a δύναμις ὑπηρετική. See Essay III. p. 169.

7 τούτων δὲ—κατορθοῦν] One MS. omits ἢ καί, leaving the sentence οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἔν γέ τι τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν, for which Dr. Cardwell suggests the emendation κατορθοῦντας. 'It is not likely that either class should be altogether at fault, but only in some particular point, their general conclusions being correct.' This is confirmed by the interpretation of the Paraphrast: ὦν οὐδετέρους εὐλογον τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν πᾶσι διαμαρτάνειν· ἀλλὰ καθ' ἔν τι μόνον ἴσως, ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις δὲ ἀληθεύειν. But the text, as it stands above, gives a sense most in accordance with what Aristotle would be likely to say. 'Now some of these are opinions held by many, and from ancient times; others by a few illustrious men; but it is not probable that either class should be utterly wrong, rather that, in some point at least, if not in most of their conclusions, that they should be right.'

8 sqq. Aristotle now proceeds to show his own coincidence with these pre-existent theories. It is to be ob-

served that he says nothing here in reference to those who made happiness to consist in 'wisdom,' or 'a sort of philosophy.' This is one of the marks of systematic method in the *Ethics*. He will not anticipate the relation of φρόνησις and σοφία to εὐδαιμονία. The rest of the argument is very simple. (1) The definition of happiness, 'conscious life under the law of virtue,' agrees with, includes, and improves upon the definition that says 'virtue is happiness.' For it substitutes the evocation, employment, and conscious development of virtue, for the same as a mere possession or latent quality. (2) Such a life implies pleasure necessarily and essentially (καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς); for pleasure, being part of our consciousness (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 6), necessarily attaches to all that we are fond of, or devoted to, or that we follow as a pursuit (ἐκάστω δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιμοῦτος, cf. *Eth.* ii. iii. 1—3), and thus will arise out of a life of virtue to him that pursues such a life. He will experience a harmony of pleasures unknown to others (τοῖς φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα). Hence we may supersede the addition proposed by some philosophers of μεθ' ἡδονῆς to the conception of happiness. Our conception, says Aristotle, needs no such adjunct 'to be tied on like an amulet.' (3) He accepts the requirements of Xenocrates. External prosperity is a condition without which happiness

τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα συνωδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηρηγηκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷον τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδῆσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστω δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. τοι-

cannot practically exist, though it is not to be confounded with happiness.

τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα] 'Virtue or excellence of some sort.' The ambiguity of the word ἀρετὴ renders it impossible to be translated uniformly. It comes into the *Ethics* with the general meaning of excellence, but constantly tends to restrict itself to human virtue, and indeed to moral virtue, as distinguished from other human excellence.

9 τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐξηρηγηκότι] 'To one asleep, or otherwise totally inactive.' Cf. I. v. 6.

πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ εὖ πράξει] Both the terms 'action' and 'well' are implied in ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν. Εὖ πράξει, however, goes off into a different train of associations.

οὕτω—γίνονται] 'In the same way it is they who act rightly that attain to the noble and excellent things in life.' ἐπήβολος repeats the metaphor of the archer, *Eth.* I. ii. 2 ;

cf. *Æsch. Prom.* 444, *Eth.* I. x. 14. The expressions here used show Aristotle's bright and enthusiastic feelings about the good attainable in life.

11 τοῖς μὲν οὖν—ἡδέα] 'Now to most men there is a sense of discord in their pleasures, because they are not naturally pleasant; but to the lovers of what is beautiful those things are pleasant which are naturally pleasant.' τοῖς πολλοῖς is a sort of *dativus com-modi*. The word φιλόκαλος occurs in the *Phædrus* of Plato, where it is said that the soul which in its antenatal state saw most clearly the Ideas, in life enters εἰς γοῆν ἀνδρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ. Plato uses it, in accordance with his context, to denote one with a poetic feeling and love for the beautiful, like the verb φιλοκαλεῖν in Thucydides, II. c. 40. In Aristotle the meaning is more restricted to a love of the noble in action. *Eth.* IV.

αὐτὰ δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν
 12 ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὐτάς. οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ
 βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν
 ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ
 χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδεὶς ἂν
 εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον
 τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 13 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτάς ἂν εἴεν αἱ κατ'
 ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαὶ γέ καὶ κα-
 λαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει
 14 περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἰπομεν. ἄριστον
 ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώ-
 ρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῆστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
 ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίστοις ἐνεργείαις· ταύ-
 τας δέ, ἥ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαι-

iv. 4, it means one with a noble spirit: τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδράδῃ καὶ φιλόκαλον. φύσει ἡδέα denotes partly things that are, ought to be, and must be pleasures, according to the eternal fitness of things, in accordance with the whole frame of the world; cf. φύσει βουλευτόν, *Eth.* iii. iv. 3; partly, pleasures which are in accordance with the nature of the individual,—his natural state—his highest condition; cf. vii. xiv. 7, φύσει ἡδέα ἃ ποιεῖ πράξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, 'Things are naturally pleasant which produce an operation of any given nature' (viewed as a whole): vii. xi. 4, γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, 'a perceptible transition into one's natural state.' On the various meanings of φύσις, see below, *Eth.* ii. i. 3, note.

12 ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός] 'Like an amulet to be tied on.' Cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Pericl.* § 38: ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς

ἠθικοῖς διαπορήσας εἰ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τρέπεται τὰ ἡγή, —ιστόρηκεν, ὅτι νοσῶν ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοποῦμένῳ τινὶ τῶν φίλων δέλξει περιάπτου ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ τραχήλῳ περιηρημένον. Cf. also Plato, *Repub.* iv. 426 b, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπωδαὶ οὐδὲ περιάπτα, κ.τ.λ.

οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων] This anticipates *Eth.* ii. iii. 1, where it is said that pleasure is the test of a ζῆσις being formed.

14 κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα] The *Eudemian Ethics* commences by quoting this inscription, rather more circumlocution being used than here. 'Ὁ μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προτύλαιον τοῦ Δηφίου, κ.τ.λ. The last line, as there given, stands πάντων δ' ἡδιστον, οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν. The verses also occur among the remains of Theognis, and the same sentiment in iambs is found in a fragment of the *Creusa* of Sophocles, Stobæus *Serm.*

μονίαν. φαίνεται δ' ὁμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδε-¹⁵
ομένη, καθάπερ εἵπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ
καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττε-
ται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ
πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ¹⁶
μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ
εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης
καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἥττον, εἰ τῷ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν
ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἵπομεν,¹⁷
ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς
ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι
δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐπιστὸν⁹
ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ¹⁰
διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ¹¹
*God, Man
Chance*

CIII. 15. This classification of goods—that 'justice is most beautiful, health best, and success sweetest,' belongs to the era of proverbial philosophy in Greece; see Essay II.

15 ἀχορήγητον ὄντα] We should say, by analogous metaphors, 'Unless sufficiently furnished' or 'equipped.' Cf. iv. ii. 20.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ — τεθνᾶσιν] Cf. *Rhetoric*, I. v. 4, εἰ δὴ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς, οἷον ὑγίειαν κάλλος ἰσχύϊν μέγεθος δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικὴν, δόξαν, τιμὴν, εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετήν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τὰ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. The expression in the *Rhetoric*—'parts of happiness,' is equivalent to 'instruments' of happiness, the more accurate designation in the present passage.

17 καθάπερ οὖν—ἀρετήν] 'As we have said then, it seems to require the

addition of such external prosperity. Hence some identify good fortune with happiness, as another class of philosophers do virtue.' The Cyrenaics and Cynics appear to be alluded to here. Aristotle's doctrine contains and gives a deeper expression to all that is true in both of the two views.

IX. 1 ὅθεν—παραγίνεται] 'Whence also the question is raised whether it (happiness) is to be attained by teaching, or habit, or any other kind of practice; or whether it comes by some divine providence, or lastly by chance.' The word ὅθεν expresses the thread of connexion, by which this new subject of discussion is introduced. Since happiness seems to be a balance of two principles, an internal one, virtue, and an external one, circumstances, the question arises whether it is attainable by the individual through any prescribed means, or whether it is beyond his control. It seems chiefly, however, to be upon the word ἀρετήν that Aristotle goes

θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὖλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσ-
δοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσω βέλτιστον.
3 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον,
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν
καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἀσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων
εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι
4 φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύ-
κοινον· δυνατόν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις
5 πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δ'
ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὖλογον ἔχειν

off. The question of the day, *πότερον* μαθητὸν ἢ ἀρετὴ, comes before him on mentioning that some identify happiness with virtue. Thus he says, not quite distinctly, 'It is questioned whether happiness can be learnt.' The question forms an important point at issue in the ethical systems of Aristotle and of Plato. The conclusion of Aristotle is directly opposed to that which is somewhat tentatively stated at the end of the *Meno* (99 π): ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται.

2—3 εἰ μὲν οὖν—εἶναι] 'Now it must be confessed that if anything else at all is a gift of gods to men, it seems reasonable that happiness too should be the gift of God, especially as it is the best of human things. But this exact point perhaps would more properly belong to another enquiry; at all events, if happiness is not sent by God, but comes by means of virtue, through some sort of learning or practice, it appears to be one of the divinest things.' We have here a characteristic exhibition of Aristotle's way of dealing with questions of the kind. We may observe: (1) His acknowledgment and admission of the religious point of view, and the *primâ facie* ground for the inter-

ference of Providence in this case *if in any others*. (2) His strict maintenance of the separate spheres of the sciences. A theological question cannot belong to ethics. (3) His manner of dismissing the subject. 'Happiness, if not given by God, is at all events divine' (cf. *Eth.* x. viii. 13)—by which expression he alters the view, giving it a Pantheistic instead of a Theistic tendency; see Essay V. (4) His immediate return to the natural and practical mode of thought.

4 εἴη δ' ἂν πολύκοινον—ἐπιμελείας] This is an addition to the preceding epithets of happiness. Not only is it 'something divine and blessed,' as being 'the crown and end of virtue,' but also 'it must be widely common property, for it may be possessed—through a certain course of learning and care—by all who are not incapacitated for excellence.' As it stands, this last clause is a *petitio principii*. Afterwards, however, the assumption is justified by arguments in its support both from reason and experience. Aristotle insisted much less than Plato on the innate difference between man and man, and approaches much more nearly to the mechanical and sophistical view, ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπου οὐ πολὺ διαφέρει.

5—6 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν—ἂν εἴη] The argu-

οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελεῖς ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον. εἴρη-
ται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργά

ment, which is stated in rather a complex way, seems as follows:—‘If it were better that happiness should be attainable by certain definite means, we may conclude that it is so (because in nature, art, and every kind of causation, especially in what is higher, things are regulated in the best possible way). But it is better, because the contrary supposition (namely, that the chief good should depend on chance) is simply absurd and inconceivable.’ It is an *a priori* argument, based on a sort of natural optimism, on a belief in the fitness of things. We find a similar classification of causes into nature, chance, and human skill, *Eth.* iii. iii. 7, where however necessity is added. Cf. vi. iv. 4. The ἀρίστη αἰτία here meant seems to be virtue. Cf. *Eth.* ii. vi. 9, and *De Juv. et Sen.* iv. 1: κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὴν φύσιν δρῶμεν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον.

7—11 The succeeding arguments may be briefly summed up. (2) He appeals to his definition of the chief good, that it is a certain ‘development and awaking of the consciousness under the law of virtue, and with certain necessary or favourable external conditions.’ This definition obviously implies the contradictory of any theory making happiness merely and entirely a contingency or chance. (3) Since the chief good is the end of politics, whose main business it is to educate and improve the citizens—

this shows that education is the recognised means of happiness. (4) Animals are not called happy, because they are incapable of the above-mentioned awaking of the moral consciousness. (5) The same applies to boys, whose age renders them incapable of that which has real moral worth. At this point Aristotle adds that happiness requires absolute virtue, and a completed round of life (*ἐρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου*), and he goes off into a new train of thoughts on the uncertainty of human affairs, by which he is brought into contact with the paradox of Solon.

7 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν—ὀργανικῶς] The Paraphrast explains τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ here to mean τὰ σωματικά, which he divides into τὰ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, such as health, which are necessary to the existence of happiness (*ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον*), and τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, as wealth, friends, &c., which are helps and instruments to happiness. Aristotle probably had not this exact division before his mind. He places happiness essentially in the consciousness; and then speaks of other and secondary conditions, partly necessary and partly favourable. He in fact hovers between the ideal and the practical. Sometimes he speaks of happiness as that chief good which includes everything (*Eth.* i. vii. 8); at other times he analyses its more essential and less essential parts, and leaves in it a ground open

ἁπλοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ
: agrees with
: definition
: not in the text
: it was the High
446
: ... but it is not by
: ... but it is not by

8 καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ'
ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος
ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ
ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτι-
10 κοὺς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε
ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν
οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν
αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαιμὼν ἐστίν· οὐπὼ γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν
τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα
μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας
11 καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλὰ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ
παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ'
εὐθηνούντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως,
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡρωϊκοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ
τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως
οὐδὲς εὐδαιμονίζει.

10 Πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμο-

to chance and circumstances, which admits of being improved or impaired.

ὁμολογούμενα—τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ] 'In agreement with what we said at starting.' Cf. x. vii. 2: 'Ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ.

10 διὰ ταύτην μακαρίζονται] In *Politics*, i. chap. xiii., it is discussed, from a more external point of view, whether boys are capable of the same virtue in a household as men. To which the conclusion is 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παῖς ἀτελής, ὅλον ὅτι τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν τέλειον καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον (§ 11). The boy's good qualities have not an independent existence; they only give the promise of such. The sentiment διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται is neatly expressed by Cicero *de Rep.* (quoted by Servius on *Æn.* vi. 877): 'O Fanni, difficilis causa laudare puerum: non enim res laudanda, sed spes est.'

11 εὐθηνούντα] aliter εὐσθενούντα. Cf. *Rhet.* i. v. 3, εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων, where also there is the variation εὐσθένεια.

ἐν τοῖς ἡρωϊκοῖς] aliter Τρωϊκοῖς. Dr. Cardwell quotes Bentley, who, upon Callimachus *Fragm.* 208, pronounces that ἥρωες is a false reading for Τρῶες. Τὰ ἡρωϊκά means 'the heroic legends.'

X. The mention of βίος τέλειος and of the Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι brings Aristotle now to consider the famous paradox of Solon, that 'no one can be called happy as long as he lives.' The discussion of this question is valuable not only for its own sake as a criticism upon the old saying, but as introducing a practical consideration of happiness, and tending to settle the relation to it of outward circumstances. Other points of interest are mooted rather than set at rest.

1 πότερον οὖν—ἀποθάνῃ] 'Must we extend this farther, and call no man

νιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεῶν τέλος ὄραν;
 εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἄρα γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων²
 τότε ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ³
 Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς
 μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ
 τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα·
 δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ
 καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι
 καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι.
 ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιω-⁴
 κότι μέχρι γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται
 πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ

come to the living
 Aristotle's def of the
 dead man.

whatever happy as long as he lives, but, according to Solon's saying, look to the end? And, if we must allow this opinion, can we say that a man is happy after he is dead?' τέλος is here used, not in the technical Aristotelian sense, but after the common usage, as in the Solonian proverb itself. There were two ways in which this proverb might be understood. It might express: (1) That a man is positively happy after death. (2) That negatively he now attains happiness, that is, safety from change; and thus may be retrospectively congratulated.

ἢ τοῦτό γε—εὐδαιμονίαν] 'Nay, surely this (the first position) is altogether absurd, especially to us who call happiness a vivid state of consciousness.'

3 ἔχει μὲν—τινα] 'Still even this (second way of putting it) is open to some difficulty.' It seems not so sure that the dead is safe and clear from the changes and chances of the world,—for may he not be affected by the fortunes of his posterity?

δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι

μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ] This is the reading of all Bekker's MSS.; but the rendering of the Paraphrast is at variance with it, and seems to imply a reading of καὶ instead of μή. His words are: πάλιν δὲ οὐκ ἀρκοῦσα ἡ λύσις δοκεῖ. Ἀπορία γὰρ ἔστιν ἔτι, εἰ λέγομεν εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι. 'For it is thought that the dead has, ay and feels too, both good and evil, just as much as the living.' If the common reading be retained, we must suppose Aristotle first to have stated in the mildest form the popular belief that the happiness of the dead is connected with the fortunes of his family, and afterwards (ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδέν) to have expressed this more strongly. In that case, he here seems to say that ordinary opinion ascribes happiness and misery to the dead in a figure, that is, with reference to our idea of their happiness and misery; just as good and evil may be ascribed to the living, who are unconscious of them.

4 τῷ γὰρ—κατὰ λόγον] 'For to him who has lived in felicity till old

τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας. δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. 5 ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν ὁ ἄθλιος. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ τινὰ χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόβων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν, τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθῇ καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ 7 ἐκείνου. εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ

age, and died accordingly,' κατὰ λόγον, 'in the same ratio;' cf. below, § 15.

δῆλον δ'—ἐνδέχεται] 'And it is plain that by gradual steps of removal (τοῖς ἀποστήμασι) the descendants may stand in an infinite variety of relationships to their ancestors.' ἔκγονοι apparently answer to the δῶς ἀπόγονοι in the preceding section. The Paraphrast omits the sentence. The Scholiast gives πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς τῶν ἀπογόνων ἀπόστασιν πολυειδῆ εἶναι καὶ ποικίλην ἀναγκαῶν ἐστί.

5 ἄτοπον δὴ—γονεῦσιν] 'It would be absurd, therefore, if the dead should change in sympathy with them, and become at one time happy, and then again wretched. But it would be absurd also that the fortunes of the descendants should affect the ancestors in nothing, and not for some time at least,' i.e. after death. The second part of this sentence, pronounced so strongly as it is, seems to contradict what one would have supposed to be Aristotle's philosophical creed. But he is here speaking from the popular point of view, and states strongly the two sides of the difficulty that presents

itself. The question as to the dead being influenced by this world is not one that belongs properly to ethics. Aristotle seems inclined to accept the common belief on the subject (cf. i. xi. 1, i. xi. 6), but to modify it so as to leave it unimportant.

6 'But let us return to the former difficulty, for perhaps the clue to our present question also may be discovered from it.' τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν is not a very accurate expression. Aristotle, when he stated the question now reverted to, εἰ δεῖ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν, gave it two meanings, and showed the impossibility of holding the first, and the difficulty that attached even to the second. He now says 'let us go back to the former difficulty.' What he means, however, is clear enough. He means to say, 'may we not after all set aside the caution of Solon in whatever way it is stated? May we not predicate happiness in the present as well as retrospectively? By settling the question as far as the present life goes, we may perhaps get some light as to the security or insecurity of the dead.'

7 τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυ-

τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς; ὁῦλον 8
 γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαι-
 μονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά
 τινα τὸν εὐδαιμόνα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον. ἡ 9
 τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ
 ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀν-
 θρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἶπαμεν, κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ'
 ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναν-
 τίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. περὶ 10
 οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης
 ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ
 καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. τούτων δ' αὐτῶν
 αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώταται διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέ-
 στατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τούτο γὰρ

mind does not abide
 because he is hurried
 of chance, but these
 moral virtues abide
 & happily by nature
 never forgotten
 10 12. For they
 not merely exist,

κλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς] 'And be-
 cause fortune makes many revolutions
 around the same individuals.' Various
 expressions of this sentiment are
 quoted from the Classics. The most
 beautiful is that which occurs in Soph.
Trachiniae, 127, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πῆμα καὶ χαρὰ
 Πᾶσι κυκλοῦσιν, οἷον ἄρκτου στροφάδες
 κέλευθοι.

8 χαμαιλέοντα—καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυ-
 μένον] It has been remarked that
 these words form an iambic line, prob-
 ably quoted from some play.

9 ἡ τὸ μὲν—ἐναντίου] 'Rather,
 to follow chances is altogether a mis-
 take, for good or evil resides not in
 these, but human life, as we have said,
 requires them as an external con-
 dition; while what determines happi-
 ness is the rightly regulated mental
 consciousness, and *vice versa*.'

10 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν
 διαπορηθ'έν] 'And even the present
 difficulty witnesses to our theory,' *i.e.*
 the difficulty felt in predicating happi-
 ness, except retrospectively, betrays a
 latent sense that happiness must be
 regarded as something more stable
 than the fluctuations of fortune. Ari-

stotle finds out that this more stable
 essence is to be found in his own con-
 ception of happiness, since he has
 placed it in the individual conscious-
 ness, in that which is the life and soul
 of the man himself.

περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ—λήθην] 'For about
 nothing human is there so much stabi-
 lity, as about the most excellent moods
 of the consciousness, for these are
 thought to be more abiding even than
 the sciences. And the highest among
 them are most abiding of all, because
 the happy dwell in them most entirely
 and continuously, which appears to
 give the reason for their never being
 forgotten.' It is one of the deepest
 and most admirable parts of Aristotle's
 system, that he insists upon the sta-
 bility and permanence of mental states.
 Cf. *Eth.* viii. iii. 6, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμος.
 Cf. also iii. v. 22, where he says that
 'we are masters of our actions, but
 our habits are masters of us.' v. ix.
 14, 'the just man cannot be unjust at
 will,' &c. To speak indeed of human
 ἐνέργειαι as μόνιμοι or συνεχεῖς is a sort
 of contradiction of Aristotle's own
 philosophy, cf. *Eth.* x. iv. 9; *Metaph.*

¹¹ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ λήθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· αἰετὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἷσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου. πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γιγνόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίγνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακά-

viii. viii. 18. The more accurate expression of his principle would be to say that while the 'ἐνέργεια' is perpetually blooming out, and then disappearing, the 'εἶς' abides, and is ever tending to reproduce the ἐνέργεια. Life then may be regarded as a series of vivid moments, with slight intervals or depressions between, or again, ideally, as a vivid moment of consciousness, the intervals being left out of sight. Cf. Essay IV. The ἐνέργεια then *is* our life and being, and it would be absurd to speak of forgetting this. It is 'more abiding than the sciences,' *i.e.* than the separate parts of knowledge, which do not constitute the mind itself. The opposition here is not between the moral and intellectual ἐνέργεια, as we may see from § 11, where it is said that 'the required stability will belong to the happy man, for always, or mostly, he will act and contemplate in accordance with the law of his being.' Σοφία, viewed as a mood of the mind, is as abiding as the moral qualities, and indeed admits of more continuous exercise. Cf. *Eth.* x. vii. 2.

περὶ αὐτὰ] (*sc.* ἐνέργειας). Cf. *Eth.* iii. xii. 2, *Pol.* vii. xiii. 3, where there occur similar transitions to a neuter pronoun.

11 ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου] 'He that is truly good, and foursquare without a flaw.' These terms are borrowed from Simonides. They are quoted also, and discussed, in the *Protagoras* of Plato, p. 339: ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, χερσὶ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόφ' τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον. Cf. *Rhetoric*, iii. xi. 2: τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον, μεταφορά. ἅμω γὰρ τέλεια. Hor. *Serm.* ii. vii. 86: in seipso totus, teres atque rotundus.

12 δῆλον ὅς—ποιήσει, κ.τ.λ.] The distinction between *ζωή* and *βίος* is hardly preserved. 'Good fortunes, if small, obviously do not alter the balance of the life and feelings, but if considerable, and coming in numbers, they will make one's condition more blessed.' Cf. *Eth.* ix. ix. 9.

καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκε] 'For they naturally add a lustre.' This is said from the practical point of view, which analyses happiness into the internal mood, and the external circumstances. From the ideal point of view, which takes happiness as a whole (*Eth.* i. vii. 8), nothing can be added to it, or make it better.

ἀνάπαλιν δὲ—μεγαλόψυχος] 'While contrary circumstances mar and deface

ριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. ὁμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἔπει- καλον (καίω) δυνω.
 δὲ φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δὲ ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὧν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δ' 13
 εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέ- 14
 ποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πρι- αμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετά- βολος· οὕτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥαδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, but if at all.

felicity, by introducing pains, and often hindering the play of the mind. But nevertheless, even in these, what is beautiful shines out, when one bears easily many and great misfortunes, not from insensibility, but from being of a noble and magnanimous nature.' In this place, and in *Eth.* in. ix. 4 (where he describes the brave man voluntarily consenting to death), Aristotle exhibits a high moral tone, quite on a level with the Stoics, and which places him above the accusation of being a mere Eudæmonist.

13 εἰ δ' εἰσὶν—φαῦλα] 'Now if life is determined by its moments of consciousness, as we have said, no one of the blessed will ever become miserable, for he will never do what is hateful and mean.' μακάριος, which is used repeatedly here and elsewhere, is a more enthusiastic term than

εὐδαίμων. Though it is applied to βίος in the previous section, it would seem generally more applicable to the internal feelings. By a false etymology, *Eth.* vii. xi. 2, it is connected with χαίρειν. In the next section it is predicated negatively of the εὐδαίμων. 'The happy man can never become miserable—not, however, that he will retain his joyful state, if he falls into the lot of Priam.' But no very marked distinction is kept up between εὐδαίμων and μακάριος.

14 ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων—ἐπήβολος] 'And after such he cannot again become happy in a short time, but if at all, in a long and complete period, having attained great and noble things in it.' This shows that happiness, being deep-seated, and depending on the entire state of the mind (ἔξις), is neither lost nor won easily.

- 15 *μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γεινόμενος ἐπήβολος. τί οὖν*
κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα
καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον, μὴ τὸν τυ-
χόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιω-
σόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσουντα κατὰ λόγον; ἐπειδὴ τὸ
μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον
 16 *τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως. εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν*
ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους
δ' ἀνθρώπους.
- II *Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω, τὰς δὲ*
τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν
μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς
 2 *δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς*

15 τί οὖν—πάντως] 'What hinders then to call him happy, who is in the fruition of absolute harmony of mind and is furnished sufficiently with external goods—not for a casual period, but an absolute lifetime? or must one add—"and who shall live on so and die accordingly"—since the future is uncertain to us, and we assume happiness to be an End-in-itself and something absolute in every possible way?' τέλειος, as before said, has two associations; one popular, with the common sense of τέλος, and thus means 'complete,' or 'perfect;' the other, philosophic, with the End-in-itself, and thus means that which is in and for itself desirable, that in which the mind finds satisfaction, the absolute. The word here seems to hover between its two meanings. Aristotle probably was not conscious of the collision between the frequent use of τέλειον here and the question to which this chapter is an answer—εἰ χρὴ τὸ τέλος δρᾶν.

16 εἰ δ' οὕτω—ἀνθρώπους] 'If so, we shall call those happy during their lifetime, who have and shall have the qualities mentioned, but still happy as

men only.' Solon's view, which had rested on a too great regard to external fortune, is accordingly superseded. Happiness viewed from the inside—from its most essential part—may be predicated of the living, though still with a reserve, since they are still subject to the conditions of humanity.

XI. 1 He returns to the question before incidentally mooted (I. x. 4), whether the happiness of the dead can be affected by the vicissitudes of the world they have left. He will not altogether deny that some consciousness of events may reach the dead, but without determining this he argues that in any case the impression produced by them must be too slight and unimportant to affect our notion of the dead.

ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον] In the so-called *Menexenus* of Plato (p. 248 B) we find this opinion stated in a wavering form.—(The dead are supposed to address their surviving parents) δεόμεθα δὴ καὶ πατέρων καὶ μητέρων τῇ αὐτῇ ταύτῃ διανοίᾳ χρωμένους τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον διάγειν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐ θρηνοῦντες οὐδὲ ὀλοφυρόμενοι ἡμᾶς ἡμῖν μάλιστα

τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων τῶν
 δ' ἦττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραν-
 τον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν ἰκανῶς *in outline*
 ἔχοι. εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ 3
 μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπήν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δ' ἐλαφρο- *the force of these*
 τέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαν- *misfortunes will*
 τας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευ- *be lined down &*
 τήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ *they reach the*
 προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογι- *dead*
 στέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ 5 *The implication*
 διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινω- *produced on a*
 νοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ *lossing & the de*

ταύτην τὴν πο.

χαριῶνται, ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἔστι τοῖς τετε-
 λευτηκόσιν αἰσθησις τῶν ζώντων, οὕτως
 ἀχάριστοι εἶεν ἂν μάλιστα, κ. τ. λ.

3—4 εἰ δὴ—διαφορὰν] There is a
 complex protasis, (1) εἰ δὴ, (2) διαφέρει
 δέ. The apodosis to both is συλλο-
 γιστέον δὴ. The argument is, that we
 must bear in mind the difference: (1)
 between misfortunes in themselves,
 light and heavy; (2) between those,
 of whatever kind, happening in our
 lifetime and after our death. 'If, then,
 it is the same case with regard to the
 misfortunes attaching to the circle of
 one's friends as it is with those attach-
 ing to oneself, namely, that some have
 a certain weight and influence upon
 life, while others seem lighter; and if,
 again, there is a difference between
 the impression made by events on the
 living and on the dead far greater
 than that between crimes and horrors
 enacted upon the stage or only alluded
 to in tragedies; we must, I say, take
 account of this difference.'

προϋπάρχειν—ἢ πράττεσθαι] The
 contrast is that between the actual re-
 presentation of horrors, or the mention
 of them, as 'presupposed,' and done
 off the stage. It is merely the prin-
 ciple of Horace. *A. P.* 181.

συλλογιστέον] This cannot mean

'We must conclude; else the same'.
 proposition would form both the pre-
 mises and the conclusion; but 'we
 must take account of,' i.e. we must
 make 'this difference' part of the
 premises we have to go upon in all
 reasonings about the dead. The word
 is used, not in its technical Aristo-
 telian, but rather in its earlier and
 natural sense, according to which it
 meant 'to put together the grounds of
 an argument.' Cf. Plato, *Charmides*,
 p. 160, D: πάντα ταῦτα συλλογισάμενος
 εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως. The Paraphrast
 here writes σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς δια-
 φορᾶς.

5 μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως—ἀντικειμένων] 'Or
 rather, perhaps' (we must take into
 account, συλλογιστέον understood), 'the
 fact that a question is raised about the
 dead, as to whether they share at all in
 good or evil.' A difficulty has been made
 about τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι. 'Lambinus ex
 Vet. Int. et Argyrop. emendat τόδε
 δεῖ, eamque lectionem Zwinger in tex-
 tum recepit, quæ hactenus commenda-
 tur, quia sequenti διὰ absorberi facile
 poterat δέ et δεῖ.'—Zell. The conjec-
 ture is supported by the rendering of
 the Paraphrast, who separates this
 clause from the preceding one. σκε-
 πτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς. βέλτιον

διικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὖν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τὸ ὑναντίον, ἀφαιρὸν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβαλλέσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι καὶ τῶν φιλῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

§ 2 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων· ὁμολογῶν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. φαίνεται δὴ

δέ ἐστι σκέψασθαι εἰ κοινωνοῦσιν, κ.τ.λ. But against it these appear to be conclusive reasons: (1) The authority of MSS. (2) We should expect διαπορεῖν, and that the sentence should stand μάλλον δ' ἴσως τότε δεῖ διαπορεῖν. (3) The alteration would really alter and spoil the context. Aristotle does not say 'Perhaps after all we had better start the question anew, whether the dead are conscious of events.' This would contradict § 6. He only says, 'While granting the hypothesis that they do feel, we must take into account the element of doubt which still continues to attach to the subject.'

6 This section was pronounced suspect by Victorius on account of its being a mere repetition and summing up of former conclusions. He says it is wanting in some MSS., and that it may be a scholium, though a very old one. In favour of its genuineness we may urge that it is quite in Aristotle's manner. Cf. *Eth.* III. v. 22. It is found in all Bekker's MSS., with the exception of the words τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι; which are omitted in two, the omission being obviously due to the similarity of εὐπραξίαι and δυσπραξίαι. It is also recognised by the Paraphrast and Eustratius.

συμβάλλεσθαι τι] 'to contribute,' or 'communicate something.' Cf. *Eth.* III. i. 12: μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος. X. x. 19.

XII. The question which occupies this chapter, namely, in which class of goods happiness is to be placed, the admirable or the praiseworthy? is one that appears of little ethical interest, to have no important scientific bearing, in short, to degenerate into a sort of trifling. Aristotle, however, who aims at verbal precision and distinctness, and again, who wishes to reconcile his theory with all questions, doctrines, and forms of language of the day, appears to have thought it worth a passing consideration. We may regard the present question as the last of that series of collateral questions growing out of his definition of happiness. It is answered by being stated; for the Chief Good and the Absolute must necessarily be above praise, which is only given to the relatively, not to the absolutely good.

1 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν] 'For it is plain that it is not a merely potential good.' This implies a classification of goods into (1) potential, (2) actual, which latter are sub-

πάν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποίον τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν ὀρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ ποίον τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. ὁῦλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ 3 τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἶπαμεν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ 4 *by relation* ἐπαινος τῶν τοιοῦτων, ὁῦλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὥς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ 5 δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξὸς καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ *plead the case* ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὕσαν μὲνύειν ᾧετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τᾶλλα ἀνα- *anaph. reference* φέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικὸς 6

divided into praiseworthy and admirable. There is a complete commentary on the present passage to be found in the *Magna Moralia*, I. ii. 1: *Ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπὲρ τούτων διάρισται, πειραθῶμεν λέγειν, τὰγαθὸν ποσαχῶς λέγεται. Ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια, τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις. τὸ δὲ τίμιον λέγω τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ψυχὴ, νοῦς, τὸ ἀρχαιότερον, ἢ ἀρχή, τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . τὰ δὲ ἐπαινετά οἷον ἀρεταί . . . τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις, οἷον ἀρχή (rule), πλοῦτος, ἰσχύς, κάλλος· τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εὖ ἂν δύνῃται χρῆσασθαι καὶ ὁ φαῖλος κακῶς, διὸ δυνάμει τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦνται ἀγαθὰ . . . λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ τέταρτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ σωστικὸν καὶ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ, οἷον γυμνάσια ὑγιείας καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.*
3 γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται] sc. οἱ θεοί,

Eth. x. viii. 7. Hence, in the 'Te Deum laudamus,' *laudare* is used in a different sense from *ἐπαινεῖν*.

διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορᾶς] 'Because praise is made by a reference to some higher standard.'

5 δοκεῖ δὲ—ἀναφέρεισθαι] 'Now Eudoxus also seems to have well pleaded the claims of pleasure to the first prize, for he argued that its not being praised, although it is a good, shows that it is above the class of things praiseworthy, as God and the chief good are, to whom all other things are referred.' On Eudoxus see *Eth.* x. ii. 1—2, Essay III. p. 169. The metaphor of the Aristeia here seems borrowed from the *Philebus* of Plato, p. 22 B: 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονή σοι πεπτω-

γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων
 7 ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια
 πεπονημένοις, ἡμῖν δὲ ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ
 8 εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων. ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν
 καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα
 πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.

13 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ'

κέναι καθάπερ ἐκ πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν
 δὴ λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων περί
 μαχομένη κεῖται. κ.τ.λ.

6 Praise is of qualities: 'encomia are for achievements, whether bodily or mental.' Cf. *Rhetoric*, I. ix. 33, where the same distinction is given: ἔστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς . . . τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστὶν . . . διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας. τὰ δὲ ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἐξεῶς ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ ἔπαινοῖμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπραγότα εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. i. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ κοῦ ἔκαστον ἔργου . . . ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.

7 ἀλλὰ—πεπονημένοις] 'But perhaps to go into the details of the subject belongs more properly to the writers on encomia.' πεπονημένοις, a deponent form, as in *Eth.* I. xiii. 2. Encomia, in the hands of the Sophists, seem to have become a complete branch of literature, so as to have been treated as a separate art with its own proper rules.

8 ἔοικε δ'—τίθεμεν] 'And this seems also the case from its being a principle; for we all do all things else for the sake of this. Now the principle and the cause of goods we assume to be something admirable and divine.' The two senses of ἀρχή—ἀρχὴ οὐσίας and ἀρχὴ γένεως (cf. *Metaph.* IV. xvii. 2), the origin of being and the origin of

knowing—the cause and the reason—seem here to flow together. Happiness, or the practical chief good, is the ἀρχή of life, as being the final cause or τέλος. In this sense ἀρχή and τέλος, the first and the last, become identical. But the idea of happiness when apprehended becomes an ἀρχή in another way, namely, a major premise or principle for action (Cf. *Eth.* VI. xii. 10). When Aristotle speaks of 'something admirable and divine, the principle and the cause of all goods,' he uses terms that approach those of Plato with regard to the Idea of Good, though his point of view is different. Cf. Essay III.

XIII. With this chapter commences a new division of the treatise. Aristotle now opens the analysis of the terms of his definition. If happiness be 'conscious life in conformity with the law of absolute excellence,' the question arises, what this law of excellence is?—a question essentially belonging to Politics. The answer to this Aristotle gives by the aid of a popular and empirical Psychology. Without attempting to sound the depths of the subject, he assumes, as sufficient for his present purpose, a threefold development of the internal principle (ψυχῇ) into (1) the purely physical or vegetative, (2) the semi-

ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον· τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα² πεπονήσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν³ τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινας ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ⁴ σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γένοιτ' ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης⁵ δῆλον ὅτι. καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως⁷

rational or appetitive, (3) the purely rational. The first being excluded from all share in virtue, or human excellence properly so called; the second is considered the sphere of moral, and the third that of intellectual virtue. This division regulates the methodical arrangement of the *Ethics*. Also it may be said to have regulated almost all subsequent human thought on moral subjects. On Aristotle's general philosophy of the *ψυχή* see Essay V.

2 δοκεῖ δὲ—ὑπηκόους] 'This, too, seems to have been the main concern of the true politician, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.' As we find in Plato *ἀλήθεια* is the quality most characteristic of the Ideas, so κατ' ἀλήθειαν here implies a thing being absolutely, deeply, essentially what it is to the exclusion of all mere seeming. The contrast here would be to those *πρακτικοὶ πολιτικοί* mentioned *Eth.* vi. viii. 2. Also to those historical and eminent statesmen whom Plato attacks in the *Gorgias*, p. 515 c sq., as having been entirely devoid of this object—making the citizens better.

3 παράδειγμα δὲ—γεγέννηται] 'As an instance of this we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, and if there have been any others such like.' Aristotle seems to have inherited the preference felt by Plato and by Socrates for the Spartan constitution; not so much as a historical fact, but rather as a philosophical idea. It presented the scheme of an entire education for the citizens, though Aristotle confesses that this became degraded into a school for gymnastic.

5 περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι] 'Now it is obviously about human excellence that we have to enquire.' This passage would prove, if it were necessary, the indeterminate sense with which the term *ἀρετή* is introduced into Aristotle's *Ethics*. At first it appears merely as the law of excellence, quite in a general signification. Afterwards this is gradually restricted to human excellence, and then physical or bodily excellence is finally excluded.

7 εἰ δὲ ταῦθ'—ἱατρικῆς] 'But if this be so, it is plain that the politician must know in a way the nature of the

ἔχει, ὁῦλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ
 ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσονται καὶ πᾶν
 σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσω τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ
 τῆς ἰατρικῆς. τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγμα-
 8 τεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὲ καὶ
 τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ
 ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ
 πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων.
 9 λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις
 ἀρκούντως ἓνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον
 10 αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρι-
 σται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν,
 ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ
 περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς

internal principle, just as he who is to cure the eyes must know also the whole body. And this holds good the more in proportion as Politics is higher and better than medicine.' A different interpretation is given by some commentators; thus Argyropulus, following the scholium of Eustratius, translates: 'Quemadmodum et eum, qui curaturus est oculos totumque corpus, de ipsis scire oportet;' as if the analogy between the *ἰατρός* and the *πολιτικός* were this, that they both are concerned to know the nature of that which they propose to benefit. The Paraphrast, however, takes it as above, referring *καὶ πᾶν σῶμα* not to *θεραπεύονται* but to *δεῖ εἰδέναι*. That this is the true interpretation is rendered almost certain by a passage in Plato (*Charmides*, p. 156 B), from which the present comparison was in all probability taken: ἄλλ' ὥσπερ ἴσως ἤδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδὴ τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσιν οὖν, ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοῖς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλοι καὶ τὰ

τῶν ὀμμάτων εἶναι· καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἶσθαι ἂν ποτε θεραπεύσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι. The general sense here evidently is that as the oculist must know to a certain extent the rest of the body, so the politician, who has not by any means to deal with the whole of the ψυχή, must yet, in some measure, know its entire nature. This knowledge, however, is to be limited (§ 8) by a practical scope. With *χαρίεντες* cf. *De Sensu*, i. 4: καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφώτερος τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες.

9 λέγεται—ἔχον] 'Now even in popular accounts certain points are sufficiently stated with regard to the internal principle, and we will avail ourselves of them; as, for instance, that part of it is irrational and part rational.' For an account of the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, and for arguments showing that they do not designate a separate class of Aristotle's own works, see Appendix B to Essays.

10 ταῦτα δὲ—παρόν] 'But whether these are divided like the limbs of the body, and all other divisible matter,

τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῶ καὶ φυτικῶ, ¹¹
λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύ-
την γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ᾧ πασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θεῖν
τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς
τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης μὲν ¹²
οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ
γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ
δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ'
ὕπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοῦς
εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀρ- ¹³
γία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἣ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ
φαύλη, πλὴν εἴ πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν διικνουῦνται τινες τῶν κινή-
σεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιει-

or whether they are only distinguishable in conception, while in nature they are inseparable, like the concave and convex in the circumference of a circle, makes no difference for our present purpose.' The above-mentioned division of the *ψυχή*, which is attributed to Plato, *Magna Moralia*, i. i. 7, is attacked by Aristotle, *De Animâ*, i. v. 26, and again, more definitely, *De Animâ*, iii. ix. 3. He here avails himself of it as popularly true, though he indicates also that from a higher point of view it will not hold good—that at all events it is a distinction and not a division. See Essay V.

11 τοῦ ἀλόγου—τινὰ] 'Now of the irrational division part appears common and vegetative, I mean that which is the cause of nourishment and growth; for this sort of power of the internal principle one must assume as existing in all things that are nourished, and even in embryos, and this same also in full-grown creatures, for it is more reasonable to suppose this than any other to be the cause of nutriment and growth.' Το τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῶ correspond the words (§ 15), 'Εοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη

τις φύσις, κ.τ.λ. Aristotle first makes the irrational side double. Afterwards (§ 19), he says that, viewing it differently, you may call the rational twofold. κοινῶ, i. e., 'not distinctive of man.' τελείοις is used in the non-philosophical sense. Aristotle's psychology is of course constructed upon a physical basis. The principle of life develops itself into perception and reason, but the lower modes of it are necessary conditions to the higher, and exist in them. So Dryden says (*Palamon and Arcite*, iii. *sub fin.*) that man is

'First vegetive, then feels, and reasons last;

Rich of three souls, and lives all three to waste.'

12—13 'Now excellence in this respect seems common, and not peculiarly human; for this part or faculty seems to operate especially in sleep, and the good and the bad are least distinguishable in sleep. Hence they say that for the half of life the happy are no better off than the wretched. Now this result is as might have been expected, for sleep is an inaction of the internal principle, viewed

14 κῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλης, καὶ τὸ
 θρεπτικὸν ἑατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον
 15 πέφυκεν. ἵεοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος
 εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς
 καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον
 'παινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ·
 φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυ-
 κός, ὃ μάχεται τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ
 καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιά
 προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τὸναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παρα-
 φέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ
 16 ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ

as something morally good or bad, except so far as certain impulses may to a trifling extent reach it, and in this way the visions of the good will be better than those of the common sort.' The physical principles here enunciated are stated at length in the interesting treatises *De Somno et Vigilâ*, *De Insomniis*, et *De Divinatione per Somnum*, which occur among Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*. It may be sufficient now to allude to his definition of sleep and its cause (*De Somno* iii. 30)—that it is a sort of catalepsy of the consciousness, caused by the rising of the vital warmth so as to clog the perceptive organ, and resulting necessarily from the functions of animal life, which its object is to preserve, by providing a rest for them. He speaks also (*De Somno* i. 15) of the nutritive particle performing its office more during sleep than waking, 'since creatures grow most during sleep.' In his discussions about dreams we find a frequent recurrence of the words here used, *κινήσεις*—*δι-ικνοῦνται*—*φαντάσματα*. He defines a dream to be 'that image resulting from the impulsion of the sensations which arises in sleep, and is dependent on the peculiar conditions of sleep.'

(*De Insom.* iii. 19) τὸ φάντασμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν ᾖ, ᾗ καθεύδει, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐνύπνιον. In his excellently wise treatise on prophetic dreams he seems especially to dwell upon the fact that in dreaming the moral distinctions between men are lost, hence dreams cannot be sent by God. (i. 3) τό τε γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν πέμποντα, πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀλογίᾳ, καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς βελτίστοις καὶ φρονιμωτάτοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τυχοῦσι πέμπειν ἄτοπον. (This is well illustrated by Plato, *Republic* ix. p. 571 c sqq.) In another place, however, he connects the illusions of dreaming with the personal character, just as the coward, he says, and the lover would form different mistakes about a distant object. (*De Insom.* ii. 15). This last coincides with what is said above about the *φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν*. Cf. on dreams generally Aristotle's *Problemata*, xxx. xiv.

15—16 εἵκει δέ—*ἀντιβαῖνον*] 'But there seems also to be another nature in the internal principle which is irrational, and yet in a way partakes of reason. For in the continent and the incontinent man we praise the reason, and that within them which

παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁράωμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναι τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, ¹⁷ οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὲ ¹⁸ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς

possesses reason, for this exhorts them rightly, and to what is best; but there appears also to be something else in them besides the reason, which fights and strives against the reason. For just as paralysed limbs of the body, when we mean to move them to the right, go in the opposite direction to the left, so it is with the mind. For the tendencies of the incontinent are in the opposite direction to reason. In the body we see the false movement, but with regard to the mind we do not see it. But perhaps not the less ought we to believe that there is in the mind something besides the reason which is opposed to it, and goes against it.' Zell mentions a conjecture, τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ εὐκρατοῦς. But a slight consideration of the context shows that no change is required. It has been said that this passage exhibits the doctrine of 'human corruption.' To say this introduces a set of associations foreign to Aristotle. Aristotle's remark (1) does not go so deep as to the contrast between sin and holiness, purity and corruption: (2) it does not point out a radical and incurable defect in the whole race of man; on the contrary, he says presently that in the σώφρων 'all things are in harmony with reason.' However, we may well esteem the present observation, especially when first made, as one of the most penetrating pieces

of moral psychology. Aristotle's purpose is to establish the existence of a principle, μετέχον λόγου, which is to be the sphere of the practical virtues. This he exhibits in the case of the continent and incontinent (*i. e.* man in a state of moral conflict) as opposing and fighting against the reason. This is given as a fact of nature. This same fact viewed from the side of personal repentance might be well expressed in the language of St. Paul. Before attributing anything like the above-mentioned doctrine to Aristotle, we should require to examine the whole bearing of his moral theories, instead of deciding from an isolated passage.

¹⁷ πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει.] This shows that Aristotle does not propose here to seek deeply for the *rationale* of these phenomena in our moral nature.

ἔτι δ' ἴσως—λόγῳ] 'And perhaps it is still more obedient in the temperate and the brave. For in them all things are in harmony with reason.' In Book vii. the ἐγκρατής, who maintains virtue by a conflict, is opposed to the σώφρων, in whom there is an absolute harmony between the passions and the reason. Here the ἀνδρείος is added, as being one whose instincts coincide with his reason. This place, Book iii. vi.—xii., and Book vii., exhibit different points of view.

κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ἢ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μὲνυει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα
 19 ἐπιτίμησις τε καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως
 20 καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους οὐ

18 τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν—μαθηματικῶν] 'But the appetitive part, and generally speaking that which desires, in a way partakes of reason, inasmuch as it is subject and obedient to it. In like manner we speak of "paying attention to" one's father or one's friends, not in the same sense as we speak of "paying attention to" mathematics.' Ἐχειν λόγον or μετέχειν λόγου must be said of the passions in a different way from that in which it is said of the rational part of our nature. Aristotle illustrates this by adducing the use of ἔχειν λόγον with a genitive, which exhibits also a shade of variety in the meaning. With ἔχειν λόγον πατρός, cf. Eurip. *Alcestis*, 51, ἔχω λόγον δὴ καὶ προθυμίαν σέθεν.

τῶν μαθηματικῶν] here apparently means, not 'the mathematicians,' as *Eth.* i. iii. 4, but 'mathematics,' as vi. viii. 9. So it is taken by the Paraphrast: Διττῶς δὲ λέγεται τὸ λόγον μετέχειν καθάπερ καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν. Λέγομεν γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων λόγον ἔχειν, τὸ ἐπιστρέφειν πρὸς αὐτούς, καὶ οἷς κελεύουσιν ἐξακολουθεῖν. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγον ἔχειν, τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ καὶ γινώσκειν τινα

καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἔχειν. Partly there is a play on the words λόγον ἔχειν, which it is impossible to translate; and partly there is an analogy between the obedience of the passions to the reason and the submission one pays to the advice of others; and, on the other hand, between the purely intellectual process of mathematical study and the independent action of the reason itself. It must not be forgotten, that the passage before us is part of one of the earliest attempts at a moral psychology.

20 διορίζεται—λέγομεν] 'According to this division also is human excellence divided. For we speak of intellectual excellences, and moral excellences; philosophy, intelligence, and wisdom being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For when speaking of the moral character we do not say that a man is philosophic or intelligent, but that he is gentle or temperate; yet we praise the philosophic man also, with regard to his state of mind, and praiseworthy states of mind we call excellences.' The old difficulty of translating less definite ancient words into more definite modern ones occurs here. Aristotle

λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων,
ἐπαινούμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν· τῶν ἑξέων δὲ
τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

*Readiest de-
monstration of
how of virtue*

is founding the distinction between the Intellectual and the Moral which has lasted ever since. But he uses the word ἀρετή as applicable to both spheres, whereas the instinct of men, whether rightly or wrongly, inclines to confine the name of virtue and the award of praise to the moral side,—to acts or states in which the will is prominently exerted. On this point we can trace a progress even in the Peripatetic school, for while the sen-

tence ἐπαινούμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν is repeated in the *Eudemian Ethics* (II. i. 18), it is corrected in the *Magna Moralia* (I. v. 3), κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς τοῦ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντος οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται· οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι σοφός, οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται, οὔτε ὅτι φρόνιμος, οὐδ' ὅλως κατὰ τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν. The last line in the first Book contains an anticipation of much that is demonstrated in Books II. and III.

PLAN OF BOOK II.

THE Second Book of the *Ethics* goes far to determine the course of the entire succeeding work, by laying down a programme of the separate moral virtues, which is afterwards followed in Books III. and IV.; and by suggesting for future consideration the conceptions of Ὀρθὸς Λόγος and of Προαίρεσις. But it cannot be said that this book itself exhibits traces of pre-conceived arrangement or artistic design. On the contrary, it bears the same tentative character as Book I. Its parts are at first confused with each other, and design seems only to grow up as the book proceeds. Its contents may be arranged under the following heads:—

(1.) A preliminary discussion on the formation of moral states. Ch. I.—IV.

(2.) The formal definition of virtue according to its genus and differentia. Ch. V.—VI.

(3.) The exhibition of this theory in a list of the separate virtues. Ch. VII.

(4.) The relation of extremes, or vices, to each other, and to the mean or virtue. Ch. VIII.

(5.) Rules for action, with a view to attaining the mean. Ch. IX.

Of these heads the first can with difficulty be divided from the second. The first four chapters implicitly contain the whole of the definition of virtue which is afterwards formally drawn out in Chapters V. and VI. And though the reservation of Ὀρθὸς Λόγος (II. ii. 2) for future analysis really afterwards gives rise to Book VI., and the account of intellectual ἀρετή; yet here Ὀρθὸς Λόγος is by no means identified with intellectual ἀρετή, and the whole conception of Book VI. seems to belong to a later develop-

ment of the Psychology of Aristotle, whether due to himself or to his school. Other marks of crudeness in detail will be adverted to in the notes. At the same time it would be unjust not to recognise the deep moral penetration exhibited by Aristotle in the different parts of his theory of Virtue. The merit of this theory can only be appreciated by a comparison with the results which had been previously arrived at, as they exhibit themselves in Plato.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ II.



ΔΙΤΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὖξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ

I. 1. The discussion is taken up from the point last arrived at in the analysis of happiness, namely, the distinction of intellectual from moral ἀρετή. We are not immediately told that the consideration of the former is to be deferred. That indeed only comes out incidentally, when (II. ii. 2) the discussion of ὁρθὸς λόγος is deferred, which ὁρθὸς λόγος is afterwards (VI. xiii. 3) identified with φρόνησις, the perfection of the practical reason. Here the mention made of the two forms of ἀρετή only goes to imply that neither of them is innate—that they are both acquired. After this first paragraph, the book confines itself to moral virtue, discussing how it is acquired and what is its nature.

ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ—ἔθους] ‘Now intellectual excellence, for the most part, takes both its origin and its growth from teaching, and therefore it requires experience and time, but moral virtue results from habit;

whence also it has, with a slight deflection, derived its name’ (ἠθική from ἔθος); a derivation which is doubtless suggested by Plato, *Laws*, VII. p. 792 B: κυριώτατον γὰρ ὄν ἐμφύεται πᾶσι τότε (scil. in youth) πᾶν ἦθος διὰ ἔθος. A mechanical theory is here given both of the intellect and the moral character, as if the one could be *acquired* by teaching, the other by a course of habits. That Aristotle inclined to this mechanical view has been already noticed (*Eth.* I. ix. 4). It is qualified, however, by admissions with regard to ἐφύια, φυσικὴ ἀρετή, &c. (Cf. III. v. 17.)

2 ἐξ οὗ—ἐγγίνεται] ‘Whence also it is plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature.’ Additional proofs of this position are subjoined. (1) The laws of nature are unalterable, and independent of habit. (2) According to the doctrine of δυνάμεις and ἐνέργειαι (see Essay IV.), moral faculties are distinguished

λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίξῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὗτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελει-

The key passage

from physical faculties in that the former are developed out of acts, and do not merely find a development in acts. (3) The whole idea of legislation is based on the supposition that virtue may be cultivated. (4) The analogy of the arts shows that out of practice grows perfection. We need only compare the theory of virtue in this book with the discussions in the *Meno* of Plato, to see how immensely moral philosophy had gained in definiteness in the meantime. While becoming definite and systematic, however, it had also to some extent become scholastic and mechanical.

3 οὗτ' ἄρα—ἐθους] 'Therefore the virtues arise in us neither by nature, nor against nature, but on the one hand we have a natural capacity of receiving them, and on the other hand we are only made perfect by habit.' (Cf. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 1-2, on the relation of φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ to κυρία ἀρετὴ.) It may be well, for the sake of clearness, to collect here some of the chief applications of the word φύσις to moral subjects in Aristotle, without going into the deeper philosophy of his conception of φύσις in relation to God, &c. φύσις is defined (*Metaph.* iv. iv. 8) as ἡ οὐσία ἢ τῶν ἐχόντων ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ αὐτὰ. 'The essence of things having their efficient cause in themselves, by reason of what they are.' Here, then, we have two notions blended together, (1) the essence of things, their matter and form; (2) the productive principle of that essence,

which is nothing external, but in the things themselves. From this general conception, we see the term applied in various ways.

I. φύσις denotes the self-produced, or self-producing, principle, opposed especially to that which is produced by the intelligence or will of man: thus to art (*Eth.* vi. iv. 4) or to the moral will, care, or cultivation (x. ix. 6). It is that for which we are irresponsible (*ibid.*), τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. That which comes of itself (vi. xi. 6), ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὐσης. That which is innate, and out of the sphere of the will, (vi. xiii. 1), πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως. (iii. v. 18), τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὅπως δῆποτε φαίνεται. It is opposed to habit, as the original tendency to that which is superinduced, (vii. x. 4) ῥᾶον ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως. Also, to the result of circumstances, (iii. v. 15) τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς.

II. From the idea of the self-caused (καθ' αὐτό), it comes to mean that which is under a fixed law opposed to the variable, (v. vii. 2) τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον. Or, to the arbitrary and conventional, (i. iii. 2) νόμος μόνον, φύσει δὲ μή. The absolute opposed to the relative, (iii. iv. 3) τὸ φύσει βουλευτόν.

III. It means not only a law, but also a tendency, as v. vii. 4, φύσει ἢ δεξιὰ κρείττων.

IV. The character and attributes of a thing, whether good or bad,

4 ουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παρα-
γίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον
δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων
δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι
τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησά-
μεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν. τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν
ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν·
ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνομεν,
οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κι-
θαρισταί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι
γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.
5 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ
νομοθεταὶ τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ

the powers possessed by a thing, (I. iii. 4) ἢ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις. (III. i. 7) ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερ-
τείνει.

V. The whole constitution of a thing, viewed as realising its proper τέλος, or the idea of good in itself, the perfect or normal state of any-thing. (VII. xi. 4) γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή. (III. xii. 2) ἢ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχον-
τος φύσιν. Cf. *Politics*, I. ii. 8: οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελε-
σεύσεως, ταύτην φάμεν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἕκαστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας.

VI. The word is sometimes almost periphrastic; *Topics*, I. i. 3, ἢ τοῦ ψεύδους φύσις. Similar to this is the usage in *Eth. Nic.* I. xiii. 15: ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος.

4 ἔτι ὅσα—ἀνδρεῖοι] 'Again, in the case of every faculty that comes to us by nature, we first of all possess the capacity, and only afterwards exhibit it in actual operation. This is clear with regard to the senses, for we did not get our senses by hearing often or seeing often, but on the contrary we used them because we had them, and

did not have them because we used them. But the virtues we acquire only after having first acted, which is also the case with the arts: for these things which we must learn before we can do, we learn by doing; as for example, men become builders by building, and harpers by playing on the harp. In the same manner we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, and brave by doing brave actions.' On the philosophy of this doctrine, see *Ar. Metaph.* VIII. viii. and *Essay* IV. above, from which it will be seen that 'acts' or 'operations' is an inadequate translation for ἐνεργεῖαι. On Aristotle's position with regard to the question whether sight is an inherent or an acquired faculty, see below, VI. viii. 9, note.

τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν] 'The arts beside,' not as if virtue were reckoned among the arts. On the idiom, cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 473 C: εὐδαιμονισόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων. οἱ ἄλλοι seems to imply a separate class in juxtaposition, as in the French idiom, 'vous autres.' Cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 8: ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν

μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὔ-
 αὐτὸ ποιῶσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία
 πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν 6
 αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ *The same class.*
 καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ καθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ *actions may pro-*
 κακοὶ γίνονται καθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι *duce now a new*
 καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὔ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγα- *new a new.*
 θοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ *But nature.*
 οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν *uniformly a*
 ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν *that the same*
 ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς *result.*
 πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι,
 πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐπιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι
 ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ
 περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν
 γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ
 ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεισθαι, οἱ
 δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνερ-
 γειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποίας ἀπο-

φανερωτέρων. *Eth.* II. iv. 3: τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας.

6 ἔτι ἐκ—καθαρισταί] 'Again, every virtue, as well as every art, is produced out of and by the same things that destroy it; for it is by playing on the harp that both good and bad players are formed.'

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν] *i. e.*, the circumstances and acts are generically the same, only differing as to well and ill. The doctrine here stated is no doubt true, with an addition. For it must not be supposed that all men start equal, either as artists or in morals. What is it that determines the well or ill of the first essays in art or in action? In the one case we say genius, talent, aptitude, or the reverse; in the other case, *εὐφυία* or the natural bent of the character as modified by circumstances. Such a

difference between man and man is quite admitted in the New Test., see *Matth.* xxv. 14-30.

7 καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ—γίνονται] 'And, in one word, states of mind are formed out of corresponding acts.' This is Aristotle's famous doctrine of habits, to appreciate the importance of which, we must think of it not as a philosophic or even as a practical doctrine for modern times, but rather as a new discovery and in contrast with the state of moral science in Aristotle's own time. We can see that it arose in his mind from a combination of his penetrating observation and experience of life with the peculiar forms of his philosophy. By means of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, he finds it possible to explain the formation of virtue, just as he does the existence of the world. In each act and mo-

διδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

- 2 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἴν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ᾔην ὕφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι σκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω,

ment at the outset of life, something which was potential in us and quite indeterminate for good or evil (*δύναμις*) is brought into actuality (*ἐνέργεια*), and now is determinately either good or bad. This determination, by the law of habits, reproduces itself, and thus there is no longer left an ambiguous *δύναμις*, but a *ἕξις*, or definite tendency for good or evil, is superinduced (see Essay IV.). It will be observed that why an act tends to reproduce itself Aristotle does not inquire. He contents himself with stating the fact as a universal law, and expressing it in his own formula; —(τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή, I. vii. 20.)

II. 1. Ἐπεὶ οὖν—εἰρήκαμεν] 'Since then this present science does not aim at speculation, like the others (for we do not inquire in order to know what virtue is, but in order that we may become virtuous, else there would be no profit in the inquiry), it is necessary to consider with regard to actions, how they should be done; for these are what determine the quality of the states of mind which are produced in us, as before stated.' *πραγματεία* is used by Aristotle and his commentators to denote the whole body of a separate science,

ἡ φυσικὴ πραγματεία, ἡ πολιτικὴ πραγματεία, &c. In Plato the word only occurs in a general sense, denoting 'business,' 'undertaking,' 'employment,' &c. ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι. According to this classification, sciences will be divided into speculative and practical; elsewhere a third class is added, the productive. On Aristotle's conception of the nature of Politics, see above I. ii, 8, 9, notes.

αὐτῆς] Sc. τῆς σκέψεως or τῆς πραγματείας.

αὗται γάρ] i. e. αἱ πράξεις, which are thus identified with the *ἐνέργειαι* of the last chapter.

2 τὸ μὲν οὖν—ἀρετάς] 'That we must act according to the right law—this indeed is a general principle, and may be assumed as a basis of our conception—but we shall discuss hereafter, both what the right law is, and how it is related to the other virtues.' The meaning of *κοινόν* is made plainer by VI. i. 2 *infra*. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν (scil. κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον) ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐδὲν δὲ σαφές. The Paraphrast has in the present passage, ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἱκανὸν τὰς πράξεις σημᾶναι. Cf. *Eth.* I. vii. 9.

ὑποκείσθω] The MSS. are at issue upon this word, a number of them giving *ὑπερκείσθω*, which reading is followed by the Paraphrast. *ὑπερκείσθω*

ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἐκεῖνο δὲ προ-
 3 διομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν λόγος τύπων
 καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλκει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς
 εἵπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ' ἐν
 ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστὴν ἔχει, ὥσπερ

would mean, 'must stand over,' and it would be taken in close connection with ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον. But the authority of Bekker, and the usage of Aristotle, seem sufficient to establish ὑποκείσθω. Cf. *Eth.* II. iii. 6, V. i. 3, *Rhet.* I. xi. 1: ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς. *Pol.* VII. i. 13: νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, κ.τ.λ.

κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον] We find the phrase ὀρθὸς λόγος occasionally occurring in Plato, thus *Phædo*, p. 73 A, it is coupled with ἐπιστήμη—εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, where it means 'a sound understanding.' In the same dialogue, p. 94 A, it occurs with the signification 'sound reasoning.' κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μετέξει, εἴπερ ἀρμονία ἐστίν. Elsewhere λόγος is found joined with φρόνησις. Cf. *Repub.* IX., p. 582 A, ἐμπειρία καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ. It is easy to see that ὀρθὸς λόγος was in Plato a floating idea; in Aristotle it is passing into a fixed idea, as is the case with many other terms of psychology and morals. But even in Aristotle something indefinite must still attach to a word used in such a variety of kindred senses as λόγος is. It means 'argument' (*Eth.* X. ii. 1, ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι, I. v. 8, πολλοὶ λόγοι), 'inference,' opposed to intuition (VI. viii. 9, ὣν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος), 'ratio' (V. iv. 2, κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτόν), 'reckoning' (V. iii. 15, ἐν ἀγαθοῦ λόγῳ), 'conception' (I. vi. 5, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), 'definition' or 'formula' (II. iii. 5,

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται. II. vi. 7, τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα), &c. In *Eth.* I. xiii. 9, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον, it means 'reason,' but still in the present passage it seems best to avoid translating κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, 'according to right reason,' as is usually done, (1) because of the article, which seems to show that λόγος is used in a general sense here, and not to denote a particular faculty of the mind; (2) because, by the use of a word so definite as 'reason,' we exclude the train of associations which must have been in Aristotle's mind, of 'standard,' 'proportion,' 'law,' &c. (see Essay IV.), and thus to some extent lose his point of view.

3—4 τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι—κυβερνητικῆς] 'Now the actions and the interests of men exhibit no fixed rule, any more than the conditions of health do. And if this is the case with the universal theory, still more is the theory of particular acts incapable of being exactly fixed, for it falls under the domain of no art or regimen, but the actors themselves must always watch what suits the occasion, as is the case with the physician's and the pilot's art.' τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα refers to the two classes specified, *Eth.* I. iii. 2, 3, τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια—τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ ἀτάγαθα κ.τ.λ. But we may add that τὸ συμφέρον is used as a very comprehensive word to express all that is 'good' in morals, cf. *Eth.* III. i. 15, note.

τὰ ὀγιεινά] Aristotle is fond of the

οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰ κριβέες· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς αἰετὸς τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὁρῶμεν· τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ

analogy between health and morals. He speaks of health as a relative, not an absolute, balance of the bodily constitution, cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 3.

τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου]

It seems an over-statement of the uncertainty and relative character of morals, to say that 'the universal theory' is devoid of all fixedness. Rather it seems true to say (1) That in some things there is an absolute, immutable law of right and wrong. This Aristotle would himself acknowledge. (Cf. *Eth.* II. vi. 19, 20.) (2) That in a large class of cases there is a law universal for the conduct of all men, but admitting also of modification in relation to the individual. (3) That there is a sphere of actions yet remaining, indeterminate beforehand, entirely depending on relative and temporary circumstances for their determination. Aristotle however may say with truth that, on the one hand, the theory of action cannot be reduced to universal axioms, like those of mathematics; on the other hand, that it is impossible to do what the casuists would attempt, namely, to settle scientifically the *minutiæ* of particular actions.

5 πειρατέον βοηθεῖν] This is said

in the spirit of the Platonic Socrates, only the uncertainty which Aristotle attributes to morals, *he*, from a different point of view, attributed to all knowledge.

6 δεῖ γὰρ—χρῆσθαι] 'For in illustration of immaterial things we must use material analogies.' This sentence is repeated in the *Magna Moralia* (I. v. 4) with a context that seems at first sight startling, *ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἐνδεία καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν. Δεῖ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι.* One might almost fancy that the writer was quoting the *Ethics* of Aristotle. Spengel, however (*Transactions of Philos.-Philol. Class of Bavarian Academy*, III. 513), remarks that the true reading must be not *ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν*, but *ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων*, confirming this conjecture by the words of Stobæus, who with regard to the Peripatetic ethics says, *πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐνδειξιν τούτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μαρτυρίοις χρῶνται.* The writer therefore is only borrowing, not quoting, from Aristotle.

ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος—ἰσχύν] Taken perhaps from Plato, cf. *Erastæ*, p. 134, where, to prove that philosophy is not *πολυμαθία*, Socrates argues that *φιλογυμναστία* is not *πολυπονία*, but exercise

σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σώζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ 7 ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν· ὃ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὃ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθίρεται γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται. ἀλλ' οὐ 8 μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ αὖξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω 9 δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνήσόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

in moderation. To which his opponent agrees (c), 'Αλλ' ὁμολογῶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ μέτρια γυμνάσια τὴν εὐεξίαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Τί δὲ τὰ σιτία; τὰ μέτρια ἢ τὰ πολλὰ; κ.τ.λ. There are three points which this chapter and the next contribute tentatively to the theory of virtuous actions; (1) From the analogy of life, health, and strength, they must exhibit the law of the balance between extremes; (2) Virtue reproduces the actions out of which it was formed; (3) It is essentially concerned with pleasure, and is indeed entirely based on a regulation of pleasures and pains.

8 ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον—ἰσχυρός] 'But

not only do the formation, the increase, the destruction of these qualities arise out of the same given circumstances, and by the same means,—the exercise also of the qualities, when formed, will be in the same sphere. We see this to be the case with things more palpable, as for instance, strength. For it arises out of taking much food and enduring much toil, and these things the strong man is especially able to do.' Virtue is developed out of, and finds its development in, the same class of ἐνέργειαι. But only those which succeed the formation of virtue are to be called virtuous, see below, Chapter IV.

3 Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξω τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή· διὰ μὲν

III. 1 Σημεῖον δὲ—δειλός] 'Now we must consider the test of a formed state of mind to be the pleasure or pain that results on doing the particular acts. For he who abstains from bodily indulgence, and feels pleasure in doing so, is temperate, but he who does it reluctantly is intemperate; and he who endures danger gladly, or at all events without pain, is brave, while he that does it with pain is a coward.' The doctrine expressed here has been already anticipated, *Eth.* I. viii. 12. It is an ideal perfection of virtue, in which all struggle has ceased, and nothing but pleasure is felt in the virtuous acts. Temperance and courage are pictured in this ideal way, *Eth.* I. xiii. 17. The terms ἀκόλαστος and δειλός above seem used merely as the contradictories of σώφρων and ἀνδρεῖος, so that ἀκόλαστος has not the more technical sense which it receives farther on in the treatise. According to Aristotle's expanded doctrine, to abstain with difficulty, or to meet danger with reluctance, shows not intemperance or cowardice, but only imperfect self-control.

περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή] 'For moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains.' On this sentence the chapter goes off, giving proofs of what is here affirmed. These proofs, to some extent, run into each other, and the whole chapter may be accused of want of method, both in itself and in relation to the

entire Ethics. But we must remember that there is still something tentative about Aristotle's theory of virtue; that psychology was still in its infancy; that Aristotle was only gradually winning his way to establish moral virtue as a state of the will in contradistinction to former systems, which had confounded it with a state of the intellect. From this point of view we may see the importance of urging the close connexion of morality with the feelings, instincts, desires, in short with pleasures and pains. The arguments are (1) Pleasures and pains induce and deter; whence Plato said that true education consists in learning to like and dislike the right things. (2) Virtue is an affair of actions and feelings, hence of pleasure and pain, which are inseparable from these. (3) Punishment consists in pain, and therefore vice, which it corrects, must consist in pleasure. (4) So much have pleasures and pains to do with the corrupting of the mind, that some have defined virtue to consist in insensibility to these. (5) There are three principles which form the motives for action: the good, the profitable, the pleasant. Of these the last is in itself the most widely extended, and it enters into both the others. (6) Pleasure is a natural instinct from infancy upwards, which it is impossible to get rid of. (7) We all, in a greater or less degree, adopt pleasure and pain as the measure of actions. (8) The very difficulty of contending with

γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, 2 ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἢ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' εἰ ἀρεταί 3 εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἐπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. μνηύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολλάσεις γινόμε- 4 ναι διὰ τούτων· ἱατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἱατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασιν γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον 5

these motives proves their claim to be the matter of virtue, and the objects of the highest science, namely, Politics. A glance at these arguments is sufficient to show that they might have been more scientifically stated. It is obvious that they are written previously to Aristotle's analysis of pleasure, as it appears in Book X. The deeper method would have been to state the connexion of pleasure with *ἐνέργεια*, and of *ἐνέργεια* with moral virtue on the one hand, and happiness on the other.

2 ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν] The reference is to Plato, *de Legibus*, II. p. 653 A: Λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παιδῶν παιδικὴν εἶνα· πρῶτην αἰσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι—παιδεῖαν δὲ λέγω τὴν παραγινομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετὴν, ἡδονὴν δὲ καὶ φιλίαν καὶ λύπην καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ, ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν· αὐτῆς θ' ἡ ξυμφωνία ξύμπασα μὲν ἀρετὴ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς, ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμῶν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδεῖαν προσαγορεύων κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.

4 αἱ δὲ ἱατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασιν γίνεσθαι] 'But it is the

nature of remedies to be the contrary of that which they cure.' This principle is stated by Hippocrates, *Aphorism* XXII. § 2, and repeated *Eth.* X. ix. 10.

5 ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον—προστίεται] 'Again, as we have already said, every mental state is essentially related to, and concerned with, those things by which it is naturally made worse or better; now our mental states are corrupted by pleasures and pains, from pursuing and avoiding them, either those which one ought not, or at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner, or whatever other points of the kind are specified in the definition. Hence it is that people define the virtues to be certain apathies and quietudes,—not rightly, however, because they state this absolutely without adding, "as is right," and "as is wrong," and "at the proper time," and all the other qualifications.'

ὡς καὶ πρότερον] The Laurentian MS. (K^b) reads ὡς καὶ πρόην, which is adopted by Dr. Cardwell. But there does not seem to be any instance of a similar usage in Aristotle, by which *πρόην* might be justified. The reference is to the preceding chapter, § 8, 9, where it is stated that virtue finds its development in those same acts and feelings out of which it sprung.

εἵπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἔξις, ὅφ' οἷων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων
καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει·
δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλαι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν αὐτάς
καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἅς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅσα χῶς
ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ
ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ
δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ,
6 καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ
ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων
7 πρακτικῆ, ἡ δὲ κακία τούναντίον. γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ
ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ἔτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων
τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ
συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλα-
βεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ πάντα μὲν ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθω-
τικός ἐστίν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν
ἡδονήν· κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ
τὴν αἴρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμ-

ἅς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ] The οὐ must be taken immediately with δεῖ, so as to form a positive conception, 'when it is wrong;' else of course μὴ would be required.

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Not 'by reason,' but 'by the formula of definition.' Cf. *Physics*, II. ix. 5 : καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου. The notion of a regular formula for defining virtue occurs *Eth.* VI. xiii. 4 : Σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὀρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασιν τὴν ἔξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐστὶ, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

Διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται] Especially the Cynics, but other philosophers also, as for instance Democritus, who seems to have placed the highest good in ἀταραξία. Cf. Stobæus, *Ecl.* II. 76 : τὴν δ' εὐθυμίαν καὶ εὐεστώ καὶ ἀρμονίαν συμμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀταραξίαν καλεῖ. Aristotle appeals to this definition, as being an evidence, though an over-statement, of the truth that

virtue consists in a balance of the feelings. He appeals to a similar over-statement of the truth that prosperity is necessary for happiness, *Eth.* I. viii. 17.

οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς] Amongst other oppositions, ἀπλῶς is frequently opposed to κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, or προσθήκην, 'absolutely' opposed to 'with a qualification.' Cf. *Eth.* VII. iv. 3 : οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν . . . ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον. This shows the force of προστίθεται above.

6 ὑπόκειται—τούναντίον] 'We may begin by assuming then, as a ground for future inquiries, that this kind of excellence (i.e. moral) is concerned with pleasures and pains, and tends with regard to them to the performance of what is best, while vice is the opposite.' The chapter might have ended here, but Aristotle re-opens the discussion with fresh arguments, and again sums it up in § 11.

φέρων ἡδὺ φαίνεται. ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέ-8
 θραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος
 ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις,
 οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἥττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' 9
 οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν·
 οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυ-
 πεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, 10
 καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰ
 καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν
 τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πασα
 ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός. ὅτι 11
 μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν
 γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθίρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως
 γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ,
 εἰρήσθω.

Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις, πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια 4

8 ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου—λύπη] 'Again, it has grown up along with us all from our infancy, and this makes it hard to rub off a feeling that is ingrained into our life. And all of us, in a greater or less degree, make pleasure and pain our standard of actions.'

χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι — ἐγκεχρωσμένον] The metaphor, though not its precise application, seems taken from Plato, *Repub.* iv. p. 429 D, where the effects of right education are compared to a dye, with which the mind is to be imbued, so as to resist the deterrent effects of pleasure and pain.

10 ἔτι δὲ—Ἡράκλειτος] 'Again, it is harder to contend with pleasure than with anger, which, as Heraclitus says, is a hard antagonist.' The saying of Heraclitus is given in full, *Politics*, v. xi. 31: ἀφειδῶς γὰρ ἑαυτῶν ἔχουσιν οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ἐπιχειροῦντες, καθάπερ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος εἶπε,

χαλεπὸν φάσκων εἶναι θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀνείσθαι (i.e. that men are ready to gratify their anger at the cost of their life). It is repeated also *Eth. Eudem.* ii. vii. 9. We see that Heraclitus only spoke of anger; the comparison of anger with pleasure is not due to him.

IV. 1 Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις] The theory thus far given of the γένεσις of virtue is now supplemented by the starting and answering of a difficulty. The theory, as stated, is a paradox. How can it be said that we become just by doing just things? If we do just things we must be just already, as he that performs music is already a musician. The answer to this difficulty is (1) in the arts, to whose analogy appeal is made, mere performance is no proof of art. The first essays of the learner may by chance, or by the guidance of his master (ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου), at-

πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ ² μουσικὰ, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν. ³ ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἐὰν βεβαίως καὶ

tain a sort of success and an artistic appearance, but the learner is no artist as yet. (2) *A fortiori*, if mere performance is no proof of art, much less is it any proof of morals. For the outward result in art is something sufficient in itself. But the outward act in morals is not enough. Hence those 'just acts' by which we acquire justice, are, on nearer inspection, not really just; they want the moral qualification of that settled internal character in the heart and mind of the agent, without which no external act is virtuous in the highest sense of the term. (3) As Aristotle rarely meets a difficulty arising out of his theories, without adding something in depth or completeness to those theories, so here, he deepens the conception of virtue previously given, by urging that knowledge is the least important element in it; and that philosophy without action is impotent to attain it.

3 Knowledge; purpose; purity of purpose (*προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*), formed and settled stability of cha-

acter, are the internal requisites for constituting a good act. Knowledge is necessary to, and presupposed in, purpose. We are told presently that knowledge is of slight or no avail for virtue, while the other elements are all in all (*πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται*). This is a reaction against the Socratico-Platonic doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge; but Aristotle does not mean more than this—that knowledge, if taken by itself, if separate from the will, if merely existing in the intellect, is of no avail. He afterwards states very strongly the opposite view, that he who has *φρόνησις* has all the virtues. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 6, vii. ii. 5.

προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά] Here would have been the place for introducing an allusion to the doctrine of moral obligation, had such formed part of Aristotle's system. But he says not that 'good acts must be done with a feeling of duty,' but that 'they must be chosen for their own sake.' A

ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πρᾶττη. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πρᾶττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σῶφρονα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σῶφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν 4 ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σῶφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σῶφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πρᾶττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτω πρᾶττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σῶφρονες πρᾶττουσιν. εὔ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δίκαια πρᾶττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται 5 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σῶφρονα ὁ σῶφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πρᾶττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσῃς γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πρᾶττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν 6 λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιον τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκείνοι εὔ ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν 5 τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις,

good act must be chosen, loved, and done because it is beautiful (ὅτι καλόν). Aristotle does not analyse further than this.

ἀμετακινήτως] No point is more insisted on in these *Ethics* than the stability of the moral ἔξεις, when once formed. Cf. I. x. 10, I. x. 14, V. ix. 14.

6 ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοί—φιλοσοφούντες] 'But most people, instead of doing these things, take refuge in talk about them, and flatter themselves that they are studying philosophy, and are in a fair way to become good men; which conduct may be likened to that of those sick people who listen attentively to what their physician says, but do not follow a tittle of his prescriptions. Such a regimen will never give health of body, nor such a philo-

sophy health of mind.' We often hear of 'the modernisms in Plato.' The above passage might be called a modernism in Aristotle.

V. With this chapter commences a new division of the Book, in which a formal definition of virtue according to substance or genus, and quality or differentia, is given. We find the conception of this kind of definition already existing in Plato. Cf. *Meno*, p. 71 B: ἐμαντὸν καταμέφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστί, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἴδειν; Like other parts of logic it was elaborated and made systematic by Aristotle. See Essay III. In the present chapter the τί ἐστὶν; of virtue is established, that it is a ἔξις, or formed state of mind. This is arrived at

2 τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θράσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη, δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι, ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ.

by assuming that every mode of the mind must be one of three things, either a feeling, a faculty, or a state, and by proving that virtue is neither a feeling, nor a faculty; whence by the exhaustive process it remains that it must be a state of mind. The form of the argument here is the same as that of *Eth.* I. vii. 9-14, where it is demonstrated what is the proper function of man, and that of the argument in *Republic* IV. p. 428-433, where the nature and province of justice are determined. Aristotle does not here explain why he assumes that the modes of mind are only three; but the assumption no doubt rests upon his doctrine of Quality. Virtue is a quality (I. vi. 3: καὶ ἐν τῷ ποίῳ αἱ ἀρεταί), and the category of Quality is subdivided into four divisions (*Cat.* viii.), (1) ἔξις and διάθεσις. (2) δσα κατὰ δύνάμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται. (3) παθητικαὶ ποιότητες. (4) σχῆμα καὶ μορφή. Of these the last is in the present case excluded by its own nature, and it is only necessary to eliminate two of the remaining three. Apart from the subdivision of the category, the threefold partition of the mind might be defended upon its own merits; for πάθος may be in a sense identified with ἐνέργεια, and ἔξις is a sort of determinate δύναμις,—a δύναμις, so to speak, on the other side of ἐνέργεια. Granting to the human mind the power of development, and of self-determination by the law of habits, it

follows that every mode in which such a mind exists, must either be its innate, undeveloped, and potential faculties, its moments of consciousness, or its acquired and formed tendencies and states.

The arguments to prove that virtue is not a πάθος, are (1) an appeal to language. We are called 'good' or 'bad' on account of virtue or vice; not on account of isolated feelings. (2) A passion is by its nature involuntary; but virtue implies deliberate choice (προαίρεσις). (3) An appeal to language; we speak of being 'moved' in regard to the feelings; of being 'disposed' in regard to virtue or vice. Again, for the same reason, virtue is not a δύναμις. (1) Because we are not 'called good' for our faculties. (2) Because a faculty is something natural and innate (δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει), and virtue is not.

2 λέγῳ δὲ—εὖ 'I mean by *emotions*, desire, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, pity; in short, everything that is accompanied by pain or pleasure. I call those *faculties*, by reason of which we are said to be capable of feeling emotions, as, for instance, capable of being angry, of suffering pain, of feeling pity; and I call those *states* by which we stand in a certain relation, good or bad, to the emotions; as, for instance, with regard to anger, we are in a bad condition if our anger is too violent or too slack, in a

ομοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τᾶλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πως. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πᾶσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

“Ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ

good one, if we hit the happy medium.' Aristotle contents himself with indicating what he means by these different terms, instead of giving anything like a scientific definition of them. Thus he gives specimens of the feelings in which there is no attempt at classification, 'desire' being a wider term than most of the others mentioned, 'envy' and 'emulation' being perhaps different modes of the same feeling, &c. The words used are throughout informal, τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα—οἷς ἐπεται ἡδονή—καθ' ὥς δυνατοί—καθ' ὥς παθητικοί. It is easy to see that a deeper psychology might have stated all that is here said in a different and better way. In his account of ἕξις there is a play on words which it is impossible to render, ἕξις—καθ' ὥς ἔχομεν. Cf. the use of πως ἔχων in § 3 of the preceding chapter.

4 αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινές]

This is an extreme statement, in opposition to the Socratic doctrine that virtues were φρονήσεις, cf. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 3. Aristotle immediately qualifies it. There has been no proof of this position as yet.

διακεῖσθαι πως] This word is very common in Plato (as in other Greek). Cf. *Repub.* iv. 431 B: ἀκόλαστον τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον, &c. In the treatise on the Categories, which bears Aristotle's name, it is made to imply a διάθεσις in contradistinction to ἔχειν, which implies a ἕξις, *Cat.* viii. 5, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διακίευνται γέ πως κατ' αὐτάς, οἱ δὲ διακίευνται οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν.

VI. Having stated the generic conception of virtue (τί ἐστι)—that it is a developed state of mind, Aristotle now proceeds to determine it more exactly (ποία τις). He lays the ground

² μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾗ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς
³ πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνε-

for this more accurate determination, by giving a summary (borrowed from Plato) of the characteristics of 'Αρετή. Every excellence is the perfection of an object, and of the functions of that object. Thus human excellence (or virtue) will be the perfection of man, and of the functions of man. This leads us to inquire more narrowly what are the characteristics of a perfect ἔργον (the word is ambiguous, denoting 'work of art,' or 'product of nature,' as well as 'function' or 'province'). From the conception of quantity, whether continuous (συνεχές) or discrete (διαμετόν), we get the conception of more, less, and equal, or excess, defect, and the mean, which in the case of human action must not be arithmetical but proportional (§§ 4-7). Now a glance at the arts shows us that the skill of an artist and the perfection of a work consist in the attainment and exhibition of the relative mean, so that nothing can be added or taken away without spoiling the effect (§§ 8-9). According to this analogy, virtue, which, like nature, is finer than the finest art, aims at the mean, avoiding excess and deficiency in feeling and action (§§ 10-13). To this account of the essence of virtue witness is borne by the Pythagorean doctrine, that right is one, and wrong manifold (§ 14). We need only qualify our theory and

our definition of virtue, by adding that it is from an abstract point of view alone we can call virtue 'a mean state.' From a moral point of view it is an extreme that is utterly removed from its opposite, vice (§§ 15-17), and we must not apply the notion of the mean and the extremes to every act. Some acts are in themselves extremes, as, for instance, acts of crime, and it will be impossible to find a mean in such as these (§§ 18-20).

² ῥητέον οὖν—πολεμίους] 'We must commence then by asserting that every excellence both exhibits that thing of which it is an excellence in a good state, and also causes the perfect performance of that thing's proper function, as, for instance, the excellence of an eye makes the eye good, and also the performance of its function, for we see well from the excellence of the eye. So, too, the excellence of a horse makes him both a good horse, and good in his paces, in bearing his rider, and in standing a charge.' This is taken almost verbatim from Plato, *Repub.* I. p. 353 B: 'Ἀρ' ἂν ποτε ὅμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάζαιτο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, κ.τ.λ. An illustration had been drawn from the horse and its excellence before in the same book, p. 335 B.

³ εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει,

ται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ 4
 τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανε-
 ρόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστίν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν
 παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον
 τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ
 πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
 ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον 5
 ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν
 πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει.
 τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἔν, οὐδὲ ταῦτόν πᾶσιν, οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ 6
 τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἐξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα·
 ἴσω γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ 7
 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ
 οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο
 δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἐξ μναῶν προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως

καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle treats of human virtue as part of a general law by which *all* natural objects fulfil their several functions, and each in accordance with its own proper excellence. He next passes to the analogy of the arts, though he regards virtue as higher than them, and more akin to nature. (ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις). In the present passage we have again to do with the conception of the ἔργον of man; see above *Eth.* i. vii. 14.

4 πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν] If any special passage is referred to, it must be ii. iv. 3.

ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ] 'Now in all quantity both continuous and discrete.' The terms here are not meant to go together, as if it were, 'In all that is continuous, and at the same time capable of division;' but the two forms of quantity are referred to, about which we read *Categories* vi. 1: τοῦ δὲ πόσου τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές.—Ἔστι δὲ διωρισμένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος (a

word), συνεχές δὲ οἷον γραμμὴ, ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος. Cf. *Politics* i. v. 3: ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλείονων συνέστηκε,—εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτ' ἐκ διηρημένων. *De Caelo*, i. i. 2.

5 λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος—ἐλλείπει] 'By an objective mean, I understand that which is equidistant from the two given extremes, and which is one and the same to all, and by a mean relatively to the person (πρὸς ἡμᾶς), I understand that which is neither too much nor too little.' In this, as in many other places of Aristotle, we desiderate a formula expressive of the opposition between the objective and subjective. Not that there is a want of clearness *here*, but if he had possessed the formula, he would have applied it here, and would by it have solved many an ambiguity elsewhere existing.

7 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν] i.e. 'Arithmetical progression,' opposed to 'geometrical proportion,' which consists of four terms, cf. *Eth.* v. iv. 3.

καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως
 8 ἐπὶ ὁρόμου καὶ πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερ-
 βολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ
 τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ
 9 πρὸς ἡμᾶς. εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπι-
 τελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ
 ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι
 οὗτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς
 καὶ τῆς ἑλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σω-
 ζούσης), οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο
 βλέποντες ἐργάζονται, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβε-
 στέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν
 10 εἴη στοχαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι
 περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
 ἑλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι
 καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὀλως ἡσθῆ-
 ναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφο-
 11 τερα οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ
 οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς
 12 ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ

Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον] This illustration may remind us of the humorous turn in Plato's *Republic*, p. 338 c, where, on Thrasymachus defining justice to be τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, Socrates answers, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τό γε τοιόνδε φῆς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιστὴς καὶ αὐτῷ συμφέρεи τὰ βόεια κρέα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἡττοσιν ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον. Cf. *Erastæ*, p. 134, quoted above on II. ii. 6.

9 εἰ δὴ—ἔργα] 'If, then, every art thus completes its work, namely, by looking to the mean and conducting its results to this.' With the theory of art here stated cf. *Politics*, III. xiii. 21, Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν, οὔτε γὰρ γραφεὺς

ἐάσειεν ἂν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῆον, οὐδ' εἰ διαφέρει τὸ κάλλος. And on the general doctrine of μεσότης, its history, and its applications, see Essay IV.

10 λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν] The intellectual ἀρεταὶ are not μεσότητες, for this simple reason—that they are λόγοι; the 'laws' or 'standards' of the balance which is to be introduced into the passions.

11 τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ—ἀρετῆς] 'But to have these feelings at the right time, and on occasion of the right things, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right manner, this is the golden mean and the highest excellence, names which are proper to virtue.' From the mention of all these qualifications it is

καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορβοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ 13 ἀρετὴ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὕσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρ- 14 τάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστὶν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορβοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπόν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπόν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι 15 οὕσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ Φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς 16 δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὕρισκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν 17 εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον

easy to see that Aristotle means by his μέσον to establish something more than a merely quantitative difference between vice and virtue.

14 ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν—μοναχῶς] 'Again it is possible to err in many ways (for evil belongs to the infinite, as the Pythagoreans figured, and good to the finite), but to do right is possible only in one way.' See Essays II. and IV. The authorship of the verse ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. is unknown.

15 ἔστιν ἄρα—ὀρίσειεν] 'Virtue, therefore, is a developed state of the moral purpose in relative balance, determined by a standard, according as the wise man would determine.' In two places already, *Eth.* II. iv. 3, and II. v. 4, we have met with the tacit assumption that virtue implies προαίρεσις. This is justified by the

account of προαίρεσις, and its relation to action, in the next book. The other terms of the definition have been sufficiently established in the progress of this book. The reference to the φρόνιμος as an impersonation of the 'law' or 'standard' of reason is a necessary modification of what would else be an entirely relative, individual, and arbitrary, theory of virtue. If the λόγος of the individual is to be a valid judge of all action, this will be returning to the sophistic principle πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. The 'wise man' stands as the representative of the absolute reason of man manifested in the individual consciousness. This ideal was prominent in the Cynic and Cyrenaic systems, as afterwards with the Stoics.

17 Διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν—ἐκρότης]

18 καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἕνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται

'Virtue, therefore, if viewed in the light of its essence and its constitutive conception, is a mean state, but with respect to supreme excellence, and rightness, it is an extreme.' This passage implies that the term *Μεσότης* is an abstract and metaphysical expression for the law of virtue, estimated by the understanding (though doubtless the deepest view attainable); but that viewed in relation to the good, or (as we should say) from a moral point of view,—virtue is no mean state lying between vices (as if virtue were a little less vice, and vice a little more virtue), but an extreme, that is, utterly removed from, and opposed to, vice. It is a profound remark, showing the balance in Aristotle between an abstract and a concrete view of morals. With regard to the terminology here employed, the word *οὐσία* is, as Aristotle himself tells us, to a certain extent ambiguous (cf. *Metaphys.* vi. iii. 1: *Λέγεται δ' ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐκάστου καὶ τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον*). It is made definite however in the present place by the addition of the phrase *καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα*, which may be regarded here as an explanation of *οὐσία*. On *λόγον—λέγοντα*, cf. *De Motu Animalium* x. 1: *κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸν λόγον τὸν λέγοντα τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς κινήσεως*. The formula *τί ἦν εἶναι*, like other leading parts of Aristotle's philosophy, appears in his works as already established. Though no trace of it is to be found in Plato, familiarity with its use is presupposed by Aristotle, and no account of its *genesis* is given. Its metaphysical import is

discussed in *Metaphys.* vi. iv–xi, from which we gather (1) that *τί ἦν εἶναι* implies the essential nature of a thing (*ἐκαστον δ' λέγεται καθ' αὐτό*) to the exclusion of all that is accidental; (2) that it is the definition of a thing, but not of all things, for it excludes all material associations, hence that to a conception like *σιμότης* you cannot assign a *τί ἦν εἶναι*; (3) that it is no mere abstraction, but closely connected with individual existence, and implying what the Germans call *Daseyn*; hence it is separable from the *καθόλου* or universal element in a thing,—it implies this, but also something more. From the concreteness of its nature, it also differs from the Platonic idea, with which it has much in common, being the immaterial, primal, and archetypal law of the being of things; (4) 'The knowledge of a thing,' says Aristotle, 'consists in knowing its *τί ἦν εἶναι*' (*Metaphys.* vi. vi. 6). With this important conception in his theory of knowledge and of existence we may compare to some extent the 'Forms' of Bacon, which were no doubt borrowed from it. But fully to comprehend the *τί ἦν εἶναι* implies mastering the metaphysical system of Aristotle. With regard to the grammar of the formula we are left to conjecture, and accordingly at least two erroneous explanations have been given. (1) That of Alexander Aphrod. *ad Top.* i. (Brandis, *Schol.*, p. 256 a 43), that *ἦν* is simply used for *ἐστί*, whereas we find a frequent contrast between the formula *τί ἦν* and *τί ἐστί*. (2) The whole phrase has been translated 'substantia quæ est, etsi præterita,' as though *τί ἦν* could be used for *ὅπερ ἦν*. *Τί ἦν* is of course a question, and has been

συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ψέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἁμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ᾧ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν τούτων ἁμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. ὁμοιον¹⁹ οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ δὲ²⁰ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' αἷς ἂν πράττῃται ἁμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστίν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.

Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ γ

represented by the term *Quidditas* in the Scholastic Latin. The preterite ἦν appears used to express the prior, *i.e.* the deeper and more essential nature of a thing. 'What was the essence of the thing?' (*i.e.* before its present individual manifestation). Cf. *Metaphys.* VI. vii. 6: "Ὡστε συμβαίνει τρόπον τινὰ ἐξ ὑγιείας τὴν ὑγίειαν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐξ οἰκίας, τῆς ἄνευ ὕλης τὴν ἔχουσαν ὕλην.—Λέγω δὲ οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. It is difficult to say what was the original phrase of which the three words are a disjointed remnant. Probably it may have been as follows, τί ἦν ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀνθρώπου. 'What was that property in man which constitutes the conception of his being a man?' Εἶναι is used in Aristotle especially to denote the conception or inner essence of a thing, cf. *Eth.* V. i. 20. We may observe that εἶναι is never affixed to the ques-

tion τί ἐστι, which implies a more superficial and accidental account.

VII. Aristotle now passes on to the exemplification of his general law of virtue in the various separate virtues. He gives accordingly a list of virtues, and shows that they are severally mean states between various extremes. This list forms a table of contents for Books III. and IV., which treat of the virtues here mentioned, and in the order here given. The question arises—upon what principle is this list formed? We find at once that Aristotle has resorted to experience. He has not contented himself with applying his law to the previously recognised divisions of virtue. He has abandoned the old enumeration of four cardinal virtues, given in Plato's *Republic*, p. 428 (and on which most of the reasoning in

τοῖς καθ' ἑκάστα ἐφαρμόττειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου †κενώτεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ

that book depends), namely, courage, temperance, justice, wisdom; but these all reappear in his list, only not on the same level with each other. Wisdom is divided into *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*, of which the first is made the standard of moral virtue, and the other stands apart as a perfection of the pure intellect. Justice is separated from other practical virtues, as being something externally determined (cf. *Eth.* v. v. 17). Plato gives, in the *Protagoras*, p. 349 B, another list of five virtues, holiness (*δσιότης*) being added to the other four; this answers to *εὐσέβεια*, which is frequently mentioned as a virtue by the Socrates of Xenophon. Aristotle omits it altogether, probably on account of the separation he made between ethics and religion. With this exception, Aristotle's list of virtues implies the same view of life as Plato's, only it goes more into detail and aims at more completeness. In the present chapter ten virtues are enumerated, to which are added modesty and indignation, two mean states in the feelings; and justice is mentioned as something to be treated of separately. In departing from the unity of a law to enumerate its exemplifications, there must always be something arbitrary. Why so many and no more? It would seem as if Aristotle applied his principle to the virtues ready at hand, and then afterwards believed in his own list as complete. (Cf. *Eth.* ii. vii. 9, *νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν*. ii. vii. 11, *ῥητέον οὖν κ.τ.λ.*; iii. v. 23, *ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν*.) In the *Rhetoric* i. ix. 5—13, we find a list of virtues (or, as they are called, *Μέρη ἀρετῆς*) given, which is identical with the present (omitting, how-

ever, *φιλοτιμία*, *εὐτραπεία*, *ἀλήθεια*, *φιλία*), *μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, πραότης, φρόνησις, σοφία*. Of those omitted it is probable that the first was included in *μεγαλοψυχία*, while the other three were excluded as possessing a less degree of moral importance. Even here Aristotle seems to set them on a somewhat lower footing than the rest.

† *κενώτεροι*] The MSS. vary here between *κενώτεροι* and *κοινότεροι*. A similar variation is found *Eth.* iii. viii. 6, where the readings are *πολλὰ κενά* and *πολλὰ καινά*. Bekker has decided against the majority of MSS. in favour of *κενώτεροι*. The Paraphrast however supports the other reading. He renders the passage, *τῶν γὰρ περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγων οἱ μὲν καθολικοὶ κοινότεροι καὶ πλείοσιν ἐφαρμόζουσιν· οἱ δὲ μερικοὶ ἀληθινώτεροι*. Dr. Cardwell accordingly reads *κοινότεροι*, which seems most natural, and is supported by the best MSS, K^b and L^b of Bekker. Whichever reading we take, the general meaning is not affected. *κενώτεροι*, which would be a term of disparagement, is well illustrated by *Eth. Eud.* i. vi. 4: *πολλάκις λανθάνουσι λέγοντες ἄλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς*. *Κοινότεροι* means 'more general,' 'of wider application.' Cf. *Eth.* ii. ii. 2: *τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείμεν*. Accordingly with this reading we may translate the passage *Δεῖ δὲ—διαγραφῆς* as follows: 'This principle however must not only be stated universally, but also we must apply it to particular cases; for in theories about moral actions universal statements are it is true of wider application, but particular ones are more real. For actions

μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία² μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβία ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας, οὐ³ πάσας, ἥττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ⁴ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλαψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δ' ἑαυταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ

are concerned with particulars, and it is necessary that our theories should be borne out when applied to these. Let us take our instances then from the table of the virtues.'

ἀληθινώτεροι] 'more real,' as being more concrete and more definite. Plato would have said the universal is more real; here, and in *Categories* v. 8, it is said that the particular is more real than the universal. In the *Politics* i. xiii. 10, Gorgias is praised for enumerating the separate virtues, while others contented themselves with general definitions. Καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς, ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετὴ, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολλὰ γὰρ ἁμείνον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀριζομένων. This is directed against the *Meno* of Plato, where Socrates urges that it is absolutely necessary to know the law of virtue as a unity, instead of regarding it in its multifarious exhibitions. Aristotle, wishing to establish a practical theory of virtue, returns to the concrete.

ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς] 'Τπογραφῆς is the word in the corresponding passage of the *Eudemean Ethics*, ii. iii., where a formal table is given, containing fourteen virtues with their respective pairs of extremes. In this place either some already existing 'table' or 'scheme' of the virtues is referred to; or the expression may be intended to be merely fanciful, 'the complete table of the virtues' being something ideal. It is difficult not to think that the present list is tentative, and that the one above quoted in the *Rhetoric* contains a summary of its results.

2 ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ κ.τ.λ.] It is a sign that Aristotle is here only working his way to his theory of the mean, that he at first speaks as if there were excess and defect of both the two opposite principles, by the balance of which virtue is constituted. This would make four vices round each virtue. But it is obviously more simple to speak of each virtue as a balance of a positive and a negative tendency: which view he afterwards adopts, though he retains the present

5 ὁ ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει
 ἄλλειπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν,
 ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ
 6 αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι δια-
 θέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλο-
 πρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ
 δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία,
 ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ
 τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.
 7 περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία,
 ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυ-
 8 χία· ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν
 ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ
 πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ
 περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς
 ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος
 ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλο-
 τίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης
 χώρας. καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον
 καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαι-
 9 νοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ
 τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν
 δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.
 10 ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης,

refinement with regard to courage in the fuller account of this virtue in Book III.

5 ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον] All details with regard to the several virtues may be accordingly reserved for consideration under Books III. and IV.

6 ἄλλαι διαθέσεις] 'other dispositions.' The word is used here as a synonym for ἔξεις, though in *Categories* viii. 1. ἔξις is distinguished from διάθεσις. "Ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἔξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν· διαφέρει δὲ ἔξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολὺ χρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον. In the same

way διακείσθαι is there opposed to ἔχειν, whereas, *Eth.* II. v. 4, it is used as equivalent to it.

9 κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον] 'According to the method which has hitherto guided us,' τύπῳ κ.τ.λ. (cf. § 5). The same phrase occurs *Politics* I. i. 3: Δῆλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. The word frequently occurs in Plato. Cf. *Protagoras*, p. 326 D: κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμμῶν. *Repub.* III. p. 403 E: εἰ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους ὑφηγησάμεθα. *Phædo*, p. 82 D: ἡ φιλοσοφία ὑφηγεῖται.

σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγον-
τες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσομεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ
μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ'
ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἐλλειψις ἀοργησία. εἰσὶ δὲ ¹¹
καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσιν μὲν τινα ὁμοιότητα
πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσιν δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ
εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι
ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τἀληθές τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ·
τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν
βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατῴωμεν
ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ὀρθὰ
οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ
πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἔνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακο-
λουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις ¹²
καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν
ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ
τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἐν ¹³
παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία,
ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ
δ' ἐλλείπων ἀγροϊκός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ
λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ
μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἄρε-
σκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ

II. ῥητέον οὖν—εὐπαρακολουθήτου]
'These also must accordingly be dis-
cussed, in order to show still more
clearly that in everything the mean is
praiseworthy, while the extremes are
neither right nor praiseworthy, but
blameable. Now most of these qua-
lities are without names; but we
must endeavour, as in other cases,
to make names ourselves for the sake
of clearness and of being easily fol-
lowed.' After discussing ἀλήθεια,
the author of the *Magna Moralia* says
Εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἢ μὴ
ἀρεταί, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος· ὅτι δὲ
μεσότητές εἰσι τῶν εἰρημένων, δηλον, οἱ

γὰρ κατ' αὐτὰς ζῶντες ἐπαινοῦνται (I.
xxxiii. 2).

πειρατέον κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle's method
consists partly in accepting experience
as shown in common language, &c.,
partly in rectifying it, or re-stating it
from his own point of view; partly
in finding new expressions for it, so
as to discover men's thought to them-
selves. He usually rather fixes the
meaning of words, than creates new
ones. For instance, he here assigns
a peculiar and limited meaning to
ἀλήθεια and φιλία. His influence
upon the forms of language of civi-
lised Europe can hardly be overrated.

- ¹⁴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἡ ὁ
¹⁵ μὴδὲ ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος· ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας. εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι

It is far greater than has ever been exercised by any one man beside.

14—15 Aristotle winds up his list by adding Αἰδώς and Νέμεσις, which he does not consider virtues, because they are not developed states of mind, but he mentions them, because he discovers the law of the balance (μεσότης), existing even in these natural instincts. There is something peculiarly Greek in the conjunction of these two names. In Greek mythology they are personified and seem to represent the natural and almost indestructible ideas of justice in the human mind. Hesiod speaks of these two goddesses as being the last to clothe themselves in white raiment and to leave the earth. (*Works and Days*, 198.) In the fable which Plato puts into the mouth of Protagoras these qualities are said to have been sent down to man as an amelioration of his previously wretched condition, without society or the political art (Plato, *Protagoras*, p. 322 c, where, however, the names are αἰδώς and δίκη.) They seem related to one another as the instinct of honour to the instinct of right—i. e. to be two slightly differing phases of the same principle, the first being rather a sensitiveness about right in oneself, the second about right external to oneself. Αἰδώς is further

discussed in Book IV., but Νέμεσις is not again alluded to. This is probably owing to the unfinished condition of the *Ethics*, which indeed first begins to show itself at the close of Book IV. See Essay I.

15 νέμεσις δὲ—χαίρειν] 'But indignation is a balance between envy and malice. Now these are concerned with pain and pleasure resulting on what happens to others. For the indignant man is pained at those who prosper unworthily, but the envious man, exceeding him, is pained at all (who prosper), while the malicious man is so far defective in feeling pain as even to rejoice.' This paragraph is a striking instance of crudeness, which the least after-reflection would have remedied. It is obvious that φθόνος (envy), and ἐπιχαιρεκακία (malice), are only different forms of the same state of mind. Hence they cannot be opposed as two extremes. Again, the ἐπιχαιρέκακος cannot be said τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπειν ὥστε κ.τ.λ., for he does not rejoice at the success of the good which the envious man grieves at. He rejoices at the misfortunes of the good. This mistake is set right by Eudemus (ii. iii. 4), who, in his list, writes φθόνος, ἀνώνυμον, νέμεσις. Of course the opposite to φθόνος must be ἀναισθησία τις.

ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι¹⁶
καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγε-
ται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς
μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.

Τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὓων, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν 8
καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς
μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταιί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση
ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον 2

Aristotle, by the time he wrote his *Rhetoric*, was clear on the point, cf. *Rhet.* II. ix. 5: 'Ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός. Socrates in Xen. *Memor.* III. ix. 8 defines φθόνος as it is here defined. Μόνους ἔφη φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνιωμένους. Plato does not separate envy and malice, cf. *Philebus*, p. 48 B: 'Ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται. Socrates is there arguing that φθόνος being granted to be a painful feeling, it yet constitutes the chief element in comedy, so that in comedy there is a mixture of pain with pleasure.

¹⁶ ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων—εἰσιν] 'But about these points in the first place we shall have another opportunity of speaking; in the second place about justice, since the term is used in more senses than one, we will separately (μετὰ ταῦτα) define it and show how the two species of it are severally mean states.' This passage gives accurately enough beforehand the order of subjects for Books III. and IV.; the word ἄλλοθι seems to show that he has in view the interruption of the argument by the discussion upon will, at the beginning of the Third Book. The separate treatment of justice is also announced. But it can hardly be said that the promise περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν κ.τ.λ.

is exactly fulfilled in Book V. On the order in which the several virtues are treated, see the note to *Eth.* III. x. 1.

† ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν] This passage is obelized, because of the term λογικάι, which never occurs elsewhere in Aristotle or Eudemus, as applied to the διανοητικά ἀρεταί—secondly, because of the sense, since Aristotle could not possibly say that he meant to show how the intellectual excellences were μεσότητες—thirdly, because of the extreme likelihood of an interpolation here; see Essay I.

VIII. A new conception is now developed of the relation between a virtue and the extremes lying on each side of it, and that is, the conception of 'contrariety,' of mutual repulsion and exclusiveness between the several terms. The extremes are opposed each to the other, and both to the mean. This addition tends yet further to raise the moral distinctions from being mere distinctions of quantity, into being distinctions of kind. With logical inconsistency, though with thorough truth, Aristotle proceeds to point out that one extreme is generally 'more contrary' to the mean than the other, either because of a greater dissimilarity to virtue in

μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις
 πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερ-
 βολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ
 γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν
 ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος,
 ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ
 3 τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον
 οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον
 ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 4 ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείων
 ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον·
 πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου,
 ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ
 5 ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνόις ἄκροις ὁμοι-
 ότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ
 τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς
 ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης. τὰ δὲ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα
 ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ
 6 πλείον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον
 ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία

the tendency itself, or from our fol-
 lowing a natural bent and pushing
 out the tendency to extravagance.

2 ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος—δειλός] 'For the
 brave man appears rash in comparison
 with the coward, but a coward in
 comparison with the rash man.' Of
 course oppositions of this kind are
 relative and depend upon the point
 of view. If the cowards had to settle
 the question, all bravery would be
 deemed rashness. Hence we see that
 Aristotle's system depends on faith in
 a certain standard inherent in the
 general reason of mankind. The
 μεσότης is ὁρισμένη λόγῳ. And this
 law or standard of the absolute reason
 finds its exponent in the wise man,
 ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν.

5 ἔτι πρὸς μὲν—ἀπέχοντα] 'Again,

while some extremes appear to have
 a sort of similarity to the mean, as,
 for instance, rashness to bravery, and
 prodigality to liberality;—the ex-
 tremes have the greatest dissimilarity
 to each other. But things most re-
 moved from each other people define
 to be 'contraries,' therefore things
 more removed are more contrary to
 each other.' In the present passage
 it is easy to see a logical inconsistency.
 If contraries be τὰ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα,
 how can we speak of them as πλείον
 ἀπέχοντα? Aristotle commences with
 an idea of absolute contrariety, and
 afterwards takes up one of relative
 contrariety, admitting of degrees.
 But repugnance admits of degrees,
 if contrariety does not, so the inac-
 curacy is merely verbal.

μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἑλλειψίς οὔσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὔσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας, τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἑναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἑναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἑναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὔσα ἑναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

7 διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας—μᾶλλον] 'Now this takes place from two causes, one (external to us) depending on the nature of the thing itself; for that extreme which is nearer to and more like the mean, we do not oppose so much to the mean, as its contrary.' The first thing, says Aristotle, which makes one extreme more repugnant to the mean than the other extreme, is a difference of kind. Some faults are errors 'on virtue's side,' and while rashness, for instance, is the same tendency as courage, only carried too far, cowardice differs from it in kind. This difference then is one with which the agent has nothing to do.

8 ἑτέρα δὲ—σωφροσύνη] 'A second cause depends on ourselves; for those things to which we are in a way more disposed by nature appear more repugnant to the mean. As, for instance, we are in ourselves more disposed towards pleasures, hence we are more carried away in the direction of

intemperance, than in that of (excessive) orderliness. Therefore we call those things more contrary to the mean in which we run to greater lengths; and thus intemperance, which is the excess, seems more contrary to temperance (than the other extreme).' Passing over the false explanation of this passage which pretends to find in it the doctrine of human corruption—as if Aristotle said that we are by nature prone to what is worst, whereas he says that 'what we are most prone to *appears* to be the worst,' there are two modes of explanation left; one is that of the Paraphrast, who renders it, ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος τῷ σπουδαίῳ πρὸς τὰ ἄκρα γίνεται, τὴν μεσότητα ζητοῦντι, πρὸς δ' τῶν ἁκρῶν μείζων ἡ μάχη, ἐκείνο ἑναντιώτερον τῷ μέσῳ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ., namely, that there is the greatest struggle in avoiding *that* extreme to which we are prone, and therefore it appears most opposed to the mean. This interpretation is

- 9 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, 2 ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστω γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ὧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὧς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ

slightly favoured by § 4 of the next chapter, σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.; but on the other hand, not a word is here said of *avoiding* either extreme; the question is rather of following one's bent. (2) The other explanation is that which the author of the *Magna Moralia* espouses, *Mag. Mor.* i. ix. 5: ἡ οὖν ἐπίδοσις γίνεται μᾶλλον πρὸς ἃ πεφύκαμεν· πρὸς ἃ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιδίδομεν, ταῦτα καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία. ἐπιδίδομεν δὲ πρὸς ἀκολασίαν μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. This is surely what Aristotle means, and his general sense may be given as follows: 'One difference is in the act itself, a difference of kind; the other difference proceeds from ourselves, a difference of degree, for wherever we have an inclination towards one side, we run into extravagance on that side, and so aggravate that form of error, and make it seem worse than its opposite.' In order to make the words suit a preconceived meaning, people have translated ἐπίδοσις 'inclination,' whereas it can only mean 'advance,' 'progression,' 'development,' &c. As the *Magna Moralia* give it, πρὸς ἃ πεφύκαμεν is the 'inclination,' and ἐπίδοσις is the result of this. The addition of γίνεται might have been sufficient to prevent the above misinterpretation. It is observable that

σωφροσύνη is here first contrasted with κοσμιότης, as if that meant 'asceticism,' and afterwards the corresponding term is omitted. Aristotle seems unwilling to employ the term ἀναισθησία, being too strong a word, cf. *Eth.* ii. 7: ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων—ἀναισθητός τις. II. vii. 3: ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναισθητοί.

IX. The book is concluded with certain practical rules for attaining the mean. (1) Avoid the worst extreme; (2) Find out your bent and go even farther than is necessary in the direction opposite to it; (3) Beware of the delusions of pleasure; (4) After all, the appeal must be in the last resort to the intuitive judgment.

2 διδ—εἰδότης] 'On this account it is a hard task to be good: for it is always hard to ascertain the mean; as, for instance, not every man, but only the mathematician, can find the centre of a circle.' The words of Simonides (quoted by Plato, *Protag.* p. 339, and referred to above, *Eth.* i. x. 11), ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθείας γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ., may have been in the mind of Aristotle, who here gives a *rationale* of them, and indeed shows that it is hard not only

ἐπαινέτον καὶ καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ 3
μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ
καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργε
νῆα.

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἁμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ' ἥττον·
ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτε- 4
ρόν φασι πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο
δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. σκο-
πεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἅ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι
γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ
τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς 5
τοῦναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόν-
τες τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ
διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ 6
μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέ-

to become, but to be, good, σπουδαῖον εἶναι, not only γενέσθαι. Cf. the discussion in the *Protagoras*.

3 καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ] There is a mistake here in which Aristotle is followed by the Paraphrast. It was Circe (not Calypso) who advised Ulysses (*Od.* xii. 108—109), when sailing between Scylla and Charybdis, to keep nearest to the former, as being less dangerous. Two of the MSS., with a view of setting Aristotle right, substitute Κίρκη for the authentic reading. The verse here given Homer puts not into the mouth of Circe, but of Ulysses ordering his pilot, according to the directions he had received (*Od.* xii. 219, 220.)

4 κατὰ τὸν δευτέρον φασι πλοῦν] A common Greek proverb, which is variously explained. It is sometimes said to mean 'on the voyage home, if not on the voyage out'; but it seems very much better to take the words as meaning 'with oars, if not with sails,' an explanation which is twice given by Eustathius; p. 661, ὁ τῶν

καπηλατούντων πλοῦς δεύτερος λέγεται πλοῦς, ὡς πρῶτος ὄντος τοῦ πλέειν πρὸς ἄνεμον. Also in p. 1453. Other instances of the proverb are *Politics*, iii. xiii. 23; Plato, *Philebus*, p. 19 c; *Phædo*, 99 d.

5 εἰς τοῦναντίον—ποιοῦσιν] 'But we must drag ourselves away in the opposite direction; for by bending ourselves a long way back from the erroneous extreme, like those who straighten crooked pieces of timber, we shall at length arrive at the mean.' The metaphor is borrowed from Plato *Protag.* p. 325 d, where it is applied to education, not, however, in precisely the same sense as here. Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς.

6 ἐν παντὶ δὲ—ἁμαρτησόμεθα] 'But in everything we must especially be on our guard against the pleasant and pleasure. For we are not uncorrupted judges in her cause. Therefore, just as the old counsellors felt towards Helen, so ought we to feel towards

καστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον
 προς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν
 ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω
 7 γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἤττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ'
 οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἶπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνήσόμεθα
 τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ'
 ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον διορίσαι πῶς καὶ
 τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ
 ἡμεῖς ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους
 φαμέν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦμεν.
 8 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ'
 ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον, ὁ δὲ πλεόν· οὗτος γὰρ
 οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτός οὐ
 ῥᾶδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ
 9 αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσει. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μέση
 ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετὴ, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν
 ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα
 τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

pleasure, and in everything apply
 their saying; for by sending her out
 of our sight we shall err the less.
 The reference is to Homer, *Iliad* iii.
 156—160:

Οὐ νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ εὐκνημίδας
 Ἀχαιοὺς
 τοιγδ' ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον
 ἔλγεα πάσχειν.
 Αἰνῶς ἀθανάτησι θεῆς εἰς ὄπα
 ἔοικεν.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς τοιή περ ἐοῦσ' ἐν νηυσὶ
 νεέσθω
 μηδ' ἡμῖν τεκέεσσ' ἵ' ὀπίσσω πῆμα
 λίποιτο.

ἀδέκαστοι] 'Unbribed,' 'uncorrupt-
 ed.' δεκάς, the origin of which is
 obscure, finds a parallel in the Latin
 'decuriare,' which meant to bribe the

tribes at elections. See Cicero, *pro*
Plancio, c. xviii. 45.

8 ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον
 ψεκτός] a condensed phrase meaning
 'to what point and how far a man
 (may go before he) is blameable.'

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσει] 'The de-
 cision of them is a matter of feeling.'
 Aristotle means that general rules are
 often inapplicable to particular cases,
 which must then be decided by a kind
 of 'intuition' or 'tact,' not derived
 from philosophy, but natural. Compare
 in. iii. 13: ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις
 δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων.
 —διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν
 ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν
 ἔσχατον ὅρον.

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